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L’avocat avait établi que le vol de pommes n’était pas 
matériellement prouvé. Son client [...] n’avait été vu 
de personne escaladant le mur ou cassant la branche. 
On l’avait arrêté nanti de cette branche (que l’avocat 
appelait plus volontiers rameau); mais il disait l’avoir 
trouvée à terre et ramassée. Où était la preuve du 
contraire? [...] en supposant qu’il fût le forçat Jean 
Valjean, cela prouvait-il qu’il fût le voleur des 
pommes? C’était une présomption, tout au plus; non 
une preuve. 
 
        [Victor Hugo, Les Misérables, 1862] 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis identifies the major evidential issues of EU competition law enforcement and the 
principles and rules on proof followed by the CJEU and the national courts to solve them. 
Analising the case law, the thesis considers how the decisions of the Luxembourg Courts 
influence the evaluation of evidence of English and Italian judges, both in the public and the 
private enforcement. Chapter I, after clarifying which rules govern evidential issues before 
the different authorities, tackles the nature of evidence and criticises its characterisation 
according to the traditional substance-procedure dichotomy. Chapter II explores the reasons 
why a significant degree of convergence is reached, well beyond the effet utile standard, by 
the case law of the CJEU and that of the analysed countries (England/Wales and Italy). It 
also shows that the peculiarities of the enforcement of EU competition law and the crucial 
role played by evidence in this field are important factors promoting the process of 
convergence. In Chapter III, the analysis is extended to the gathering of evidence. In this 
phase, despite the diversity characterising the national administrative procedures, 
convergence is promoted, on the one hand, by the coordination mechanisms provided by EU 
law to foster the free movement of evidence and, on the other, by the fundamental rights 
standards that Member States are bound to follow. The conclusions show how, having been 
tested by means of judicial integration, the adoption of uniform rules of evidence in EU 
competition law, complementing Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, is conceivable and 
desirable. 
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Abstract (Italian) 
 
La tesi esamina vari aspetti relativi alla prova nel diritto europeo della concorrenza, riguardo 
ai quali principi e regole comuni vengono adottate sia dalla Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione 
Europea che dalle corti nazionali. Attraverso l’analisi delle decisioni in materia di 
concorrenza, la tesi considera l’influenza esercitata dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di 
Lussemburgo sulla valutazione delle prove in due giurisdizioni nazionali, quella inglese e 
quella italiana, sia nel public che nel private enforcement. Il primo capitolo, dopo aver 
illustrato i regimi probatori applicati dalle diverse autorità, affronta il problema della natura 
della prova e propone una critica della tradizionale rigida distinzione tra profili sostanziali e 
procedurali. Il secondo capitolo esplora le ragioni per le quali un considerevole livello di 
convergenza viene raggiunto tra la giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione 
Europea e la giurisprudenza delle corti degli Stati membri analizzati, ben oltre il rispetto del 
principio dell’effetto utile. Secondo la ricostruzione riproposta, il ruolo cruciale giocato 
dalla prova in questo campo e le peculiarità del sistema europeo della concorrenza sono 
fattori determinanti nel processo di ravvicinamento delle discipline probatorie. Nel terzo 
capitolo, l’analisi si sofferma sull’acquisizione e formazione della prova. In fase di raccolta 
della prova, nonostante la diversità che caratterizza i procedimenti amministrativi nazionali, 
la convergenza è stimolata, da un lato, dagli strumenti europei che promuovono la libera 
circolazione della prova e, dall’altro, dalla tutela dei diritti fondamentali che gli Stati 
membri sono tenuti a rispettare. L’analisi porta a concludere che alcuni principi uniformi in 
tema di prova nel diritto europeo della concorrenza siano già osservati dai giudici nazionali 
e che un corpo di norme comuni dovrebbe essere adottato, ad integrazione della scarna 
disciplina della prova contenuta nel Regolamento (CE) 1/2003. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Evidence and Proof in EU Competition Law: Between Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 
 29 
Introduction 
 
The present work addresses the rules on proof governing the public and private enforcement 
of EU competition law.1 The author will contend that a high degree of convergence of 
procedural rules on proof is progressively being reached in the EU competition law 
enforcement. The EU case law influences both NCAs and national judges to a great extent. 
The adoption of common rules and principles can be observed not only within the public 
enforcement (i.e. between the judicial review of EU Courts and that of national courts), but 
also between the public and the private enforcement (i.e. between the judicial review of EU 
Courts and the national civil proceedings). Such symmetry, which is undoubtedly 
accentuated in the case law regarding the evaluation of evidence, is to a lesser extent 
attained in the gathering of evidence, due to the important role played in this field by 
administrative authorities. Reasons of this different evolution of the rules on evidence in EU 
antitrust law can be traced back to the sharp differences existing between national 
administrative procedures and to the balance that has to be struck between the principle of 
procedural autonomy and the principle of effet utile. Broad voluntary convergence in the 
evaluation of evidence stems from the technical nature of the subject-matter and the need to 
enhance effectiveness. Convergence on the gathering of evidence is, conversely, the 
objective of Regulations, Notices and, more generally, the ECN. Many instruments are 
available for the furtherance of convergence in this phase and the role of the judge, 
especially by means of judicial review for the protection of fundamental rights, is crucial in 
achieving harmonisation.  
 It will be demonstrated how convergence of rules on proof in EU antitrust law is 
highly beneficial in order to avert many difficulties arising out of the multi-level 
implementation of the EU enforcement system. These common rules of evidence, already 
tested in the practice, might be statutorily adopted in the future, with a view to improving 
the functioning of the system and reaching solid harmonisation.       
 The analysis will provide a comparison of the way evidence is dealt with in the 
public enforcement, at both the EU level and at the national law, and in the private 
enforcement before national judges. The dissertation will encompass the analysis of issues 
                                               
1 For the purposes of the present work the term ‘competition law’ is used as a synonym of ‘antitrust law’, 
encompassing exclusively the enforcement of EU and national prohibitions of restrictive practices and abuses 
of dominant position.  
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arising out of the intersection between national civil procedural law and EU law. Some 
problems are solved by uniform legal rules, while other problems are left to the different 
legal systems. This intersection is not competition law-specific: in other fields of EU 
commercial law similar problems arise and are addressed by European Union policies and 
legislative interventions.2  
 In competition law, however, it seems that the level of convergence reached on the 
rules on proof is remarkably high. This might be due, on one hand, to the complex nature of 
the subject-matter, which pushes national judges to adopt a deferential approach to the case 
law of the EU Courts; and, on the other, to the fact that competition law is a subject-matter 
located at the core of the advancement of the internal market. Therefore, harmonised (albeit 
not uniform) procedural solutions are favoured in this field, wherever possible, in 
conjunction with broad cooperation systems.3 In addition, due to the direct applicability of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, national judges are required, in the private enforcement, to act 
as EU judges in civil national proceedings and to follow the guidance of the EU Courts for 
the interpretation of substantive EU law.4  
 The thesis will focus on the case law of the EU Courts5 and of the courts of two 
chosen jurisdictions (these latter both with regard to the public and the private enforcement 
of competition law).6 It will, thus, consider the role of evidence in the enforcement of EU 
competition law both from the perspective of the European legal system and from that of the 
national legal system of two Member States: the United Kingdom and Italy. They have been 
                                               
2 EVA STORSKRUBB, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered (Oxford University Press 
2008) 2. According to the Author, who does not refer specifically to competition law matters, the complexity 
of the interaction between national procedural law and European law are originated by three main causes: 
absence of adequate transnational procedural regulation to effectively manage cross-border trade, as fostered 
by the development of the Internal Market and the four freedoms within the EU; the direct effect of certain EU 
law provisions, which directly attributes rights and impose obligations upon individuals; and the rights of the 
private individuals in the field of judicial cooperation and effective access to justice (primarily, the right to a 
fair trial). All these problems arise in the private enforcement of EU competition law as well.  
3 DAMIEN GERARD, ‘Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective Enforcement and Due Process 
in Cross-border Antitrust Investigations’ in International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and 
Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012) 365. 
4 ENZO CANNIZZARO and LORENZO FEDERICO PACE, ‘Le politiche di concorrenza’ in GIROLAMO 
STROZZI (ed), Diritto dell’Unione Europea - Parte speciale (3rd edn, Giappichelli 2010) 322. 
5 As specified in the Glossary, the expressions ‘EU Courts’ and ‘Luxembourg Courts’ will be used so as to 
encompass both the Court of Justice and the General Court in their judicial functions, as separate institutions 
forming the ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ (abbreviated CJEU). The term ‘Court of Justice’ and 
‘General Court’ will be used of preference, whenever possible, in order to avoid ambiguities. The expression 
‘European judges’ or ‘European courts’ is intended as including both the EU Courts and the national judges of 
the Member States. 
6 Namely, the analysis of the public enforcement systems of the selected jurisdictions will take into account the 
case law produced by the national courts empowered to hear appeals lodged against decisions issued by the 
national competition authority or to exercise judicial review over them.    
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chosen, out of the twenty-eight, because they are particularly representative of the current 
functioning of the decentralised enforcement of EU competition law. The case study of the 
United Kingdom will be adopted because it features one of the most developed and effective 
public and private enforcement systems in Europe. In the United Kingdom, most of the 
competition law legislation apply to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but 
these three countries do not have the same private law systems, and the procedure for 
bringing a claim differs broadly. For these reasons, only the competition law enforcement of 
England and Wales will be examined, keeping in mind that most of the observations 
regarding the public enforcement system of competition law can be referred to the United 
Kingdom. As specified in the Glossary, the term ‘English law’ will be used to refer to the 
law of England and Wales. Italy, on the other hand, has had a relatively small number of 
private enforcement actions at present,7 more often seeking interim relief rather than 
decisions on the merits. The selection of a common law and a civil law system is of course 
intentional, given that in the gathering of evidence and the evaluation of proof the 
differences between the two traditions are not negligible. This choice will allow 
appreciating strengths and weaknesses of the two systems, as well as underscoring analogies 
and differences, in order to determine whether a convergent pattern of evolution may be 
identified. Furthermore, it will be interesting to detect under which circumstances the case 
law of the EU Courts adopts concepts which are closely linked to civil law traditions, as 
opposed to common law ones. Both these countries have relatively young national 
competition law modelled on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; this will permit to highlight the 
developments of the enforcement of EU competition law and of national competition laws. 
 Along the exposition of the national experiences, some remarks about the public or 
private enforcement of the relevant national competition legislations will be provided. It is 
useful to take into consideration the case law relating to those provisions, which are a 
faithful reproduction of EU provisions, because some of the issues encountered in the 
                                               
7 GIUSEPPE TESAURO, ‘Recenti sviluppi del private antitrust enforcement’ (2011) XIII Mercato 
concorrenza regole 427, 430–431. The Author observes how in Italy, in the five years between 2006 and 2010, 
over 170 undertakings have been sanctioned for antitrust infringements either by the European Commission or 
the Italian competition authority. Conversely, in the same period of time, around eighteen damages actions 
were brought before Italian courts, five of which were follow-on actions. It is, however, difficult to obtain an 
accurate estimate of private antitrust actions, especially since they often terminate following settlement. 
Compare, for instance, MICHELE CARPAGNANO, ‘Competition Law Litigation: the Italian Perspective 
(1990-2010)’ in LUIS ANTONIO VELASCO SAN PEDRO and CARMEN ALONSO LEDESMA (eds), 
Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Lex Nova 2011) 81, who gives an estimate of over ninety cases.  
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context of their application are realistically very similar to the ones posed by the EU law.8 
When doing so, the legal and procedural context in which the domestic courts were deciding 
was considered apt to allow a proper comparison with the approach taken by the EU 
Courts.9 As we shall see, analogous notions of EU and national competition law are often 
interpreted in the same way by national judges. When needed, the institutional architecture 
of the English and Italian private antitrust enforcement systems will be considered shortly.  
 The dissertation will follow an approach which appears, to date, to have been 
neglected. It will discriminate according to the stage of the judicial proceedings where 
evidence plays a main role. Rather than simply distinguishing between public and private 
enforcement, or between judicial and administrative proceedings, or, again, between 
European and national level, it will transversally analyse the phase of the gathering of 
evidence, on one hand; and that of the evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties 
before the decision-maker, on the other. This approach will prove more conducive to the 
task of depicting the current state of the rules on proof as shown by the case law, with the 
EU Courts significantly influencing the national judge in most evidence-related matters in 
antitrust cases. Secondly, it will help shedding some light on the importance of respecting 
fundamental rights impinged upon by antitrust proceedings. At the same time, this analysis 
will allow to assess whether any coherent approach can be detected that would adjuvate the 
circulation of decisions.  
 The scope of the research has been narrowed down to encompass only antitrust 
violations – that is, infringements of Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (and, when appropriate, their national transposition). As a result, 
mergers have been left out of the analysis, due to the particular nature of merger control and 
the fact that it is not the subject of private enforcement in Europe.10 So doing, a proper 
comparison between the public and the private enforcement is made possible for each of the 
tackled topics. Another important part of competition law, State aid control, has been 
                                               
8 Such as the probative value of documents found in the hands of third parties; the use of presumptions; or the 
need to evaluate evidence contextually. 
9 In the thesis, where the mentioned competition law cases referred exclusively to the violation of national 
competition law, the violated prohibition has been indicated into brackets at the end of each case citation. All 
cases whose citation lacks such detail relate, also or exclusively, to Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU violations.  
10 Mergers are the subject of private enforcement in other jurisdictions, such as the United States, under federal 
and state law. Private individuals may seek injunctive relief, in order to stop the merger from occurring, or 
damages arising out of it. See BONNY E. SWEENEY, ‘Defining Antitrust Violations in the United States’ in 
ALBERT A. FOER and RANDY M. STUTZ (eds), Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2012) 27. 
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excluded from the scope of the dissertation, as a result of the sharp differences 
characterising its control procedure.11 
 For different reasons, but in response to the same need of narrowing down the 
subject-matter of the analysis, the thesis will not consider the topic of evidence from the 
point of view of international arbitration involving issues of EU competition law. 
Alternative dispute resolution would merit to be tackled separately, due to, on one hand, the 
flexibility of choice in the legal and procedural rules to which the parties are entitled and to 
the confidential nature of the award, which is typical of arbitration. Many other asymmetries 
and differences from judicial proceedings compel not to enclose an analysis of evidence in 
arbitration litigation. To mention a few, arbitrators have no coercive powers for the 
gathering of evidence, especially when it is in the hands of third parties. Arbitrators could 
theoretically resort to the aid of national courts to assist them in the fact-finding, but this 
happens in very few cases. In addition, pursuant to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the so-called ‘New York Convention’), all 
courts of contracting parties must recognise and enforce arbitration awards made in other 
states, in some regards in a smoother way than decisions of administrative authorities or 
court judgments.12 More importantly, the current analysis aims at focusing on a strictly 
judicial perspective on evidence in EU antitrust law enforcement. When considering both 
EU and national proceedings, the decision-making of administrative authorities acting in 
their capacity as regulators will not per se be considered. Only the judicial review of such 
decisions by the Luxembourg Courts (i.e. the General Court and the Court of Justice) or the 
decisions of national judges (i.e. the national courts empowered to hear appeals against 
decisions of the relevant NCA or to exercise judicial review over them)13 will be discussed.   
 The dissertation will commence with a basic illustration of the institutional 
architecture of EU antitrust public and private enforcement.14 Given the complex and multi-
layered structure of the EU competition law enforcement system, it appears necessary to 
                                               
11 It is useful to recall that Article 108(3) TFEU is directly applicable by national judges and that parties 
affected by unlawful State aid can bring direct action before national courts for damages and injunctive relief. 
Proving causation and quantification in State aid damages actions arises difficulties that are analougous to 
those encountered in private antitrust actions. For further details, see FRANCESCO BESTAGNO, ‘L’azione 
risarcitoria come strumento di private enforcement della disciplina di diritto dell’UE sugli aiuti di Stato’ 
(2013) 27 Diritto del commercio internazionale 623, 641–645. 
12 Compare for these aspects, OECD, Arbitration and Competition - Hearing held in the Working Party No. 3 
meeting of 26 October 2010 [2011] DAF/COMP (2010) 40, para. 7.  
13 For the English system, the appellate powers of the CAT/Court of Appeal and, for the Italian system, the 
judicial review of the Regional Administrative Tribunal Lazio/Council of State will be examined. 
14 This will be done very shortly, since it is not possible to include a thorough portrait of the framework of EU 
competition law enforcement. 
Introduction 
Evidence and Proof in EU Competition Law: Between Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 
 34 
present briefly the different legal frameworks separately. A brief description of the English 
and Italian competition law regimes will also be provided, to elucidate the context in which 
the rules operate. Indeed, a ‘diversity/effectiveness conundrum’15 arises due to the fact that 
evidence is gathered and evaluated in different fora in the European context (European 
Commission, NCAs, national courts). For the public enforcement, the Commission’s 
approach to evidence and its powers of investigation will be analysed. The judicial review 
exercised by the EU Courts over its decision will also be illustrated. In the context of the 
analysis of the public enforcement at the national level, the system of appeal and judicial 
review provided by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) and the Court of 
Appeal/Supreme Court,16 for England; and the system of judicial review of the Regional 
Administrative Tribunal Lazio/Council of State, for Italy, will be described. For the private 
enforcement, since there is no self-sufficient private enforcement system at the European 
level, the analysis will focus on the harmonized system of private enforcement in the 
European Union, that is to say the principles established by the EU judicature and ‘soft 
law’17 used to bring into line the different traditions, as well as the EU Regulations to 
determine jurisdiction and applicable law in private antitrust cases. The analysis of the case 
law of English and Italian courts will be provided when addressing specific issues.18   
                                               
15 This expression is used by GERARD, ‘Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective Enforcement 
and Due Process in Cross-border Antitrust Investigations’ 365. 
16 Judicial review is a type of court proceedings in which the lawfulness of an administrative decision is 
verified. By means of the judicial review, the exercise of public power is supervised by judicial courts upon 
application of an individual. The review does not address the merits of the decision, as long as the procedure 
has been followed, and will not substitute the decision itself. It may, if the case, quash the decision. Appeals, 
on the other hand, concern the merits of the decision and are apt to substitute it. In England, decisions of 
competition authorities (the OFT, or other sectoral authorities) may be challenged by a full appeal on the 
merits to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, if they are appealable under the Competition Act 1998. Non-
appealable decisions can be subject to judicial review before the High Court of England and Wales (first 
instance court). CAT’s decisions can be appealed before the Court of Appeal, either on point of law or as to 
the amount of the sanction imposed. The Court of Appeal is divided into criminal and civil division. 
Competition appeals are heard by the Civil Division, headed by the Master of the Rolls. Further appeals can be 
filed to the Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords), which hears appeals on points of law of the greatest 
public important, according to the ordinary system of justice of the UK.  
17 The expression ‘soft law’ is intended as encompassing quasi-legal instruments and rules of conduct issued 
by the European Commission which, despite not having any binding effect, have an impact on the regulation 
policy and practice of EU Member States. Compare, for an exhaustive definition, HÅKON A. COSMA and 
RICHARD WHISH, ‘Soft Law in the Field of EU Competition Policy’ (2003) 14 European Business Law 
Review 25, 27–30. 
18 For the English system, the first instance court is the High Court (or, for follow-on claims for damages or 
other monetary relief, the CAT). Appeals from the High Court are heard by the English Court of Appeal, and 
from this latter further appeals are heard by the UK Supreme Court. In Italy, the jurisdiction belongs to 
specialised divisions within the ordinary courts, the so-called Enterprise Courts (Tribunale delle imprese), 
since the enactment of Law 27/2012. For the intricate framework existing before this concentration (i.e. the 
separate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal for national competition law and of the ordinary judge for EU 
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 The first Chapter will tackle the nature of evidence, and its classification as a matter 
of substance or procedure by the relevant legal framework. It will also clarify which rules 
govern the allocation of cases before the relevant authorities and the choice of the 
procedural rules applicable to the matter. 
 Chapter II will analyse the way in which evidence is evaluated, providing a 
comparison between the public and the private enforcement systems of the way in which 
some important issues of evidence are dealt with by the European judges (EU Courts and 
national courts) and the way some uniform rules of management of evidence are created, 
interpreted and applied in both systems.  
 Chapter III will address the moment, albeit preceding in time, of the gathering of 
evidence in the public and private enforcement, focusing on the existing tools for the 
gathering of evidence, and on the limits imposed to the process of fact-finding by 
fundamental rights. The sharing of evidence and the coordination of decisions between 
administrative and judicial authorities will be addressed. This analysis is aimed at 
underscoring how cooperation and fundamental rights contribute to fostering the procedural 
convergence of the rules on proof. It extends to the evaluation of the circumstances under 
which the final assessment of evidence contained in formal decisions can, or must be, taken 
into account by different authorities in different proceedings. Chapter III will therefore deal 
with the intersection between the protection of fundamental rights and the gathering and 
sharing of evidence, at the national constitutional level or at the European trans-national and 
international level (particularly within the system of the EU Treaties and of the European 
Convention of Human Rights). 
 The research methodology was to combine two fields: EU competition law, on the 
one hand, and the law of evidence of national jurisdictions, with a comparative approach, on 
the other. The method adopted consisted of the analysis of the relevant existing provisions 
and the case law of the EU Courts and of the national courts of the chosen jurisdictions. The 
entire dissertation will be permeated by the consideration of international commercial 
litigation aspects of private enforcement. The last Chapter will discuss fundamental rights 
affected by the application of EU competition law, with the only exception of the 
presumption of innocence, that is addressed in Chapter II.  
                                                                                                                                                
competition law), refer to PAOLO CATALLOZZI, ‘Il giudice competente nel processo antitrust’ in Dizionario 
sistematico del diritto della concorrenza (Jovene 2013) 275–279. 
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1) GENERAL EU LAW PRINCIPLES GOVERNING EVIDENCE 
 
In the EU Member States, competition law provisions are enforced either by the public 
authorities or by claimants, through civil antitrust action. The two types of enforcement 
differ in many respects, one of the most important being the nature of the proceedings, 
which is inquisitorial in administrative public enforcement and adversarial in private 
antitrust actions. Notwithstanding the undeniably diverse characteristics of the public and 
the private enforcement of the EU competition law provisions at the European and at the 
domestic level, a few principles of evidence law can be identified. These principles are 
generally valid both before the EU Courts and the national judges and therefore, indirectly, 
guide both the action of the European Commission and that of the NCAs. If a given 
principle or general rule of evidence is to be applied by the General Court or by the 
appointed court which hears appeals against decisions of the NCA in the Member States, it 
is likely that the relevant competition authority will also seek to respect those principles or 
rules. If they did not, appeals against decisions will be allowed. By the same token, such 
principles will be applied within national jurisdictions by national civil judges in the private 
enforcement too, although, in this latter context, some differences remain. The two systems 
of national enforcement - judicial review, on the one hand, and private enforcement, on the 
other - tend toward a few intersecting principles. Four well-established principles of 
evidence law transversally apply both before the European Courts and, generally, the 
national judges: 
 ‘the court knows the law’ (iuria novit curia), prescribing that the parties need to 
prove allegations of facts but not the law that applies to their dispute;19 
 ‘he who asserts must prove’ (actori incumbit probatio), enjoining the parties to 
adduce sufficient evidence supporting their allegations;20 
                                               
19 A clarification in this regard is due: the EU Courts are not bound to know the national laws of the Member 
States, unless they concur to the formation of the European law itself, as, for instance, general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States and fundamental human rights. They are not, contrariwise, bound to 
know administrative acts of individual scope (decisions), nor judicial precedents (of the EU Courts or of other 
Courts). See PAOLO BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea (Giuffré 2009) 222–223. 
20 This principle is embodied, for competition law, by Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1, modified by Council Regulation (EC) 1419/2006 [2006] OJ L 269/1 (hereinafter, 
simply ‘Regulation (EC) 1/2003’). 
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 cooperation of the parties, enjoining the parties to cooperate with the judge, 
whenever he or she orders measures of enquiry and, more generally, to facilitate the 
process of the gathering of evidence;21 
 free and unfettered evaluation of evidence by the judge,22 prescribing that the judge 
is master of the procedure both as regards the admission – i.e. the relevance and the 
admissibility - and the evaluation – i.e. the assessment of the probative strength - of 
the evidence presented.23 
Two of these principles will be thoroughly examined below. More specifically, ‘he who 
asserts must prove’, which establishes on whom the burden of proving a given fact weighs, 
will be addressed when dealing with the allocation of the burden of proof.24 The principle of 
unfettered evaluation of evidence will be analysed along with the probative value of 
evidence.25 It is important to note the discretion of the judge to evaluate evidence in the EU 
legal system. The judge is required to evaluate the factual evidence presented by the parties 
and to determine its reliability.  
 The principle of free evaluation of evidence allows the EU Courts to take into 
consideration any factual elements presented, including those elements which, under 
national rules of evidence, should have been adduced by means of a specific item of 
evidence26 (for instance, both English and Italian law sometimes require evidence to be in 
writing). The principle would exclude, theoretically, the attribution of predetermined value 
to certain types of evidence. Yet, the principle is recognized also in some national legal 
systems (and this is one of those aspects where the application of EU competition law may 
be inconsistent before domestic civil courts), where the law sometimes assigns to certain 
types of evidence a certain value or significance which the adjudicator cannot disregard, or 
where there are statutory requirements of written evidence (i.e. when the law requires that, 
                                               
21 The extent of this obligation may vary broadly in the different legal systems. In the English system, 
disclosure is one of those devices which requires great cooperation on behalf of the parties. In the Italian 
system, the request for documents under Article 210 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or the inspection, under 
Article 118 of the same code, are examples of such principle. From the obstructive behaviour of the requested 
party, the judge may usually draw adverse inferences.   
22 KOEN LENAERTS, ‘Some Thoughts on Evidence and Procedure in European Community Competition 
Law’ (2006) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 1463, 1465–1467. 
23 BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea 217-224. 
24 See Chapter II, para. 4 below. 
25 See Chapter II, para. 7 below. 
26 BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea 221-222. 
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to be held valid, a particular transaction or type of contract, must be proven by a written 
document).27 
 Before the EU Courts, the only admissible items of evidence are: 
a) any form of documental evidence; 
b) personal appearance of the parties;  
c) request for information and production of documents; 
d) oral testimony; 
e) expert’s reports; 
f) inspections of places and things.28 
 Nonetheless, the EU Courts are free to evaluate any information which lawfully 
comes into their knowledge: for instance, they can rely for their decisions upon written 
statements of third parties who have not been heard as witnesses.29 In the words of Judge 
Vesterdorf, sitting as Advocate-General, in his Opinion in Rhône-Poulenc SA, the only 
guiding principle for the evaluation of evidence, which is unconstrained by the rules laid 
down in the national legal systems, is the reliability of the evidence presented: 
 
Apart from the exceptions laid down in the Communities’ own legal order, it is only the 
reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to its 
evaluation.30 
 
This principle has been confirmed by abundant case law.31 Apart from these general 
principles, there is a noticeable reluctance to take a clear stand with regard to evidence or 
proof-related topics in the case law of the Luxembourg Courts. The judgments of the EU 
                                               
27 This is the case of the Italian system, where there are certain types of agreements which can be exclusively 
proved in writing, such as insurance agreements or out-of-court settlements. The general principle of free and 
unfettered evaluation of evidence is recognised by Article 116 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
28 Compare Rules of Procedure of the General Court [1991] OJ L 136/34, last modified on 19 June 2013 OJ L 
173/66, Article 65 and Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2012] OJ L 265/1, Article 64(2). The types 
of evidence listed from b) to f) are the ones that can be ordered by the judge, whereas the parties are free to 
adduce any type of relevant documental evidence (including records, video, digital data and the like). 
29 BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea 231. 
30 Case T-1/89 Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission [1991] ECR II-867, 954. This opinion has been more recently 
confirmed by the Court of Justice in case C-411/04 P Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v Commission [2007] 
ECR I-1005, para. 45: ‘[…] the Court of First Instance was correct to hold: […] the principle that prevails in 
Community law is that of the unfettered evaluation of evidence and that it is only the reliability of the evidence 
that is decisive when it comes to its evaluation.’ 
31 Compare joined cases C-310/98 and C-406/98 Met-Trans and Sagpol [2000] ECR I-1797, para. 29; joined 
cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-150/99 and T-151/99 Vela and Tecnagrind v Commission [2002] ECR II-4547, 
para. 223; T-50/00 Dalmine SpA v Commission [2004] ECR II-2395, para. 72, also quoted by AG Vesterdorf 
in his Opinion in Rhône-Poulenc v Commission.  
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Courts, in particular, are rarely crystal clear upon evidential issues such as burden of proof 
and standard of proof. Nonetheless, it is the author’s opinion that this trend might be 
changing. The case law allows detecting autonomous definitions of some concepts (such as 
the creation of a ‘European’ standard of proof, which does not match exactly the national 
ones) and offers guidance for others (e.g. for the allocation of the evidential burden of proof, 
with the creation of presumptions, or for the evaluation of evidence). These issues and 
connected observations will be set out in Chapter II.   
 
2) THE NATURE OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST PROCEEDINGS  
 
As already noted, the way evidence is evaluated differs radically in criminal, administrative 
and civil proceedings because of their nature and their teleological approach.32 In criminal 
proceedings the judge has the duty to ascertain the truth of the alleged facts with which the 
accused is charged. In administrative proceedings, the public authority has to find evidence 
beyond what the parties submitted to its knowledge: the parties’ failure to present enough 
evidence to convince the authorities must not harm the public interest and the rightness of 
the final judgement. EU public enforcement is an example of administrative proceedings. In 
civil proceedings, the remit of the judge consists in the resolution of a dispute between 
individuals, according to the allegations and the evidence presented by the parties. National 
judges, however, are often endowed with inquisitorial powers of different extent. 
 The discussion here presented upon the features of competition law proceedings 
before the different authorities at the European and national level is aimed at clarifying their 
adversarial nature, as far as the judicial review and the private enforcement are concerned; 
and at predisposing some later observations upon the relevance of the respect of 
fundamental rights in the fact-finding process before the European Commission.  
 
A) Proceedings before the European Commission 
 
It is out of doubt that proceedings before the European Commission do not have civil nature 
for the purposes of the ECHR.33 Article 23(5) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides that 
                                               
32 IAN DENNIS, The Law of Evidence (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 19. 
33 For further details, see also Chapter II, text accompanying fn. 266-275. Case C‑272/09 P KME Germany 
AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v Commission, not yet reported, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para. 
64: ‘In the light of those criteria [the three ‘Engel criteria’], I have little difficulty in concluding that the 
procedure whereby a fine is imposed for breach of the prohibition on price-fixing and market-sharing 
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decisions of the Commission imposing fines on undertakings ‘shall not be of a criminal law 
nature’. Nonetheless, commentators diverge in considering whether they present 
administrative or criminal nature. Each position entails relevant consequences with regard to 
the rights of the parties involved in the proceedings: evidently, a ‘quasi-criminal’ procedure 
would require stronger protection of the rights of the defending parties, along with particular 
caution in the phase of the collection of evidence, the application of a different standard of 
proof and the provision of a thorough system of legal review of final decisions, which 
administrative proceedings would not necessarily require.34 The CJEU has provided a rather 
clear answer: proceedings before the Commission qualify as administrative. The procedure 
before the European Commission has been expressly described as ‘administrative’,35 and the 
Court of Justice excluded that the competition authority in its quality as enforcer of EU 
competition rules should be considered as a ‘tribunal’ for the purpose of the application of 
Article 6 of the ECHR.36 Concerns upon the combination of roles of the Commission as 
investigator, prosecutor, and judge and the debate upon the importance of a separation of 
powers in the context of competition matters have been tentatively rebutted with the 
creation of the Hearing Officer in 1982 and the peer review panels for the scrutiny of the 
investigation conclusions in 2003. Great criticism, however, is still levelled at the hybrid 
role of the Commissions,37 for the questions left unanswered to date, particularly with 
regard to the protection of fundamental rights, the respect of due process guarantees and the 
                                                                                                                                                
agreements in Article 81(1) EC falls under the “criminal head” of Article 6 ECHR as progressively defined by 
the European Court of Human Rights.’ Compare also joined cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-
117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, Opinion of AG 
Darmon, para. 451: ‘[…] A Commission decision in the field of competition is another matter entirely, 
particularly where it orders a trader to pay a fine and is therefore manifestly of a penal nature’ (emphasis 
added). 
34 CHRISTOPHER HARDING and JULIAN JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2010) 199. 
35 Case C-45/69 Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v Commission [1970] ECR 769, para. 23: ‘As the purpose of 
the procedure before the Commission is to apply Article 85 of the Treaty even where it may lead to the 
imposition of fines, it is an administrative procedure.’ 
36 Joined cases C-209 to C-215 and C-218/78 Heintz van Landewyck S.a.r.l. v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, 
para. 8: ‘The Commission is bound to respect the procedural guarantees provided for by Community law on 
competition; it cannot, however, be classed as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, under which everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal’ and joined cases C-100 to C-103/80 SA Musique Diffusion française v 
Commission [1983] ECR 1825, 1880, para. 7: ‘[…] the Commission cannot be described as a “tribunal” within 
the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.’  
37 A number of proposals have been made to address such general state of things, but all of them were rejected. 
The most important ones were the transferral of adjudicator upon anti-competitive infringements directly to the 
General Court, thus reducing the role of the Commission to that of a simple investigator and prosecutor; and 
the creation of a completely detached EU competition enforcement agency, the European Cartel Office. See 
HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 202, and, for more details, ARIANNA 
ANDREANGELI, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights (Edward Elgar 2008) 235-243.   
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standard of proof to be applied.38 Given the alleged inadequacy of these reforms, and 
spurred by the possibility of accession of the European Union to the ECHR envisaged by 
Article 6(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the attention of commentators was 
steered in the direction of the standard of review of the EU Courts.39 It was felt that the 
judicial review provided for under Article 263 TFEU40 was the only way to reduce the 
possible adverse consequences on fundamental rights.41 Among those who are inclined to 
consider the procedure before the European Commission a criminal procedure, the major 
concern is that the protection ensured by the system of the ECHR is not equalled by the 
standard of review guaranteed by the EU Courts. In particular, as will be clarified in Chapter 
III, the ‘uncovered areas’ – i.e. those areas where the protection offered by the EU Courts 
and by the ECtHR differs – are the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and of 
lawyer-client confidentiality, namely with regard to the protection of the correspondence 
with in-house lawyers, and, according to some commentators, the lack of judicial review of 
the decisions of the Hearing Officer on the disclosure of evidence to the investigated 
parties.42 But other discrepancies will be uncovered, including a tension created by the 
application of presumptions and the respect of the presumption of innocence.43 The point to 
mention at this stage is that the variance between the two areas of coverage is mainly to be 
ascribed to the legal nature of the proceedings:  
 
Article 6 and 8 of the Human Rights Convention were not conceived with either 
corporate actors or ‘administrative’ procedures foremost in mind. Moreover, even if the 
Court of Human Rights has insisted that it is the substance of the procedure rather than its 
formal description that should determine the level of legal protection for defendants, it is 
still possible to argue that prosecuting a cartel for infringement of the EU rules is 
different in some important respects from the usual kind of criminal proceeding at the 
national level.44 
           
                                               
38 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 200-201. 
39 ALBERT SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR and Due Process Rights in EU 
Competition Law Matters: Nothing New Under the Sun?’ in VASILIKI KOSTA, NIKOS SKOUTARIS and 
VASSILIS P. TZEVELEKOS (eds), The Accession of the EU to the ECHR (Hart Publishing 2014), 
forthcoming.  
40 The review of legality here mentioned is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction of the CJEU, according 
to Article 31 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, to substitute its own appraisal for the Commission’s, with regard to 
penalties, and to cancel, reduce or increase them.  
41 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 203. 
42 ANDREANGELI, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights 224-225. 
43 See Chapter II, para. 5 G). 
44 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 203. 
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Albeit with due consideration for the specific differences characterising competition law, 
however, the protection of fundamental rights is crucial and the risk of inadvertently 
exporting administrative policy considerations in private antitrust proceedings must be 
prevented. 
 
B) Proceedings before the EU Courts 
 
When issuing decisions finding competition law infringements, the European Commission 
plays a role that is completely different from that of a civil judge in any of the EU Member 
States. Rather than doing justice between two parties, the Commission must ensure the 
fairness of the administrative procedure, respect EU law and maintain a coherent 
competition policy of the European Union.45 Although the nature of the proceedings brought 
before the EU Courts is undoubtedly adversarial, rather than inquisitorial, the EU Courts are 
inspired by similar goals, when operating as review judges. They are constantly acting to 
protect the consistent interpretation and application of the Treaties.46 In this respect, the EU 
Courts have broad inquisitorial powers,47 but generally they are not often used in practice. 
Indeed, both the Court of Justice48 and the General Court49 can require the parties to provide 
evidence and can adopt any measure of inquiry.50 It cannot, however, be concluded that 
proceedings before the Luxembourg Courts are inquisitorial, rather than adversarial. On the 
one hand, the powers of EU Courts in the fact-finding may be exercised only once the 
parties have diligently tried their best to prove their allegations, and they are rarely used in 
practice; on the other, the Commission is endowed with extensive investigatory powers. The 
EU Courts can order on their own initiative or under request of a party the gathering of 
                                               
45 Compare Article 17(1) TEU and, for EU competition law, Article 105 TFEU.  
46 MASSIMO CONDINANZI and ROBERTO MASTROIANNI, Il contenzioso dell’Unione Europea 
(Giappichelli 2009) 393. 
47 Case C-119/97 P Union française de l’express (Ufex), formerly Syndicat français de l’express international 
(SFEI), DHL International and Service CRIE v Commission [1999] ECR I-1341, paras. 108-111: ‘[T]he Court 
of First Instance could not reject the appellants’ request to order production of a document which was 
apparently material to the outcome of the case on the ground that the document had not been produced and 
there was nothing to confirm its existence. […] the appellants had stated the author, the addressee and the date 
of the letter they wished to be produced. Given such details, the Court of First Instance could not simply reject 
the parties’ allegations on the ground of insufficient evidence, when it was up to the Court, by granting the 
appellants’ request to order production of documents, to remove any uncertainty there might be as to the 
correctness of those allegations, or to explain the reasons for which such a document could not in any event, 
whatever its content, be material to the outcome of the case.’ 
48 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Article 64(1): ‘The Court, after hearing the Advocate General, 
shall prescribe the measures of inquiry that it considers appropriate by means of an order setting out the facts 
to be proved.’ 
49 Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Article 66(1).  
50 Compare Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Article 65 and Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, 
Article 64(2). See text accompanying fn. 28 above. 
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evidence that they foresee will be helpful for verifying facts, but those proceedings retain 
adversarial nature.51 The applicant and the defendant are always responsible for offering 
evidence in support of their allegations, according to Article 124 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Court of Justice.52 After that, both the applicant in the reply and the defendant in the 
rejoinder can still give further evidence, provided that they explain the reasons for the 
delay,53 but it is forbidden to introduce a new plea in law in the course of proceedings unless 
it is based on matters of law or of fact which had come to light in the course of the 
procedure. This procedure is aimed at letting the judges (and the Advocate-General) know 
thoroughly all the facts, evidence, arguments and conclusions of the parties as early as 
possible along the proceedings.54 As it will be observed later, the judges can intervene 
actively in the evidence gathering process. For example, they can request the parties to 
provide evidence which is in their possession, but only after they have diligently done their 
best to support their allegations.55 These rules of procedure also apply to the European 
Commission, in its quality as the respondent in the proceedings initiated by the applicant 
against a Commission’s decision before the General Court. Nonetheless, their use seems to 
be moderate, partly due to the fact that the Commission naturally selects cases in which 
evidence is stronger and that are likely to resist to the judicial review of the CJEU and partly 
because it collects evidence at a time that is much closer to the infringement than that in 
which the case is appealed before the General Court. On top of that, the cases in which 
applicants expressly contest the infringement are progressively diminishing, especially in 
cartel cases, due to the major role played by the application of leniency programmes and 
settlements in eliciting the production of evidence.56 The test of evidence before the General 
                                               
51 PAOLO BIAVATI, ‘L’impatto del diritto comunitario sull’insegnamento del diritto processuale civile’ 
[2008] Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 227, 234–235. 
52 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Article 124(1): ‘Within two months after service on him of the 
application, the defendant shall lodge a defence, stating: (a) the name and address of the defendant; (b) the 
pleas in law and arguments relied on; (c) the form of order sought by the defendant; (d) where appropriate, any 
evidence produced or offered’ (emphasis added). 
53 Notes for the guidance of Counsel in written and oral proceedings before the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (February 2009), available at <curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/ 
2008-09/txt9_2008-09-25_17-37-52_275.pdf> accessed on 10 January 2014, Article 14, letter c): ‘The initial 
pleadings must indicate all evidence in support of each of the points of fact at issue. However, new evidence 
may be put forward subsequently (in contrast to the rule excluding new pleas in law), provided that adequate 
reasons are given to justify the delay […]’. 
54 ROSTANE MEHDI, ‘La prevue devant les juridictions communautaires’ in HÉLÈNE RUIZ FABRI and 
JEAN-MARC SOREL (eds), La preuve devant les juridictions internationales (A. Pedone 2007), 167-168. 
55 Compare BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea, 219 and MEHDI, ‘La prevue devant les 
juridictions communautaires’, 167–168. 
56 FERNANDO CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ (2009) 
32(4) World Competition 505, 561–562. 
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Court seems to be focusing mostly on the allocation of the burden of proof; on the accuracy, 
reliability and consistency of evidence presented in order to seek an annulment for lack of 
sufficient evidence; and on the specific facts which might play a role in quashing or 
reducing the imposition of fines.57  
  
C) Proceedings before National Judges 
 
In civil proceedings, such as private antitrust actions, the judge has the responsibility to 
evaluate the asserted facts according to the claims of the parties. Undoubtedly, the different 
goals and procedures that characterize civil antitrust cases brought before national 
jurisdictions broadly affect the way evidence is evaluated. These purposes are one of the 
main differences in the adjudicator’s approach to private enforcement matters compared to 
public enforcement cases. Nonetheless, differences become less evident when comparing 
private enforcement proceedings and the judicial review of public enforcement decisions, 
because the nature of the proceedings is still markedly adversarial. This is due to the fact 
that, even when in the Member States the courts empowered to review decisions of the NCA 
are not appellate courts,58 but judicial review courts (as it is the case in Italy), they can and 
should review the competition authority’s decision thoroughly. In particular, the courts must 
review the factual elements on which the decision is based and allow re-examining the 
circumstances of the matter under examination, even if limited to the assessment of the 
legitimacy of the decision, in a way that is totally similar to (and has been compared with)59 
that of the EU Courts against the Commission’s decisions.60 
                                               
57 Naturally, the relevance of the grounds of the case are linked to the fact that the scope of the judicial review 
of the General Court is determined by the arguments raised by the applicant, and cannot go beyond that, except 
under specific circumstances in which the General Court is empowered to raise issues of its own motion. For 
further details on this aspect, refer to FERNANDO CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘La relevé d’office par la 
juridiction communautaire’ (2005) 3-4 Cahiers de droit européen 395, 440–441. The Author observes that it is 
not unusual to see the Luxembourg Courts take into consideration ex officio elements of fact belonging to files 
of joined cases or matters relating to the European Union civil service. The Author recalls that the General 
Court has full jurisdiction according to Article 261 TFEU upon the claim brought against the Commission’s 
decisions imposing fines pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Such de novo review, 
independently of any manifest errors of assessment committed by the Commission, justifies the production and 
the consideration of additional information that was not mentioned in the Commission’s decision. Compare 
joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd v 
Commission [2004] ECR II-1181, para. 165 and joined cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 Tokai 
Carbon Co. Ltd, Intech EDM BV, Intech EDM AG and SGL Carbon AG v Commission  [2005] ECR II-10, 
paras. 164 and 189–190. 
58 In England, the CAT acts as an appellate court which fully reviews the merits of the case. 
59 See, for instance, Council of State, 2 February 2004, decision no. 926, para. 3.3, in which the court stated 
that the scope of the judicial review of the Court of Justice of the European Union de facto encompasses also 
Introduction 
Evidence and Proof in EU Competition Law: Between Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 
 45 
 In the majority of the Member States there is little leeway for the court to ask the 
parties to adduce evidence of its own will. National competition law proceedings, therefore, 
qualify as adversarial, which, if considered with the asymmetry of information that usually 
characterizes antitrust cases, adds up to the extreme difficulty encountered by the claimant 
in giving the proof of the alleged antitrust violation in private antitrust actions.     
 Before moving on to the analysis of the rules of evidence applied in the enforcement 
of EU competition law and of problems arising out of the handling of evidence before 
European Commission, EU Courts and national judges, it is necessary to summarise the 
legal framework and functioning of EU public and private enforcement. The discussion will 
be introduced by an illustration of the peculiarities of enforcement of EU competition law, 
paying special attention to evidential issues.  
 
3) THE PECULIARITIES OF ENFORCEMENT OF EU COMPETITION LAW: WHY IS EVIDENCE 
SO CRUCIAL? 
 
Private and public enforcement of competition law are independent and complementary 
systems which pursue common objectives.61 The main goals reached through the synergy of 
the two types of enforcement have been identified with the injunctive function, which is 
achieved via cease and desist order or injunctions; the compensatory function, which is 
achieved via redress; and deterrence, which is achieved via the infliction of fines and, in 
some systems, also of penalties for individuals, such as disqualification orders and 
imprisonment.62 The first objective is pursued by both systems, even if sometimes it is more 
efficiently attained by means of national civil proceedings.63 The last objective, deterrence, 
is mainly served by public enforcement64 (although an effective private enforcement highly 
                                                                                                                                                
the economic analysis carried out by the European Commission. It extends to the factual elements of the case 
in issue and is similar to the judicial review performed by the Italian administrative judge.  
60 ANNALAURA LEONI, ‘La tutela giurisdizionale contro gli atti dell’AGCM in materia antitrust’ in 
LORENZO FEDERICO PACE (ed), Dizionario sistematico del diritto della concorrenza (Jovene 2013) 425. 
61 Commission, White Paper on  Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final, 
para 1.2. 
62 WOUTER P.J. WILS, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ (2005) 28 World 
Competition 117–159, 130. 
63 VALENTINE KORAH, EC Competition Law and Practice (7th edn, Hart Publishing 2000) 177–178. 
64 Sometimes, severe sentencing is not sufficient to attain perfect deterrence. Compare, for the U.S., the 
opinion of DONALD C. KLAWITER and JENNIFER M. DRISCOLL, ‘Sentencing Individuals In Antitrust 
Cases: The Proper Balance’ (2009) 23 Antitrust 75, 79: ‘[P]erfect deterrence is a worthy, but elusive, goal - 
particularly in white collar cases like antitrust, where the executive knows the risk but often believes he can 
“beat the system” or caves to the pressure to keep his business profitable. Unless human nature or the 
shareholder short-term objectives suddenly evolve, even extreme sentences will not eradicate violations of the 
antitrust laws.’ For a detailed analysis of the effect of antitrust sanctions on deterrence, see DOUGLAS H. 
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contributes indirectly to increasing overall deterrence); whereas the second one, the 
compensatory function, is mainly served by private enforcement.65 There is no formal 
interdependence between the public and private enforcement: they are institutionally 
autonomous.66 They have, however, many points in common with regard to evidence. This 
is because evidence raises many problems that are experienced in both systems and that are 
dealt with in analogous ways in the two types of enforcement. Moreover, evidence in 
competition law has implications on other domains of the law, such as civil procedure, 
conflict of laws and human rights. 
 The difficulties of proving an infringement of competition law, encountered by the 
public authority and the claimant, are many. First of all, both the administrative rules and 
the fact-pleading nature67 of civil law proceedings require the regulatory body or the 
claimant to be in the knowledge of the facts or, at least, the general nature of the facts of the 
case. Fact-pleading is currently applied by all EU Member States. Allegations of 
competition law infringements must be supported by sufficient detail and evidence.68 Since 
the burden of the proof placed on the authority or the party bringing (administrative or civil) 
action is heavy, most countries provide for some alleviation of that burden, by means of 
presumptions, the use of prima facie regimes,69 or the reversal of the burden of proof.70 
Secondly, evidence is particularly important in competition law because the dispute is 
                                                                                                                                                
GINSBURG and JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, ‘Antitrust Sanctions’ (2012) 8 Competition Policy International 46, 
46. 
65 These objectives are identified by ASSIMAKIS P. KOMNINOS, ‘Relationship between Public and Private 
Enforcement: quod Dei Deo, quod Caesaris Caesari’ in PHILIP LOWE, MEL MARQUIS (eds), European 
Competition Law Annual 2011: Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law - 
Implications for Courts and Agencies (Hart Publishing 2014), forthcoming. For a partially different 
perspective compare WOUTER P.J. WILS, ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and 
Private Actions for Damages’ (2009) 32 World Competition 3, 5–12.  
66 KOMNINOS, ‘Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement: quod Dei Deo, quod Caesaris 
Caesari’ in PHILIP LOWE, MEL MARQUIS (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2011: Integrating 
Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law - Implications for Courts and Agencies (Hart Publishing 
2014), forthcoming.  
67 A fact-pleading system is a legal system which requires that, in order for a claim to be well-founded, it has 
to mention all facts that need to be submitted before the judge, and the same is required to the defendants as 
regards their answers. By contrast, the notice-pleading system, as in the U.S, is a system in which pleadings 
refer to unspecified issues at the very first stage, working as a message to the notified parties conveying the 
general terms of the impending dispute. All detailed information, technical points and allegation of proof is 
reserved for a later stage of the proceedings and the task of narrowing the matter is left to the phase of the 
disclosure. Compare THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, American Law and the Legal System: Equal Justice 
Under the Law (Cengage Learning 2000) 136. 
68 ALAN RILEY, ‘Beyond Leniency: Enhancing Enforcement in EC Antitrust Law’ (2005) 28 World 
Competition 377, 383–384 and ASSIMAKIS P. KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 226. 
69 In order to establish a prima facie case, the evidence provided much be regarded as sufficient to prove that 
an infringement might have occurred. 
70 For the private enforcement, a survey conducted for thirty-two countries can be found in the International 
Competition Network, Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement in Cartel Cases 27. 
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generally fact-driven71 and the proof is often revolving upon economic evidence (such as 
market analysis, pricing trends and the like).72 Thirdly, evidence of anti-competitive 
violations is particularly hard to find for two main reasons: on one hand, cartels are often 
concealed and infringers have an incentive to avoid leaving documental evidence;73 on the 
other, relevant evidence is often in the hands of the alleged infringer, meaning that, as often 
as not, the regulatory body or the claimant is not aware of its existence or does not have 
access to it. Details of pricing structures and evidence of cartel are often contained in 
internal company documents. In the case of tight oligopolistic markets, for instance, 
demonstrating that prices charged by undertakings are nearly identical is not sufficient to 
establish an infringement. Similar prices could be the totally lawful commercial response to 
a transparent market with few leading market players. In such cases, the undertaking’s 
documentation would be necessary to prove a cartel.74 Problems of access to evidence are 
found also for Article 102 TFEU violations, especially for exploitative abuses,75 for the 
inherent difficulties of proving, for instance, an abuse of excessive pricing76 or 
discriminatory treatment of customers. Also evidence of exclusionary conducts, however, 
may be difficult to produce. Consider, for instance, the case of price squeezing (i.e. a form 
of pricing behaviour by a company that, being dominant in both an upstream and 
downstream market, charges a price in the upstream market that does not enable its 
competitors to operate profitably in the downstream market). For the proof of such 
                                               
71 IAN FORRESTER, ‘A Bush in Need of Pruning: the Luxuriant Growth of “Light Judicial Review”’ in 
CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN and MEL MARQUIS (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2009: The 
Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing 2011) 410. 
72 BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea 217. 
73 For reference to the ‘clandestine fashion’ in which cartels usually take place, see joined cases C-204/00 P, 
C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland A/S, Irish Cement Ltd, 
Ciments français SA, Italcementi - Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA, Buzzi Unicem SpA and Cementir - 
Cementerie del Tirreno SpA v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, paras. 55–57. Contra, see KPE LASOK, ‘Some 
Procedural Aspects and How They Could/Should be Reformed’ in Cross-border EU Competition Law Actions 
(Hart Publishing 2013) 212. The Author believes that competition cases are not atypical so far as concerns 
matters such as the burden and standard of proof, and that the problems caused by the fact that illegal anti-
competitive arrangements are often deliberately hidden are not unique to competition law: ‘civil frauds are, 
likewise, typically hidden from view.’ 
74 RILEY, ‘Beyond Leniency: Enhancing Enforcement in EC Antitrust Law’ 383. 
75 RINO CAIAZZO, ‘L’azione risarcitoria, l’onere della prova e gli strumenti processuali ai sensi del diritto 
italiano’ in Dizionario sistematico del diritto della concorrenza (Jovene 2013) 324. 
76 Compare JONATHAN FAULL and ALI NIKPAY (eds), The EC Law of Competition (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2007) 399, who observe how: ‘[t]he United Brands case highlights the major difficulties of 
proof associated with finding an abuse of excessive pricing, and probably explains the relative dearth of 
instances in which the Commission has intervened.’ Examples of cases of excessive pricing were evidence was 
considered ‘insufficient’ to prove the infringement are: C-27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands 
Continentaal BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207; C-298/83 Comité des industries cinématographiques des 
Communautés européennes (CICCE) v Commission [1985] ECR 1105; Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of 
Helsingborg (case COMP/36.568) [2006]; Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg (COMP/36.570) [2006]. 
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behaviour, the squeezed company is required to be in possession of data usually very 
difficult to access, such as the cost structure of the dominant company. Fourthly, economic 
evidence may not be conclusive, because the weight to be attributed to specific item of 
evidence often hinges upon the economic theory or model in question and the plausibility of 
the assumption on which it is based.77 Fifthly, even when such economic evidence is 
available, it is hard to present it to the (review or civil) judge in such a way to make the 
conclusions convincing, due to the inherently different knowledge of adjudicators and 
experts. This challenge is compounded by the general reluctance of judges (especially 
national ones) to go into the details of economic probation theories. Sixthly, the interference 
of the gathering of evidence with fundamental rights makes the fact-finding process even 
more arduous. All these issues can be referred to both the public and the private 
enforcement. Chapter II is devoted to the analysis of the evidence-related issues in 
competition law proceedings. The framework of EU public and private enforcement is set 
out below.   
 
4) LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EU PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
 
From 1962 to 2004, the public enforcement of EU competition law was governed by the 
provisions contained in Council Regulation (EEC) 17/62,78 the first Regulation 
implementing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty). Pursuant to this Regulation, the enforcement was 
based on a notification process, by means of which the information upon an agreement or 
practice was filed to the Commission on a voluntary basis. The Commission could then 
issue a decision granting the agreement negative clearance or an individual exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU.  
 In the need of a system ensuring effectiveness, on the one hand, and simplified 
administration to the greatest possible extent, on the other,79 the Council enacted Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003 (also called ‘New Regulation on Procedure’),80 which entered into force on 1 
                                               
77 IOANNIS LIANOS, ‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A 
European View’ in IOANNIS LIANOS and IOANNIS KOKKORIS (eds), The Reform of EC Competition 
Law (Kluwer Law International 2010) 293. 
78 Council Regulation No 17 of 21 February 1962 Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty [1962], OJ 
13/204. 
79 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Recital (2). 
80 Regulation (EC) 1/2003.  
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May 2004, repealing and replacing Council Regulation (EEC) 17/62. In the old regime, the 
European Commission’s resources were principally devoted to the process of notifications, 
rather than to the detection of ‘hard-core’ competition law infringements. This allocation of 
resources was perceived as a betrayal of the original goals of effective supervision that the 
EC Treaty (now, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) had set.81 Under 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 the notification and exemption system was abolished and replaced 
by a decentralised system, in which all competition authorities and national courts of the 
Member States had power to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in their entirety: a directly 
applicable system.82 The rationale for the change from an ex ante to an ex post control was 
the need for a better allocation of the scarce resources of the Directorate-General for 
Competition (DG COMP).83 Regulation (EC) 1/2003 also strengthened the investigatory 
powers of the European Commission.  
 The public enforcement of EU competition law is entrusted to both the European 
Commission and the NCAs. As observed by some commentators, since the entering into 
force of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the major enforcers of EU competition law have been the 
NCAs, adopting nearly 90% of the overall amount of decisions taken.84 Nonetheless, the 
enforcement output of the European Commission has not decreased, and the Commission 
maintains its role as guiding institution for the enforcement of EU competition law. Only 
one provision of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, however, concerns evidence: Article 2 on the 
allocation of the burden of proof, to be read in conjunction with Recital (5).   
 
A) European Commission 
 
At the EU level, the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is essentially the 
responsibility of one institution, the European Commission. The procedure before the 
                                               
81 See Article 83(2)(b) of the EC Treaty: ‘to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 81(3), taking 
into account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify administration to the 
greatest possible extent on the other’ and now, with exactly the same wording, Article 103(2)(b) TFEU. 
Compare also Recital (2) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, stating: ‘[…] Under Article 83(2)(b) [now 103] of the 
Treaty, account must be taken in this regard of the need to ensure effective supervision, on the one hand, and 
to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent, on the other.’ 
82 EU competition law can be applied by national competition authorities and national courts in the context of 
domestic matters when competition law infringements do not affect trade between Member States. 
83 WOUTER P.J. WILS, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective’ (2013) 4 Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 321, 322. 
84 WILS, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective’, 323–324. The Author illustrates how, in the 
period of time running from 1 May 2004 to the end of 2012, the national competition authorities adopted 646 
final decisions, whereas the European Commission only took 88 final decisions, i.e. 12% of the total number 
of decisions. 
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Commission is mainly based on written statements and inquisitive investigation. The 
Commission’s investigation and procedure are administrative in nature.85 As explained 
further below, the Commission enjoys broad powers of investigation and enforcement. 
 The investigation of the European Commission may be triggered by a complaint 
lodged by a private party;86 or may start ex officio due to information collected in different 
ways (press reports, anonymous tip-offs, research, other proceedings, information gathered 
from leniency applications, referral by a NCA, and so on). Not only the Commission is 
entitled to reject any complaints submitted in violation of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, but also 
the Commission is not required to adopt a final decision in relation to every complaint 
received.87 Detailed guidelines for the proceedings are provided by Regulation (EC) 
773/2004.88 The content of the complaint is set forth by Form C annexed to Regulation (EC) 
                                               
85 See text accompanying footnotes 33 to 38 above. 
86 Any physical or legal person (including trade unions, trade associations, consumer associations, individual 
consumers and Member States) may file a complaint if they bear a legitimate interest, meaning that they 
somehow have to be or have to have been harmed by the alleged infringement. Compare Article 7(2) of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on the Handling of Complaints by the 
Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty of 27 April 2004, 65–77, paras. 36-39, a ‘legitimate 
interest’ can be found where undertakings (themselves or through associations that are entitled to represent 
their interests) are operating in the relevant market or where the conduct complained of is liable to directly and 
adversely affect their interests: ‘This confirms the established practice of the Commission which has accepted 
that a legitimate interest can, for instance, be claimed by the parties to the agreement or practice which is the 
subject of the complaint, by competitors whose interests have allegedly been damaged by the behaviour 
complained of or by undertakings excluded from a distribution system.’ Individual consumers who are the 
buyers of goods or services that are the object of an infringement can also lodge complaints with the 
Commission, as well as local or regional public authorities. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, Competition Law of 
the European Community (4th edn, Klumer Law International 2005) 1039-1040. For the right of natural and 
legal persons to institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate interests in case their request is not 
complied with wholly or partly by the Commission, see C-26/76 Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v 
Commission [1977] ECR 1875, para. 13 and HERWIG C.H. HOFMANN, GERARD C. ROWE, and 
ALEXANDER H. TÜRK, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford University Press 
2011) 831. 
87 When the Commission has been resorted to with a case, it is up to it to decide whether the complaint has a 
‘Community interest’ and if it deserves to be treated as priority. Community interest is affected any time that 
the infringement is serious, or the case raise novel issues of law, or the violation has important repercussions 
on market integration. According to para. 41 of the Commission Notice on the Handling of Complaints by the 
Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, the Commission: ‘[…] is not required to conduct an 
investigation in each case or, a fortiori, to take a decision within the meaning of Article 249 EC on the 
existence or non-existence of an infringement of Articles 81 or 82, but is entitled to give differing degrees of 
priority to the complaints brought before it and refer to the Community interest in order to determine the 
degree of priority to be applied to the various complaints it receives.’ Paragraph 45 indicates the criteria 
according to which the Commission must pursue its assessment, particularly balancing ‘the significance of the 
alleged infringement as regards the functioning of the common market, the probability of establishing the 
existence of the infringement and the scope of the investigation required in order to fulfil its task of ensuring 
that Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty are complied with.’ Since Automec II, the Commission has considered 
that the possibility for the complainants to access private law actions before national courts might justify the 
rejection of a complaint. Compare case T-24/90 Automec Srl v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223, para. 94. 
88 Commission Regulation (EC) 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the Conduct of Proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L123/18. 
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773/2004, which requires the complainant to set out in detail the facts from which the 
infringement arise and, at the same time, to submit:  
 
all documentation […] relating to or directly connected with the facts set out in the 
complaint (for example, texts of agreements, minutes of negotiations or meetings, terms of 
transactions, business documents, circulars, correspondence, notes of telephone 
conversations […]). 
 
Complainants are required to identify relevant witnesses and to provide the Commission 
with statistics or other data showing the effects of the infringement on the market.89 In short, 
complainant must adduce all evidence available to them and indicate all information which 
could be relevant to the investigation.90 
 The enforcement procedure consists of two phases: first of all, the Commission 
gathers all relevant evidence to ascertain the facts; secondly, it informs the investigated 
undertaking of its preliminary assessment, holds a hearing and adopts a decision.91  
 Of these two stages, the first one will be set out below; whereas the second one, 
featuring the assessment of evidence (i.e. the allocation of the burden of proof, the standard 
of proof, the use of presumptions, etc.), will be most usefully analysed when discussing the 
judicial review of the decisions taken by the European Commission.92 Indeed, the European 
Commission’s decision deals with the facts under examination, but rarely engages in the 
analysis of points of law and it is exclusively targeted to the finding. Moreover, the 
approach of the EU Courts is highly relevant, given that the evaluation and assessment of 
evidence are connected to issues of law and fact, which are matters for the General Court.93 
Therefore, the European Commission tends to abide by the principles provided by the 
General Court or, on appeal, by the Court of Justice, which ultimately determines matters of 
                                               
89 Form C mentioned in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) 773/2004, para. 4. 
90 When initiated by a private complaint, the administrative procedure usually consists of the collection of 
information about the complaint and of a notice under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) 773/2004 that there are 
no grounds for pursuing the complaint (the so-called ‘Article 7 letter’) or, conversely, of the Commission’s 
decision, which, unlike the ‘Article 7 letter’, can be challenged pursuant to Article 263 (formerly Article 230) 
TFEU. 
91 DAMIAN CHALMERS, CHRISTOS HADJIEMMANUIL, GIORGIO MONTI, and ADAM TOMKINS, 
European Union Law: Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press 2006) 941. 
92 See Chapter II, para. 9.  
93 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, para. 39. 
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EU law.94 This tendency is even stronger when one considers the view of those 
commentators who emphasise a progressive shift of the Commission from its role as an 
adjudicator to that of a mere investigator/prosecutor, with its decisions being appealed 
before the General Court in the vast majority of cases, thus producing a significant amount 
of case law and operating as the sole proper trial judge.95 
 As regards the fact-finding process, the powers available to the European 
Commission will be briefly described below, but the topic will be revisited under Chapter 
III, when discussing cooperation between authorities and gathering of evidence.  
 When the European Commission opens an investigation, it will often seek relevant 
information from the undertaking under investigation; other undertakings; governments; and 
NCAs. This can be done either by means of simple request or by decision.96 Formal 
decisions require the addressee of the decision to supply the Commission with relevant 
information; fines may be imposed in case of non-compliance.97 The European Commission 
is empowered, on the one hand, to request information and conduct interviews; and, on the 
other, to carry out inspections in the investigated undertaking’s premises (in the form of 
visits, oral questions, and searches).98 The required information must be relevant for the 
Commission to verify the existence of the alleged infringement. The link between the 
request for information and the alleged infringement is considered to be sufficiently close 
                                               
94 Compare CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 514: ‘[I]n so 
far as the Commission must be satisfied that it could prove its case before the court, the standard that the Court 
of First Instance will require will necessarily determine the standard to be applied by the Commission.’ 
95 For this opinion on the changing role of the Commission, compare HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating 
Cartels in Europe 220. The Authors, at page 185, highlight how: ‘[q]uantitatively and qualitatively, this case 
law [relating to the enforcement of competition policy] accounts for a significant part of the total judicial 
output in the EU system. It is both a major segment of judicial review and it has contributed significantly to 
the emerging European public law of due process and the protection of basic rights. […] It may appear as a 
cynical observation, yet it should be recognized that powerful actors with considerable resources at their 
disposal are willing and able to engage in litigation, which in turn produces case law, which in turn contributes 
to the theory and practice of legal protection.’  
96 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 18(1). 
97 According to Article 23 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the Commission may by decision impose on 
undertakings which do not supply information or refuse to submit to inspections (or, in the lack of a decision, 
which supply incorrect or misleading information) fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the 
preceding business year. The Commission can also increase the fine subsequently imposed for any finding of 
infringement. An example is Professional Videotape (Case COMP/38.432) Commission Decision 2007/5469 
[2008] OJ C57/08, para. 8.4.1, where representatives of Sony Europe Holding BV refused to answer oral 
questions and an employee of Sony United Kingdom Limited shredded documents from a file labelled 
‘Competitors Pricing’. The Commission increased the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on Sony of 30%.  
98 Article 20(3) and Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 address voluntary investigations and mandatory 
investigations respectively. Whilst the first ones are only authorized in writing, the latter ones are based on a 
formal decision. Both orders must specify the subject-matter and the purpose of the investigation, besides any 
possible penalties in case of non-compliance. Decisions only are reviewable by the General Court. Compare 
HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 205. 
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when the European Commission can ‘reasonably suppose, at the time of the request, that the 
document [sought for] would help it to determine whether the alleged infringement had 
taken place’.99 The Commission, however, enjoys wide discretion when deciding whether 
information is necessary or not in order to bring to light an infringement of the competition 
provisions, as shown in Solvay100 and Orkem.101 The information is usually provided 
through documentary evidence or statements of the parties, collected through interviews.102 
The European Commission can also carry out any necessary inspection on the premises of 
the investigated party (or, where reasonable suspicion exists that books or other business 
records may be found elsewhere, such other premise, land or means of transport can be 
inspected)103 without any advance notice. These so-called ‘dawn-raids’ include the 
Commission’s right to: 
- enter premises, land or means of transport; 
- examine the business records of the undertaking and take (hard or electronic) copies or 
extracts of them;104 
- seal business premises and books of records during the inspection; 
- ask for oral explanations on facts or documents to any representative or staff member of 
the undertaking.105  
 As recently confirmed by the appeals brought with regard to the power cables cartel, 
the inspection decisions must be drafted carefully and sufficiently specify the essential 
characteristics of the subject-matter and purposes of the inspection, in order to protect the 
undertaking’s rights of defence and to avoid ‘fishing expeditions’.106 
                                               
99 Case C-36/92 P Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-produktiebedrijven NV (SEP) v. Commission [1994] ECR I-
1919, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para. 21. 
100 Case C-27/88 Solvay & Cie v Commission [1989] ECR I-3355, para. 1: ‘Even if [the Commission] already 
has evidence, or indeed proof, of the existence of an infringement, the Commission may legitimately take the 
view that it is necessary to request further information to enable it better to define the scope of the 
infringement, to determine its duration or to identify the circle of undertakings involved.’ 
101 C-374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, para. 15. 
102 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 19(1). 
103 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 21.  
104 Original documents cannot be removed from the premises of the investigated company. The CJEU has not 
had the occasion to pronounce itself on the legitimacy of the practice of the Commission to take away the 
forensic copies of computer hard driver for subsequent review at the Commission’s premises. The issue has 
been recently arisen in T-135/09 Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v Commission, not yet reported, para. 
120, but the General Court considered the challenge inadmissible on grounds that the action of the 
Commission during the dawn raid was an intermediate measures which is not, alone, subject to judicial review 
and which implements the decision ordering the inspection.     
105 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 20(2).  
106 Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v Commission, para. 64; T-140/09, Prysmian SpA and Prysmian Cavi e 
Sistemi Energia Srl v Commission, not yet reported, para. 65. 
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 Once the Commission’s officials have started investigating, the relevant undertaking 
has a duty to cooperate fully, not only giving them access to all relevant files and records 
but also actively helping them to find the material which is sought for.107 Obstructive 
behaviour is penalised by means of periodic penalty payments or by taking them into 
account when imposing a fine for a finding of infringement.108 As it has been clarified by 
the Court of Justice, such positive duty of cooperation entails the Commission’s power to 
have shown all documents requested and the contents of any piece of furniture which its 
officials indicate. The Commission’s officials may not, however, obtain access to premises 
by force, nor carry out searches without the previous consent of the management staff of the 
undertaking.109 
 The Commission is entitled to examine records related to the business, stored on 
whichever medium available. The access to electronic documents is particularly relevant, 
given the massive relevance of IT resources for storing data related to business activities. 
The Commission’s inspection team is formed by, inter alia, information technology experts 
who are trained to retrieve deleted files and recover any possible information regarding 
circulation, modification or editing of a file. When conducting investigations, the 
Commission can require the assistance of the competition authority of the Member State 
where the inspection is being conducted, especially in those cases where the investigated 
undertaking opposes the inspection.110 When the Commission considers that it has gathered 
sufficient evidence to find an infringement, it will notify the undertaking by issuing a 
statement of objections.111 Only the documents mentioned and appended to the statement of 
objections are admissible as evidence against the undertaking during the proceedings. If the 
Commission intends to make use of novel evidence in its decision, it has to bring such 
                                               
107 Fabbrica Pisana (Case IV/400) Commission Decision 80/334/EEC [1980] OJ L75/30, para. 10: ‘ […] the 
obligation on undertakings to supply all documents required by Commission inspectors must be understood to 
mean not merely giving access to all files but actually producing the specific documents required.’  
108 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 23(1). For an illustration of how the Commission used to fine obstruction 
of investigation as an aggravating circumstance in the final decision, and is now starting to fine it as an 
autonomous infringement, see MAURITS TER HAAR, ‘Obstruction of Investigation in EU Competition Law: 
Issues and Developments in the European Commission’s Approach’ (2013) 36 World Competition 247–268. 
An example of standalone fining, is found in Professional Videotape (Case COMP/38.432) Commission 
Decision 2007/5469 [2008] OJ C57/08, para. 8.4.1 and see fn. 97 above. It is interesting to note that fines are 
easily imposed also due to the reversal of the evidential burden of proof that the Commission apply in such 
cases.   
109 Joined cases C-46/87 and C-227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission [1989] ECR I-2927, para. 31. 
110 Hoechst AG v Commission, para. 32. 
111 The statement of objections is the document which discusses thoroughly, in the language of the addressee, 
the facts and legal reasoning on the basis of which the Commission reaches the provisional conclusion that 
there is an infringement of Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU and states clearly whether the Commission intends to 
impose a fine. It is a preparatory document and therefore it cannot be challenged before the European Courts.  
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information to the attention of the concerned parties by means of a ‘letter of facts’, 
encouraging them to comment on it.112  
 
B) The National Competition Authorities 
 
In the Member States, the NCAs have investigative powers which are analogous to those of 
the European Commission. A significant level of voluntary convergence has been achieved 
so far, due to the action of the European Competition Network.113 The NCAs are designated 
by the Member States to apply Article 101 and 102 TFEU, alongside with the national 
competition law, and are empowered to ask undertakings to stop the violations, order 
interim measures, accept commitments and impose financial sanctions.114 In 2004, along 
with the enactment of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the European Competition Network (ECN) 
was created, a forum for cooperation to which all NCAs and the European Commission take 
part.115 Its existence is relevant to the topic here analyzed because its main functions are, on 
the one hand, the efficient allocation of cases among the network and, on the other, the 
coordination of investigations and the organisation of mutual assistance and exchange of 
evidence and other information.  
 In all jurisdictions, competition authorities are empowered to inspect business 
premises (often also of undertakings which are not subject to investigation) and request for 
information during inspections. In Italy, a decision to conduct an inspection can be adopted 
only following a formal decision to open an investigation,116 whereas in the UK an 
inspection can be carried out at any time in the proceedings. All competition authorities may 
make copies of documents and collect digital evidence, and the vast majority of them have 
the power to seal premises. Almost all competition authorities are empowered to conduct 
interviews, some on a voluntary basis (e.g. the UK), some on a compulsory basis.117   
 
C) The Judicial Review of the EU Courts 
 
                                               
112 Article 27(1) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides that ‘[t]he Commission shall base its decisions only on 
objections on which the parties concerned have been able to comment.’ 
113 ECN Working Group Cooperation Issues and Due Process, Investigative Powers Report [2012] 48. 
114 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Recital (18). 
115 The ECN was created by the ‘Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the 
Network of Competition Authorities’, adopted along with the Regulation (EC) 1/2003, in order to ensure that 
the EU competition rules are applied effectively and consistently.  
116 Article 14 of Italian Competition Act (Law 287/1990). 
117 ECN Working Group Cooperation Issues and Due Process, Investigative Powers Report.  
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As observed by numerous commentators,118 the European Commission combines the three 
roles of investigator, prosecutor and judge. For present purposes, it is important to note the 
role played by the EU Courts in rendering the Commission’s function as respectful of the 
defendant’s rights as possible.119 In such interplay between the Commission as a 
prosecutor/decision-maker and the EU Courts as the guardians of the legitimacy of its 
decisions, a central role is indeed reserved to the evaluation of evidence. As noted by Judge 
Vesterdorf, sitting as Advocate-General, in Rhône-Poulenc SA, in the occasion of the first 
judgment adopted by the newly created Court of First Instance in 1989: 
 
[T]he very creation of the Court of First Instance as a court of both first and last instance 
for the examination of facts in the cases brought before it is an invitation to undertake an 
intensive review in order to ascertain whether the evidence on which the Commission relies 
in adopting a contested decision is sound.120   
 
Judicial review by the EU Courts in competition law matters is carried out under Articles 
263 and 261 TFEU.121 The grounds for review are four: lack of competence, infringement of 
an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law 
relating to their application, or misuse of powers.122 Usually all challenges are encompassed 
by the third ground of review but given the high risk of overlap between grounds the 
applicants tend to formulate them in very broad terms.123 The creation of the General Court 
has established a court of first instance, whose mandate entails a way of scrutinising the 
Commission’s fact-finding. According to some authors, with regard to cartels, from the mid-
1990s to date the relationship between the Commission and the General Court has moved in 
                                               
118 Inter alia DONALD SLATER, SÉBASTIEN THOMAS, and DENIS WAELBROECK, ‘Competition Law 
Proceedings before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?’ [2008] 
GCLC Working Paper 04/08 2; ANDREANGELI, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights 3; 
FRANK MONTAG, ‘The Case for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure Under Regulation 17’ 
(1996) 17 European Competition Law Review 428–437, 429; WOUTER P.J. WILS, ‘The Combination of the 
Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis’ (2004) 27 World Competition 201–224, 201-202. 
119 Compare KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v Commission, Opinion of AG 
Sharpston, para. 68: ‘The fact that the Commission i san administrative body, and may not be able to separate 
entirely its three functions in the procedure, is a given […]. The issue is whether the General Court exercised 
“full jurisdiction” within the meaning of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.’ 
120 Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission, 908 (emphasis added).  
121 The legal consequences of successful actions brought under Article 263 and 261 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union are (i) the annulment of the decision or of a part of it, and (ii) the 
cancellation, reduction or increase of the imposed fine respectively. 
122 Article 263(2) TFEU. 
123 ALISON JONES and BRENDA SUFIN, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 1135. 
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the direction of a prosecution/judge relationship, in which the Commission’s formal 
decision plays the role of a statement of the case for the prosecution, which is then judicially 
tested before the General Court.124 Without going so far as to affirm a ‘de facto separation 
of functions’, it can be agreed that the EU judicial review has been driven, in part, by the 
willingness of undertakings to challenge all aspects of the Commission’s decision.125 While 
compelled to ensure that the Commission’s decisions contain adequate reasoning, are 
supported by sufficient evidence and are not manifestly erroneous, the General Court 
generally refrains from encroaching the margin of appreciation of the Commission.126   
 The judicial review of the EU Courts has assumed four main directions in 
competition law matters: (i) the interpretation of substantive law; (ii) the legal protection of 
the due process127 and of the rights of defence; (iii) the review of the amount of imposed 
fines; (iv) the test of evidence,128 in particular by means of attacking the factual basis of the 
case (but only rarely the existence of the infringement tout court or the anti-competitive 
effects of it) and challenging the sufficiency of evidence gathered by the Commission to 
ground it. When performing this test, two main aspects are reviewed by the EU Courts: the 
protection of rights which are directly involved by the gathering of evidence (such as the 
right to privacy and the privilege against self-incrimination); and inter-related issues of fact 
and law (such as the allocation of the burden of proof, the standard of proof, the probative 
strength of evidence and so on). This test of evidence is very broad and amounts, in effect, 
to an appeal on the merits (as opposed to a mere administrative review).129 When 
performing the test of evidence over Commission’s decisions, especially with regard to 
issues that are positioned in the middle of the two domains of substantive and procedural 
                                               
124 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 219-220. 
125 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 184. 
126 DAVID BAILEY, ‘Scope of Judicial Review under Article 81 EC’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law 
Review 1327, 1328. 
127 In recent judgements, the CJEU clarified that protracted judicial review, as a procedural irregularity which 
violates Article 47(2) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights, entitles the party concerned to claim 
compensation for the damage caused by the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time. The claim must be 
brought before the General Court sitting in a different composition from that which heard the dispute giving 
rise to the procedure. See case C-40/12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH v Commission, not yet reported, 
paras. 89–90 and C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt - Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission [2009] 
ECR I-6155, para. 195. In previous judgments, the Court of Justice had reduced the fine directly, in order to 
make up for the excessive length of proceedings before the General Court. See C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe 
GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, para. 48.   
128 ANDREAS SCORDAMAGLIA-TOUSIS, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling Effective Public 
Enforcement with Fundamental Rights, vol. 54 (Klumer Law International 2013), International Competition 
Law Series 258. 
129 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 188. 
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law,130 the EU Courts provide authoritative guidance, which ultimately influences national 
judges (administrative review courts and civil trial judges).   
 A thorough test of evidence was not performed until the CFI was created,131 because 
the ECJ restrained itself, in its function as a Supreme Court responsible for the consistency 
and uniform interpretation of the law,132 to the review of manifest errors of fact and errors of 
law.133 Among the reasons for the establishment of the CFI, the most important one was the 
necessity of providing ‘detailed examination of complex facts, particularly – but not 
exclusively – in competition cases […]’.134 In filling in the gap, the Court of First Instance 
redefined its jurisdiction,135 progressively assuming the tasks of fully reassessing the 
evidence presented.136 Accordingly, the judicial review of the EU Courts encompasses a 
thorough re-examination of the evidence, although to a limited extent for specific aspects, 
such as the value to be attributed to evidence.137 Also the national appellate and review 
courts embark on such re-assessment when NCAs’ decisions are challenged.138  
 The standard of review for the rules of evidence applied both by the CJEU and by 
the national courts of England and Italy is illustrated in Chapter II, whereas the protection of 
fundamental rights and the standard of review for their safeguard in connection with the 
gathering of evidence and its limits will be considered wholly in Chapter III. 
                                               
130 For an illustration of the ambivalent nature of evidence, see Chapter I, paras. 1 and 2.  
131 The Court of First Instance was established by Council’s decision of 24 October 1988, adopted on request 
of the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 168(a) of the EEC Treaty. 
132 Put blunty, the function of the Court of Justice of the European Union consists in ensuring that the law of 
the European Union is observed, by means of accomplishing three main tasks: reviewing the legality of the 
acts of the institutions of the European Union; verifying that the Member States comply with their obligation 
deriving from the EU Treaties; and interpreting European Law when prompted by national judges. 
133 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 189. 
134 NICHOLAS FORWOOD, ‘The Court of First Instance, its Development, and Future Role in the Legal 
Architecture of the European Union’ in ANTHONY ARNULL and others (eds), Continuity and Change in EU 
Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacob (Oxford University Press 2008) 37. 
135 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 190. The Authors observe that: ‘[t]he Court of 
First Instance was opening for itself a large new field of jurisdiction […]. Review of the facts de novo was 
very much an inventive step on the part of the CFI.’  
136 This task was declined by the Court of First Instance at an earlier stages of its activity, as showed in joined 
cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and PPG Vernante 
Pennitalia SpA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, paras. 319-320: ‘[T]he Court considers that, although a 
Community court may, as part of the judicial review of the acts of the Community administration, partially 
annul a Commission decision in the field of competition, that does not mean that it has jurisdiction to remake 
the contested decision. The assumption of such jurisdiction could disturb the inter-institutional balance 
established by the Treaty and would risk prejudicing the rights of defence. In the light of those factors, the 
Court considers that it is not for itself […] to carry out a comprehensive re-assessment of the evidence before 
it, nor to draw conclusions from that evidence in the light of the rules on competition.’  
137 BAILEY, ‘Scope of Judicial Review under Article 81 EC’ 1331. 
138 See, for Italy, Council of State, 2 February 2004, decision no. 926, para. 3.3; and for England, see fn. 16 
above. 
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5) LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EU PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
 
Private enforcement of EU competition law provisions is defined as any type of civil 
domestic litigation by private claimants in order to enforce EU competition law. Private 
enforcement does not include the participation of private parties in proceedings before the 
European Commission or before national competition authorities either as direct 
complainants139 or as mere interveners.140 In other words, it is limited to litigation and 
alternative dispute resolution, and it encompasses both stand-alone and follow-on actions.141 
 In contrast to ‘privately triggered public enforcement’,142 ‘[p]rivate enforcement 
actions are paid for by the individual bringing the action, and that individual can recoup the 
money paid out as part of the award of compensation if the action is successful’.143 The 
Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for 
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules144 contends that the goals of the two types of enforcement 
define their differences. Both aim at increasing deterrence and compliance of competition 
law provisions; but providing compensation for a loss caused by a breach of the law is the 
                                               
139 See above fn. 86. 
140 ASSIMAKIS P. KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts (Hart Publishing Limited 2008) 1. 
141 This latter distinction is very important for the purposes of the present dissertation, because of the different 
role played by evidence in the two types of actions. Notably, a stand-alone action is an action taken by a 
private individual in a competition case where the public enforcement has not previously intervened. In such 
actions, the claimant is burdened with the tricky task of providing all evidence of the infringement from 
scratch, without being able to rely on preceding decisions issued by a public authority. This can happen either 
when a claimant alleges an infringement in the context of a damage action or when a claimant uses 
competition provisions as a shield, in order to justify a breach of contract or the violation of an intellectual 
property right. Conversely, in follow-on actions the claimant does not have to demonstrate the anti-competitive 
infringement on his or her own, given that he or she can lean on the decision of the public authority which 
produces erga omnes effects. In such actions, the claimant’s position is significantly more favourable, 
especially if one considers that public authorities’ decisions, on occasions, may have binding effect on the 
national judge. As it will be illustrate further on in the thesis, this is the case, for instance, of Commission’s 
decisions for the national judges of the Member States, and of the CAT for decisions taken by the OFT in the 
United Kingdom. 
142 This wording is used by FRANCIS G. JACOBS and THOMAS DEISENHOFER, ‘Procedural Aspects of 
the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: A Community Perspective’ in CLAUS-DIETER 
EHLERMANN and ISABELLA ATANASIU (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective 
Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Publishing 2003) 197. 
143 Conversely, in public enforcement the relevant competition authorities trigger and pursue the investigations 
and issue orders and sanctions for the ascertained violations. See Commission Staff Working Paper Annex to 
the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules [2005] SEC (2005) 1732, 3. 
144 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules’ [2008] SEC (2008) 404. 
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role of private enforcement alone.145 Thus, public and private enforcement differ for the 
consequences that they entail once the infringement has been found. In the Commission’s 
White Paper,146 the relationship between public and private enforcement is defined as 
complementary,147 given that private enforcement, in combination with the action of public 
authorities, increases deterrence and reduces transgressions of the law.148 The 
complementary function of the private enforcement is stressed also by Regulation (EC) 
1/2003 which, at Recital (7),149 underlines the vital role played by national courts in the 
private enforcement.   
 If this definition of private enforcement is accepted, private antitrust actions are 
always civil proceedings.150 This observation is particularly important when dealing with 
evidence, because the different nature of the public and private proceedings directly reflects 
on the management and assessment of evidence and poses, to some extent, different 
problems. Since the CJEU cannot hear private law suits,151 the private enforcement of the 
EU competition rules is a matter of national courts,152 which are empowered to apply them 
by Article 6 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Each national court will apply its own rules of 
                                               
145 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules [2008] SEC (2008) 404 17. The White Paper deals exclusively with damages actions, 
which are the paramount expression of EU private enforcement. Other common forms of private enforcement 
are actions for injunctive relief, actions for nullity, actions for restitution, actions for declaratory judgments, 
and rescission, besides defensive litigation. When competition law provisions act as a sword, they represent 
the grounds for an action seeking compensation or other relief; when they are used as a shield, they come into 
play as a defence of the party who undergoes the civil proceedings. Common shield actions are counter-actions 
against the enforcement of a contract or against the enforcement of other rights, such as, for instance, IP rights, 
when their implementation qualifies as an abuse of dominance. Compare also KOMNINOS, EC Private 
Antitrust Enforcement 2–3. 
146 White Paper on  Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final. 
147 Compare Recital (7) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and Article 15 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. 
148 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules 20–21. 
149 Recital (7) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides that ‘[w]hen deciding disputes between private individuals, 
[the national courts] protect the subjective rights under Community law, for example by awarding damages to 
the victims of infringements.’ 
150 KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 2. 
151 To be more precise, the General Court has jurisdiction to hear actions brought by private individuals, but 
only against acts of the institutions or agencies of the European Union affecting them directly and individually. 
The other actions upon which the General Court has jurisdiction are: appeals on point of law against the 
decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal; actions brought by the Member States against the Commission; actions 
brought by the Member States against the Council relating to acts adopted in the field of State aid, dumping 
and acts by which it exercises implementing powers; actions for damages caused by the institutions or their 
staff; actions based on contracts concluded by the European Union which expressly choose the jurisdiction of 
the General Court; actions relating to Community trademarks; actions brought against decisions of the 
Community Plant Variety Office or of the European Chemicals Agency. 
152 KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 142. The Author calls them ‘European courts endowed 
with full jurisdiction’. 
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evidence,153 albeit in the broader context of the respect of EU general principles.154 The 
difficulties arising from such a diverse system of courts and procedures are mainly 
connected to the consistency and effectiveness of private enforcement.155 In June 2013, the 
European Commission adopted the Proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (hereinafter, 
simply ‘Proposal for a Directive’).156 This is an important development for the 
harmonisation of the private enforcement, especially in conjunction with the general 
acceptance on the part of the national courts of the signposting offered by the case law of 
the EU Courts with regard to evidence and their respect of the rules and principles identified 
by them. 
  
A) The Direct Effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
 
Starting in 2001 with preliminary ruling in Courage, the ECJ established the principle 
according to which private individuals within the European Union have a right to 
compensation for damages for any breach of competition law provisions. The ECJ specified 
that it was left to the domestic rules of the Member States to (i) allocate cases by 
establishing the competence and the jurisdiction; and (ii) provide detailed procedural rules 
to ensure the right of the individuals to claim compensation for damages. Such procedural 
rules were only limited by the respect of two principles:  
a) the principle of equivalence – enjoining that said rules have to be at least as favourable as 
those applicable to other analogous national action; 
                                               
153 This holds valid only in principle, with the exception of those cases where the law applicable to the matter 
is different from the lex loci. For further details, see Chapter I. 
154 See Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Recital (5) at the end: ‘This Regulation affects neither national rules on the 
standard of proof not obligations of competition authorities and courts of the Member States to ascertain the 
relevant facts of a case, provided that such rules and obligations are compatible with general principles of 
Community law’. 
155 From national disparities it is very likely to stem inequality in the application of EU antitrust provisions, 
which has adverse effects on the general goals of increasing deterrence and lowering the amount of anti-
competitive infringements. Compare, for such opinion, KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 146. 
156 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and 
of the European Union of 11 June 2013. 
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b) the principle of effectiveness – enjoining that said rules ought not to render impossible or 
too difficult the exercise of rights recognized by EU law.157 
 After Courage stated the horizontal liability and the full compensation principle, 
Manfredi158 confirmed and defined more in detail the standpoint of the CJEU as to the 
application and implementation of such a principle. With regard to the object of the proof, 
Manfredi identified three requirements that allow individuals to ask for a compensation of 
damages: a) harm; b) infringement; c) causal link between infringement and harm.159 
 Advocate-General van Gerven, in his Opinion in Banks,160 observed that the 
principle of liability for damages derived from the breach of EU competition law needed a 
minimum set of rules laid down at the EU level, in order to preserve the uniform application 
of EU law. The Advocate-General restated, in his Opinion, the rules already established by 
the case law of the Court of Justice, which must be observed by national courts. In his view, 
besides respecting the principle of equivalence and effectiveness,  
 
national rules of evidence may not make it practically impossible or excessively difficult to 
obtain redress as required by Community law, particularly by means of presumptions or 
rules of evidence which place an unreasonably heavy onus of proof on the individual in 
                                               
157 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others [2001] 
ECR I-06297, para. 19. The European Court of Justice refers to a previous case where the two principles were 
laid down, see C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) [1997] I-
4025, para. 27: ‘[…] it follows from consistent case-law since Francovich I [that] it is on the basis of the rules 
of national law on liability that the State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss or damage 
caused; further, the conditions, in particular time-limits, for reparation of loss or damage laid down by national 
law must not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims (principle of equivalence) and 
must not be so framed as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation (principle 
of effectiveness)’. 
158 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio 
Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA [2006] ECR I-
6619. The preliminary ruling was made to the European Court of Justice by the judge (Giudice di Pace) of 
Bitonto, Italy, who formulated four questions on issues of civil procedure concerning: a) the parallel 
application of European and national competition law and the compatibility of Article 33(2) of the Italian 
Competition Act (Law 287/1990) with European competition law provisions; b) the locus standi for nullity 
and damage actions; c) the dies a quo of the limitation period to be observed for seeking compensation; d) the 
adjudicability of punitive damages. 
159 See Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA and 
Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA, para. 2 of the conclusions: ‘Article 81 EC must be 
interpreted as meaning that any individual can rely on the invalidity of an agreement or practice prohibited 
under that article and, where there is a causal relationship between the latter and the harm suffered, claim 
compensation for that harm.’ Compare KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 175. 
160 Case C-128/92 HJ Banks & Co. Ltd. v British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209, paras. 47 ff. 
Introduction 
Evidence and Proof in EU Competition Law: Between Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 
 63 
question, or by means of special limitations concerning the form of the evidence to be 
adduced, such as the exclusion of anything other than documentary evidence.161 
  
This Opinion seems to have been influential on the Commission, which analyzed thoroughly 
evidence-related aspects both in the Green Paper162 and the White Paper, focusing on the 
challenges to successful private enforcement in Europe; and possible solutions to those 
challenges.163 Moreover, the Opinion anticipated a general trend, on the part of the EU 
Courts, to consider the rules on the allocation of the burden of proof as part of the uniform 
EU rules on proof of competition law. 
 
B) Evidence in the Commission’s White Paper 
 
As regards evidence, the White Paper devotes paragraph 2.2 to access to evidence and inter 
partes disclosure. The Commission makes the proposal to introduce inter partes 
disclosure164 as a means to counteract the information asymmetry which characterizes 
competition law matters. More precisely, the suggestions made by the Commission include: 
 endowing the national courts with the power to order disclosure, whenever it proves 
relevant according to the facts at issue and under the condition that the specific item 
of evidence required is sufficiently identified or, at the least, its category is;  
 ensuring that an order for disclosure is not granted unless the facts are clearly 
established by the plaintiff, who has to produce all evidence existing in his or her 
sphere of availability which contributes to the likelihood of the claim; 
 allowing the disclosure only upon the circumstance that the claimant cannot get hold 
of the evidence for which the disclosure is to be granted; 
 making sure that the disclosure ordered is connoted by relevancy, indispensability 
and proportionality as to the case; 
                                               
161 HJ Banks & Co. Ltd. v British Coal Corporation, Opinion of AG Van Gerven, para. 48. The Advocate-
General quoted, as reference for this rule, case C-199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San 
Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, para. 14 and C-104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799, para. 7. 
162 Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules of 19 December 2005, COM(2005) 
672. 
163 FRIEDRICH WENZEL BULST, ‘Of Arms and Armour - The European Commission’s White Paper on 
Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Law’ (2008) 2 Bucerius Law Journal 81, 81. 
164 Specific reference is made by the Commission to the approach taken by the Intellectual Property Directive 
2004/48/EC, by way of mentioning the two main pillars of the evidence-related aspects of the proceedings: the 
fact-pleading and the judicial control of the claim and the disclosure request. 
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 guaranteeing protection from disclosure to corporate statements165 submitted in the 
context of a leniency programme; 
 imposing effective, substantive or procedural,166 sanctions in order to bar the 
defendant from the concealment or destruction of items of evidence or from 
adopting obstructive behaviour. 
In the Commission Staff Working Paper annexed to the White Paper, the Commission 
fleshes out the issue of evidence, which results to be, if one considers the length of the 
several paragraphs in which the different topics are addressed, by far the most elaborate and 
thoroughly discussed. After giving a short explanation of why this topic is so profoundly 
connected with the difficulty of giving successful implementation to private enforcement in 
the European system, the Commission goes on to analyse the three main factors that are 
considered responsible for the poor performance of damages actions at the date of the 
publication of the White Paper. The first factor, an unavoidable one, is the need for 
economic evidence in competition law matters, which are, in the words of the Commission, 
characterized by a ‘fact-intensive’ nature.167 The second factor, which is also intrinsic to 
many competition law cases, is the information asymmetry. This is a consequence of the 
fact that most evidence relevant to substantiate a damage action is usually in the hands of 
the defendant, or of third parties. The uneven distribution of the evidence in the sphere of 
accessibility of the two parties contributes highly to the failure of an efficient use of private 
enforcement. The third factor is the most workable one, according to the Commission: the 
                                               
165 Corporate statements are voluntary declarations made by or on behalf of an undertaking to the Commission 
by means of which leniency applicants describe the way a cartel work and illustrate contemporaneous 
documentary evidence substantiating the existence of the infringement. They are prepared to be submitted 
under the Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases of 8 December 
2006, OJ C298/17. See THEMISTOKLIS K. GIANNAKOPOULOS, Safeguarding Companies’ Rights in 
Competition and Anti-dumping/Anti-subsidies Proceedings (Klumer Law International 2011) 210. At an early 
stage of the application of leniency programmes by the Commission, the corporate statements were submitted 
in writing, whereas now, also in consideration of the interaction between discoverability and leniency 
incentives, the Commission permits only oral statements, i.e. the lawyers of the leniency applicants make an 
oral statement which is recorded by the Commission’s officials at the Commission’s premises. Such records 
are protected from disclosure under ‘investigatory’ privilege, whereas pre-existing documents upon which the 
statement is based are protected from disclosure under the ‘lawyer’s work product’ privilege. Given the 
delicacy of the disclosure of such statements, the European Commission has so far adopted precautions in 
order to limit it: it has expressly prohibited their disclosure to third parties, via access to file, requests under 
Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 or requests of assistance by a national court; and the possibility for co-participants 
to cartels to make verbatim copies of the statements, under their right to access the file, is denied, owing to the 
fact that such other copies would then be subject to disclosure of third parties. For further details, see SVEN B. 
VÖLCKER, ‘“Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 14 June 2011”’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 695, 696–698.  
166 The Commission mentioned the possibility of drawing adverse inferences to punish the defendant’s 
unlawful behaviour. 
167 White Paper on  Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final. 
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national rules compelling claimants to formulate and plead their allegations in a clear and 
precise manner (as envisaged by the fact-pleading system).168 Since, conversely, there are 
no legal rules reducing or resolving the problem of information asymmetry, this third factor 
exacerbates the difficulties of getting compensation in action for damages. 
 The White Paper takes into account alternative solutions to this conundrum. Besides 
disclosure, it analyses two other methods to dispose of the problem: lowering the standard 
of proof and/or shifting the burden of proof. The first of the two solutions is rejected 
because lessening the amount or the cogency of the evidence required to prove an alleged 
infringement is detrimental to the compensation system. Such a solution would increase the 
risk of error and abuses. The second solution should be dismissed, according to the 
Commission, for two reasons. First, shifting the burden of proof is of no use in facilitating 
the quantification of damages; and, secondly, it could increase the likelihood of frivolous 
claims.  
 Both these reasons, however, are not decisive, as shown by the case law of the EU 
Courts, by the extensive use of presumptions and by other devices shifting the burden of 
proof (such as the concept of restriction ‘by object’). In the public enforcement, the 
quantification of damages is less relevant and the prosecutor selects well-founded cases. In 
the private enforcement, although quantification is crucial, the infringement has first to be 
established (in stand-alone cases) and the risk of frivolous claims exists only if the 
allocation of the burden of proof is ill-managed. Further confirmation can be found in the 
use of presumptions in the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive, which shows that such 
method is indeed an effective choice.169 
 As already noted, one of the main difficulties confronting claimants is finding 
sufficient evidence to discharge the burden of proof and win the case (by proving 
infringement, suffered harm and causal nexus between the two). In some cases, the evidence 
                                               
168 See fn. 67 above.  
169 A similar solution to the problems of proof was outlined by JÜRGEN BASEDOW, ‘Private Enforcement of 
Article 81 EC: A German View’ in EHLERMANN and ATANASIU (eds), European competition law annual 
2001, 141. The Author proposed, as a less radical solution than that of introducing pre-trial disclosure, the 
possibility of creating an obligation for the defendant ‘to clarify certain facts that have occurred in its sphere of 
influence’. The Author quotes as an example of such procedural rule, in the field of infringement of liability 
limits in the carriage of goods under Article 29 of the Convention for the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road (CMR). In those cases, the burden of proving the gross negligence of the carrier rests upon the consignee 
or the sender. Nonetheless, given that such parties cannot reasonably be in the knowledge of the internal 
organisation of the carrier’s business, the German Federal Court requires the carrier to provide the court with 
such information, once the sender or the consignee has made a prima facie case of the carrier’s fault. 
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needed by the claimant will lie in the hands of the defendant.170 Matters are not helped by 
the reluctance of defendants to disclose the evidence or, in cartel cases, having an incentive 
to conceal or destroy such evidence. To overcome such information asymmetry, the 
Commission’s suggestion in the White Paper was to harmonise the procedural rules of 
Member States, in order to reach a minimum degree of uniformity. As explained below,171 
the case law of the EU Courts seems to have found a partial solution to this problem in the 
public enforcement – the so-called proof-proximity principle – that can, and should be 
applied across the Member States of the EU. The European Commission started to work 
upon the Proposal for a Directive in 2009.  
 
C) Evidence in the Proposal for a Directive  
 
On 11 June 2013 the European Commission published a Proposal for a Directive.172 If the 
European Parliament and the Council will adopt the proposal or any amended version, the 
Member States will have to implement the Directive with their national laws within the time 
limit of two years from the date of adoption of the EU Directive. According to the 
Commission’s proposal, the major hindrances to the development of the redress system 
throughout the EU are still those pinpointed by the Green Paper of 2005. Therefore, the 
Proposal for a Directive is aimed at integrating public and private enforcement of 
competition law and at ensuring that the victims of infringements of the EU competition 
rules can obtain full compensation for the suffered harm.173 Chapters II to V of the Proposal 
contain the rules regarding evidence.174 Chapter II is about the disclosure of evidence; its 
Article 5 prescribes that Member States should implement rules that allow their national 
judges ordering disclosure to the defendant or third parties, whenever there is a prima facie 
                                               
170 Compare para. 3 above.  
171 Refer to Chapter II, para. 6 of the present dissertation. 
172 More precisely, the European Commission published a package of documents which included, beside the 
Proposal for a Directive, the Commission Communication ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for 
Collective Redress’; a Recommendation on common principles for collective redress; a Communication on the 
quantification of harm in antitrust cases and a practical guide on quantification, which comprises the analysis 
of different methods for quantification.  
173 Proposal for a Directive, para. 1.2. According to the Commission’s estimates, in the last few years, out of 
all cases where the Commission found an infringement, only ¼ of them brought to a civil antitrust action for 
compensation before the national judge. 
174 The other paramount innovations introduced by the Proposal for a Directive are: empowering national 
courts to order disclosure; making NCAs’ infringement decisions binding before national courts; providing a 
minimum limitation period of five years; permitting the passing-on defence; introducing rules to facilitate 
consensual dispute resolution and settlements. 
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case of a right to compensation.175 There is a prima facie case when the claimant has 
presented reasonably available facts and evidence showing plausible grounds for suspecting 
that he or she suffered harm as a result of a competition law infringement. 
 Article 7 addresses the limits on the use of evidence, requiring inter alia the Member 
States to consider inadmissible leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions 
obtained solely through access to the file of a NCA. With the purpose of preserving 
available evidence, Article 8 prescribes that the national courts impose sanctions on parties, 
third parties and lawyers when they fail or refuse to comply with a disclosure order, or when 
they destroy relevant evidence, or when they fail to protect confidential information. 
Member States shall also ensure that the judge may draw adverse inferences from the 
party’s obstruction of justice. In particular, the judge may presume that sufficient proof had 
been adduced in order to dismiss the claims and defences. Article 9 provide for the binding 
effect of final decisions, and will be discussed in Chapter III.176 
 As regards the quantification of harm, in order to facilitate the claimant’s task, 
Article 16 shifts the burden of proof on the defendant. Article 16 aims at introducing a 
rebuttable presumption that cartels produce harm. The same Article provides that the burden 
and the ‘level of proof’ and of fact-finding required to prove quantification complies with 
the proviso of effectiveness, at the same time ensuring that courts are empowered to 
equitably estimate the damages, where the plaintiff fails to quantify the suffered harm. 
Incidentally, it must be noted that the use of the expression ‘level of proof’ on the part of the 
Commission as opposed to the more widespread ‘standard of proof’ might be read in light of 
its desire to refer to an autonomous concept, which does not recall a common law notion of 
standard of proof. This choice is in line with the case law of the EU Courts, which patently 
dodge the use of the wording ‘standard of proof’. The fact itself that a proposal of legislative 
intervention cannot avoid reference to the concept, however, seems to endorse the 
observation that the notion underlay the EU legal system of competition law. 
 Essentially, the Proposal is directed at making it easier to prove elements of damages 
action, and, in order to do so, great recourse is made to the device of the shifting of the 
burden of proof. This device is used not only in relation to the proof of the alleged 
infringement, but also with regard to the pass-on defence.177 Where in an action for damages 
                                               
175 This topic is set out in detail in Chapter III, para. 2 D) c). 
176 See Chapter III, para. 1 A). 
177 The passing-on defence is a defence raised by the defendant, who may claim that the plaintiff has been able 
to pass the damage (wholly or partly) on to his or her customers by raising prices accordingly. It is aimed at 
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the existence of a claim for damages or the amount of compensation to be awarded depends 
on whether or to what degree an overcharge was passed on to the claimant, the burden of 
proving the existence and scope of such pass-on rests with the claimant. The indirect 
purchaser, nonetheless, shall be deemed to have proven that a passing-on to him or her 
occurred where he or she has shown that the defendant has committed an infringement; the 
infringement resulted in an overcharge for the direct purchaser of the defendant; and he or 
she purchased the goods/services that were the subject of the infringement.178 When such 
proof has been reached, the burden of proving that no passing-on to the indirect purchaser 
occurred shifts to the defendant.  
 Shifting the burden of proof is not a novelty within the system of enforcement of the 
EU competition law and its inclusion in this Proposal for a Directive confirms that it is one 
of those issues of evidence which would be beneficially harmonised at the EU level, as it 
will be illustrated below.179  
 
6) THE ENGLISH COMPETITION LAW REGIME 
 
The two key statutes founding the English competition law regime are the Competition Act 
1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002. They govern competition law in different sectors. The 
two provisions contained in the Competition Act 1998 are Chapter I and Chapter II. Their 
wording is very close to that of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Chapter I and II entered into 
force on 1 March 2000,180 and they are intended to operate and to be interpreted in a fashion 
consistent with their EU equivalents.181 More specifically, they are to be enforced by means 
of applying EU principles, unless there is relevant difference between the situations at 
hand.182 
                                                                                                                                                
showing that the plaintiff did not suffer any damage. The passing-on defence is connected with the standing of 
indirect purchasers. If the passing-on defence is not permitted and the indirect purchaser does not have 
standing, the direct purchaser may be unduly enriched, whilst the indirect purchaser, who has actually suffered 
the damage, cannot bring any action. See International Competition Network, Interaction of Public and Private 
Enforcement in Cartel Cases, Report to the ICN Annual Conference of May 2007, Moscow, 11. 
178 Proposal for a Directive, Article 13.  
179 See Chapter II, paras. 5-6. 
180 SANDRA MARCO COLINO, Competition Law of the EU and UK (7th edn, Oxford University Press 
2011) 41. 
181 Lord Simon of Highbury, Competition Bill, HL, Deb 30 October 1997, vol. 582, col 1145: ‘To ensure 
smooth interaction between the EC legal and business environment and the UK prohibitions, we intend that the 
UK prohibition would be interpreted in a manner consistent with the equivalent provisions under EC law. 
[Section 60] has this effect.’ 
182 See, also, para. 8 A) below. 
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 The Enterprise Act 2002 deals mainly with merger control and market investigation 
references. It is important to note that the Enterprise Act 2002 established a stand-alone 
provision183 which rendered cartel infringements a criminal offence,184 permitting to impose 
on individuals jail sentences up to a maximum of five years and/or financial sanctions,185 
and competition disqualifications orders.186 Whilst the criminal offence extends exclusively 
to the UK (i.e. directly or indirectly fixing a price for the supply of a product or service in 
the UK; limiting or preventing its supply or production in the UK; dividing supply or 
costumers in the UK), competition disqualification orders apply also for decisions of the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in relation to infringements of Article 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Clearly the criminal offence is a matter of domestic law, because no criminal liability stems 
directly from the infringement of EU competition law provisions. There is, however, an 
intersection (in the practice) between the enforcement of the offence and of the civil 
provision of the Competition Act 1998. Caution must be taken in order to guarantee the 
rights of the defence in criminal cases, being the enforcement placed under the jurisdiction 
of the same regulatory body, the OFT.187 In particular, the OFT is allowed to use all 
documental evidence gathered in the course of a civil investigation under the UK 
competition law to pursue a cartel criminal offence, and vice versa. Statements obtained 
from interviews by the OFT using criminal powers may be admissible in civil proceedings, 
whereas when the person is interviewed by the OFT using its compulsory civil powers, such 
evidence cannot be used in subsequent criminal proceedings unless it is contrary to evidence 
adduced in those criminal proceedings.188 In addition, the OFT encounters limitations in 
using evidence obtained by the European Commission or another NCA to sustain the 
prosecution of a cartel offence. These evidential constraints are likely to affect the strategic 
choice of the OFT in deciding which type of actions it wants to undertake.  
 The regulatory organs implementing (EU and UK) competition law in the UK are the 
OFT, the Competition Commission and the Competition Appeal Tribunal. 
                                               
183 No interference exist theoretically between the EU provisions, the civil provision under the Competition 
Act 1998 and Section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
184 To the author’s knowledge, cartel infringement are considered criminal offence in England, France, 
Germany, Ireland and Slovakia. 
185 Enterprise Act 2002, Section 188. 
186 According to competition disqualification orders, directors who have engaged in serious breaches of 
competition law are prohibited, up to a maximum of 15 years, from being a company director; acting as a 
receiver of a company’s property; promoting, forming or managing a company or act as an insolvency 
practitioner.  
187 MARCO COLINO, Competition Law of the EU and UK 235. 
188 MICHAEL O’KANE, The Law of Criminal Cartels - Practice and Procedure (Oxford University Press 
2009) 122–123. 
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 The CC (also referred to as ‘CoCo’), which is not strictly relevant to the present 
discourse, is empowered to investigate mergers and to conduct market investigation 
references where referred to it by the OFT.189  
 The OFT is the competition and consumer authority of the United Kingdom, a non-
ministerial governmental body (in earlier cases referred to as Director General of Fair 
Trading) which, in the field of competition law, applies Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and 
enforces Chapter I and II prohibitions; reviews mergers and prosecute cartel offences (for 
this latter function in partnership with the Serious Fraud Office in England and Wales).190 
OFT decisions are subject to appeal before the CAT191 both in relation to Chapter I and II 
prohibitions and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The CAT’s jurisdiction extends to the whole 
of the United Kingdom, but not to criminal matters (including cartel offences). The judicial 
review of the CAT’s decisions is performed, with permission, by the Court of Appeal.192  
 In the private enforcement, besides the ordinary avenue of bringing a civil action 
before the Chancery Division of the High Court,193 there is an alternative avenue provided 
for by Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998. Indeed, the CAT is endowed with the 
power of awarding damages and monetary awards for infringements of Chapters I and II of 
the Competition Act 1998 or of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which have been already 
                                               
189 Pursuant to the Enterprise Act 2002, the OFT can investigate where there is a prospect that a merger will 
lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the UK. If there is, it can refer the merger to the CC for further 
investigations and the taking of a decision. 
190 MARCO COLINO, Competition Law of the EU and UK 42. 
191 The CAT was created by Section 12 and Schedule 2 to the Enterprise Act 2002, which entered into force on 
1 April 2003. The ordinary members of the Tribunal have expertise in law, business, accountancy and 
economics. The usual composition of the Tribunal is the President and two ordinary members. The Tribunal 
can: i) hear appeals on the merits in respect of decisions made under the Competition Law Act 1998 by the 
OFT and the regulators in different sectors (electricity, gas, water, telecommunications, railways and air traffic 
services); ii) hear actions for damages and other monetary claims under the Competition Law Act 1998; iii) 
review decision of the Secretary of State, OFT and the Competition Commission in respect of merger and 
market references; iv) hear appeals against certain decision taken by OFCOM (the independent regulator for 
the UK communications industries) and the Secretary of State under the Communications Act 2003 and the 
Mobile Roaming European Communities Regulations 2007.   
192 Permission is usually granted only where there is a real prospect of success or other compelling reason why 
the appeal should be heard. See RICHARD WHISH and DAVID BAILEY, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 449. 
193 The Chancery Division has been appointed as competent court in January 2004, pursuant to an amendment 
of the Civil Procedure Rules, entitled ‘Transfer of Competition Law Claims’ Part 30.8 (1) and (3): ‘(1) This 
rule applies if, in any proceedings in the Queen’s Bench Division, (other than proceedings in the Commercial 
or Admiralty Courts) a district registry of the High Court or a county court, a party’s statement of case raises 
an issue relating to the application of –  
(a) Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community; or 
(b) Chapter I or II of Part I of the Competition Act 1998. […]  
(3) The court must transfer the proceedings to the Chancery Division of the High Court at the Royal Courts of 
Justice.’  
Before the amendment, both the County Courts (in those cases where the value was £50,000 or less) and the 
High Court had jurisdiction. 
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established by the OFT or the European Commission. Decisions of these latter authorities 
are binding for the civil judge.194 The CAT cannot award any remedy other than 
compensation (such as, for instance, injunctive relief) and cannot be resorted to if appeal 
remedies are not exhausted (i.e. appeal has been unsuccessful or the time limit has expired). 
Therefore, whilst the High Court can hear both stand-alone and follow-on private antitrust 
actions,195 the CAT’s concurrent competence is limited to these latter.   
 Summing up, the Chancery Division is the exclusive jurisdiction (i) for stand-alone 
actions, that the CAT cannot hear;196 ii) for all remedies available under the national law 
(for instance, injunctive relief), because the CAT is only empowered to adjudicate upon 
claims for damages or other claims to recover a sum of money; and iii) for some other 
claims under specific circumstances, due to the different limitations periods for bringing 
actions before the High Court and the CAT. In general, the limitation period for tort actions 
brought before the High Court is six years from the date in which the negligent conduct 
occurred;197 whereas damages actions must be brought before the CAT within two years of 
the date on which the appeal arising from the public authority’s decision has been decided, 
or of the date of expiry of the time limit for the appeal, or, if later, of the date on which the 
cause of action accrued. Before the CAT, follow-on actions can be brought also by 
consumers’ associations or other representative entities, on behalf of individually identified 
consumers. 
 This situation is bound to change soon, as a result of the combination of the 
functions of the OFT and the CC into a single new entity: the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA). By means of the same reform, the scope of the power of judicial review 
of the CAT might be reduced from a full review over the facts and the merits of the decision 
to a full review only over the penalty. Reasons for such changes appear to lie in the need for 
                                               
194 Competition Act 1998, Section 58A. 
195 The High Court can hear follow-on actions also in relation to legal initiatives with a broader cause of action 
than the one covered by the competition authority’s decision, for instance when the claimant is alleging to 
have suffered damages from a longer infringement than the one assessed by the public authority; or with 
different parties, for instance when the claimant is suing other parties than the ones already found guilty by 
said authority.  
196 When there is no previous finding of infringement by the Commission or the OFT, the action cannot be 
brought before the CAT. Such previous decision must be final and the public authority must have ruled on that 
specific issue, and a finding of facts made as part of the general decision is not sufficient: ‘No right of action 
exists unless the regulator has actually decided that such conduct constitutes an infringement of the relevant 
prohibition […].’ See English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited v Enron Coal Services Limited (in 
liquidation) [2009] EWCA Civ 647, para. 31. 
197 Compare Part I, Section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980: ‘An action founded on tort shall not be brought after 
the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.’ 
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streamlined procedure and consistency across regulatory sectors, in which the scope of the 
review is limited. It is particularly worth noting, in this context, that the restriction of the 
appeal to those cases in which relevant ‘new evidence’ has become available at appeal stage 
is strongly criticised. According to commentators,198 if appeals focus only on decisions 
affected by material errors or on cases where novel evidence is adduced, there is a serious 
risk of sacrificing the interest of justice. The case management powers of the CAT (for 
instance, the power of admitting evidence which was not available to the administrative 
authorities and whose introduction at appeal stage is justified) are often are conducive to the 
sound exercise of public powers and for the goals of effectiveness and deterrence. 
Concomitantly, the jurisdiction on the merits of the CAT is often referred to as a means to 
ensure the protection of fundamental rights and to warrant compliance with Article 6 
ECHR. According to a former President of the CAT, reducing the jurisdiction to a more 
limited judicial review would dumb down the intensity of judicial oversight and play down 
the quality of the regulatory decisions themselves.199  
 
7) THE ITALIAN COMPETITION LAW REGIME 
 
Italian competition law provisions are contained in Law 287/1990. Articles 2 and 3 are 
modelled on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The enforcement of both national and EU 
competition law provisions is, in relation to the public enforcement, the responsibility of the 
Autorità Garante del Commercio e del Mercato (AGCM, also known as ‘Antitrust 
Authority’) established in 1990. It operates as an independent body. Besides the 
enforcement of competition law, it also protects consumers from unfair commercial 
practices and misleading advertising.  
 The judicial review over the decisions of the AGCM, which is located in Rome, is 
exercised by the Regional Administrative Tribunal (TAR) of Lazio, which has an exclusive 
competence to review its decisions.200 The review, which is limited to issues of law, is 
extended to encompass the merits of the case in relation to the sanctions imposed by the 
                                               
198 ARIANNA ANDREANGELI, ‘The Future of the UK Competition Enforcement Regime - More Food for 
Thought for the CMA?’ (Competition Law in Edinburgh, 23 September 2013) <www.clie.law.ed.ac.uk/> 
accessed 17 December 2013. 
199 GERALD BARLING, ‘Reforming the UK Competition Regime - Assessing the Impact of New Legislation 
and Challenges Ahead for the CMA’, 10 September 2013, Westminster Business Forum. 
200 Italian Administrative Procedure Code, Articles 133(1)(l) and 135(1)(b). 
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AGCM. The extent of the power of the TAR Lazio is indeed analogous to that of the 
General Court over the European Commission’s decisions.201    
 The Italian legal system provides for two levels of judicial review of the AGCM’s 
decisions. The decision taken by the TAR Lazio, as a court of first instance, can be 
challenged as for its legitimacy, before the Council of State, which is the last instance 
administrative court. As it will explained in detail later,202 both administrative courts have, 
in the practice, wide powers to review the decisions of the AGCM, in  particular as regards 
the accuracy of the findings of fact and and economic assessments. Nonetheless, the 
administrative courts cannot substitute their judgment to the one taken by the regulatory 
body, as they do not act as appellate courts. As a result, AGCM’s decisions, when they are 
not upheld, may only be totally or partly annulled. This holds true for any part of the 
decision except for the one concerning the amount of the fine imposed, which is subject to a 
full review on the merits and which can be directly substituted.  
 With regard to the Italian private enforcement, the jurisdiction belongs to specialised 
divisions within the ordinary courts, the so-called Enterprise Courts, pursuant to the 
amended203 d. lgs. 168/2003, Article 3 lett. c) and d). According to Article 33(2) of Law 
287/1990, these courts can hear all disputes relating to Italian and EU antitrust law 
infringements.204      
 
8) EU LAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU COMPETITION LAW AT THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL 
 
Before moving on to the qualification of evidence-related issues in EU antitrust law, a short 
illustration of the relationship between EU law and the national legal regimes of competition 
law could prove useful. It is material to clarify, with regard to competition law, the 
hierarchy between EU law and national legal systems. The interactions examined are: 
between the EU competition law and the national competition laws, on the one hand; and 
between the EU competition law and the national civil procedural systems, on the other. 
                                               
201 Council of State, 2 February 2004, decision no. 926, para. 3.3. 
202 See text accompanying fn. 495 to 499. 
203 D. lgs. 168/2003 was amended by d.l. 1/2012, passed with amendments by law no. 27 of 24 March 2012, 
enacted on 25 March 2012.  
204 For a detailed analysis of all types of actions that can be brought under Article 33(2) of Law 287/1990, see 
FABIO VALERINI, ‘Il giudizio di merito nell’azione antitrust’ in LORENZO FEDERICO PACE (ed), 
Dizionario sistematico del diritto della concorrenza (Jovene 2013) 232–236.  
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A) The Relationship between EU Competition Law and National Competition Laws 
   
With regard to the first aspect, which is less relevant to the present discussion, but still 
important to clarify, it has been already showed how the competition laws of the EU 
Member States are frequently moulded on the relevant provisions of the TFEU. This is 
certainly the case of England and Italy. Furthermore, both national competition laws contain 
a specific provision recommending the NCA and the national judge to interpret the domestic 
law according to the guidance provided by the EU Courts. Section 60(1) of the Competition 
Act 1998 provides that: 
 
The purpose of this section is to ensure that so far as is possible (having regard to any 
relevant differences between the provisions concerned), questions […] in relation to 
competition within the United Kingdom are dealt with in a manner which is consistent 
with the treatment of corresponding questions arising in Community law in relation to 
competition within the Community.  
 
In addition, Section 60(2)(b) provides that when the national court determines a question 
relating to competition, it must act with a view to secure that no inconsistencies arise 
between its decision and the principles laid down by the Treaty and the Luxembourg Courts 
and their case law. By the same token, Article 1(4) of Law 287/1990 expressly provides that 
the interpretation of that law must be done according to the principles of EU competition 
law. These provisions do not compel competition authorities and judges to abide by the 
procedure of the European Commission and the EU Courts, but compel them to follow the 
principles that these institutions adopt and to follow their interpretation. They were inspired 
by the need to avoid misuse of powers, misinterpretation and creative lawyering in the early 
days of introduction of the domestic competition laws.205 Clearly, the existence of such 
provisions does not have any direct effect on the converging interpretation of the issues of 
evidence arising out in relation to EU competition law enforcement. Nonetheless, given that 
the same administrative and adjudicative bodies enforce national and EU competition 
provisions at the national level, they will tend to adopt similar views when applying 
identical rules, like Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and their national transpositions. 
                                               
205 PAOLO GIUDICI, ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Italy’ (2004) 1 Competition Law Review 61, 68. 
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Consequently, it is likely that an analogous perspective will be adopted in similar cases, 
even if the scope of the provisions and the markets affected are different. 
 With regard to the second aspect, far more relevant to the present discussion, three 
guiding principles must be referred to: the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 TEU); the 
principle of supremacy of EU law (Article 4(3) TEU); and the principle of the direct effect 
of Article 101 and 102 TFEU.206 But whilst these principles undoubtedly govern the 
allocation of competences and the substantive application of EU law, they do not solve the 
issue of the relationship between EU law and national procedural law. To govern this latter 
relationship two other principles come into play (or, rather a balance between the two): the 
principle of procedural autonomy, on one hand; and the principle of effectiveness, on the 
other.  
 
B) The Relationship between EU Competition Law and National Procedural Systems 
 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have direct effect, and therefore can be enforced without need 
for any further implementation at the national level. Those Treaty provisions need to be 
enforced through the national institutional architecture. Since national procedural rules fill 
in the gaps left by EU law, the potential for diversity and discrepancy in the implementation 
of EU competition law is high. Examples include standing, collective redress, remedies and, 
of course, the approach to evidence. These differences entail a high risk of undermining the 
effectiveness of EU competition law.207 That being so, a degree of harmonization in this 
field is highly desirable, without impairing those national differences which ought not to be 
ruled out. Harmonization of procedural provisions would be the only way to rule out those 
differences, if ever, since the current negative integration approach is not sufficient to 
provide Member States with a clear guidance, nor a reference for eliminating inequalities 
and discrimination.208 While some substantive rules like the allocation of the legal burden of 
proof are contained in Regulation (EC) 1/2003, and are therefore directly applicable by 
NCAs and national judges, procedural rules should theoretically remain a matter for national 
provisions.209  
                                               
206 MARCO COLINO, Competition Law of the EU and UK 38–40. 
207 STORSKRUBB, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered 2. 
208 KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 146. 
209 MICHAEL M. COLLINS, ‘The Burden and Standard of Proof in Competition Litigation and Problems of 
Judicial Evaluation’ (2004) 5 ERA Forum 66, 68–69. 
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 The principle of institutional, procedural and remedial autonomy of the Member 
States provides that, in order to implement EU law provisions at the national level, it is for 
the domestic rules to govern the procedural aspects of the matter, identify the competent 
courts and the types of remedies available.210 Such a principle goes back to the EU case law 
in Rewe Zentralfinanz211 and Comet,212 and has been subsequently adjusted to competition 
cases in Courage and Manfredi. The case law of the CJEU expects the Member States 
domestic systems to specify the detailed procedural rules governing the enforcement of EU 
competition law, in the absence of EU procedural rules.213 Foremost among these rules are 
the rules of evidence, which play a paramount role in the enforcement of competition law. 
With regard to the relationship between EU law and national procedural systems, two 
approaches have been followed to date: the most classical one is the ‘integration approach’, 
whereas a more recent one is the ‘international approach’.214  
 
a) The Integration Approach 
 
The so-called ‘integration approach’ is the approach according to which the balance 
between the procedural autonomy of the Member States and the principle of effectiveness is 
struck giving precedence to the former. In particular, according to this perspective, EU law 
is integrated by national law and only this latter ensures the respect of procedural 
guarantees. As a result, the Member States enjoy procedural autonomy, provided that the 
two conditions of equivalence and effectiveness are respected. The less recent case law of 
the CJEU seems to endorse this approach, providing that: 
 
in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal 
system of each Member State […] to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing 
actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of 
Community law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those governing 
similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically 
                                               
210 KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 147. 
211 Case C-33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland 
[1976] ECR 1989, para. 5. 
212 Case C-45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043, para. 13. 
213 See, for the private enforcement, case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v 
Courage Ltd and others [2001] I-06297, para. 29. 
214 For this distinction and for sections a) and b), reference has largely been made to ENZO CANNIZZARO, 
‘Sui rapporti fra sistemi processuali nazionali e diritto dell’Unione Europea’ [2008] Il Diritto dell’Unione 
Europea 447, 447–450. The Author, in particular, focuses on the impact of EU law on national rules governing 
the res judicata effect. 
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impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law 
[…].215 
 
b) The International Approach 
 
The international approach accords more importance to the supremacy of EU law and to the 
effet utile. According to this perspective, EU law is superimposed on the national legal 
system, whose procedural rules are the instrument by means of which effect is given to EU 
provisions. Procedural rules, therefore, ought not to hinder, in any way, the application of 
EU law. It appears that this latter scheme has recently started to prevail, in the case law of 
the EU Courts, particularly with a view to safeguarding the effet utile in those cases where 
national procedural rules may constitute an impediment to it.216 Nevertheless, even if, in the 
furtherance of effectiveness, procedural autonomy may be played down, the adoption of an 
international approach is not tantamount to harmonisation with regard to procedural rules. 
Indeed, considerable leeway is still left to domestic provisions, under the condition that they 
do not deter the application of EU law.  
 Even if one adopts the ‘international approach’, it by no means follows that national 
rules on proof will fall foul of the EU law and will need to be substituted by EU rules on 
proof. Only those national rules on proof that are considered to hinder significantly the 
application of EU law may be elided. The uncovered area where national rules of evidence 
should be preserved by virtue of the procedural autonomy, however, is influenced by the EU 
jurisprudence, well beyond the twin principles of equivalence and effectiveness and, in the 
author’s opinion, mainly with beneficial effects. As it will be showed in Chapter II, 
considerable convergence is reached on the rules on proof between the EU level and the 
national level. This process appears to be inspired often by the target of effectiveness and 
can be considered an expression of an overall propensity for the ‘international approach’ in 
this field of law. For those (many) rules of evidence which are not governed by EU law, 
NCAs and national judges voluntary adopt rules of proof laid down by the case law of the 
Luxembourg Courts, in pursuance of the effet utile. One example of this jurisprudential 
harmonization is the one of evidential presumptions. Presumptions affect the evidential 
burden of proof and, therefore, the standard of proof. They could be considered as a 
                                               
215 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, para. 29. 
216 CANNIZZARO, ‘Sui rapporti fra sistemi processuali nazionali e diritto dell’Unione Europea’ 450. 
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‘procedural’ issue. Nonetheless, presumptions applied by the EU Courts when dealing with 
competition law matters become part of the substantive scope of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU,217 and have to be applied by NCAs and national judges in their direct application of 
those provisions.218  
 This ad hoc process of harmonization by ‘international convergence’ proves to be 
considerably smoother than the imposition of exogenous legal rules by means of a 
Regulation or even of a Directive, for two reasons. First, it is softer and diluted in time. 
Secondly, it directly gives NCAs and national judges the power and the responsibility to 
adhere to uniform substantive or procedural rules. This is valuable because NCAs and 
national judges are in the best position to embody changes and transfer their knowledge to 
the other players in the proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
217 RENATO NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles 
of Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2011) 291. 
218 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV 
v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529, para. 53: ‘In applying 
Article 81 EC, any interpretation that is provided by the Court is therefore binding on all the national courts 
and tribunals of the Member States. As regards the presumption of a causal connection formulated by the 
Court in connection with the interpretation of Article 81(1) EC, […] the Court went on to consider that, subject 
to proof to the contrary, which the economic operators concerned must adduce, it must be presumed that the 
undertakings taking part in the concerted action and remaining active on the market take account of the 
information exchanged with their competitors in determining their conduct on that market. […] In those 
circumstances, it must be held that the presumption of a causal connection stems from Article 81(1) EC, as 
interpreted by the Court, and it consequently forms an integral part of applicable Community law.’ See, for 
further details, Chapter II, para. 5 of the present dissertation.  
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Chapter I – Evidence in EU Competition Law: Between Substance and 
Procedure 
  
1) EVIDENCE LAW IN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITION  
 
Evidence is the pivotal element of adjudication.1 Without prejudice to the national 
differences and peculiarities, legal proceedings can always be reduced to three stages: (i) 
allegation of facts; (ii) proof of facts with evidence; and (iii) decision-making. Relying 
heavily on evidence to reach a decision is normally an unavoidable step. The need to adduce 
and evaluate evidence is only unnecessary where the facts are known to the judge at all 
times.2 In all other cases, evidence is crucial. Yet, extremely hard to classify. Evidence may 
be considered as part of substantive law or of procedural law; or, in alternative, may be 
considered as the intersection between these two spheres of law.3 Not all European legal 
systems separate the law of evidence law from civil procedural law and, more importantly, 
there is no single way across legal systems to characterise evidence. Many continental legal 
systems, and particularly those based on the Napoleonic code,4 set out the rules concerning 
the allocation of the burden of proof, the types of evidence envisaged, the admissibility of 
evidence and its probative value in their civil codes. Rules governing the gathering and 
handling of evidence are usually located in the civil procedure codes. This two-fold 
allocation of the rules concerning evidence supports the idea that evidence acts as an 
intersection between substantive civil law and procedural civil law and, indeed, inspired the 
                                               
1 LAURENCE IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ in International Antitrust 
Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012) 259. 
2 JOSÉ LEBRE DE FREITAS (ed), The Law of Evidence in the European Union (Kluwer Law International 
2004) 1. It must be pointed out that, in some systems, evidence might not be necessary according to statutory 
provisions or other rules which operate as strong inferences in favour of the claimant. An example is, in 
English tort law, the effect of res ipsa loquitur. 
3 C. H. VAN RHEE and REMME VERKERK, ‘Civil Procedure’ [2006] Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law 120, 120. As highlighted by the Authors, one of the difficulties of providing a clear-cut definition of ‘civil 
procedure’ has to do with the blurred distinction between procedure and substance. In the words of the 
commentators: ‘Substantive law inter alia defines, regulates and creates rights and duties, whereas procedural 
law regulates the legal proceedings in case of a dispute concerning those rights and duties. However, in 
practice the distinction is not always that clear. How should, for example, remedies in English law be 
classified? Do they belong to the domain of procedural or substantive law? […] And to what area of the law do 
the rules on proof belong? […]’. 
4 This is the case of Italy, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
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outline of this thesis. Conversely, the common law tradition and the legal tradition of some 
other European civil law systems5 identify all rules of evidence as rules of procedure.6 
 The dichotomy between substance and procedure is, especially in relation to EU law 
matters, losing much of its attractiveness.7 A European process of re-interpretation of this 
dichotomy is underway,8 but the distinction between substance and procedure still entails 
important consequences. Namely, characterisation of the rules of evidence according to the 
substance-procedure dichotomy is not merely theoretical in nature. In EU competition law, 
it has significant implications under two main perspectives: on the one hand, with regard to 
the relationship between EU law and national procedural systems;9 on the other, with regard 
to the relationship between lex causae and lex fori in the private enforcement.  
 Within the first intersection, if a particular issue is qualified as substantive rather 
than procedural, it will fall under EU law directly, and the national law will not govern it. 
Contrariwise, if it is considered as procedural, it may be governed, according to the 
perspective to which one adheres,10 either exclusively by national procedural law, with the 
only proviso that equivalence and effectiveness are respected; or by national procedural law 
as an instrument for the application of EU law, and under the condition that the former fully 
implements the latter. For instance, if, under EU law, the evidential burden of proof 
qualifies as a ‘procedural’ issue, because it ultimately reverts to the standard of proof (and 
therefore falls out of the scope of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003), such issue will be 
governed exclusively by national law, which does not necessarily need to integrate EU 
presumptions. By contrast, if it qualifies as a substantive issue, EU law will govern it, and 
reference to the case law of the EU Courts with regard to presumptions is mandatory.  
  Within the second intersection, which concerns private enforcement exclusively, 
characterisation of the issue as substantive or procedural also entails important 
consequences. It is well-known that the national judge may be required, in multi-
jurisdictional antitrust actions, to apply the law of a country different from his or her own. 
                                               
5 Such as Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. Slightly differently, Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland put all rules of evidence in the Code of Civil Procedure, with the only exception of the rules 
concerning the allocation of the onus probandi. 
6 LEBRE DE FREITAS, The Law of Evidence in the European Union 3. 
7 ELSABE SCHOEMAN, ‘Rome II and the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy: Crossing the Rubicon’ (2010) 
81 Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 81, 93. 
8 See, for instance, the original characterisation operated by Rome I and Rome II Regulations of matters such 
as limitation periods, burden of proof, presumptions, mode of proof, interlocutory injunctions and forms of 
compensation. 
9 This perspective refers to both the judicial review of NCA’s decisions and the private enforcement of EU 
competition law.  
10 See text accompanying fn. 207 to 218. 
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Consequently, in those countries where procedural rules only encompass the gathering and 
the handling of the proof, the rules of evidence of another country (for instance, as regards 
the apportionment of the burden of proof, the object of the proof, or the relevant 
presumptions) may, in principle, be applied by means of the applicable law. Conversely, in 
common law countries, where it is generally considered that rules of evidence are 
procedural, the national judge should always make reference to his or her national law, as 
law of the forum.  
 The results attained by means of applying the conflict of laws rules, however, are not 
always easy or satisfying. The main reason is that when the substance of the matter is 
governed by EU rules for choice of law, what qualifies as a procedural matter is 
autonomously determined by EU law and differs from what qualifies as a procedural matter 
under national law.11 For instance, when the matter falls under the jurisdiction of a court of 
a Member State of the European Union, for civil antitrust actions brought by individuals 
who have (allegedly) been harmed by contractual breaches, reference can be made to Article 
18 of Regulation (EC) 593/2008 (Rome I).12 For actions in tort and other non-contractual 
obligations, to Article 22 of Regulation (EC) 864/2007 (Rome II).13 This is the only 
evidential matter that is expressly governed by EU uniform private international law. The 
formulation of the two provisions is analogous. The applicable law (lex causae) applies to 
the extent that it contains rules which raise presumptions of law or determine the burden of 
proof.14 A contract or an act intended to have legal effect may be proved by any type of 
proof recognised by the law of the forum or by any other law according to which the 
obligation has validly arisen, if such latter type of proof can be administered by the forum.15  
 In competition law cases, however, Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 determines 
the allocation of the legal burden of proof. Adopting the distinction between the evidential 
and legal burden of proof as adumbrated by the case law of the EU Courts would ease the 
tension.16 It is not, however, completely clear whether those choice of law rules incorporate 
judicially created presumptions in their role as part of the substantive applicable law of the 
                                               
11 ADRIAN BRIGGS, The Conflict of Laws (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013), Clarendon Law Series 
197. 
12 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), OJ [2008] L 177/6. 
13 Regulation (EC) no. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ [2007] L 199/40. 
14 Article 18(1) and Article 22(1) of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. 
15 Article 18(2) and Article 22(2) of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. 
16 See Chapter II, text accompanying fn. 149 to 157. 
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EU17 (therefore depriving the choice of law rule of its substantial meaning, for the solution 
would be the same across the EU), or not (and therefore depriving Article 2 of Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003 of any effect, or, at the least, making it redundant in the private enforcement, 
for the solution would be the one laid down by the applicable law). Moreover, since the 
evidential burden of proof (and presumptions of fact) is often intertwined with the 
assessment of the probative value of the evidence, which traditionally falls within the scope 
of the lex fori,18 it appears that such inconvenient depeçage is very likely to be ill-managed 
by national courts. Whilst the evaluation of the probative value of evidence and the 
hierarchy between different means of proof is undoubtedly a matter for national procedural 
law, the applicable law still governs the application of any presumptions, and, in particular, 
the determination of whether the lack of direct evidence entitles the judge to rely on 
circumstantial evidence. In addition, since the probative assessment of evidence is strongly 
intertwined with other procedural law issues, such as admissibility,19 allocation of the 
evidential burden of proof, and the standard of proof,20 it is submitted that it would be 
unconvenient to subject them to different laws, thus creating profound discrepancies.21 
Preference should be given to the guidelines offered by the EU Courts in order to reach 
uniform procedural solutions, whenever possible.    
                                               
17 As the EU case law seems to suggest. Compare Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, 
Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529, para. 53: ‘[I]t must be held that the presumption of a causal 
connection stems from Article 81(1) EC, as interpreted by the Court, and it consequently forms an integral part 
of applicable Community law.’ 
18 In this regard, it must be specified that the probative value of evidence can be governed by different laws 
according to the type of evidence assessed. It is generally agreed that written documents are governed by the 
lex loci actus (i.e the law of the place where the document was drafted or the transaction concluded), whereas 
testimony and presumptions of facts are governed by the lex fori. Compare, for this opinion, ERIC 
FONGARO, La loi applicable à la preuve en droit international privé (L.G.D.J. 2004) 108–109. 
19 For the opinion that admissibility and probative value of evidence should be governed by the same law to 
preserve legal certainty and predictability, see, with regard to Rome I Regulation, ANTONIO LEANDRO, 
‘Articolo 18, Onere della prova’ in FRANCESCO SALERNO and PIETRO FRANZINA (eds) Commentario 
al Regolamento (CE) 593/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 17 giugno 2008 sulla legge 
applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (Roma I) [2009] Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 886–892, 892. 
20 Note that the standard of proof is traditionally considered as a procedural issue, but with less conviction than 
other questions, such as that of admissibility. Since, in the next paragraphs, it will be illustrated how the 
standard of proof is linked to the allocation of the evidential burden of proof, the assessment of the probative 
value of evidence, and the use of presumptions, it is contended here that all these issues should be to the 
maximum extent possible governed by the same law, the EU law of evidence, which, at the present stage, is 
established by means of the case law of the EU Courts. 
21 See, for this opinion, also MARIE-LAURE NIBOYET, ‘Contre le dogme de la lex fori en matière de 
procèdure’ in Vers de nouveaux équilibres entre ordres juridiques. Liber amicorum Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon 
(Dalloz-Sirey 2008) 372–373, who contends that issues of probative value and administration of evidence are 
so strongly connected to other issues concerning evidence, such as admissibility, that they should all be subject 
to the same law, namely the lex causae.  
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 Finally, a clash clearly arises with regard to presumptions of causation, such as those 
contained in the Proposal for a Directive. In particular, in order to lighten the burden of 
proof for the claimant, Article 16 of the Proposal for a Directive introduces a rebuttable 
presumption that anti-competitive infringements produce harm. The establishment of 
causation and the definition of the object of the proof, traditionally considered a matter of 
national law,22 would then be governed by EU law. 
 Against this background, it appears to be far more effective to adopt uniform 
European rules of management of evidence.23 Indeed, it seems that many questions of 
evidence, such as those revolving upon the object of the proof, the allocation of the burden 
of proof and the standard of proof now fall under EU law. This is partly due to the rules 
contained in Regulations and soft law (Notices),24 but to a much greater extent to the 
voluntary convergence of the national courts towards the rules on proof applied by the EU 
Courts. The flexibility in the characterisation of issues of evidence could be part of a general 
trend across the EU, implemented also by the advent of uniform choice of law instruments, 
which have substracted specific issues from the scope of the national lex fori.25 But, on one 
hand, this ‘substraction’ occurs only for common law countries, given that most continental 
systems already qualified those issues as substantive;26 on the other, it is very limited in 
relation to evidence (as already noted, only Article 18 and 22 of Rome I and II Regulations).   
 In the field of competition law, it seems more plausible that the progressive 
convergence of rules on proof is traced back to the ‘integration approach’ and to the 
prevalence attributed to effectiveness over procedural autonomy. In this vein, it appears that, 
                                               
22 Society of Lloyd’s v John Stewart Clementson [1997] ECC 193 Queen’s Bench Division (Comm), para. 61: 
‘It is common ground that the questions of causation and remoteness of loss are determined by English law.’ 
23 For instance, considerations connected to where the relevant evidence is located might redirect the choice of 
jurisdiction within which the claim is brought – and therefore possibly influence the allocation of the 
evidential burden of proof, if one adopts the view that it should be borne by the party in whose hands the 
evidence is available, as opposed to the general head of jurisdiction of the defendant’s domicile. For more on 
the proof-proximity principle, refer to Chapter II, para. 6.  
24 For the ‘quasi-legislative’ role taken on by the Commission with regard to all issues that can be dealt with at 
the national level, see FRANCESCO MUNARI, ‘Antitrust Enforcement after the Entry into Force of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003: the Interplay between the Commission and the NCAs and the Need for an Enhanced 
Role of National Courts’ in BERNARDO CORTESE (ed), EU Competition Law (Wolters Kluwer 2014) 116–
117.  
25 SCHOEMAN, ‘Rome II and the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy: Crossing the Rubicon’ 88; RICHARD 
GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 189–190; 
MARTIN ILLMER, ‘Neutrality Matters - Some Thoughts about the Rome Regulations and the So-Called 
Dichotomy of Substance and Procedure in European Private International Law’ (2009) 28 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 237, 253. 
26 As evidence of such trend in civil law systems, GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private 
International Law 190, quotes Article 3130 of the Quebec Civil Code, as one of the most blatant examples: 
‘Evidence is governed by the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, subject to any rule of the court seised 
of the matter which are more favourable to the establishment of evidence.’ 
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in the private enforcement, such indirect process of harmonization via the assessment of 
evidence by the EU Courts could enhance the effectiveness of the system. In turn, this 
would create uniform rules of management of evidence. It would also rectify discrepancies 
created by the application of general conflict of laws rules that were not designed 
specifically to meet the particular characteristics of antitrust law.27 In the enforcement of EU 
competition law, the ‘substraction’ of evidential issues from the lex fori is even more 
accentuated. Instead of expanding the role of the lex causae and narrowing that of the lex 
fori, we witness a progressive broadening of the scope of the EU law and narrowing of 
national procedural laws. Aiming at effectiveness, EU law thus covers evidential and 
procedural issues, curtailing the role of the forum also with regard to many rules affecting 
the outcome of the case. This is due to the fact that many of those procedural issues are 
interwined with the substantive law (i.e. EU competition law). Consequently, EU law 
redefines the substance-procedure dichotomy so as to serve its purposes.      
 Regarding the types of evidence that are available in antitrust cases, a distinction 
between common law and civil law tradition could be once again drawn, but has little 
significance in the practice. In common law, there is no closed list of types of evidence. Any 
type of evidence is admissible, subject to the limits that are imposed by the case law. The 
means of evidence usually accepted under English law are testimony, hearsay, documental 
evidence (including any type of exhibits) and expert evidence.28 Conversely, in civil law 
traditions, lists of the admissible means of evidence are often found in the civil codes. The 
most widely accepted types of evidence are witness testimony, documental evidence, in-
court or out-of-court inspections by the judge and expert evidence. Other common types of 
evidence are presumptions,29 confessions, oaths or affidavits, oral examination and the 
litigants’ behaviour. Nonetheless, even when the list of the types of evidence is prescribed 
by civil codes, it is not exhaustive and is normally interpreted broadly, so as to encompass 
different possibilities of storing data and new technologies.30 Usually common law does not 
attribute probative value to evidence and adduced evidence is subject to the free evaluation 
of the judge. Conversely, in accordance with listing admissible types of evidence, civil 
                                               
27 See Introduction, para. 3.  
28 GORDON BLANKE and RENATO NAZZINI (eds), International Competition Litigation - A 
Multijurisdictional Handbook (Wolters Kluwer 2012) 156–157. 
29 Although it is not possible to consider presumptions as proper means of adducing evidence, they are often, 
in civil legal systems, included in such broad category. Compare ENRICO REDENTI and MARIO VELLANI, 
Diritto processuale civile (Giuffrè 2011) 174; LUIGI PAOLO COMOGLIO, Le prove civili (3rd edn, UTET 
Giuridica 2010) 645.  
30 LEBRE DE FREITAS, The Law of Evidence in the European Union 9–10. 
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codes derived from the Napoleonic tradition sometimes set the probative value of single 
types of evidence. 
 As a final thought on this point, it must be restated that, when applying EU 
competition law, NCAs and national judges are strongly influenced by the evaluation of 
evidence by the European Commission and the EU Courts and a high degree of 
harmonization is attained through the case law of the EU Courts. In addition to Article 2 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, reference must be made to the rules on evidence applied by the EU 
Courts in competition matters. These rules could be applied uniformly across the EU and 
complement (or supplement) the national provisions. Chapter II is devoted to the 
identification of such general rules and the circumstances in which such convergence is 
witnessed. 
 
2) THE APPLICABLE LAW OF EVIDENCE OF EU COMPETITION LAW 
 
In order to determine which rules on proof are applicable to EU competition law cases it is 
necessary to determine who is enforcing them: the EU Commission or the NCAs (in the 
sphere of public enforcement); or the national judge (in the context of private 
enforcement).31 For some evidence-related issues, EU law is directly applicable. A clear 
example is Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003; the same legal burden of proof is applied 
by the European Commission, the NCAs, and the national judges. Some aspects, such as 
presumptions of fact, are governed by the case law of the EU Courts. It has been noted 
above32 how convergence beyond the effet utile standard is progressively reached on those 
aspects that are not harmonised. This convergence is voluntary and operates only for some 
                                               
31 A different topic is that of the concurrent application of EU and national competition law. According to 
Article 3 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, it is possible that EU and national competition law apply concurrently to 
the same infringement. As a general principle, the application of national law in concurrence with EU law is 
only acceptable where it does not jeopardize the coherent and uniform application of the EU law, due to the 
supremacy of this latter. Where this two laws clash, EU law takes precedence, but the Member States are not 
precluded from applying on their territory stricter national competition laws regulating unilateral behaviour. 
The landmark case in this regard is case C-14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, 
paras. 5 and 9, where the Court of Justice affirmed the possibility of a parallel application of the EU and 
national competition law, provided that the latter ‘does not prejudice the uniform application, throughout the 
Common Market, of the Community rules’. Yet, national authorities can ‘take action against an agreement, in 
accordance with their internal law, even when an examination of the agreement from the point of view of its 
compatibility with Community law is pending before the Commission, subject however to the condition that 
the application of national law may not prejudice the full and uniform application of Community law or the 
effects of measures taken or to be taken to implement it’. Compare case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice 
Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369, paras. 51-52 and Article 16(1) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. 
32 Reference is made to the adoption of an ‘international approach’ with regard to the relationship between EU 
law and national procedural systems of the Member States. 
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areas left uncovered by EU law. Indeed, not all aspects of evidence/proof in competition law 
have been harmonised. Other issues (e.g. admissibility of evidence, proof of causation, 
economic evidence) are still determined by national laws. Thus it is important to determine 
whether a specific matter falls under the jurisdiction of the European Commission or of a 
NCA, for the purposes of public enforcement, and, for the private enforcement, the court of 
which Member State has jurisdiction upon the case and which law is applicable to the case. 
These latter questions are addressed in the following paragraphs.   
 
A) Public Enforcement: Coordination between European Commission and NCAs 
 
a) Before the Initiation of Proceedings: Allocation of Cases 
 
Recital 18 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides that competition authorities ‘should suspend 
or close a case on the ground that another authority is dealing with it or has already dealt 
with it, the objective being that each case should be handled by a single authority […]’. The 
criteria for the allocation of cases between the Commission and one or more NCAs can be 
found in the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities (Network Notice).33 Usually NCAs are considered in a good position to deal 
with a case if there is a ‘material link’ with the case and therefore if:  
 
1. the agreement or practice has substantial direct actual or foreseeable effects on 
competition within its territory, is implemented within, or originates from its territory; 
2. the authority is able to effectively bring to an end the entire infringement, i.e. it can 
adopt a cease-and-desist order the effect of which will be sufficient to bring an end to the 
infringement and it can, where appropriate, sanction the infringement adequately; 
3. it can gather, possibly with the assistance of other authorities, the evidence required to 
prove the infringement.34 
 
The physical location of evidence is therefore one of the criteria that is relevant for the 
allocation of cases before NCAs in the public enforcement. Parallel action of two or three 
NCAs may be appropriate if the anti-competitive agreement or practice substantially affects 
competition in their respective territories and the action of one NCA would not be sufficient 
                                               
33 Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities, OJ [2004] C101/43 
(hereinafter, simply, ‘Network Notice’). 
34 Network Notice 8. 
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to bring an end to the infringement in question.35 The Commission is well placed to deal 
with a case when the agreement or practice has effects in more than three Member States. 
The NCAs can request the Commission to start proceedings or to take up their cases, when 
deemed necessary. In addition, the Commission may choose to deal with cases closely 
linked to other Commission proceedings or in those cases where a Commission’s decision is 
needed to develop the EU competition policy or to ensure effective enforcement.  
 To ensure consistency within the European system, the NCAs must inform without 
delay the Commission after starting proceedings (the first formal investigation measure)36 
and later on supply the Commission with a summary of the case and any eventual draft 
decisions, no later than 30 days prior to its adoption.37 
 
b) Along the Proceedings: Cooperation During the Phase of the Investigation 
 
Issues related to the gathering of evidence and its sharing will be analyzed in Chapter III. 
For present purposes, it will suffice to anticipate that the cooperation between NCAs and the 
Commission is touched upon by Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, which provides 
that the European Commission shall transmit to all NCAs copies of the most important 
documents collected through its investigations and, upon request of the NCA, it shall 
provide all other documents used for the case. Article 12 allows the exchange of information 
gathered by one NCA before re-allocation of the case to another or by one NCA while 
assisting another in its investigations. Fundamental rights are safeguarded by Article 12(2), 
which provides that shared evidence can only be put to the use of applying Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU and ‘in respect of the subject matter for which it was collected by the 
transmitting authority’. Article 12(3) is devoted to limiting the dangers of transferring 
evidence towards those countries, like the UK, where the enforcement of competition law 
envisages the imposition of criminal sanctions.38 Article 12(3) provides that the 
transmission of evidence is admitted only if the law of the transmitting NCA provides for 
sanctions of a similar kind to those of the receiving NCA, or if evidence has been collected 
in a way which would be admitted by the law of the receiving NCA, i.e. by means of 
                                               
35 Network Notice 12. 
36 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 11. 
37 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 11(4); MARK FURSE, Competition Law of the EC and UK (5th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2006) 102. 
38 Compare Section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002. See, for further details, Introduction, text accompanying 
fn. 183 to 187.  
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guaranteeing the same level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons. This 
provision does not prevent the risk that NCAs evade their national provisions by means of 
trying to obtain evidence from another NCA, in those cases where the gathering of a 
specific item of evidence is prohibited in the country of the receiving NCA - because, for 
instance, that particular means of proof is prohibited under its rules of evidence - and is 
allowed under the rules of evidence of the transmitting NCA.39 
 
B) Private Enforcement: Allocation of Cases between National Judges 
 
Ever since the recognition of the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, private 
antitrust actions for their enforcement fall within the scope of national jurisdictions. 
Pursuant to those provisions, national judges are empowered to declare the nullity of a 
contractual obligation and to determine whether the alleged infringement satisfies the 
conditions for the defence under Article 101(3) TFEU. Other elements of the adjudication 
are left either to the case law of the EU Courts (which, for instance, identifies the 
justifications under Article 102 TFEU)40 or to the national laws, particularly as regards the 
legal consequences of the infringement.41 What has been left largely ungoverned by EU law 
is the question of proof. National provisions on evidence and civil procedure fill the gaps 
left behind by the EU Regulations and by the case law of the EU Courts. It is necessary to 
clarify how the allocation of cases is performed throughout the European Union and, in the 
following paragraph, how the applicable law is determined. To set the scene, it is convenient 
to set out briefly below the existing rules applicable to the private enforcement and then 
explain which of them influence how evidence is collected and evaluated. Finding out the 
lex fori and the lex causae is a preliminary step in order to determine which of these laws 
govern the particular issue of evidence under consideration in cross-border litigation.  
 
a) Determining the Jurisdiction 
 
                                               
39 CHALMERS, HADJIEMMANUIL, MONTI, and TOMKINS, European Union law 966. 
40 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, not yet reported, paras. 40–41: ‘[I]t is open to a 
dominant undertaking to provide justification for behaviour that is liable to be caught by the prohibition under 
Article 82 EC […]. In particular, such an undertaking may demonstrate, for that purpose, either that its 
conduct is objectively necessary […] or that the exclusionary effect produced may be counterbalanced, 
outweighed even, by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers.’ 
41 STEFANIA BARIATTI, ‘Problemi di giurisdizione e di diritto internazionale privato nell’azione antitrust’ 
in Dizionario sistematico del diritto della concorrenza (Jovene 2013) 267. 
Chapter I 
Evidence in EU Competition Law: Between Substance and Procedure 
 
 
 89 
It is common ground that the provisions of the lex fori will be applied to the admissibility,42 
the acquisition and the disclosure of evidence (which is one of the reasons why the English 
legal system is regarded as being highly desirable for claimants, given its broad and 
effective disclosure mechanism).43 To determine the forum in which a private antitrust case 
will be brought, it is necessary to refer to Regulation (EC) 44/2001.44 This Regulation 
provides that the claimant may sue the defendant in his or her domicile,45 pursuant to Article 
2, according to the usual general forum46 or, in alternative, according to the special 
jurisdictions provided for by Articles 5(1) and 5(3). The application of these special 
jurisdictions depends on whether the case can be characterised as contractual or 
tortious/non-contractual. The contractual characterisation takes precedence over the tortious 
one.47 Accordingly, it must first be considered whether the matter relates to a contract 
before the matter can be qualified as non-contractual. Also, the expression ‘matters relating 
to a contract’ under Regulation (EC) 44/2001 is broadly interpreted, encompassing all 
contractual obligations existing regardless the fact that a contract has been concluded, 
including those actions brought in order to declare the nullity of the contract, therefore 
challenging the existence of the contract itself,48 or to claim restitution.49 Consequently, 
Article 5(1) is applicable to ‘all actions in which the concerned parties are the parties to the 
restrictive agreement.’50 The only exception to this rule is contained at Article 23 which 
provides, for claims connected to contracts (like in the case of shield litigation), that parties 
                                               
42 BRIGGS, The Conflict of Laws 192. 
43 Between those governed by the law of the seised judge, there are also other issues that are not related to 
evidence, like the types of remedy available, the funding devices, the amount and the allocation of legal costs, 
which may steer the claimant towards a forum or another.  
44 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ [2001] L12/1. 
45The internal laws of the Member States whose courts are seised are taken into account to define the notion of 
‘domicile’. For legal persons and associations the domicile is the place where the entity has its statutory seat, 
its central administration, or its principal place of business. For undertakings based in the United Kingdom or 
Ireland, the statutory seat is the registered office or the place of incorporation or the place under the law of 
which the formation took place. Compare Articles 59 and 60 of the Brussels Regulation. 
46 When the defendants are more than one, in multi-party cases, the claimant has the choice to sue in the 
domicile of any of the defendants. 
47 Case C-189/87 Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and co. and others [1988] 
ECR 5565, para. 17. 
48 BLANCA VILÀ COSTA, ‘How to Apply Articles 5(1) and 5(3) Brussels I Regulation to Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law: a Coherent Approach’ in JÜRGEN BASEDOW and others (eds), 
International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012) 23. 
49 PIETRO FRANZINA, La giurisdizione in materia contrattuale - L’art. 5 n. 1 del regolamento n. 
44/2001/CE nella prospettiva della armonia delle decisioni (Cedam 2006) 279-283. 
50 VILÀ COSTA, ‘How to Apply Articles 5(1) and 5(3) Brussels I Regulation to Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law: a Coherent Approach’ 24. 
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must seise the forum chosen in the contract, which ousts the jurisdiction of any other 
competent court.  
 The most common form of private enforcement, i.e. actions for damages between 
parties who are not bound by contractual obligations, as well as injunctions51 and actions for 
a negative declaration establishing the absence of liability in tort or delict,52 fall within the 
scope of Article 5(3).53 That provision states that the action must be brought before the court 
of the place where the effect or, if multiple, one of the effects was felt (that is, the place 
where the harmful event occurred). The place where the harmful event occurred has been 
defined, in line with the ubiquity rule established in Mines de potasse,54 as both the place 
where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to the damage.55 It is 
interesting to note that the most significant reason why such fora are relevant according to 
the circumstances of the case under examination is their ‘potential to be particularly helpful 
with regard to the procurement of evidence’.56 
 The place where the harmful event occurred or may occur can be, in antitrust cases, 
the place where the anti-competitive agreement was concluded, or the place where the 
decisions implementing it were taken, or the place where the abuse of dominance is carried 
out.57 Whilst usually the abuse of dominant position harms individual competitors, or 
                                               
51 Given the fact that the provision of Article 5(3) provides that the court for the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur, this head of jurisdiction is deemed to be valid also for ex ante injunctive relief. 
Compare VILÀ COSTA, ‘How to Apply Articles 5(1) and 5(3) Brussels I Regulation to Private Enforcement 
of Competition Law: a Coherent Approach’ 25. For preliminary injunctions and other interim measures in 
contractual matters, Article 31 of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 provides that application can be made to the court 
of the Member State which allows their granting, even if the jurisdiction is reserved to the judge of another 
Member State. For the sake of expediency and urgency, the provisional measure will be normally asked to the 
judge where the action is required to be performed. It is theoretically possible that the claimant asks for the 
granting of an injunction to a court different from that having jurisdiction and from that of the country where 
the injunctions has to be enforced, for reasons of convenience (i.e. because a certain court is particularly fast in 
issuing decisions, or because the claimant has more familiarity with the legal system of a country or with the 
language). To that purpose, at the moment, a declaration of enforceability is required for the injunction to be 
executed. Such declaration will not be any more required when Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 will enter into 
force on the 10 January 2015. Compare Article 39 of said Regulation: ‘A judgment given in a Member State 
which is enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in the other Member States without any 
declaration of enforceability being required.’ 
52 Case C-133/11 Folien Fischer AG and Fofitec AG v Ritrama SpA, not yet reported, para. 55. 
53 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible Company plc & others [2013] CAT 18, paras. 27–29. 
54 Case C-21/76 Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735, para. 24.  
55 Case C-51/97 Réunion européenne SA and Others v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV and the Master of 
the vessel Alblasgracht V002 [1998] ECR I-6511, para. 28. Compare also Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v 
Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA, para. 11 (f), paras. 15-19. 
56 JÜRGEN BASEDOW, ‘International Cartels and the Place of Acting under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation’ in International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012) 
32.  
57 VILÀ COSTA, ‘How to Apply Articles 5(1) and 5(3) Brussels I Regulation to Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law: a Coherent Approach’ 28. 
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customers or suppliers, located in one Member State, anti-competitive restrictions under 
Article 101 TFEU often result in scattered effects and in losses produced across a number of 
States. 
 Yet, rarely this head of jurisdiction coincides with the place where evidence is apt to 
be found. For instance, in the case of an action brought by a competitor, where multi-
jurisdictional disputes are less likely to arise, Marinari58 seems to suggest that the 
competent jurisdiction is where the anti-competitive effects of the infringement where felt. 
In the case of an action brought by a consumer,59 however, the place of the suffered harm 
will be the claimant’s domicile,60 which is usually remotely connected with the evidence of 
the infringement, in particular with the factual elements of the infringement as opposed to 
the suffered harm. Conversely, in the case of follow-on actions, the problem has little 
relevance. 
 In multi-jurisdictional antitrust cases it is generally very hard to pinpoint the exact 
location where the direct harmful consequences were felt.61 In those cases, the claimant is 
entitled to sue in each of the Member States where the damage occurred, but only for the 
harm caused in that particular State.62 In order to claim damages in respect of the overall 
harm suffered, the claimant would have to refer to other heads of jurisdiction, namely the 
domicile of the defendant or the place of the event giving rise to the damage.63 Whilst 
Article 102 TFEU infringements may harm individual competitors, suppliers or consumers, 
Article 101 TFEU usually inflicts harm to a much wider range of customers (and 
competitors) in a number of different States. This therefore justifies the adoption of the 
                                               
58 See, for instance, how the Court of Justice links the ‘efficiency of proof’ with the interpretation of Article 
5(3) in case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc and Zubaidi Trading Company [1995] ECR I-2719, 
para. 20: ‘[A]s regards the argument as to the relevance of the location of the assets when the obligation to 
redress the damage arose, the proposed interpretation might confer jurisdiction on a court which had no 
connection at all with the subject-matter of the dispute, whereas it is that connection which justifies the special 
jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of the Convention. Indeed, the expenses and losses of profit incurred 
as a result of the initial harmful event might be incurred elsewhere so that, as far as the efficiency of proof is 
concerned, that court would be entirely inappropriate.’ 
59 No special forum is provided for consumers in regard to tortious acts. 
60 BARIATTI, ‘Problemi di giurisdizione e di diritto internazionale privato nell’azione antitrust’ 269. 
61 For a general analysis of the difficulties arisen by cross-border EU competition law actions, that the current 
private international law framework is not well suited to tackle, see MIHAIL DANOV, ‘EU competition law 
enforcement: Is Brussels I suited to dealing with all the challenges?’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 27–54. 
62 Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v 
Presse Alliance SA  [1995] ECR I-415, paras. 30–32. 
63 VILÀ COSTA, ‘How to Apply Articles 5(1) and 5(3) Brussels I Regulation to Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law: a Coherent Approach’, 28–29. 
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Shevill approach, whose factual circumstances were analogous to those usually found in 
Article 101 TFEU matters.64  
 According to the Court of Justice, when it is very hard to locate where the event took 
place (i.e. where the undertaking acted in infringing competition rules, the so-called ‘place 
of acting’), it is preferable that the plaintiff commences the litigation in the jurisdiction 
where the damage occurred.65 In Cooper Tire v Shell,66 the case of a single and continuous 
infringement under Article 101 TFEU, the English High Court adumbrated the problem of 
identifying where the event which gave rise to the damage had occurred. The problem was 
accentuated by the circumstance that the meetings between co-infringers had taken place in 
various locations across Europe (Milan, Vienna, Amsterdam, Brussels, Richmond-on-
Thames, Frankfurt, Grosse Leder, and Prague). The Butadiene Rubber cartel was, by pure 
happenstance, instigated and implemented in England. The High Court expressed a sense of 
unease in concluding: 
 
[I]n the context of a Europe-wide cartel orchestrated at meetings in several 
countries, that the place where the harmful event occurred is England because that 
is where the first meeting took place.67  
 
The English High Court also noted how the claimant is entitled to bring proceedings only in 
respect of the damage occurred in the jurisdiction in which the court is seised. Therefore, the 
claimant’s choice of forum must encompass this factor too. Given the difficulty of satisfying 
the head of jurisdiction under Article 5(3), the English High Court opted for Article 6(1) of 
Regulation (EC) 44/2001, which allows a party domiciled in one of the Member States to be 
sued in another State, if this is the place where all other defendants are domiciled and their 
claims are ‘so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to 
                                               
64 JÜRGEN BASEDOW, ‘International Cartels and the Place of Acting under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation’ in International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012), 
33. 
65 Réunion européenne SA and Others v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV and the Master of the vessel 
Alblasgracht V002, para. 32. For further details on how this approach is not followed by the Court of Justice in 
those cases where there is a risk of limiting the possibility of initiating legal actions only to those damages 
occurred in the State where the judge has been seised, see FRANCESCO SALERNO, Giurisdizione ed 
efficacia delle decisioni straniere nel Regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 - La revisione della Convenzione di 
Bruxelles del 1968 (3rd edn, Cedam 2006) 158–159. With regard to the risks of parallel multiple actions with 
different subject-matters, see at 162-163.    
66 Cooper Tire & Rubber Company and others v Shell Chemicals UK Limited and others, High Court Queen’s 
Bench Division [2009] EWHC 2609 (Comm). The 101 TFEU infringement concerned, in that case, 
agreements on price targets, sharing of customers by non-aggression agreements and the exchange of sensitive 
commercial information relating to prices, competitors and customers. 
67 Cooper Tire & Rubber Company and others v Shell Chemicals UK Limited and others, para. 65. 
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avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings […]’.68 The 
rationale behind Article 6(1) is one of procedural economy and of preservation of the 
consistency of the legal system. Closely connected pieces of litigation may be brought 
together in the same jurisdiction, instead of being splintered across different Member 
States.69 Under Article 6(1), it is possible, in the case of cartels, to bring together actions 
directed to the compensation of the harm suffered by direct buyers, competitors and indirect 
purchasers.70 In Cooper Tire v Shell,71 the High Court decided for an ‘extensive 
interpretation’72 of Articles 2 and 6(1) of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 which allowed the 
claimant to bring the case before the English courts, even if only three (out the twenty-four) 
original defendants were domiciled in England. In that case, the English High Court held 
that it is the claimant’s responsibility to establish ‘a good arguable case’ that the chosen 
court has jurisdiction on the matter.73 ‘A good arguable case’ was described as ‘flexible’ by 
the High Court, in the sense that the standard varied according to the type of issue under 
examination.74 When the assessment of the correct jurisdiction requires proving a fact or 
resolving an issue of law, those questions first need to be addressed to ensure that the 
particular judge has jurisdiction. For instance, the claimants may be required to establish the 
fact that subsidiaries and parent company acted as a single economic entity in the particular 
case, or that their claim towards one of the defendant does not present the risk of being 
struck out. This proof is clearly subject to the law of the forum exclusively.  
 The Italian judge relied on Article 6(1) in order to found its jurisdiction in a case 
stemming from the same synthetic rubber cartel. The Milan court, which was asked to 
pronounce itself in an action for a negative declaration establishing the absence of the 
infringement and subsequent damages, but only limited to the defendants domiciled in Italy, 
considered that the claims were closely connected and that the infringement was essentially 
the same one, despite the multiple defendants.75  
                                               
68 Regulation (EC) 44/2001, Article 6(1). 
69 RICHARD WHISH, ‘Damages Actions in the Courts of England and Wales’ in LUIS ANTONIO 
VELASCO SAN PEDRO (ed), Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Lex Nova 2011) 160. 
70 MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, ‘Jurisdiction Issues: Brussels I Regulation Articles 6(1), 23, 27 and 28 in 
Antitrust Litigation’ in International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 
2012) 42. 
71 The second part of the decision deals with the ‘torpedo’ effect purposely created in order to stay 
proceedings, compare paras. 66-91.  
72 WHISH, ‘Damages Actions in the Courts of England and Wales’ 161.  
73 Cooper Tire & Rubber Company and others v Shell Chemicals UK Limited and others, para. 36. 
74 Deutsche Bahn AG & others v Morgan Crucible Company plc & others, paras. 30–31. 
75 Court of Milan, Soc. Eni v Soc. Pirelli Tyre, 8 May 2009 (2011) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale 405.  
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 The different issue of who bears the burden of proving the jurisdiction of the seised 
court, and to which extent, has been addressed by the English High Court in Roche v 
Provimi,76 where Hoffman-La Roche, the defendant in an action for damages following 
from the European Commission’s decision in the Vitamins cartel, sought to strike out and 
set aside part of the proceedings. The High Court was asked, among other issues, to 
determine whether it had jurisdiction under Article 5(3), 6(1), and 23 of Regulation (EC) 
44/2001, in a case involving contracts with Swiss, French, and German jurisdiction clauses. 
The Court established that it was for the claimant to found that the English courts had 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the choices of forum included in the contracts. Regarding the 
standard of proof, the High Court concluded that ‘the court must be as satisfied as it can, 
having regard to the limitations which an interlocutory process imposes, that factors exist 
which allow the court to take jurisdiction’. But such test is nothing like the civil standard of 
proof of the balance of probabilities, as cautiously clarified by Mr. Justice Aikens (as he 
then was): 
 
In trying to encapsulate the test that the claimants have to pass in dealing with that point, 
the phrase ‘has much the better of the argument’ will do to describe what a claimant must 
achieve. But that test must not be applied like a formula, for fear of falling into the trap 
of thinking that the claimant must prove, on a balance of probability, that the jurisdiction 
clauses do not apply to the present disputes. That is clearly not the correct test.77 
  
As far as the forum within the chosen jurisdiction is concerned, the domestic procedural 
rules of the chosen jurisdiction must be followed.78 The choice may be influenced by 
different considerations, relating to the specialisation of the court or the specific 
circumstances of the case. As an example, in England, the rule that requires that appeals 
must be exhausted before a monetary claim can be brought before the CAT without 
permission79 has redirected litigation towards the High Court, where proceedings can be 
                                               
76 In Roche Products Ltd & Others v Provimi Ltd, High Court [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm), paras. 9-11, the 
English High Court confirmed the direct applicability of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 to the matter under 
examination by virtue of Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. The High Court confirmed that 
the ‘general jurisdictional rule is that a party should be sued in the courts of the Member State in which it is 
domiciled’ and that concurrent jurisdictions were established on the basis of Article 5(3) and 6(1) of the same 
Regulation. The same articles were relied on in Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd v KME Yorkshire Ltd, High Court 
Chancery Division [2011] EWHC 2665 (Ch), para. 9. 
77 Roche Products Ltd & Others v Provimi Ltd, para. 57. 
78 BARIATTI, ‘Problemi di giurisdizione e di diritto internazionale privato nell’azione antitrust’ 268. 
79 Section 47A(5)(b) and Rule 31(3) of CAT Rules.  
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commenced as of right. Similar strategic choices may be taken by the litigants who seek 
interim relief, which at present cannot be granted by the CAT.80 In other jurisdictions across 
the European Union, some courts have become particularly popular or have gained a 
reputation for being plaintiff-friendly for different reasons (such as Amsterdam, Düsseldorf, 
Paris).81 
 For the sake of completeness, all the above mentioned provisions of Regulation (EC) 
44/2001 about jurisdiction remain untouched by the successor to the Brussels Regulation, 
Regulation (EU) 1215/2012,82 which will enter into effect on 10 January 2015. 
 
b) Determining the Applicable Law 
  
In apparent contrast with the adamant belief (reported especially by Anglo-Saxon 
commentators)83 that substance is always governed by the lex causae while procedure is 
governed by the lex fori, what is regarded as procedural not only varies between different 
national laws, but also from national laws to EU law. Evidential issues, due to their 
substantial/procedural nature, are variously characterised.84 The issue of applicable law is 
relevant because the law governing evidence and the formation of the proof is not always 
categorised as procedural law. Thus, once the correct jurisdiction has been established, not 
all evidence-related issues are automatically solved. Some evidential issues will be 
governed by the law of the forum (usually applicable to issues of procedure). Others will be 
governed by the applicable law. This is the case for not only presumptions of law and the 
allocation of the legal burden of proof,85 but also the object of the proof (i.e. the definition 
                                               
80 The CAT is, however, empowered to award interim relief in relation to any case before it, pursuant to Rule 
61 of CAT Rules. See also BLANKE and NAZZINI, International Competition Litigation - A 
Multijurisdictional Handbook 137. 
81 For an analysis of the importance of procedural aspects such as the availability of disclosure, a ‘low’ 
standard of proof and other plaintiff-friendly instruments like presumptions, see MIHAIL DANOV, FLORIAN 
BECKER, and PAUL BEAUMONT (eds), Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions (Hart Publishing 2013) 
67–68. 
82 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ [2012] L 
351/1. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 is fully applicable also to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. 
83 BRIGGS, The Conflict of Laws 189; SCHOEMAN, ‘Rome II and the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy: 
Crossing the Rubicon’ 83. 
84 ILLMER, ‘Neutrality Matters - Some Thoughts about the Rome Regulations and the So-Called Dichotomy 
of Substance and Procedure in European Private International Law’ 255. 
85 For this latter aspect, in EU antitrust actions, reference is made to the provision contained at Article 2 of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, which takes precedence. 
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of which elements need to be proven) and the question of causation.86 Other evidential 
issues will be governed by the lex loci actus.  
 As far as the applicable law is concerned two major problems arise: first, in which 
situations the EU competition law is applicable other than in intra-EU litigation; and, 
secondly, which national law is applicable in intra-EU litigation.87 
 Regarding the first issue, in situations where the applicable law is the one of a third 
country (that is, a country that is not part to the European Union), there are two main 
approaches for applying the EU competition rules, despite the fact that they are not integral 
part of the applicable law. The first approach is the one in which the parties did not make 
any choice of applicable law. In that situation, the seised judge will have to make reference 
to his or her national conflicts of law rules in order to determine the applicable law and will 
be bound to apply EU competition law if the relevant conflicts of law rules compels the 
application of EU law. This means that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are deemed to contain 
an implicit rule, unilaterally established, which imposes their application in all cases where 
a connecting link (or connecting factor) with the territory of the European Union exists. 
Such connecting link consists in the anti-competitive effect of the conduct in the EU 
territory.88 By means of such unilateral affirmation, EU competition law is applied in cases 
where the only connecting link is the anti-competitive effect on all or part of the EU 
territory, where all other elements characterizing the case89 connect it to non-EU countries. 
 The second case in which it is possible to apply the EU competition rules is the case 
where the law of the forum recognizes those rules as necessarily applicable in a private 
                                               
86 Some of these aspects will be governed by the uniform substantive EU law, if and when the Proposal for a 
Directive will be adopted. See, for an overview, Introduction, para. 5 C). 
87 KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 239 ff. 
88 The territory of the European Union largely coincides with the territory of the 28 EU Member States. The 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) are excluded, and so are some islands, like the Faroe Islands and 
certain enclaves or landlocked territories within the EU territory, such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San 
Marino, and the Vatican City, which all have special relationship agreements with the European Union. 
Conversely, some other territories of the EU enjoy ad-hoc arrangements or exemptions from EU customs or 
VAT provisions (examples are Büsingen am Hochrhein, Campione d’Italia, Livigno, Heligoland, the Channel 
Islands or the Isle of Man). The EU competition rules are extended, by the agreement establishing the EEA, to 
all EFTA countries, with the exception of Switzerland. For further details on Articles 53 and 54 EEA, 
modelled on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; on the ESA, empowered to enforce the EEA competition rules; and 
on the EFTA Court, see EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 115–116. 
89 Such as, for instance, the defendant’s domicile, the nationality of the parties involved, the main place of 
business of the undertaking or its place of incorporation, the place where the infringement was committed or 
where the damages were felt. 
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international law sense (the so-called ‘overriding mandatory provisions’),90 which are 
defined as those  
 
provisions whose respect is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its 
public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an 
extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable […].91  
 
It seems that, in those situations, even if EU law applies, the applicable law of the third 
State will solve evidential issues. The EU rules on proof should be disregarded, as the 
overriding mandatory power is connected to their content, rather than to the procedural 
aspects. This observation is supported by the common conception according to which 
overriding mandatory rules ‘do not exclude the entire foreign law but only so much of that 
law which is inconsistent with the legislation’.92 The foreign law will be regarded to solve 
those issues of evidence that are a matter for the applicable law.  
 Turning to the second problem, concerning intra-EU litigation, in order to determine 
which of the law of the Member States is applicable to the matter at issue, EU private 
international law is applicable. Naturally, any time that a complaint is lodged with the 
Commission or a NCA about an alleged anti-competitive behaviour, it is excluded from the 
scope of Rome I and Rome II Regulations by virtue of their Article 1(1).93 Where the 
infringement of competition law has been committed in the context of an agreement 
between the parties, Rome I Regulation provides for the applicable law,94 giving precedence 
to the choice of law contained in the contract. Separately, reference has to be made to Rome 
                                               
90 See Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member 
States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004/C 101/04, para. 3. Compare case C-126/97 Eco 
Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3055, paras. 36 and 39: ‘[…] Article 81 EC 
(ex Article 85) constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks 
entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market. […] For the reasons 
stated […] the provisions of Article 81 EC […] may be regarded as a matter of public policy within the 
meaning of the New York Convention.’ See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, Competition Law of the European 
Community 1185: ‘These provisions [Articles 101 and 102 TFEU] are a matter of public policy implying, inter 
alia, that national courts which under their national law have to apply national rules of public policy of their 
own motion, should also apply Articles 81 and 82 of their own motion’.  
91 The definition is contained at Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation, which provides that lex causae is 
applicable without prejudice to the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori. 
92 GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 62. 
93 FALLON and FRANCQ, ‘Private Enforcement of Antitrust Provisions and the Rome I Regulation’ 64. 
94 The applicable law is determined according to a list of connecting factors for the most common types of 
contracts; for the remaining contracts according to a close connection test. See FALLON and FRANCQ, 
‘Private Enforcement of Antitrust Provisions and the Rome I Regulation’ 65. 
Chapter I 
Evidence in EU Competition Law: Between Substance and Procedure 
 
 
 98 
II Regulation when the alleged infringement is non-contractual or when the choice of law in 
the contract is defective, for claims of damages, injunctions arising out of tort, and unjust 
enrichment. Accordingly, the applicable law will most often be, in antitrust cases, the law 
chosen by the parties, that of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic 
performance of the contract has his or her habitual residence, or that of the country whose 
market has been, or is more likely to be, affected.95 The effects principle is contained in 
Article 6(3)(a) of the Rome II Regulation.  
 Identifying which market has been, or is more likely to be, affected is not always an 
easy task. The task is particularly difficult in multi-jurisdictional infringements, like 
international cartels, which affect the market of different countries, especially in stand-alone 
actions, where there is no previous decision of a competition authority. In an attempt to 
reduce the costs and burdens borne by the claimant,96 Article 6(3)(b) of the Rome II 
Regulation provides that, in such cases, when the claimant brings his or her claim before the 
court of the domicile of the defendant, following the general rule of jurisdiction of Article 2 
of the Brussels I Regulation, he or she has two options. The claimant can choose to apply 
either the law identified according to the effects principle or the law of the seised court, if 
the market of that Member State is one of those ‘directly and substantially affected by the 
restriction of competition’. If the claim is brought against more than one defendant, the 
claimant has that option only if that Member State’s market has also been affected directly 
and substantially. This is intended to prevent the risk that the claimant includes defendants 
in the litigation just to guarantee himself or herself the opportunity ‘to shop’ for their 
applicable law too. 
 For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to point out that Article 6(3) of the 
Rome II Regulation was directly inspired by the policy goal of fostering private 
enforcement at the national level within the EU,97 rather than by the general goals of 
predictability and uniformity of results. The particular nature98 of competition law required 
an autonomous regulation, which is not completely in line with the general objectives of 
                                               
95 In contrast with the general criterion provided for torts and delicts by Article 4(1) of Rome II Regulation, 
which indicates the place where damages have occurred (clearly opting for the ‘the law of the country in which 
the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and 
irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur’), for antitrust 
cases the relevant provision is Article 6(3). This latter provision cannot be derogated. 
96 STÉPHANIE FRANCQ and WOLFGANG WURMNEST, ‘International Antitrust Claims under the Rome 
II Regulation’ in International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012) 
124. 
97 FRANCQ and WURMNEST, ‘International Antitrust Claims under the Rome II Regulation’ 92. 
98 See Introduction, para. 3. 
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other conflict of laws rules.99 This consideration advocates for the argument according to 
which existing private international rules sometimes struggle to adapt to the particular 
nature of competition law.  
 Article 1(3) of Rome I and Rome II Regulations explicitly exclude evidence and 
procedure from their scope of operation. Regard must be had, for evidential issues, to the 
choice of law rules of the forum, which often redirect to the lex fori.100 Apart from the 
requirements for formal validity,101 the only exceptions are Article 18 of Rome I Regulation 
for contractual breaches; and Article 22 of Rome II Regulation for actions in tort. They 
provide, respectively, that the application of presumptions of law and the allocation of the 
burden of proof shall be governed by the applicable law; and that the use of any type of 
proof, recognised by the law of the forum or (alternatively)102 by any other law according to 
which the obligation has validly arisen (i.e. lex causae or lex contractus/lex loci actus), is 
admitted, if such latter mode of proof can be administered by the forum.103 It is submitted 
that presumptions falling within the scope of these provisions are only presumptions of law 
relating to contractual or non-contractual obligation. This argument is corroborated by the 
Giuliano-Lagarde Report104 on the corresponding Article 14(1) of the Rome Convention of 
1980,105 according to which the provision referred to those rules of substance relieving the 
party in whose favour they operate from the necessity of producing any evidence. 
Presumptions of fact, on the other hand, are part of procedural law and should not be subject 
to the law of the contract. Perfectly in line with this distinction, it is argued that EU 
evidential presumptions, in competition law, are neither subject to Article 2 of Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003, nor to Articles 18(1) and 22(1) of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. They are, 
conversely, theoretically a matter of national procedural rules, but, in the author’s view, as it 
will be shown below, national judges tend to adopt them by virtue of their effectiveness.106   
                                               
99 The other rules contained in the Rome I and Rome II Regulation are inspired by the intent of maintaining 
uniformity and legal certainty and to call for the application of the law which displays the closest connection to 
the matter under examination.  
100 See GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 194. 
101 See Article 11 of Rome I Regulation and Article 21 of Rome II Regulation. 
102 For an explanation on the alternative and not cumulative reference to these laws, see LEANDRO, ‘Articolo 
18, Onere della prova’ 889. 
103 It is considered that reference is made to cases where evidence cannot be easily or practically administered 
by the judge, depending on the specific circumstances of the case. See, for such interpretation, LEANDRO, 
‘Articolo 18, Onere della prova’ 890. 
104 MARIO GIULIANO and PAUL LAGARDE, Report on the Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations [1980] OJ C282. 
105 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 19 June 1980 [1980] OJ L 266. 
106 For further details on the distinction between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact, see Chapter II, 
para. 5. 
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 It must be noted, however, that, pursuant to these provisions contained in the EU 
Regulations, the issue of the legal burden of proof may not always fall under the scope of 
the law of the obligation, as opposed to the lex fori. According to some commentators, 
presumptions and the burden of proof should be subject to the law of the obligation only if, 
according to the choice of law rules, the matter is classified as substantive and not 
procedural by the lex causae. As a result, the judge should apply the law of the cause of 
action to verify whether this law considers the burden of proof as a substantive issue.107 If 
the judge, by means of applying the applicable law, finds out that that law does not ‘want’ to 
be applied, because it treats the issue as procedural, the EU provision does not apply and the 
matter is likely to be solved according to the conflict of law rules of the judge. If those 
conflict of law rules identify presumptions and the burden of proof as substantive issues 
governed by the lex causae, it seems plausible to apply this latter, disregarding whether it 
‘wants’ to be applied or not, to avoid gaps.108 It appears, however, that the most correct 
interpretation would be to dispense with the need for the judge to re-classify the evidential 
issue according to the lex causae, to preserve the goals of predictability and certainty 
envisaged by the Regulation.109 Reasoning otherwise, the matter would be characterised 
differently according to the lex causae and uniformity would be jeopardised. It is 
established, however, that rules on presumptions and on the allocation of the burden of 
proof would be ruled out if incompatible with public policy110 (for instance, if they were 
considered incompatible with Article 6 ECHR and the presumption of innocence).  
 Agaist this backdrop, in cross-border antitrust matters, the legal burden of proof,111 
presumptions of law112 and the mode of proof113 are governed according to EU Regulations, 
whereas all other issues of evidence will be governed according to the conflict of laws rules 
of the forum.114 As anticipated, however, some rules of proof (e.g. presumptions of fact) are 
                                               
107 LEANDRO, ‘Articolo 18, Onere della prova’ 888. 
108 GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 200. 
109 SCHOEMAN, ‘Rome II and the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy: Crossing the Rubicon’ 87. 
110 LEANDRO, ‘Articolo 18, Onere della prova’ 888. 
111 Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. 
112 Articles 18(1) and 22(1) of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. 
113 Articles 18(2) and 22(2) of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. 
114 Whether all evidential issues left out of the scope of the Rome Regulations will be subject to the lex fori is a 
matter for the national judge to decide. See ILLMER, ‘Neutrality Matters - Some Thoughts about the Rome 
Regulations and the So-Called Dichotomy of Substance and Procedure in European Private International Law’ 
242: ‘By merely excluding them from the material scope of application, national laws are left to decide 
whether to apply the lex fori or the lex causae according to their understanding of the dichotomy. The net 
result of this exclusion, however, comes close to an allocation to the lex fori: Member States are entitled to 
apply the lex fori to all matters of evidence and procedure.’   
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established by means of the case law at the EU level and, due to their general recognition in 
the public enforcement and to the specificities of competition law, are being adopted at the 
national level as well, by both the NCAs and the national judges. Nonetheless, to date, 
harmonisation remains limited and uncomplete. Therefore, the relevant rules of evidence are 
still partly determined by the competent jurisdiction and the applicable law respectively.  
 As a last remark on this point, in the same way as the proof of jurisdiction, proof of 
the applicable law must be established according to the rules of procedure of the seised 
jurisdiction. The same is (theoretically) true for the standard to which they have to be 
proved. Usually, it is for the claimant to establish the relevant facts for the determination of 
the correct jurisdiction or of the appropriate applicable law only if they are contested by the 
defendant, or if the issue has to be raised ex officio by the court. 
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Chapter II – The Evaluation of the Proof in EU Competition Litigation: A 
Comparison of Public and Private Enforcement 
  
1) THE OBJECT OF THE PROOF 
 
Before addressing the evidential challenges in connection with the application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, it is necessary to analyze the structure of these norms and to state 
clearly what needs to be proven by competition authorities and claimants in order to prove 
their case. This topic is by nature intertwined with that of the legal burden of proof, which 
will be analyzed afterwards, leaving aside what already said in the present paragraph. 
 ‘Evidence’ and ‘proof’ are not synonyms, despite the fact that a single word is used 
in some European languages to represent these distinct ideas.1 The term ‘evidence’ denotes 
the display of the existence of a fact, or that an asserted fact has happened. It thus relates to 
the means presented in order to prove (or disprove) a fact. ‘Proof’ is defined as the result of 
the process of demonstration of the existence of an alleged fact to the requisite legal 
standard. It is the conclusion inferred from the available evidence. 
 According to Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the burden of proving an 
infringement under Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU rests upon the authority or party 
alleging it,2 in application of the general principle actori incumbit probatio (‘he who asserts 
must prove’).3 While under both prohibitions the party alleging the infringement bears the 
burden of proof, the legal burden rests on the party concerned if it wishes to defend its 
agreement under Article 101(3) TFEU. There is no equivalent reversal of the (legal) burden 
of proof laid down by Article 102 TFEU, but it is for the undertaking concerned to raise any 
plea of objective justifications and support it with evidence.4  
 Owing to the principle ‘he who asserts must prove’, it would run against the EU 
principle (and to the established EU law of evidence) to allow the Commission or the 
plaintiff to only assert the infringement, while charging the defendants with the burden of 
                                               
1 The same word is used to combine both concepts, for example, in German (Beweis), French (preuve), Italian 
(prova/mezzo di prova), Greek (απόδειξη), Romanian (dovadă).  
2 It is widely accepted, and here given for granted, that Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 is applicable to 
both public and private enforcement proceedings. See MAJA BRKAN, ‘Procedural Aspects of Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: Heading Toward New Reforms?’ (2005) 28 World Competition 479, 502. 
3 For how fair and natural this principle might be perceived in the European context, it is not established in 
every jurisdiction. The major example of rejection of this principle in competition law is represented by per se 
rules. 
4 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
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proving their innocence.5 The only task for the accused/defendant is to demonstrate how the 
evidence relied on by the Commission/NCA or claimant (as the case may be) does not meet 
the ‘requisite legal standard’.6  
 
A) The Object of the Proof under Article 101 TFEU 
 
The elements to be proven for an infringement of Article 101 are: the identity of two or 
more7 undertakings involved;8 an appreciable9 effect on trade between Member States;10 the 
agreement, decision by association of undertakings or concerted practice;11 the fact that the 
                                               
5 LENAERTS, ‘Some Thoughts on Evidence and Procedure in European Community Competition Law’ 1471; 
LUIZ ORTIZ BLANCO, European Community Competition Procedure (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2006) 162. Other Authors, nonetheless, highlight how the principle of presumption of innocence has more to 
do with the standard of proof to be met, rather than with the object of the proof. See CASTILLO DE LA 
TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 509. 
6 MARIO SIRAGUSA and CESARE RIZZA (eds), EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive 
Agreements and Practices between Competitors, vol. III (Claeys & Casteels 2007) 21. 
7 JONES and SUFIN, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 147: ‘The question of when behaviour 
is truly unilateral […] and when unilateral behaviour is merely apparent (receiving explicit or tacit 
acquiescence by another) is an important and difficult one […]. The former […] falls outside of Article 101 
and the scope of the competition rules unless conducted by a dominant firm’. 
8 It is also often held that the Commission must give precise evidence of the participation of the undertaking to 
the infringement, compare case T-295/94 Buchmann GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR II-813, para. 121, not 
available in English: ‘Or, pour que la Commission puisse tenir chacune des entreprises visées par une décision 
comme celle de l’espèce pour responsable, pendant une période déterminée, d’une entente globale, il lui faut 
établir que chacune d’elles soit a consenti à l’adoption d’un plan global recouvrant les éléments constitutifs de 
l’entente, soit a participé directement, pendant cette période, à tous ces éléments.’ Contra see case T-110/07 
Siemens AG v Commission [2011] ECR II-477, para. 55, where the General Court held that the apportionment 
of the burden of proof can vary, depending on the kind of evidence adduced, which may require the 
counterparty to provide an explanation or justification. Therefore, in cases ‘[w]here […] the Commission has 
adduced evidence of the existence of an agreement, it is for an undertaking which has taken part in that 
agreement to adduce evidence that it distanced itself from that agreement’. See, for further details on the 
shifting of the evidential burden of proof, Chapter II, para. 5 A). 
9 Compare Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) [2001] OJ 368/13. The Notice identifies market share thresholds below which 
an agreement is not likely to appreciably restrict competition (aggregate market share below 10% for 
competitors and below 15% for non competitors). 
10 The definition of the relevant market is required only to the purpose of establishing that Article 101 
infringement has appreciable effects on trade between Member States, differently from what happens for 
infringements of Article 102 TFEU, where ‘the definition of the relevant market is a necessary preconditions’, 
see case T-62/98 Volkswagen AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, para. 230. 
11 Case T-41/96 Bayer AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, para. 173. It is contended that a satisfactory 
concept of collusion in general, and, in particular, of the three forms it may take (agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices) is not well-defined by the EU case law, so that it is ‘virtually impossible to draw a line 
between, on the one hand, unlawful (reciprocal) agreements and, on the other, lawful unilateral acts’. See 
PETER STIG JACOBSEN and MORTEN BROBERG, ‘The Concept of Agreement in Article 81 EC: On the 
Manufacturer’s Right to Prevent Parallel Trade within the European Community’ (2002) 23 European 
Competition Law Review 127, 139. As a consequence, it is hard to pinpoint a conception of collusion that is 
‘capable of being proven when the undertakings do not openly acknowledge, and actively seek to conceal, its 
existence’. Compare OKEOGHENE ODUDU, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law - The Scope of Article 
81 (Oxford University Press 2006) 59. Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, the EU Courts do not require the 
qualification of the infringing conduct as an agreement or as a concerted practice, tracing the violation back to 
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agreement has as its object or effect the restriction of competition; the duration of the 
restraint of competition (whereas information regarding dates and place of the meetings 
between competitors is not required),12 and other variable elements depending on the factual 
circumstances of the case.13 Article 101(3) TFEU allows the undertaking to prove the 
existence of its right to benefit from an exemption rendering inapplicable the prohibition of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. Exemptions are granted if the anti-competitive practice contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. In addition, the 
practice ought not to (i) impose on the concerned undertakings restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of said objectives; and (ii) afford them the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. Once the 
infringement has been established, the undertaking may provide such evidence. It it does not 
manage to do so, the infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU is considered proven.14   
 
B) The Object of the Proof under Article 102 TFEU 
  
When the alleged infringement is an abuse of a dominant position, it is necessary for the 
Commission, NCA or claimant to prove the relevant product and geographical markets 
                                                                                                                                                
the broad category of ‘cartel offence’. See CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review 
in Cartel Cases’ 511. 
12 Joined cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-
39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, 
T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, 
T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others v 
Commission [2000] ECR II-491, para. 2354: ‘It is therefore irrelevant that it has not been possible to determine 
the precise date on which that agreement was concluded in 1984, since the evidence adduced by the 
Commission indicates that an agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty was concluded in 
1984.’ 
13 ORTIZ BLANCO, European Community Competition Procedure 163. Elements to be proved for the 
assessment of the infringement are very diverse, depending on the specific violation, as specified by the Court 
of Justice in case T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel 
NV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, para. 60: ‘[T]he number, frequency, and 
form of meetings between competitors needed to concert their market conduct depend on both the subject-
matter of that concerted action and the particular market conditions. If the undertakings concerned establish a 
cartel with a complex system of concerted actions in relation to a multiplicity of aspects of their market 
conduct, regular meetings over a long period may be necessary. If, on the other hand, as in the main 
proceedings, the objective of the exercise is only to concert action on a selective basis in relation to a one-off 
alteration in market conduct with reference simply to one parameter of competition, a single meeting between 
competitors may constitute a sufficient basis on which to implement the anti-competitive object which the 
participating undertakings aim to achieve.’ 
14 ORTIZ BLANCO, European Community Competition Procedure 165. 
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(sometimes the temporal market is also considered by the Commission)15; the dominance of 
the undertaking in the relevant market (which on its part requires the assessment of market 
shares and the existence of barriers to entry) held within the internal market or at least in a 
substantial part of it; an abuse of such dominance; the appreciable effect on trade between 
Member States. The lack of objective justification needs to be proved only after the 
defendant has made a prima facie case of the existence of such justification.16 Contrary to 
the structure of Article 101 TFEU, nonetheless, the existence of objective justifications is 
not incompatible with the proof of an infringement, but excludes the suitability of a 
sanction. In this perspective, they are considered here as operating on the evidential burden 
of proof, rather than on the legal burden of proof.17 Obiective justifications may be 
categorised under three types: (i) legitimate business behaviour, which includes commercial 
freedom, when the firm is efficiently competitive or objective necessity, when it had no 
alternative way to act for external reasons; (ii) efficiency considerations, when the abuse of 
dominance produces efficiency benefits for final consumers; (iii) public interest, when such 
interest justifies the anticompetitive behaviour. The first of such justifications is by far the 
easier to prove.18 
 
C) The Object of Proof in Private Enforcement 
 
In the case of both Article 101 and 102 TFEU, whenever the claimant is seeking 
compensatory damages, further conditions must be established: the existence of a causal 
nexus linking the abuse and the damages (causation);19 the suffered damages and their 
                                               
15 ABG Oil [1977] OJ L117/1; joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night 
Services Ltd. and others v Commission, not reported. 
16 CHALMERS, HADJIEMMANUIL, MONTI, and TOMKINS, European Union law 1025. See Post 
Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, paras. 40–41, quoted at Chapter I, fn. 40.  
17 For this distinction, see para. 4 of this Chapter.  
18 TJARDA VAN DER VIJVER, ‘Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective 
Justifications in the Case of prima facie Dominance Abuse?’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice 121, 121–122 and 132. 
19 Causation is usually interpreted as a question of fact, and it has to be established by means of showing that it 
is more probable than not that the damage would not have been suffered, had the infringement not occurred. 
Tort law rules generally apply, so that only the damage directly caused by the infringement can be recovered 
by the claimant (provided that, according to Courage/Manfredi principles, the claimant is granted full 
compensation, which includes lost profits and interest). The burden of proof of causation always rests with the 
claimant. See 2 Travel Group Plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2012] CAT 19 
(Chapter II prohibition), para. 78: ‘[The CAT] should compare the position in the ‘real world’ (in which the 
infringement occurred) with what the position would have been in the counterfactual or ‘but-for’ world (in 
which there was no infringement). To the extent that the Claimant is worse off in the real world than it would 
have been in the ‘but-for’ world, such losses are to be treated as having been caused by the infringement and 
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amount (quantification);20 and, in those national systems requiring it as a condition for 
redress, the element of fault.21 Since the first two elements only arise in damages actions 
and, as a result, would not enable a comparison with public enforcement, they are not 
discussed further here. With regard to the third element, the fault, its analysis is particularly 
well-suited to showing the influence of EU case law on national judges.  
 
a) The Element of Fault 
 
Pursuant to the English legislation proof of fault is not necessary. In particular, in England, 
an antitrust damages action is a tortious action for breach of a statutory duty and a breach of 
antitrust law entails strict liability. Thus, once the infringement is proven, no further proof 
of fault is needed.22 This approach is totally consistent with the case law of the EU Courts, 
which has long established that, for the element of negligence to be found, it is sufficient 
that the parties have full knowledge that their behaviour will result in a restriction of 
competition, even if they are not aware of the fact that they are committing an 
infringement.23  
                                                                                                                                                
are in principle recoverable (subject to issues such as remoteness and mitigation). By the same token, to the 
extent that a particular claimed loss would equally have been suffered in the ‘but-for’ world, such loss is not to 
be treated as having been caused by the infringement, and the Claimant has no claim for damages in respect of 
it […].’ Claimants must then give evidence that they suffered harm as a result of the violation, and thus 
quantify the importance of the damages suffered.  
20 Compare Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd. & others [2003] EWHC 687 (Comm), para. 591. The High Court, 
even though it did not concluded to award any damage, outlined the suggested methodology for loss 
calculation. It is based on the counterfactual, and it involves the identification, ‘as a matter of commonsense’, 
of the amount of losses ‘directly’ caused to the claimant. When the defendant manages to demonstrate that, in 
the counterfactual, the position of the claimant would have not better, no loss is awarded. As an example, in 2 
Travel Group Plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2012] CAT 19 (Chapter II 
prohibition), 2 Travel Group Plc had tried to contend that, among the losses suffered there was the loss of 
commercial opportunity. Namely, given that the alleged abuse of dominant position drove 2 Travel Group Plc 
out of business, this latter had to sell some land, that otherwise it would have kept as a capital asset and gained 
value over time. The CAT did not award compensation for that loss on grounds that Cardiff City Transport 
Services had successfully managed to give evidence that 2 Travel Group Plc was already in an economic crisis 
and that 2 Travel’s need to sell the land had little to do with the infringement (para. 444). The causal link 
between the sale and the abuse of dominance had not ben established. 
21 The proof of fault on the part of the person causing the damage needs to be established, for instance, under 
the Austrian and German system. See BLANKE and NAZZINI, International Competition Litigation - A 
Multijurisdictional Handbook 4 and 286. Proof of other elements may be required by the domestic tort law 
rules of each country, such as, for example, mitigation, in order to subtract from the calculation of damages the 
loss which has been avoided or should have reasonably been avoided by the claimant. 
22 SIMON VANDE WALLE, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European Union and Japan - A Comparative 
Perspective (Maklu 2013) 164. 
23 See, inter alia, joined cases T-202/98, T-204/98, T-207/98 British Sugar v Commission, not yet reported, 
para. 127: ‘It is settled case-law that, for an infringement of the competition rules of the Treaty to be regarded 
as having been committed intentionally, it is not necessary for an undertaking to have been aware that it was 
infringing those rules. It is sufficient that it could not have been unaware that its conduct was aimed at 
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 In the Italian system, an analogous approach is taken by the review judge.24 Whilst 
the element of fault is in theory required, a presumption of strict liability operates, according 
to which, once the infringement is established, it is for the undertaking to prove that it acted 
without fault.25 Fault is expressly required also by the Italian system of civil redress,26 
according to Article 2043 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding such provision, in private 
antitrust damages, the civil judge has frequently made use of the above mentioned reversal 
of the burden of proof, which shifts the burden of showing the absence of fault on the 
alleged infringer. Although such reversal is often said to be based on Article 2600 of the 
Civil Code,27 which establishes a presumption of fault for acts of unfair competition, it 
appears much more plausible to make it derive directly from the influence of the case law of 
the Luxembourg Courts. Indeed, the regime of acts of unfair competition is very different 
from that of antitrust, and, in the Italian system, this distinction is underlined by the 
allocation of the relevant norm for acts of unfair competition, in the Civil Code, and for 
antitrust, in Law 287/1990. Conversely, the consistency with the case law of the EU Courts 
and with the national public enforcement is evident. This is thus one of those evidential 
issues where the national regime converges towards the EU case law, far beyond what 
would be required by the equivalence and effectiveness principles.    
 
2) THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
 
Admissibility is needed for evidence to be accepted and produced before the court. When 
evidence is considered inadmissible, that evidence has to be excluded from consideration 
even though it might shed light on the merits of a case. The issue of admissibility is closely 
related to the standard of proof and, in turn, with the outcome of a case.  
                                                                                                                                                
restricting competition.’; joined cases C-96/82 to C-102/82, C-104/82, C-105/82, C-108/82 and C-110/82 NV 
IAZ International Belgium and others v Commission [1983] ECR 3369, para. 45. 
24 Council of State, Soc. P. v AGCM, 9 May 2011, decision no. 2742 (2011) Foro amministrativo 1598. 
25 Compare Council of State, decision no. 2438 of 20 April 2011, para. 2.4.2; TAR Lazio, decision no. 6917 of 
2 August 2011, para. 6. The element of fault is required by Article 3 of Law 689/1981, referred to by Article 
31 of Law 287/1990.  
26 CAIAZZO, ‘L’azione risarcitoria, l’onere della prova e gli strumenti processuali ai sensi del diritto italiano’ 
324.  
27 MASSIMO SCUFFI, ‘I poteri inibitori e risarcitori del giudice nazionale antitrust’ in GIAN ANTONIO 
BENACCHIO and MICHELE CARPAGNANO (eds), I rimedi civilistici agli illeciti anticoncorrenziali. 
Private Enforcement of Competition Law - Atti del III Convegno di Studio presso la Facoltà di Giurisprudenza 
dell’Università di Trento 15-16 aprile 2011 (Cedam 2012) 42–43; CAIAZZO, ‘L’azione risarcitoria, l’onere 
della prova e gli strumenti processuali ai sensi del diritto italiano’ 326. 
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 With regard to the admissibility of evidence in the public enforcement of 
competition law before the EU Courts, there are no rigid rules governing the admissibility of 
evidence. Instead, the EU Courts are guided only by the general principle of the free and 
unfettered evaluation of evidence. When evidence is gathered and transmitted to the 
Commission in compliance with national laws, it is admissible as evidence under EU law: 
 
[G]iven that there is no legislation at Community level governing the concept of proof, 
any type of evidence admissible under the procedural law of the Member States in 
similar proceedings is in principle admissible.28 
 
The same rule of reciprocity applies for evidence obtained in non-EU countries.29 Apart 
from this rule of compliance with domestic legislation, EU case law has identified a few 
procedural rules in the context of competition law. In principle, the Commission and the EU 
Courts can consider all evidence relevant to the specific matter,30 but there are boundaries 
within which evidence can be produced and evaluated by the EU Courts. First of all, 
evidence found to have been obtained by the competent authorities through the use of 
violence would be inadmissible.31 Secondly, means of adducing evidence which are not 
envisaged by the Rules of Procedure of the EU Courts, which constitute a numerus clausus, 
would be excluded. Thirdly, inadmissibility also applies to evidence gathered in violation of 
fundamental rights, because the Commission, as with any EU institution, is bound to respect 
the general principles of law recognized as part of the European legal order.32 This matter 
                                               
28 Joined cases C-310/98 and C-406/98 Hauptzollamt Neubrandenburg v. Leszk Labis (Met-Trans) and Sagpol 
SC Transport Miedzynarodowy i Spedycja [2000] ECR I-1797, para. 29. 
29 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 27 fn. 94. 
30 The lack of specific rules limiting the admissibility of evidence has brought commentators to conclude that 
evidence is considered unreliable by the EU Courts only when assessing its probative value, rather than ex 
ante, on the basis of its inadmissibility. Compare SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law 
- Restrictive Agreements and Practices between Competitors 26: ‘As a result of the generous rules on 
admissibility, the probative value of evidence – in terms of the weight, credibility and sufficiency – is a central 
issue in cartel cases, particularly as the secrecy surrounding cartels mean that the Commission is often required 
to rely on evidence which is indirect or of somewhat weak probative value.’  
31 Case C-511/06 P Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission [2009] ECR I-5843, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, 
para. 114: ‘Whilst it is true […] that in Community law – saving specific provision to the contrary – a 
particular fact may be proved by any form of evidence (freedom as to the form of evidence adduced) and 
determination of the probative value of an item of evidence is a matter for the Community judicature, not for 
legislation (unfettered evaluation of evidence), it cannot on the other hand, in my view, be maintained that 
every item of evidence produced is usable and has to be evaluated as to its merits by the Commission or the 
Community judicature. That would be inconceivable, for example, in the case of a statement found to have 
been obtained by the competent authorities throught the use of violence.’ 
32 Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes and Commission [2002] ECR I-09011, para. 49: ‘[...] If the decision in question were 
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will be analyzed in Chapter III, when discussing the fundamental rights that are involved by 
investigations. For the present purposes, it is anticipated that inadmissibility either allows 
the judge to eliminate it physically from the case file; or entitles the party required to 
disclose it to avoid such a court order. Other examples of inadmissible evidence before the 
EU Courts are:  
 statements or documents acquired by the Commission in an earlier proceeding under 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, when it is not directly relevant to the subject-matter;33 
 documents in respect of which the undertaking under investigation has not had an 
opportunity to exercise its right to be heard during the course of that investigation;34 
 communications between lawyers and clients that benefit from legal professional 
privilege;35 
                                                                                                                                                
annulled by the Community judicature, the Commission would in that event be prevented from using, for the 
purposes of proceeding in respect of an infringement of the Community competition rules, any documents or 
evidence which it might have obtained in the course of that investigation, as otherwise the decision on the 
infringement might, in so far as it was based on such evidence, be annulled by the Community judicature.’ 
See, also, case C-46/87 R Hoechst AG v Commission [1987] ECR 1549, Order of the President of the Court, 
para. 34. 
33 Case C-85/87 Dow Benelux NV v. Commission [1989] ECR 3137, paras. 17-18: ‘With regard to the 
complaint concerning the improper use of information obtained during the investigations […], it should be 
pointed out […] that information obtained during investigations must not be used for purposes other than those 
indicated in the order or decision under which the investigation is carried out. […] in addition to professional 
secrecy, […] that requirement is intended to protect the rights of the defence of undertakings […]. Those rights 
would be seriously endangered if the Commission could rely on evidence against undertakings which was 
obtained during an investigation but was not related to the subject-matter or purpose thereof.’ See also joined 
cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 Limburgse 
Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM), DSM NV and DSM Kunststoffen BV, Montedison SpA, Elf Atochem SA, 
Degussa AG, Enichem SpA, Wacker-Chemie GmbH and Hoechst AG and Imperial Chemical Industries plc 
(ICI) v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, para. 305: ‘[I]t is forbidden to make direct use as evidence in a 
second proceeding of a document obtained in a previous proceeding.’ 
34 Case C-107/82 Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, 
para. 27: ‘Since these documents were not mentioned in the statement of objections, AEG was entitled to take 
the view that they were of no importance for the purposes of the case. By not informing the applicant that 
these documents would be used in the decision, the Commission prevented AEG from putting forward at the 
appropriate time its view of the probative value of such documents. It follows that these documents cannot be 
regarded as admissible evidence for the purposes of this case.’ 
35 Case C-155/79 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission [1982] ECR 1575, paras. 29-31: ‘If an undertaking which 
is the subject of an investigation […] refuses, on the ground that it is entitled to protection of the 
confidentiality of information, to produce, among the business records demanded by the Commission, written 
communications between itself and its lawyer, it must nevertheless provide the Commission’s authorized 
agents with relevant material of such a nature as to demonstrate that the communications fulfil the conditions 
for being granted legal protection […], although it is not bound to reveal the contents of the communications 
in question. […] Since this is a matter involving an appraisal and a decision which affect the conditions under 
which the Commission may act in a field as vital to the functioning of the common market as that of 
compliance with the rules on competition, the solution of disputes as to the application of the protection of the 
confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client may be sought only at Community level. 
In that case it is for the Commission to order […] production of the communications in question and, if 
necessary, to impose on the undertaking fines or periodic penalty payments […] as a penalty.’ See also case C-
7/04 P (R) Commission v Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd [2004] ECR I-8739, Order of 
the President of the Court, paras. 37-38: ‘The Court has also held, with respect to a decision by the 
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 statements made by executives of an undertaking in reply to questions posed in the 
course of a preliminary examination of witnesses prior to the initiation of national 
civil proceedings, where the reply entails an admission of an infringement of the 
competition rules;36 
 minutes of questioning from national criminal proceedings, where transmission of 
those minutes to the Commission has been declared unlawful by the competent 
national court;37 
 statements made in a proceeding other than the one conducted by the Commission, 
where the interested party was not given benefit of the procedural protection that he 
or she would have enjoyed under EU law if those statements had been taken directly 
by the Commission.38 
Besides this case-law inspired list, in antitrust cases, the most likely reason for the 
inadmissibility of documents is their confidentiality. In search for a balance between the 
protection of the right of defence and the confidential nature of certain information, Article 
67(3) of Rules of Procedure of the General Court provides that: 
 
[…] the General Court shall take into consideration only those documents which have 
been made available to the lawyers and agents of the parties and on which they have been 
given an opportunity of expressing their views. 
                                                                                                                                                
Commission to order an investigation, that if that decision were annulled by the Community judicature, the 
Commission would in that event be prevented from using […] any documents or evidence which it might have 
obtained in the course of that investigation […]. The same principles apply where a decision of the 
Commission not to allow professional privilege for one or more documents is at issue and that decision is 
annulled by the Community judicature’. 
36 Case C-60/92 Otto BV v Postbank NV [1993] ECR I-5683, para. 20: ‘[T]he Commission - or for that matter 
a national authority - cannot use that information to establish an infringement of the competition rules in 
proceedings which may result in the imposition of penalties, or as evidence justifying the initiation of an 
investigation prior to such proceedings.’ 
37 Case C-407/04 P Dalmine SpA v Commission [2007] ECR I-829, paras. 62-63: ‘As regards, next, the 
admissibility of those minutes as evidence, it must be held […] that the lawfulness of the transmission to the 
Commission by a national prosecutor or the authorities competent in competition matters of information 
obtained in application of national criminal law is a question governed by national law. Furthermore, […] the 
Community judicature has no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness, as a matter of national law, of a measure 
adopted by a national authority […]. As regards the use of that information by the Commission, the Court of 
First Instance correctly observed […] that Dalmine’s arguments could affect only ‘the reliability and therefore 
the probative value of its managers’ statements and not the admissibility of that evidence in the present 
proceedings’. […] the principle which prevails in Community law is that of the unfettered evaluation of 
evidence and the only relevant criterion for the purpose of assessing the evidence adduced relates to its 
credibility. Accordingly, as the transmission of the minutes in issue was not declared unlawful by an Italian 
court, those documents cannot be considered to have been inadmissible evidence which ought to have been 
removed from the file.’ 
38 This list, with similar wording, and reference of the cited case law can be found in Archer Daniels Midland 
Co. v Commission, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras. 114-115. 
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This principle also applies in the event of joined cases,39 in order to avert the situation where 
a competitor, that is party to the proceedings, discovers confidential and potentially 
sensitive information regarding the appellant undertaking.40  
 It is evident from the preceding observations, that the approach to the admissibility 
of evidence in antitrust proceedings before the Luxembourg Courts is shaped by concerns 
that are typical of an adversarial blueprint, rather than an inquisitorial one. Whilst this 
consideration can be referred only to the review process and not to the procedure before the 
EU Commission, it must be observed that the rules on admissibility in Article 67 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the General Court appears to encapsulate a more general principle.41 
That principle requires the adjudicators to rely on evidence on which the parties had the 
opportunity to express their views.42 If evidence from which the Commission has drawn 
conclusions in its decision has not been communicated to the defendant, that evidence 
should not be used to support that decision in the course of the review control.43 Such 
principle is at the basis of the mechanism of the statement of objections and of the 
provisions of Article 12 of Regulation (EC) 773/2004, pursuant to which the Commission 
‘shall give the parties to whom it has addressed a statement of objections the opportunity to 
develop their arguments at an oral hearing, if they so request in their written submissions.’ 
Moreover, in support of the above observations, anonymous evidence is considered 
admissible,44 but its nature must be taken into account when determining the weight of that 
                                               
39 Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Article 50(2). 
40 BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea 227-230. 
41 BIAVATI, Diritto processuale dell’Unione Europea 229. 
42 Compare also MARC JAEGER, ‘The Court of First Instance and the Management of Competition Law 
Litigation’ in HEIKKI KANNINEN and others (eds), EU Competition Law in Context: Essays in Honour of 
Virpi Tiili (Hart Publishing 2009) 11: ‘Considering the fact-intensive nature of competition cases, which 
generally require in-depth economic analysis, the measures of organisation of the procedure have been 
developed through the years to ensure that the preliminary report, and consequently the report for the hearing, 
is as detailed as possible so as to allow all of the judges in the chamber to master from the earliest stage of a 
procedure all of the facts at stake.’   
43 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para. 21: ‘In that respect it must be held 
that since the reply of Steetley Chemicals was not disclosed to AKZO, although the Commission drew 
conclusions from it, the information contained in that document cannot be used in the present proceedings.’ 
44 Dalmine SpA v Commission, paras. 72-73: ‘The prevailing principle of Community law is the unfettered 
evaluation of evidence and the sole criterion relevant in that evaluation is the reliability of the evidence […]. 
Moreover, it may be necessary for the Commission to protect the anonymity of its informants […] and that 
fact alone cannot require the Commission to set aside evidence in its possession. Consequently, whilst 
Dalmine’s arguments may be relevant in evaluating the reliability and, therefore, the probative value of the 
sharing key document, it should not be regarded as inadmissible evidence which should be removed from the 
file.’ Compare also, with regard to the protection of informant’s anonymity, case C-145/83 Stanley George 
Adams v Commission, [1985] ECR 3539, para. 34: ‘As regards the existence of a duty of confidentiality it 
must be pointed out that Article 214 of the EEC Treaty lays down an obligation, in particular for the members 
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evidence.45 Admitting evidence whose origin is undisclosed could be seen as a violation 
Article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR.46 Nonetheless, the admissibility of evidence without cross-
examination has been confirmed as compatible with the system of EU law by the General 
Court.47 It seems that such a conclusion, in the lack of clearer indications in relation to the 
criminal nature of competition law proceedings, is justified by the considerable difficulties 
of gathering evidence. Doubt remains, however, about whether there is adequate respect of 
the principle of equality of arms, especially due to the fact that the utility of cross-
examination of a witness may be significant in some cases.48 
 The fact-intensive nature of competition law must be reconciled with, especially for 
cartel cases, a recurring scarcity of direct evidence. This may be done also by means of 
lowering the standard of admissibility of evidence in this field. This attitude of the CJEU, 
according to which it  
 
is the sole judge of whether the information available to it concerning the case before it 
needs to be supplemented […] to assess the relevance of the request to the subject-matter 
of the dispute and the need to examine the witnesses named […]49 
 
does not only affect the Commission’s approach, but also affects the approach of the 
national courts to cases of public and the private enforcement.  
 With regard to the admissibility of evidence at the national level, the rules of 
admissibility of evidence vary according to the legal system. A frequent feature of many 
                                                                                                                                                
and the servants of the institutions of the Community ‘not to disclose information of the kind covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about undertakings, their business relations or 
their cost components’. Although that provision primarily refers to information gathered from undertakings, 
the expression ‘in particular’ shows that the principle in question is a general one which applies also to 
information supplied by natural persons, if that information is ‘of the kind’ that is confidential. That is 
particularly so in the case of information supplied on a purely voluntary basis but accompanied by a request 
for confidentiality in order to protect the informant’s anonymity. An institution which accepts such 
information is bound to comply with such a condition.’ 
45 Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v Commission, paras. 46-50. 
46 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 534. For the criminal 
nature of competition law proceedings, see para. 5 G) a) of this Chapter. 
47 Case T-9/99 HFB Holding für Fernwärmetechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Others v 
Commission [2002] ECR II-1487, para. 392; Aalborg Portland and others v. Commission, paras. 200-201; 
joined cases T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 
Bolloré SA and others v Commission [2007] ECR II-947, paras. 87–88; case T-54/03 Lafarge SA v 
Commission [2008] ECR II-120, paras. 145-150. 
48 HFB Holding für Fernwärmetechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and others v Commission, 
paras. 384–385. Compare also SCORDAMAGLIA-TOUSIS, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling Effective 
Public Enforcement with Fundamental Rights 298–299 
49 Joined cases C-125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 P and C-137/07 P Erste Group Bank AG, Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank Österreich AG, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG and Österreichische Volksbanken AG v 
Commission [2009] ECR I-8681, paras 319-320. 
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system is the link between the admissibility of evidence and its relevance to the matter at 
issue and the way in which the evidence in question has been gathered. 
 
A) The Admissibility of Evidence in the Judicial Review 
 
As far as the appellate and review jurisdictions in England and Italy are concerned, the CAT 
and the TAR Lazio are respectively endowed with extensive powers to reconsider the 
factual elements of the case.50 This is in line with the flexible criteria of admissibility of 
evidence applied by the EU Courts. It reflects the view that appellate and review courts in 
the UK and Italy are largely free to decide whether evidence is admissible before them. For 
instance, in Italy, the administrative judge has recently been vested with the power to order 
expert evidence, so that no procedural constraints will hamper its ability to fully evaluate the 
facts.51 The Italian administrative judge can make use of all civil means of proof, except for 
declaration under oath and confession.52 As a result, evidence with mandatory value 
attached to it are excluded from the proceedings, with full respect of the principle of free 
evaluation of the judge.  
 In England, the CAT adopts a ‘broad brush’ approach: in the taking of witness 
evidence, it declared to be willing to give much more importance to the general picture and 
to ‘circumstances of overall fairness’53 rather than to strict rules of procedure or evidence.54 
Under CAT Rule 22, the CAT can give directions in order to focus attention on those issues 
upon which it requires evidence; which types of evidence it requires and the nature of the 
evidence required; and the way in which the evidence must be presented.55 Moreover, it has 
the power to admit or exclude evidence, whether or not the evidence was available to the 
respondent when the disputed decision was taken; it may require any witness to give 
evidence or dispense it if a witness statement has been submitted. The CAT has a broad 
                                               
50 Along the dissertation, unless otherwise specified, when talking about the function of the CAT as an 
appellate court, reference is made exclusively to public appeals against findings of fact by the OFT, as 
opposed to its function under Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998 in private follow-on actions.  
51 LEONI, ‘La tutela giurisdizionale contro gli atti dell’AGCM in materia antitrust’ 425. 
52 ELIO CASETTA, Manuale di diritto amministrativo (6th edn, Giuffrè 2004) 769 and 855–856. 
53 Argos Limited and Littlewoods Limited v OFT, [2003] CAT 16, para. 105 (Chapter I prohibition). 
54 Compare also British Telecommunications plc v Office of Communications (Ofcom) and Hutchison 3G UK 
Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 245, para. 75. In that case, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought by Ofcom 
against a procedural decision of the CAT. The CAT had agreed, in a preliminary ruling, to allow BT to 
introduce fresh evidence on the appeal, which it had not presented to Ofcom. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
CAT’s decision on ground that ‘refusal to admit fresh evidence would not be consistent with basic justice […]. 
Indeed, the case might be thought to provide a compelling illustration of why the strict general exclusionary 
rule contended for by Ofcom would be capable of causing injustice.’ 
55 The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003, Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 1372, para. 22. 
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discretion in its appreciation of the collected evidence, and its case law shows that many 
factors have a bearing upon the probative value to be attributed to a specific item of 
evidence.56  
 
B) The Admissibility of Evidence in the Private Enforcement 
 
As for the private enforcement, this ‘broad brush’ approch takes the form of a general favor 
probationis, i.e. a rule of validation which aims at ‘saving’ the admissibility and validity of 
the evidence presented. It is generally accepted that admissibility of evidence is determined 
according to the law of the forum,57 which deals with how the facts are to be proved and the 
means of proof which may be used by the parties. The consequences of such strict 
characterisation, nonetheless, may lead to undesirable results. For example, an item of 
evidence could be accepted into evidence in the forum even if it were inadmissible under the 
law of the cause of action. Conversely, if that evidence were admissibile in the lex causae it 
would be excluded from consideration under the lex fori. Since direct evidence in some 
competition law matters, such as cartels, is particularly sparse, this outcome is not the most 
desirable. Doubts have been expressed as to the effectiveness and consistency of this rule if 
applied mechanistically, because it could have a profound impact on the outcome of the 
case.58 The argument that a court should take account of the inadmissibility of an item of 
evidence when assessing its probative value is not convincing for two reasons. First, the 
argument only applies in cases where evidence is admitted, and does not provide a solution 
for the much more serious situation in which evidence is excluded. Secondly, the evaluation 
of the probative value of evidence raises similar concerns as regards its allocation under the 
lex fori or the lex causae.59 This second concern is even more troubling when one considers 
that coordination between NCAs across the EU easily allows evidence to be transferred 
from one jurisdiction to another and, as often as not, the country where the claimant 
eventually decides to sue, either on a follow-on or on a stand-alone basis, is a third country.  
 With regard to the admissibility of documentary evidence in private cross-border 
litigation it can be further observed that a strict lex fori approach is adopted by common law 
                                               
56 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17, para. 294: ‘[O]ur general approach to 
the witness evidence [...] is to be cautious, and to look for corroboration, whether from the context, documents, 
or other witnesses, wherever possible.’ 
57 FONGARO, La loi applicable à la preuve en droit international privé 203. 
58 GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 191. 
59 This opinion will be supported in the next paragraph. 
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countries.60 By contrast, in civil law systems, where the question as to the admissibility of 
the means of adducing evidence is usually considered as falling under the law of the place 
of its execution (lex loci actus), regardless of its admissibility under the law of the forum.61 
It is submitted that a more consistent solution is provided by Articles 18(2) and 22(2) of the 
Rome I and Rome II Regulations, which allow any mode of proof recognised either by the 
law of the forum or by the law of the cause of action or of the place of the act.  
 In the English system, all types of documents (including all notes, records, 
statements, correspondence, tapes or any other material support with stores data) or 
witnesses are generally admissible within the terms of the question brought before the court. 
The rules upon the collection of evidence are contained in Part 32 of the Civil Procedure 
Rules (‘CPR’). An unusual feature of the English system concerning the gathering of the 
proof is the broad disclosure. Rules on disclosure enable each party to obtain documentary 
evidence in the control of the other party or in the hands of a third party. Since disclosure 
plays a very important role in the effectiveness of private enforcement in England, it will be 
analysed on its own in Chapter III.62 Apart from documentary evidence, evidence is given 
by witnesses, who usually write witness statements before the trial and are then cross-
examined at the trial about the facts, events and matters described in their statement. If a 
witness is reluctant to attend the trial, his or her presence at the hearing can be ordered by 
the court issuing a written summons. A witness summons him or her to attend the hearing 
and, where appropriate, give oral testimony or to produce documents before the court. This 
second function is very similar to that of disclosure, but operates exclusively for documents 
possessed by a witness. Witness statements, together with the cross-examination and re-
examination of the witness at trial, may have weight, depending on the witness credibility.  
 In Italy, the general rules of relevance and admissibility for civil proceedings apply. 
Some commentators63 consider that the means of adducing evidence contemplated by Italian 
law form a numerus clausus, including only documents, presumptions, confession, 
                                               
60 Compare Wicken v Wicken [1999] Fam 224; [1999] 2 WLR 1166, where the question arose as to the validity 
of a divorce letter from the former husband as a valid method of proof for a talaq divorce between two 
Muslims of Gambian nationality. The law of the cause of action was the Gambian law, under which the 
authenticity of the handwritten letter had to be verified by two witnesses. Conversely, under the English law, 
the law of the forum, the Gambian requirements were not necessary and the letter was considered per se 
authentic and therefore admissible. See GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 
192–193. 
61 FONGARO, La loi applicable à la preuve en droit international privé 74. 
62 See Chapter III, para. 2 D). 
63 ANTONIO CARATTA, ‘Prova e convincimento del giudice nel processo civile’ [2003] Rivista di diritto 
processuale 27, 52; NICOLA PICARDI, Manuale del processo civile (2nd edn, Giuffrè 2010) 307. 
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declaration under oath and testimony. The majority of the scholars, however, now agree that 
there is no specific rule excluding the admissibility of alternative types of evidence other 
than those listed in the Civil Code.64 It is also generally accepted that all ‘atypical’ types of 
evidence (such as written statements of third parties or evidence collected in previous, 
concluded proceedings or joined proceedings) are to be evaluated by the judge under Article 
2729 of the Civil Code, as if they were indicia.65 In this respect, ‘atypical’ evidence is 
assessed by the judge pursuant to Article 116(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Article 116(1) 
provides for the principle of free and unfettered evaluation of evidence, with the exception 
of those types of evidence which have a legally binding value.66 Atypical evidence is 
excluded from consideration, however, whenever it infringes a legal norm or due process.67    
  
3) THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF EVIDENCE 
 
Closely linked to the issue of admissibility of evidence, is the assessment of its probative 
value. In what can be considered a summary of the rules on the probative value of evidence 
for EU competition law, the General Court established its approach to the evaluation of 
evidence as follows:  
 the sole criterion for evaluating freely adduced evidence is its reliability;68 
 the reliability and the probative value of a document depends on its origin, the 
circumstances in which it was drawn up, the person to whom it is addressed and the 
reputed and reliable nature of its content;69 
                                               
64 Inter alia, MICHELE TARUFFO (ed), La prova nel processo civile (Giuffrè 2012) 73; LUIGI 
LOMBARDO, ‘Profili delle prove civili atipiche’ [2009] Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 1447, 
1447–1448. 
65 REDENTI and VELLANI, Diritto processuale civile 180; CRISANTO MANDRIOLI, Il processo di 
cognizione, vol. II (6th edn, Giappichelli 2007), Corso di diritto processuale civile 119. For the necessity of 
written documents of third parties to be corrobated by other evidence, see LOMBARDO, ‘Profili delle prove 
civili atipiche’ 1454.  
66 As an example, the judge must consider as fully proved those facts which are described by public officers as 
happened in their presence in the emanation of a public deed; or those facts which make the object of 
confession or declaration under oath of the parties to the proceedings. This evidence, however, is rare in 
private antitrust actions.  
67 Court of Cassation, 5 March 2010, decision no. 5440 (2010) Giurisprudenza italiana 2589-2595. 
68 Dalmine SpA v Commission, para. 72; joined cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering 
v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501, para. 273; T-44/00 Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission [2004] 
ECR II-2223, para. 84; Vela and Tecnagrind v. Commission, para. 223; and Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission, 
Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, at II-869. 
69 Cimenteries CBR and others v Commission, para. 1053; Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission, Opinion of AG 
Vesterdorf 867, 869 and 956.  
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 documents that have been drawn up in close connection with the events70 or by 
direct witnesses of those events71 or statements which run counter to the interests of 
the declaring party are particularly reliable.72  
The principle of free and unfettered evaluation of evidence, which, as already illustrated, is 
recognized as a general principle of EU evidence law,73 is a polar star in the reasoning of the 
EU Courts since its affirmation in Rhône-Poulenc. All legitimately gathered evidence is 
considered by the judge to the end of reaching his or her conviction upon the facts. The 
factors influencing the free evaluation carried out by the judge are set out below.  
 The EU Courts clearly favour a contextual approach to evidence, which is also 
particularly helpful in those cases where there is a total lack of documentary evidence.74 An 
overall view is useful for the ‘sanity check’ of the available evidence,75 to verify whether 
alternative plausible explanations exist which give the evidence a more coherent and 
meaningful sense.76 This attitude of the EU Courts is matched by their propensity not to 
require a point-by-point demolition of the arguments of the investigated undertaking on the 
part of the Commission.77 What is relevant in the eyes of the Court of Justice is the 
consistency of the story proposed by the Commission (or by the defence of the undertaking). 
Whilst it might be easy to find plausible alternative explanation for an isolated item of 
evidence, it is hardly possible to do so for a body of evidence and information considered as 
a whole.78     
 With regard to the timing of evidence, in its Opinion in Rhône-Poulenc SA, Judge 
Vesterdorf, sitting as Advocate-General, stated that the fact that the documents are drawn up 
                                               
70 Case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federative Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v 
Commission [2006] ECR I-8725, para. 181 and case T-157/94 Empresa Nacional Siderurgica SA (Ensidesa) v 
Commission [1999] ECR II-707, para. 312. 
71 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 207. 
72 JFE Engineering v Commission, paras. 207, 211 and 212. The admission of facts contrary to one’s interests 
is attributed relevance also when statements come from officers or managers of the investigated undertaking, 
provided that they are under an obligation to act in the interests of their company. Compare SIRAGUSA and 
RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices between Competitors 27. 
73 Case C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P Siemens v Commission, not yet reported, para. 128. 
74 See Introduction, fn. 73. 
75 Case C-48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) v Commission [1972] ECR 619, para. 68: ‘[T]he 
question whether there was a concerted action in this case can only be correctly determined if the evidence 
upon which the contested decision is based is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole […].’  
76 Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission, Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, at II-954: ‘A very important factor […] is the 
overall view of the evidence. It is clear that even where it is possible to give a reasonable alternative 
explanation of a specific document, which may be isolated from a number of documents, the explanation in 
question might not withstand closer examination in the context of an overall evaluation of a whole body of 
evidence.’ 
77 Bolloré SA and others v Commission, para. 451. 
78 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 540. 
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immediately after a meeting and without any thought for the fact that they might fall into the 
hands of third parties, enhances their probative value. In the specific circumstances of the 
Polypropylene case, according to the Advocate-General, the reports of the meetings showed 
that they were drafted with care by people who were in the knowledge of the relevant facts 
described, and their content was concise, measured, and clear. Ultimately, these 
circumstances led the Advocate-General to conclude, insofar as material: 
 
[…] I consider that there need be no hesitation in assuming that the notes are a reliable 
source for understanding what took place at the meetings and given their ordinary natural 
meaning they thus provide a basis for surmising the significance of the matters 
discussed.79 
 
Interestingly, the probative value of the document is not diminished by the circumstance 
that the document is hardly legible, unsigned or undated, provided that its origin is made 
clear by circumstantial evidence.80 This is because, even if legal formalities like signatures 
and dates may help a court to authenticate a document, obviously in antitrust there is much 
less scope for formality. Statements emanating from people acting on behalf of an 
undertaking are attributed higher probative strength than those emanating from employees, 
because managers and chairmen are under a professional obligation to act in the interests of 
the company. Their statements are regarded as particularly credible.81 Moreover, when 
evidence has been disclosed following compulsion by state authorities, it is considered 
highly reliable, owing to the serious consequences arising from perjury under criminal 
law.82 Any evidence available can therefore be used in evidence, on condition that it is 
considered altogether with other evidence,83 and the judge must take into account whether, 
for instance, the document emanated from third parties84 or whether the identity of the 
                                               
79 Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission, Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, at II-956 and II-957. 
80 Case T-11/89 Shell v Commission [1992] ECR II-757, para. 86: ‘The Court finds that the evidence which the 
applicant puts forward in order to diminish the evidentiary weight of that note made by Hercules’ marketing 
director cannot contradict the conclusions which the Commission drew from the note. The note itself is free of 
ambiguity and the fact that it is badly written, unsigned and undated is quite normal since it is a note taken 
during a conversation, probably over the telephone, and the anti-competitive object of the note was a reason 
for its author to leave the least trace possible [...]’. CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial 
Review in Cartel Cases’ 546. 
81 JFE Engineering v Commission, paras. 206 and 210. 
82 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 312. 
83 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 25. 
84 Case C-40/73 Suiker Unie and others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, para. 164: ‘Contrary to the view of 
SU and CSM there is no reason why the Commission and the Court should not accept as evidence of an 
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author is undetermined.85 In particular, the General Court considers highly reliable also 
documents originated by other infringing undertakings, thus indicating that their status as 
defendants does not necessarily impinge upon the probative strength of the evidence they 
provide.86 Moreover, the fact that the evidence was not produced by a person who had direct 
knowledge of the facts does not necessarily lower its probative strength.87 Clearly, 
precautions such as those usually applied in the field of criminal law, like the exclusion of 
hearsay,88 do not apply in antitrust proceedings. This supports the observation that the 
assessment of evidence in EU competition law does not entirely fit the model of criminal 
proceedings. It also entails the implication that the full safeguards of proceedings under 
domestic criminal law do not have to be guaranteed. The less stringent procedural 
guarantees of ECHR are applicable since competition law is classified as ‘non-hard core’ 
criminal law.89  
 The credibility of the relevant evidence can be traced back to the information 
contained, the author and the circumstances in which the particular document or other type 
of evidence was produced.90 As observed by the General Court in Shell,91 the more detailed 
the evidence, the more it is likely to be reliable, in that the level of detail is deemed to be 
                                                                                                                                                
undertaking’s conduct correspondence exchanged between third parties, provided that the content thereof is 
credible to the extent to which it refers to the said conduct.’ See also Shell v Commission, para. 86: ‘[T]he fact 
that the information is reported second hand is immaterial since the Commission expressly uses the note as 
written, contemporaneous evidence of the facts, and as evidence that producers other than the author of the 
note had concluded an agreement.’  
85 Joined cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 
and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV, Elf Atochem SA, BASF AG, Shell International Chemical 
Company Ltd, DSM NV, DSM Kunststoffen BV, Wacker-Chemie GmbH, Hoechst AG, Société artésienne de 
vinyle, Montedison SpA, Imperial Chemical Industries plc, Hüls AG and Enichem SpA v Commission [1999] 
ECR II-931, para. 665: ‘[T]he exact identity of the author of the planning documents does not appear to be 
decisive. The only question which matters is whether those documents may be regarded as the blueprint for a 
cartel, as the Commission maintains.’ See also Shell v Commission, para. 86: ‘The author’s imprecise 
recollection of the circumstances in which the note was drawn up does not impugn its evidentiary value since 
the contents of the note indicate that the information which it contains was provided by one of the ‘big four’, 
and it is not necessary to identify which of the ‘big four’.’ 
86 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 192: ‘[N]o provision or any general principle of Community law 
prohibits the Commission from relying, as against an undertaking, on statements made by other incriminated 
undertakings […]. If that were not the case, the burden of proving conduct contrary to Article 81 EC and 
Article 82 EC, which is borne by the Commission, would be unsustainable and incompatible with the task of 
supervising the proper application of those provisions which is entrusted it by the EC Treaty […].’ 
87 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 299: ‘It is inappropriate to infer therefrom that the statement made on 
behalf of a company by an executive thereof, against it and against other undertakings, is of limited probative 
value because he did not have direct knowledge of the facts. A fortiori, there is no reason to reject such an item 
of evidence as inadmissible.’ 
88 Compare Article 197(a) of Italian Criminal Procedure Code. 
89 Jussila v Finland, Application no. 73053/2001 [2006] ECHR XIV, para. 43. 
90 Cimenteries CBR and others v Commission, para. 3172. 
91 Shell v Commission, para. 86: ‘Finally, the precise, detailed nature of that information makes it wholly 
unlikely that it simply reflected market gossip, was completely wrong or invented.’ 
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inversely proportional to the likelihood of its wrongness or inexactness. It is interesting to 
note that the EU Courts will take account of the fact that a national judge has discarded 
evidence as unreliable, thereby reducing its evidentiary weight.92 Ex post drafted documents 
are treated with particular caution by the Luxembourg Courts, especially when they yield 
exculpatory content:93 
 
[T]he value of evidence alleged to be exculpatory evidence may diminish, for example, 
because it came to light at the initiative of the defendants and at a time when it was 
already clear that the Commission had begun to suspect a cartel infringement and the 
undertakings concerned had therefore received a warning (‘in tempore suspecto’).94  
 
When the admissibility, relevance and weight of evidence is not contested by the defendant 
it will be considered as reliable. It appears that, in EU law, an acknowledgment of certain 
facts by the undertaking in question is interpreted as some sort of probative estoppel,95 
preventing it from challenging the probative value of that evidence at a later stage.96 The 
estoppel is justified on the ground that only a timely contestation would permit the 
Commission ‘to investigate the matter more thoroughly and to attempt to adduce further 
evidence’.97 When evidence has not been referred to in the decision or in the statement of 
                                               
92 Case T-36/05 Coats Holdings Ltd and J & P Coats Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-110, paras. 165–167: 
‘The applicants correctly point out that Mr E was not involved in the negotiation of the 1994 agreements and 
that the judge rejected his evidence as unreliable in the litigation between Entaco and Prym in the High Court 
of Justice in September 1999. […] As regards the compensation scheme, Mr E’s statements are contradictory 
[…] In those circumstances, Mr E’s testimony is unreliable and incapable of corroborating the Commission’s 
case.’  
93 Lafarge SA v Commission, para. 509: ‘[E]n ce qui concerne la nouvelle déclaration de M. [G] [...], il y a lieu 
de relever que la requérante ne l’a pas invoquée pendant la procédure administrative. Eu égard à la 
circonstance selon laquelle cette déclaration est tardive, éloignée de la date des faits en cause et manifestement 
établie aux fins de l’instance, elle n’a qu’une faible valeur probante et ne saurait mettre en cause les éléments 
factuels relevés par la Commission dans sa décision.’; Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission, para. 51.  
94 Nederlandse Federative Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, para. 
28. 
95 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd v Commission, para. 108: ‘As to whether Nippon can go back on that cooperation and 
claim before the Court that it had not participated in the infringement between May 1992 and March 1993, it 
has consistently been held that where the undertaking involved does not expressly acknowledge the facts, the 
Commission must prove the facts and the undertaking is free to put forward, in the procedure before the Court, 
any plea in its defence which it deems appropriate […]. It may be concluded, a contrario, that that is not the 
case where the undertaking expressly, clearly and specifically acknowledges the facts: where it explicitly 
admits during the administrative procedure the substantive truth of the facts which the Commission alleges 
against it in the statement of objections, those facts must thereafter be regarded as established and the 
undertaking estopped in principle from disputing them during the procedure before the Court.’ See Lafarge SA 
v Commission, para. 509, quoted at fn. 93 above. 
96 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 552. 
97 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd v Commission, para. 106.  
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objections, it cannot be relied upon by the Commission when the decision is challenged 
before the General Court.98  
 
A) The Probative Value of Evidence in the Judicial Review 
 
In the appellate and review proceedings under national law, similar principles seems to be 
followed. Mention has been made of the adoption of a contextual assessment of evidence by 
the UK CAT,99 and the breadth of the review of the Italian administrative judge suggests 
that its control over the evidence and its power of assessment is comparable. In a Scottish100 
case, Aberdeen Journals Limited v OFT, the CAT observed that no supremacy of one kind 
of evidence over another exists that the Tribunal would have to follow when deciding a 
case. The appellant is free to decide on which type of evidence to rely on. The Tribunal is 
then free to decide whether the evidence presented is sufficient to prove the alleged case.101 
The presence, as well as the absence, of a certain category of evidence must be appreciated 
‘in the round’ by the Tribunal, when taking its decision.102 Moreover, Rule 22(2) of the 
CAT Rules 2003 provides that the Tribunal can admit or exclude evidence, regardless of 
whether or not the evidence was available to the respondent when the disputed decision was 
taken. Hence, before the Tribunal, documents will rarely be considered inadmissible, but the 
weight attributed to them may vary according to different factors, particularly those that 
would have rendered the document inadmissible under other jurisdictions (such as, for 
example, a document that contains hearsay).103 
 When assessing the value of documentary evidence, the Tribunal considers its 
natural meaning, by means of identifying the time at which it was formed, the context of its 
preparation, and the identity of the author; it therefore proceeds to according it the probative 
                                               
98 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 176. 
99 Argos Limited and Littlewoods Limited v OFT, para. 105. See text accompanying fn. 53 above. 
100 As already clarified, when referring to the case law of England or the UK, reference is made to the England 
and Wales jurisdiction. Nonetheless, since the English rules of public enforcement are largely applicable to 
Scotland, it seems acceptable to make reference here to a Scottish case of public enforcement. 
101 It appears evident how the assessment of evidence is directly connected with the issue of the standard of 
proof. 
102 Aberdeen Journals Limited v OFT [2003] CAT 11(Chapter II prohibition), para. 128. The Tribunal admits 
that consumer surveys, market studies and any type of evidence showing the attitudes of consumers or end 
users are particularly valuable to the definition of the relevant market. Nonetheless, there is no rule of law 
requiring the plaintiff to necessarily provide them, in case he or she considers other evidence more relevant 
and sufficient to make their case. 
103 Tesco Stores Ltd and Tesco Holdings Ltd and Tesco plc v OFT [2012] CAT 31 (Chapter I prohibition), 
paras. 125–128; Aberdeen Journals Limited v OFT, para. 131. For the irrelevance of this argument to solve 
inconsistencies, see text accompanying fn. 59 above. 
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value considered appropriate.104 It is open to those who wish to challenge the document’s 
accuracy or credibility to produce a witness statement from the author of the document 
which seeks to clarify its content or place that document in context. In those cases where 
evidence is extremely fragmented and sparse,105 the English courts will consider indirect or 
circumstantial evidence, being also prepared to rely entirely on such evidence in some 
cases.106 In practice, it is necessary, when considering the evidence available, to take into 
account that colluding parties are generally well aware of the risks involved by such activity 
and normally take care to not leave record of their violation, such as minutes of meetings or 
e-mail exchanges.107 On the one hand, it is easy to see that the contextual approach adopted 
by the EU Courts is followed also by the CAT; on the other hand, it is hard to imagine that 
the CAT will adopt such an approach only when reviewing OFT decisions and not when 
deciding on follow-on actions for damages brought before it. 
 The context in which a document is formed is very important also for the Italian 
review judge, which considers that statements emanating from chief executive officers must 
be accorded high probative strength.108 The importance of the overall consideration of 
evidence is also stressed repeatedly by the Council of State, which, in its evaluation, focuses 
on the probative framework considered as a whole. In particular, the need for a contextual 
approach arises out, in cartel cases, of the scarcity of direct evidence in certain cases,109 and 
the fact that a too rigorous evaluation of evidence would result in the complete frustration of 
the objectives of deterrence of competition law.110 The fact that the proof is based on 
circumstantial evidence does not make it any less reliable.111 The Council of State considers 
that documents found in the hands of a third party can be used in evidence,112 contrary to 
what the ordinary courts case law appears to suggest. Italian civil procedural rules provide 
that such documents do not qualify as evidence but only as an ‘argomento di prova’. An 
                                               
104 Tesco Stores Ltd and Tesco Holdings Ltd and Tesco plc v OFT, para. 125; Aberdeen Journals Limited v 
OFT, para. 132. 
105 Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd v OFT [2004] CAT 24 (Chapter I prohibition), para. 312. 
106 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading (Chapter I prohibition), para. 206: ‘In our view even 
a single item of evidence, or wholly circumstantial evidence, depending on the particular context and the 
particular circumstances, may be sufficient to meet the required standard.’ 
107 Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd v OFT [2004] CAT 24 (Chapter I prohibition), paras. 107, 558, 560 and 604.  
108 Council of State, B. v AGCM, 23 May 2012, decision no. 3026, para. 4; Council of State, 30 August 2002, 
decision no. 4362 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990), para. 5.1.2. 
109 Council of State, Soc. Trambus v AGCM, 9 April 2009, decision no. 2201 (2009) Repertorio del foro 
italiano 838 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990). 
110 Council of State, B. v AGCM, 23 May 2012, decision no. 3026, para. 5. 
111 Council of State, Soc. Ataf v AGCM, 25 March 2009, decision no. 1794, para. 10.5. 
112 Council of State, Soc. Colabeton v AGCM, 29 September 2010, decision no. 5864 (2010) Repertorio del 
foro italiano 722.  
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‘argomento di prova’ is not regarded as having any probative value per se, but it can be 
considered by the judge for the corroboration of other evidence, or for its interpretation.113 It 
is generally accepted, in the case law of the Italian ordinary judges, that decisions should not 
be based on an only ‘argomento di prova’.114 By contrast, the Italian Council of State 
expressly referred to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Suiker Unie.115 It stated that 
there is nothing preventing the judge from relying exclusively on an ‘argomento di prova’, 
provided that it is considered reliable.116 In the lack of direct evidence, the judge may resort 
to inferences and corroborating evidence. This approach is in keeping with the one taken by 
the EU Courts: as often as not, direct evidence of an agreement is rarely found.117 That 
being so, circumstantial evidence may be used to establish the existence of concerted 
practices.118 The reasoning of the Italian review courts is substantially analogous to that of 
the EU Courts in that it makes reference to the need to take into account the effectiveness of 
the overall system, which would lose much of its sense in the practice if the Court did not 
rely on circumstantial evidence.119 Moreover, the principle of contextual evaluation of 
evidence120 is expressly endorsed by both the TAR Lazio and the Council of State, which 
both stress the importance of considering the facts in conjunction with the body of evidence 
available.121 
 
B) The Probative Value of Evidence in the Private Enforcement 
 
In the English private enforcement, in principle there is no hierarchy of evidence for EU 
competition law matters. Especially for cartels, English judges are well aware of the fact 
                                               
113 The distinction can be appreciated by means of comparing Article 116(2) and 116(1) of the Italian Civil 
Procedure Code. 
114 COMOGLIO, Le prove civili 61–62 and 191. 
115 Compare text accompanying fn. 393 below. 
116 Council of State, 12 January 2001, decision no. 1189 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990), para. 4.2: ‘The fact, as 
highlighted by the TAR, that a single item of evidence would not be suitable to prove the prohibited practice is 
not conclusive, because what is relevant is exclusively the credibility of the note, which is apt to found the 
present action.’; Council of State, 2 March 2001, decision no. 1191 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990), para. 4.2. 
117 Council of State, B. v AGCM, 23 May 2012, decision no. 3026, para. 5.1. 
118 TAR Lazio, 8 August 2005, decision no. 6088 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990), para. 9; Council of State, 30 
August 2002, decision no. 4362 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990), para. 5.1.8. 
119 Council of State, B. v AGCM, 23 May 2012, decision no. 3026, para. 5.1.  
120 See also text accompanying fn. 78 above. 
121 This is the Italian criterion of the ‘congruenza narrativa’, recalled by, inter alia, Council of State, AGCM v 
Acea SpA, Suez Environnement SA, Federutility-Federazione Imprese Energetiche ed Idriche, 24 September 
2013, decision no. 5067, para. 5.1; TAR Lazio, Soc. Siemens SpA v AGCM, 18 June 2012, decision no. 5559, 
para. 10; Council of State, Rifornimenti aeroportuali italiani Srl and Rifornimenti aeroportuali milanesi v 
AGCM, 20 Febbraio 2008, decision no. 594, para. 4. 
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that not much direct evidence is usually available. In the words of Lord Denning MR in 
Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements v W.H. Smith & Son Ltd: 
 
People who combine together to keep up prices do not shout it from the housetops. They 
keep it quiet. They make their own arrangements in the cellar where no one can see. 
They will not put anything into writing, nor even into words. A nod or a wink will do.122  
  
The English High Court attaches particular importance to contemporaneous documents, 
which are capable of having high probative value. A helpful example is provided by 
Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Limited v Amalgamated Racing Limited, where 
Mr Justice Morgan held that ‘documents which pointed, even obliquely, to the existence of 
an agreement or concerted practice had particular weight.’123 To assemble the various 
indicia together to form a coherent picture and, more importantly, a position that would 
stack up in court, it is not unreasonable to give careful consideration to the rare ‘slip-ups’ of 
the parties, such as e-mail exchanges that are written ‘in a less guarded way with no 
expectation that they will ever see the light of day, much less the light of a trial with cross-
examination’. The same is true of attention given to fragmentary or sporadic pieces of 
evidence that emerge during an investigation124 (in follow-on actions) or that are in the 
hands of the claimant. It is common grounds that contemporaneous documents may be used 
to give evidence of the truth of their contents, with a soft interpretation of the rules of 
hearsay that apply in other matters.125 
 To the author’s knowledge, there does not seem to be an abundance of Italian case 
law dealing with the probative value of evidence in private antitrust cases in stand-alone 
cases. As in the EU law, the guiding principle is the free appreciation of all the evidence by 
the judge and the civil judge is alive to the difficulties of retrieving evidence, especially in 
cartel cases: 
 
                                               
122 Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements v W. H. Smith & Son Ltd. and others, Court of Appeal [1969] 
1 WLR 1460, 1466. 
123 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services Limited v Amalgamated Racing Limited, English High Court, 
Chancery Division [2008] EWHC 2688 (Ch), para. 18. 
124 Bookmakers’ Afternoon Greyhound Services Limited v Amalgamated Racing Limited, para. 18. 
125 Compare Practice Direction 32 on Evidence which supplements Part 32 of Civil Procedure Rules, para 
27.2: ‘All documents contained in bundles which have been agreed for use at a hearing shall be admissible at 
that hearing as evidence of their contents, unless –  
(1) the court orders otherwise; or  
(2) a party gives written notice of objection to the admissibility of particular documents.’ 
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It would be naïve to expect that evidence of an anti-competitive practice is found in a 
written document, especially since any means of evidence can be used, including 
presumptions […].126 
 
What can be noted is that, in the lack of any express provision endowing administrative 
decisions of the AGCM or other NCA with binding effect, the case law of the Italian civil 
judge has attributed very high probative value to administrative decisions in follow-on 
actions.127 The Italian civil judge is free to evaluate evidence, but it usually considers 
previous administrative decisions issued on the same matter as a ‘prova privilegiata’.128 This 
means that such evidence acts as a rebuttable presumption in favour of the claimant that the 
infringement has occurred and that it caused damages.129 The assessment of the probative 
value of evidence, as a result, is considerably influenced by administrative decisions, which 
in turn, are considerably influenced by the EU Courts. Thus, it is hard to imagine that the 
rules judicially designed by the EU Courts will not affect the national judge’s consideration 
in analogous competition matters.  
 
4) THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
Fact-finding is pivotal for performing the functions of a trial judge.130 In both national and 
EU systems of law, the rules relating to evidence are crucial in order to adjudicate a dispute 
and, ideally, to ascertain the truth.131 This is particularly true for antitrust law cases, that are 
often fact-intensive and full of technical and economic facts. In the private enforcement of 
competition law, the fact-pleading nature132 of civil proceedings lays upon claimants the 
responsibility of verifying the facts alleged. In public enforcement, both the Commission 
                                               
126 Court of Appeal of Milan, Soc. Bluvacanze v Soc. I viaggi del Ventaglio, Soc. Turisanda, Soc. Hotelplan 
Italia, 11 July 2003 (2004) Foro italiano, I, 597-615, 601-602. 
127 ALBERTO PERA, ‘Decisioni con impegni e private antitrust enforcement’ in I rimedi civilistici agli illeciti 
anticoncorrenziali. Private Enforcement of Competition Law - Atti del III Convegno di Studio presso la 
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Trento 15-16 aprile 2011 (Cedam 2012) 111. 
128 Court of Cassation, Soc. Allianz v Buonocore, 14 March 2011, decision no. 5942 (2011) Foro italiano, I, 
1724 ff. (Article 2 of Law 287/1990); Court of Cassation, ANCL v Inaz Paghe Srl, 13 February 2009, decision 
no. 3640 (2010) Foro italiano, I, 1901 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990). 
129 Court of Cassation Tommasselli v Soc. Axa Assicurazioni, 4 March 2013, decision no. 5327 (2013) Il Foro 
Italiano, I, 1519-1520 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990); Court of Cassation, Soc. Allianz v Palladino, 20 June 
2011, decision no. 13486 (2011) Il Foro Italiano, I, 2674 ff. (Article 2 of Law 287/1990).  
130 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 259. 
131 CHESTER BROWN, A Common Law of International Adjudication, Oxford University Press (2007) 84. 
The Author highlights how rules of evidence before international courts have mostly been developed 
judicially, in the general lack of prescription for such rules in the constitutive instruments. 
132 See Introduction, fn. 67. 
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and the NCAs expend a great deal of their time and resources in the fact-finding process. In 
antitrust law, on hand hand, there is often a dearth of documental evidence (for instance, in 
cartel cases)133 and economic evidence is not always conclusive;134 on the other hand, the 
authority or claimant often lacks the necessary evidence to support their allegations. All 
Member States have rules about the allocation of the burden of proof upon the parties.  
 As a general rule, claimants must establish those facts that they allege.135 Most 
systems of civil law have codified the maxim ‘he who asserts must prove’136 in their civil 
procedure,137 but the principle is recognised in systems of common law countries as well.138 
How importantly the obligation to adduce evidence reflects on the outcome of the 
proceedings will depend on the structure of the relevant norm, on the nature of the 
proceedings, and on the importance of the fact to be proved. If the evidence is insufficient to 
satisfy judge, the allegation will not be held to be proved. Given this, determining which 
party has to disclose evidence in a particular case is vital. 
                                               
133 White Paper on  Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final, para. 2.2: 
‘Much of the key evidence necessary for proving a case for antitrust damages is often concealed and, being 
held by the defendant or by third parties, is usually not known in sufficient detail to the claimant.’ The fact that 
cartels are investigated by the Commission years after the events took place also plays a role, compare 
SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices between 
Competitors 26.  
134 An example is provided by the lack of formulation of a final theory of harm in abuse of dominance cases. 
Compare also CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 557: 
‘These [economic] reports often tend to make an interpretation of certain observed facts, and they are not, as 
such, facts. They are mainly economic argument or economic analysis of the facts which is certainly useful 
[…] but cannot be given some sort of scientific status.’ Compare also ERIC BARBIER and ANNE-LISE 
SIBONY, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’ [2008] Common Market Law Review 968. 
135 WILLIAM MAWDESLEY BEST, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence and Practice as to Proofs in 
Courts of Common Law, Garland Publishing (1854) 332: ‘[…] the man who brings another before a judicial 
tribunal must rely on the strength of his own right and the clearness of his own proofs, and not on the want of 
right or weakness of proof in his adversary.’ 
136 The principle ‘he who asserts must prove’ makes its appearance also in the Pandects, where the quotation is 
reported at 22.3.2 from Paulus Libro 69 Ad Edictum. The Pandects or Digest (Domini nostri sacratissimi 
principis Iustiniani iuris enucleate ex omni vetere iure collecti digestorum seu pandectarum) is one of the 
book of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the massive compilation of civil law ordered by Iustinian I in the 6th century 
A.D. 
137 For instance, such rule is contained in Article 2697 of the Codice Civile; in France at Article 9 of the 
Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile; in Spain at Article 1214 of the Code Civil. See NAZZINI, The 
Foundations of European Union Competition Law 291. As a counterpoint of this principle, the party who 
invokes an exception against the claimant’s assertion has the obligation to give evidence of the facts raising 
the exception: quicumque exceptio invocat eiusdem probare debet. 
138 Compare joined cases C-100 to C-103/80 SA Musique Diffusion française v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, 
Opinion of AG Slynn, at 1930: ‘a principle of law recognized in all Member States, that the legal burden of 
proving the facts essential to an assertion normally lies on the party advancing it’; and M/V Saiga (No. 2), 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea, ITLOS, Separate Opinion of Vice-President Wolfrum, para. 7: ‘It 
is the prevailing principle governing the appreciation of evidence by adjudicating bodies in all main legal 
systems that the burden of proof lies on the party who asserts them (actori incumbit probatio). […] The 
principle actori incumbit probatio is recognized in all legal systems.’ (emphasis added). 
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 In EU law, the position was neatly encapsulated by Advocate-General Tesauro in his 
Opinion in Blackspur DIY:  
 
In general, the Community judicial process has always been governed, as far as the onus 
of proof is concerned, by the principle that it is incumbent on the party who relies on 
particular facts to identify and produce evidence such as to convince the Court of the 
existence of those facts.139  
 
It would contravene EU law for the Commission or a plaintiff to assert only the 
infringement, while requiring the defendants to prove their innocence.140 If the Commission 
or a plaintiff do not manage to provide sufficient evidence of the infringement,141 the 
defendant can simply say that the evidence does not meet the ‘requisite legal standard’.142  
 The recent abundant use of evidential presumptions, which will be illustrated 
below,143 does not contradict this principle of law now embodied in Article 2 of Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003. Indeed, it is argued that evidential presumptions do not affect the allocation of 
the legal burden of proof, but simply operate on the evidential burden of proof. Such 
presumptions facilitate the discharge of the legal burden of proof. They shift the evidential 
                                               
139 Case C-362/95 P Blackspur DIY and Others v. Council and Commission [1997] ECR I-4775, para. 26. The 
Advocate-General also quotes case C-44/76 Milch-, Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v. Council and Commission 
[1977] ECR 393, para. 16: ‘[…] The applicant has not provided a scintilla of evidence in support of its 
allegation that the Commission had by its various communications led it to believe that proof of marketing in 
the country of destination could not be required’; and case C-346/82 Pierre Favre v. Commission [1984] ECR 
2269, para. 32: ‘It should be noted in this connection that no evidence has been produced in support of that 
allegation. This submission must therefore be rejected.’ Compare also joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. 
Lélos kai Sia EE v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton, formerly Glaxowellcome AEVE [2008] 
ECR I-7139, Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, para. 68. 
140 LENAERTS, ‘Some Thoughts on Evidence and Procedure in European Community Competition Law’ 
1471; ORTIZ BLANCO, European Community Competition Procedure 162. 
141 Case T-110/07 Siemens AG v Commission [2011] ECR II-477, paras. 174-175: ‘[T]he general principle that 
the Commission is required to prove every constituent element of the infringement, including its duration […], 
that is likely to have an effect on its definitive findings as regards the gravity of that infringement is not called 
into question by the fact that the applicant raised a defence of limitation, in respect of which the burden 
of proof rests, in general, with the applicant. […] the duration of the infringement, which requires that the date 
on which it ended be known, is one of the essential elements of the infringement, which must be proved by the 
Commission, irrespective of the fact that the disputing of those elements also forms part of the defence of 
limitation.’ 
142 Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, para. 58: ‘[I]t must be pointed 
out that, where there is a dispute as to the existence of an infringement of the competition rules, it is incumbent 
on the Commission to prove the infringements found by it and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to 
the requisite legal standard the existence of the circumstances constituting an infringement.’ 
143 See para. 5 below. 
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burden of proof to the other party; thus affecting the standard of proof, rather than the legal 
burden of proof.144  
 More precisely, the EU evidential burden of proof is not exactly the same as the 
equivalent idea in the common law tradition, and particularly in criminal law. In common 
law, the evidential burden of proof consists of the obligation on a party ‘to adduce sufficient 
evidence for the issue to go before the tribunal of fact’.145 This evidential burden, also called 
‘burden of production’ or ‘burden of evidence’, is placed on the party with the obligation to 
adduce evidence in order to persuade the judge to resolve an issue in their favour. Once the 
evidential burden has been discharged, the evidential burden of proof can, and normally 
does, shift to the other party.  
 The legal burden of proof, also called burden of persuasion, is defined as ‘the 
obligation imposed on a party by a rule of law to prove a fact in issue’.146 The legal burden 
of proof, therefore, ‘determines which party bears the risk of the lack of proof of a material 
fact at the end of the proceedings’.147 Generally, the legal burden does not shift from one 
party to the other in the proceedings. Whilst a distinction between legal and evidential 
burden of proof in these exact terms is not recognised in Romano-Germanic law, a 
somewhat distinct notion of burden of adducing evidence,148 is widely accepted by the EU 
Courts.  
 In clearer terms, such ‘European’ evidential burden relates to ‘the need for a party to 
give evidence of a prima facie case, such evidence not being considered sufficient unless it 
                                               
144 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 518. The connection 
between the evidential burden of proof and the standard of proof is highlighted also by the famous opinion of 
Lord Hoffmann in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, House of Lords [2001] UKHL 47, 
para. 55, where he observed how ‘some things are inherently more likely than others. It would need more 
cogent evidence to satisfy one that the creature seen walking in Regent’s Park was more likely than not to have 
been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that it was an Alsatian […] the question 
is always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not.’ 
145 KEANE and McKEOWN, The Modern Law of Evidence 82; RODERICK MUNDAY, Evidence (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 85. Compare Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43, para. 1: 
‘An evidential burden is not a burden of proof. It is a burden of raising, on the evidence in the case, an issue as 
to the matter in question fit for consideration by the tribunal of fact. If an issue is properly raised, it is for the 
prosecutor to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that that ground of exoneration does not avail the defendant.’ 
146 KEANE and McKEOWN, The Modern Law of Evidence 80. 
147 NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 291. 
148 Compare for this opinion with regard to mergers, ANNE-LISE SIBONY, ‘Limits of Imports from 
Economics into Competition Law’ in IOANNIS LIANOS and D. DANIEL SOKOL (eds), The Global Limits 
of Competition Law (Stanford University Press 2012) 51–52. The Author explains how, applying the same 
standard of proof, it would take more ‘evidentiary effort’ to prove a fact that is considered to be intrinsically 
improbable (for instance, the harmful consequences of a conglomerate merger) than it would be to establish a 
fact that is considered to be highly probable (for instance, the harmful consequences of a horizontal merger). 
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is not successfully contested by the counterparty.’149 According to Lord Devlin in Jayasena 
v Reginam,150 it is inaccurate and misleading to call the burden of adducing evidence a 
burden of proof,151 because it can be discharged by the production of evidence which falls 
short of proof.152 The same is valid also for the ‘European’ notion of evidential burden of 
proof, as suggested by Advocate-General Kokott, who clarifies that the shifting of the 
evidential burden of proof is nothing like an inversion of the burden of proof.153 
 The European Court of Justice has developed an autonomous notion of burden of 
evidence,154 which forms ‘part of the EU law of evidence’.155 In EU competition law, the 
difference between legal and evidential burden of proof was clarified by the Court of Justice 
in Aalborg Portland: 
 
Although according to those principles the legal burden of proof is borne either by the 
Commission or by the undertaking or association concerned, the factual evidence on 
which a party relies may be of such a kind as to require the other party to provide an 
explanation or justification, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the burden of 
proof has been discharged. 156 
 
Subsequently, the expression ‘burden of adducing evidence’ was used by Advocate-General 
Kokott in her Opinion in FEG, where she explained how:  
 
[T]he Commission naturally bears the burden of proving all the findings which it makes 
in its decision. However, before there is any need to allocate the burden of proof at all, 
each party bears the burden of adducing evidence in support of its respective assertions. 
A substantiated submission by the Commission can be overturned only by an at least 
                                               
149 ERIC BARBIER DE LA SERRE and ANNE-LISE SIBONY, ‘Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle 
en droit communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective’ (2007) Revue trimestrielle de 
droit européen 211. The translation is by the author of the present thesis. 
150 Jayasena v Reginam, Privy Council [1970] AC 618, 624. 
151 Whilst acknowledging Lord Devlin’s opinion, the expressions ‘evidential burden of proof’ or ‘burden of 
adducing evidence’ will still be used to refer exclusively to the ‘European’ notion of burden of adducing 
evidence to substantiate allegations. 
152 See KEANE and McKEOWN, The Modern Law of Evidence 82. 
153 Case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federative Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v. 
Commission [2006] ECR I-8725, para. 74. 
154 The evidential burden of proof requires the party who makes the assertion to substantiate it with evidence. 
It discourages the assertion of facts, which the party is not in the position to demonstrate. Compare VAN DER 
VIJVER, ‘Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective Justifications in the Case of prima 
facie Dominance Abuse?’ 123.  
155 NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 290. 
156 Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland A/S, Irish Cement Ltd, Ciments français SA, Italcementi - Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA, Buzzi 
Unicem SpA and Cementir - Cementerie del Tirreno SpA v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, para 79. 
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equally substantiated submission by the parties. The rules governing the burden of proof 
are only applicable at all where both parties provide sound, conclusive arguments and 
reach different conclusions.157  
 
There is great uncertainty in the literature about the principles interacting with the main 
principle ‘he who asserts must prove’. This uncertainty is, perhaps, due to the fact that not 
all legal traditions endorse the distinction between evidential and legal burden of proof. 
Judges do not generally adopt a clear theoretical approach to the burden of proving 
justifications or exemptions,158 often preferring to resolve disputes by means of procedural 
devices such as disclosure, presumptions, ‘lower’ standards of proof or orders of measures 
of enquiry.159 In EU competition law, the approach to the concept of restrictions of 
competition ‘by object’ can be explained in this fashion. Indeed, a reversal of the evidential 
burden of proof is embedded in restrictions ‘by object’, because the undertaking is always 
allowed to adduce evidence of the economic and legal context, which justify the finding that 
the alleged infringement is not liable to impair competition.160 In addition, a finding of 
restriction of competition ‘by object’ does not necessarily exclude the possibility that the 
                                               
157 Nederlandse Federative Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v. Commission, para. 
73 (emphasis added). The expression ‘evidential burden’ was used by AG Kokott only later on, in case C-8/08 
T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van 
bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529, para. 60, but it seems to have never 
been used by the European Courts to date. 
158 Some uncertainty in the distinction between the burden of adducing evidence and that of providing 
evidence of a justification, which, strictly speaking, does not instantiate a reversal of the evidential burden of 
proof (because, on the contrary, it is an application of the general rule actori incumbit probatio) can be 
observed in case Microsoft Corp. v Commission, para. 688: ‘The Court notes, as a preliminary point, that 
although the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances that constitute an infringement of Article 82 
EC is borne by the Commission, it is for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the Commission, 
before the end of the administrative procedure, to raise any plea of objective justification and to support it with 
arguments and evidence. It then falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of an abuse of a 
dominant position, to show that the arguments and evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, 
accordingly, that the justification put forward cannot be accepted.’ 
159 BARBIER DE LA SERRE and SIBONY, ‘Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit 
communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective’ 217, referring to case C-526/04 
Laboratoires Boiron SA v Union de recouvrement des cotisations de sécurité sociale et d’allocations 
familiales (Urssaf) de Lyon [2006] ECR I-07529, para. 55. In those circumstances, ‘[I]n order to ensure 
compliance with the principle of effectiveness, if the national court finds that the fact of requiring a 
pharmaceutical laboratory such as Boiron to prove that wholesale distributors are overcompensated, and thus 
that the tax on direct sales amounts to State aid, is likely to make it impossible or excessively difficult for such 
evidence to be produced, since inter alia that evidence relates to data which such a laboratory will not have, the 
national court is required to use all procedures available to it under national law, including  that of ordering the 
necessary measures of inquiry, in particular the production by one of the parties or a third party of a particular 
document.’ 
160 Joined cases C-403 and 429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure [2011], not yet 
published, para. 140. 
Chapter II 
The Evaluation of the Proof in EU Competition Litigation: A Comparison of Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 132 
undertaking meets the requisite conditions to fall under the umbrella of Article 101(3).161 As 
a consequence, restrictions of competition ‘by object’ do not entail a reversal of the legal 
burden of proof, but only of the evidential burden of proof. 
 Such reluctance to define a clear ‘general theory of the burden of proof’ is very 
noticeable in the case law of the Court of Justice, which, operating in a mixed tradition, 
intentionally and artfully dodges the risk of espousing legal notions or principles which are 
entrenched in only one of the two big families of law which are most represented across the 
EU Member States - i.e. Romano-Germanic law and Common law.  
 Some commentators, after having noted that plaintiffs may rely, to the purpose of 
discharging their burden of proof, on a number of inferences and rebuttable presumptions of 
fact, argued, in a slightly contradictory passage,162 that: 
 
These [inferences and rebuttable presumptions of fact] do not, strictly speaking, shift the 
evidentiary burden onto the undertakings, because they arise only through common sense 
and not through force of law, and any such inferences may be accepted or rejected by the 
reviewing Court as it sees fit. The legal and evidentiary burden therefore remains on the 
Commission throughout to adduce sufficient evidence of all elements of the 
infringement. Despite this, certain inferences are commonly accepted by the Courts in the 
absence of evidence from the undertakings, thereby effectively requiring the undertaking 
to lead evidence in rebuttal as if the evidentiary burden had shifted onto them.163  
 
It is submitted that this opinion is not convincing. When EU Courts operate a shift of the 
evidential burden of proof to alleviate the rigidity of the rule according to which the burden 
of proving a fact is placed on he who asserts it, they refer to another principle of EU 
evidence law. This is the proof-proximity principle, which is making its appearance in 
antitrust case law. It provides that the burden of proof is allocated upon the party in whose 
hands evidence is more likely to be available, that is assumed to be the party who is more 
likely to succeed in discharging that burden. The procedural transposition of the proof-
                                               
161 On this point see DAVID BAILEY, ‘Restrictions of Competition by Object under Article 101 TFEU’ 
(2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 559, 595. It must be pointed out, however, that the possibility for an 
agreement anti-competitive by object to benefit from an exemption is rather theoretical, see CSONGOR 
ISTVÁN NAGY, ‘The Distinction between Anti-competitive Object and Effect after Allianz: the End of 
Coherence in Competition Analysis’ (2013) 36 World Competition 541, 542.  
162 The Author’s view seems to be contradictory in that it is rather hard to understand how presumptions of fact 
that are not statutorily, but judicially established, would not shift the evidentiary burden of proof, but at the 
same time require the defendant to produce evidence as if the evidentiary burden of proof had shifted.     
163 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 22 (emphasis added).     
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proximity principle is the relevant evidential presumption applied to the specific matter. 
Given that the legal burden of proof does not shift, presumptions of fact only affect the 
shifting of the evidential burden of proof. They trigger the obligation to provide 
counterevidence disproving the facts subsumed by the presumption. To use a traditional 
sporting metaphor, discharging an evidential presumption may be compared to scoring a 
break point,164 rather than a match point;165 the contestant still having the possibility to win 
the match.166 In other words, the EU competition law system of allocation of the burden of 
proof seems to be governed by a balance of these two principles, as in a mixed system, in 
which both of them are referred to by the Courts. On one hand, from the principle ‘he who 
asserts must prove’ stems the general statutory presumption that the plaintiff is allotted the 
legal burden of proof and the defendant that of exemptions or justifications. On the other, 
from the proof-proximity principle arise all evidential presumptions which allocate the 
burden of evidence on the counterparty when a prima facie case is reached on the contested 
facts. In this view, it is contended that, in order to discharge the evidential burden of proof, 
mere allegations of the parties are not sufficient: the production of evidence is required.167 
The proof-proximity principle, its origins and the presumptions which embody it will be 
considered in the following paragraphs.   
                                               
164 When evidential burden is successfully discharged, the burden shifts to the other party. Reference is made 
here exclusively to the effect that break points have in tennis: when evidential presumptions are won they 
result in a ‘break of service’ and the counterparty has the next move.   
165 When the legal burden of proof is successfully discharged, the party wins the trial: just like match points in 
the game of tennis, when the contestant wins the legal presumption, he or she also wins the match.   
166 Precisely for this reason the shifting of the evidential burden of proof does not violate the principle of 
presumption of innocence. Compare T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and 
Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Opinion of AG Kokott, 
para. 93: ‘[T]he presumption of innocence is not disregarded if in competition proceedings certain conclusions 
are drawn on the basis of common experience and the undertakings concerned are at liberty to refute those 
conclusions. After all, classic criminal proceedings allow for the use of circumstantial evidence and recourse 
to principles derived from experience.’ With regard to the compatibility of the use of presumptions and the 
principle in dubio pro reo, see also Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited and Subsidiaries v Director 
General of Fair Trading (Napp 4) [2002] CAT 1 (Chapter II prohibition), para. 111: ‘Presumptions […] 
simply reflect inferences that can, in normal circumstances, be drawn from the evidence: they do not reverse 
the burden of proof or set aside the presumption of innocence […] Article 6(2) of the ECHR does not prohibit 
a permissive or evidentiary presumption from which a trier of fact may (as opposed to must) draw an inference 
of guilt […]. If a defendant undertaking seeks to rebut the presumption in question, the legal burden of proof 
remains on the Director to show that an abuse is established.’ This issue will be revisited in para. 5 G). 
167 Compare NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 295, who stresses how the EU 
Courts seem to use the verb ‘to demonstrate’ rather than ‘to prove’ when talking about the evidential burden, 
as in case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v Commission [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 69: ‘[A]n undertaking is at 
liberty to demonstrate that its bonus system producing an exclusionary effect is economically justified.’ It is 
contended here that, in order to discharge the evidential burden of proof, the production of evidence, and not 
the mere allegation of facts, is required. This view is strongly supported by the case law, see Microsoft Corp. v 
Commission, para. 688 and case C-521/09 P Elf Aquitaine SA v Commission [2011] ECR I-8947, para. 61: 
‘[I]f, in order to rebut that presumption, it were sufficient for a party concerned to put forward mere 
unsubstantiated assertions, the presumption would be largely robbed of its usefulness.’ 
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 According to Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the burden of proving any 
infringement under Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU rests upon the party alleging it, and 
this is an application of the already mentioned general principle ‘he who asserts must 
prove’. A reversal of the legal burden of proof is intrinsic to the formulation of Article 
101(3) TFEU, because it is for the undertaking to claim and prove the requirements for 
benefiting of the listed exceptions.168 The problem arises of in favour of who a situation of 
non liquet would be decided in the case of sparse evidence. Some authors have envisaged 
the possibility to interpret such provision in the light of the presumption of innocence, 
therefore considering that, if the undertaking presents a prima facie case169 that it fulfils the 
requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU and the public authority or the plaintiff does not 
succeed in proving that it does not, the application should then be dismissed. Conversely, it 
seems more sensible to interpret Article 101(3) TFEU as a procedural defence offered to the 
defendant: once the infringement has been established (in absence of which there is no need 
for the undertaking to provide a defence), the defendant has to yield evidence of its 
entitlement to benefit from that exemption. If it does not discharge such legal burden, the 
infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU stands and the case must be decided against it.170  
 As regards the allocation of the legal burden of proof for the application of Article 
102 TFEU, the dominant undertaking does not bear the burden of proving the fact that it is 
not abusing its position in the market. It is for the Commission, the NCA or the claimant to 
demonstrate the existence of such an abuse and they will pay the legal consequences of 
failing to provide sufficient evidence.171 The public authority or the private claimant bears 
the legal burden of proof as regards the abuse of dominant position, whereas the dominant 
undertaking only bears the evidential burden of showing that no abuse occurred, by means 
of yielding defences or objective justifications.172 These defences do not serve the goal of 
discharging a legal burden of proof, which does not rest upon the undertaking. They rather 
dismiss the evidential burden that has been passed to it by means of reaching a prima facie 
case of abuse. The objective justifications return to three main categories: legitimate 
business behaviour or objective necessity, when the firm is efficiently competitive and had 
no alternative way to act; efficiency considerations, when the exclusionary conduct has 
                                               
168 NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 292. A similar reversal of the burden of 
proof operates for those vertical agreements which fall under the scope of the Block Exemption Regulation. 
169 See, for this notion, Introduction, fn. 69. 
170 ORTIZ BLANCO, European Community Competition Procedure 165. 
171 NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 395. 
172 NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 292. 
Chapter II 
The Evaluation of the Proof in EU Competition Litigation: A Comparison of Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 135 
efficiency effects beneficial to final consumers; public interest, when such interest might be 
at stake and justify an anticompetitive behaviour. The first of such justifications is by far the 
easier to prove.173 In those cases where efficiencies outweighing anticompetitive effects are 
claimed to exist, the evidential burden of proof shifts to the undertaking, which has to 
demonstrate the benefits of its conduct for consumers.174 If the undertaking succeeds in 
discharging this evidential burden, it is again for the counterparty to confute the 
justification.175 If the undertaking does not succeed in proving the justification, the 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU is admitted.176 
 
A) Burden of Proof and Notorious Facts  
 
The allocation of the burden of proof for notorious fact is, in competition matters, a rather 
unexplored topic. The proof is not required for those facts that are so well known that they 
do not require any evidence to be established. According to the judicial notice rule 
developed in the common law tradition,177 the vast majority of scholars consider that 
notorious facts need not to be proved, unless they are specifically questioned. Deciding 
whether the facts are to be considered matter of public knowledge or not appertaining to the 
competent judge is a question of fact. Such observations were confirmed by the President of 
the Court of Justice, in the dismissal order of an appeal for an application to intervene in a 
case for annulment of an anti-dumping duty.178 While the appellant argued that: ‘the 
economic situation of a region is a fact of economic geography, which is known or is liable 
to be known to everyone and which thus does not need to be proven’; the President clarified 
that it is usually within the responsibility of the person alleging facts in support of a claim to 
adduce proof of such facts. The Order stated that, even if the rule is derogated from when 
                                               
173 VAN DER VIJVER, ‘Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective Justifications in the 
Case of prima facie Dominance Abuse?’ 121–122 and 132. 
174 PHILIP LOWE, ‘Taking Sound Decisions on the Basis of Available Evidence’ in European Competition 
Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing 
2011) 164. 
175 Microsoft Corp. v Commission, para. 688. See Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings OJ C-45/7 
[2009], para. 31. 
176 VAN DER VIJVER, ‘Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective Justifications in the 
Case of prima facie Dominance Abuse?’ 125. 
177 The judicial notice rule allows a fact to be introduced into evidence if the truth of it is so public and well-
known, or authoritatively attested, that it cannot reasonably be doubted. 
178 AINDRIAS Ó CAOIMH, ‘Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof, Standard of Review and Evaluation of 
Evidence in Antritrust and Merger Cases; Perspective of Court of Justice of the European Union’ in European 
Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases 
(Hart Publishing 2011) 276. 
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the allegation concerns facts which are ‘well known’, deciding whether the facts concerned 
can be considered as ‘well known’ is a task that competes to the General Court and which 
constitutes a finding of fact, non reviewable on appeal, except for the case where the facts or 
evidence are distorted.179 Whether mainstream or well-established economic theories will 
ever be considered as notorious facts is hard to predict, but such conundrum is easily 
bypassed through the application of presumptions, which often enshrine those theories.   
 In one of the numerous lawsuit which arose out of the AGCM’s investigation in the 
motor insurance sector, the Italian civil judge showed a propensity not to consider 
information, however renowned, as proven. The AGCM had sanctioned the exchange of 
information between insurance companies in relation to the Italian compulsory car accident 
insurance. In 2011, the Court of Cassation had to pronounce itself upon a private antitrust 
action and stated that the defendant insurance company had not produced any specific 
counterevidence, but mere allegations, of the general situation of the insurance market at the 
time of the loss. According to the Court, the company should have produced its account-
books to prove the losses.180 Some commentators have argued that the general situation of 
the market should have been considered as notorious fact. For its proof, the production of 
two laws which attested the origins of the increase in prices in the sector and the AGCM’s 
decision should have been considered sufficient.181 Contrariwise, the Court did not consider 
the crisis in the sector as a notorious fact, and rejected the appeal on grounds that sufficient 
evidence had not been adduced by the defendant.    
 
B) Burden of Proof before the English Courts 
  
Even though sometimes the case law makes an ambiguous use of the terminology on the 
burden of proof,182 it can be generally observed that the allocation of the evidential and legal 
burden of proof by the European Courts described above is dittoed by national courts in the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
                                               
179 Case C-464/07 P (I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno and Comune di Monte Urano v Apache Footwear Ltd and 
Others [2008] ECR I-15, para. 9.  
180 Court of Cassation, Soc. Allianz v Buonocore, 14 March 2011, decision no. 5942 (2011) Il Foro Italiano, I, 
1724 ff. (Article 2 of Law 287/1990).  
181 ALDO FRIGNANI, ‘L’onere della prova nelle cause risarcitorie da illecito antitrust’ in I rimedi civilistici 
agli illeciti anticoncorrenziali. Private Enforcement of Competition Law - Atti del III Convegno di Studio 
presso la Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Trento 15-16 aprile 2011 (Cedam 2012) 65. 
182 NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 293-294. 
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 The allocation of the burden of proof is one of those issues that are governed by 
substantive uniform EU law, which removed it from the procedural autonomy of the 
Member States and from the scope of the conflict of laws rules in multi-jurisdictional 
proceedings. This is, however, in line with private international law considerations, which 
predominantly classify the topic as substantive and governed by the lex causae.183 The 
reason why this solution is regarded as the most appropriate is that the burden of proof 
directly affect the outcome of the decision and it would not be appropriate to detach it from 
the substantive right which it seeks to affirm.184 These reasons probably justify the fact that 
this is the only issue of evidence that has been expressly regulated by Article 2 of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Such provision must be followed by all national competition 
authorities and courts.185 
As a consequence, the burden of proof before English Courts is allocated according 
to the EU law. The legal burden of proof always rests on the public authority or the plaintiff 
(in line with Article 2 of the Regulation (EC) 1/2003) to prove the infringements alleged, 
and to establish causation and to prove losses. Such an approach is followed by the CAT 
when exercising its appellate jurisdiction over OFT decisions. It is for the appellant to 
convince the CAT that the challenged decision has to be overturned.186 As regards both the 
burden and standard of proof applied by the English courts, the landmark case to make 
reference to is Napp.187 In the occasion of the first appeal under the Competition Law Act 
1998 against an infringement decision, the CAT clearly illustrated the burden and standard 
of proof to be applied for the imposition of fines at the national level. With regard to the 
allocation of the burden of proof, the usual ‘he who asserts must prove’ principle was 
applied, and on the OFT was placed the legal burden of discharging the legal burden of 
proof of the infringement.188 The statement was corroborated by the application of the 
presumption of innocence, stemming from the asserted relevance in the matter of Article 
6(2) of the ECHR, transposed into the English domestic system under the Human Rights 
Act 1998. The applicability of that provision (which refers to criminal charges and criminal 
                                               
183 BRIGGS, The Conflict of Laws 192.  
184 GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 198. 
185 BRKAN, ‘Procedural Aspects of Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: Heading Toward New 
Reforms?’ 502. 
186 Tesco Stores Ltd, Tesco Holdings Ltd, Tesco Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2012] CAT 9: ‘It is, of course, 
true that the legal burden of proof rests on the OFT to prove the infringements alleged in its decision. […] The 
onus is on an appellant to persuade the Tribunal that the decision being challenged should be set aside.’ 
187 Recently upheld also by North Midland Construction PLC v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 14 
(Chapter I prohibition), paras. 14–15.  
188 Napp 4, para. 95. 
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offences) was due, according to the Tribunal, to the fact that a competition infringement 
decision can lead to the imposition of severe financial penalties. Interestingly, in the same 
paragraph, the CAT specified that such allotment of the persuasive burden does not impinge 
upon the use of evidential presumptions, which may well guide the allotment of the 
evidential burden.189 The OFT is therefore entitled to rely on inferences or presumptions 
which normally flow from a given set of facts. The UK Tribunal made specific reference to 
different presumptions drawn on from the case law of the EU Courts, deeming them 
applicable by domestic courts when applying EU competition law provisions. The 
presumptions mentioned were: very high market shares as an indicator of a dominant 
position; sales below average variable costs may be predatory; attendance to a meeting with 
anti-competitive purpose shows participation in the cartel, unless otherwise proven.190 These 
types of evidential presumptions do not reverse the legal burden of proof, nor set aside the 
principle of the presumption of innocence which must be respected at all times.191 
Presumptions will be considered thoroughly in the following paragraph. 
In actions for damages, the burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff is considerably 
lighter in those circumstances where a decision of the OFT or of the European Commission 
(upheld on appeal if applicable) is already available, because the claimant can rely on that 
decision which is considered evidence of the infringement. In such follow-on actions, the 
plaintiff ‘only’ needs to prove causation and loss.192  
 
C) Burden of Proof before the Italian Courts  
  
                                               
189 For further details on the interplay between evidential presumptions and the principle of presumption of 
innocence, refer to para. 5 G) below. 
190 Napp 4, para. 110: ‘That approach does not in our view preclude the Director, in discharging the burden of 
proof, from relying, in certain circumstances, from inferences or presumptions that would, in the absence of 
any countervailing indications, normally flow from a given set of facts, for example that dominance may be 
inferred from very high market shares […] Hoffman-La Roche v Commission […]; that sales below average 
variable costs may, in the absence of rebuttal, be presumed to be predatory (see the opinion of Advocate 
General Fennelly in […] Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission […]; or that an undertaking’s presence at a 
meeting with a manifestly anti-competitive purpose implies, in the absence of explanation, participation in the 
cartel alleged: Montecatini v Commission […].’ 
191 Napp 4, para. 111. 
192 BLANKE and NAZZINI, International Competition Litigation - A Multijurisdictional Handbook 155. With 
regard to the numerous evidential hurdles that claimants encounter also in follow-on actions, see Enron Coal 
Services Ltd (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 2, para. 130: ‘[S]ince 
a finding of infringement does not require proof that damage has in fact been caused to a rival undertaking, the 
fact that an infringement has been established does not show, as a necessary implication, that such damage has 
been caused.’ 
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With regard to the burden of proof applied by Italian courts, the above mentioned European 
allocation of the burden of proof has been confirmed in many occasions and substantially 
dittoes the general principle for the allotment of the legal burden of proof expressed by 
Article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code.193 This allocation of the burden of proof is adopted 
by the administrative judge when reviewing AGCM’s decisions,194 with some alleviation 
due to the difficulties encountered by the parties in accessing evidence and the structure of 
the administrative procedure. In particular, before the administrative judge the leading 
principle is that he who asserts must produce a ‘principio di prova’ (prima facie evidence) 
of what he affirms, rather than ‘prove’. Basically, the administrative judge is entitled to take 
into account which party has access to evidence in order to alleviate, where appropriate, the 
burden of proof.195 This is nonetheless feasible only where substantial difficulties hinder the 
retrieval of evidence for the investigated undertaking, otherwise the application of the 
regular rule ‘he who asserts must prove’ is more suitable.196     
 In the private enforcement, the maxim ‘he who assers must prove’ applies. In 
particular, private antitrust actions are categorized as tort law action, under the general 
clause of Article 2043 of the Civil Code, which, according to the case law, requires the 
victim of the infringement to adduce evidence of the infringement, or its assessment 
performed by the national competition authority, evidence of the loss suffered, of causation 
and of the fault of the infringer.197 The judge will be empowered to ascertain causation by 
means of inferences and presumptions, if need be, under condition that all counterevidence 
provided by the defendant is thoroughly analysed.198  
  
5) PRESUMPTIONS IN EU ANTITRUST LAW 
 
                                               
193 GIAN LUCA ZAMPA and GIULIA ATTINÀ, ‘Il riparto dell’onere della prova ai sensi dell’art. 2 Reg. 
1/2003 anche con riferimento all’art. 101 § 3 TFUE’ in LORENZO FEDERICO PACE (ed), Dizionario 
sistematico del diritto della concorrenza (Jovene 2013) 312. 
194 TAR Lazio, 6 October 1998, decision no. 1902, para. 6.  
195 CASETTA, Manuale di diritto amministrativo 766–767. 
196 For details on the proof-proximity principle, see below para. 6. 
197 It is also material to note how, under Italian tort law, the claimant is also required to provide evidence of the 
defendant’s fault. Such an element has been examined above, see para. 1 C) a).   
198 Court of Cassation, Soc. Allianz v Palladino, 20 June 2011, decision no. 13486 (2011) Foro italiano, I, 2674 
(Article 2 of Law 287/1990); Court of Cassation, Soc. Allianz v De Cusatis, 10 May 2011, decision no. 10211 
(2011) Foro italiano, I, 2675 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990); Court of Cassation, Soc. Azienda Agricola Fratelli 
Didonna v Soc. Allianz, 20 January 2011, decision no. 1340 (2011) Foro italiano, I, 1724 ff. (Article 2 of Law 
287/1990); Court of Appeal of Milan, Soc. Bluvacanze v Soc. I viaggi del Ventaglio, Soc. Turisanda, Soc. 
Hotelplan Italia, 11 July 2003 (2004) Foro italiano, I, 597-615 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990).  
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Presumptions in EU competition law affect the definition of the object of the proof and what 
needs to be established by the claimant. Inferences and presumptions are extremely common 
in competition law because evidence is often sparse and documentary evidence of 
infringements is extremely rare. Recently, the use of factual presumptions by the EU Courts 
has become more and more important, on grounds of their practical utility in helping judges 
to reach their decisions and of the paramount role acquired by economic evidence in 
competition law matters.199 It is necessary to clarify that presumptions here examined are 
those inferences and presumptions of facts on which the party may rely in order to prove a 
state of affairs whose demonstration is needed to back up their claims.200 Despite the lack of 
general consensus on a theoretical and terminological framework for presumptions,201 the 
distinction between legal and factual presumptions is usually accepted. They allegedly differ 
in that legal presumptions, or presumptions of law, statutorily prescribe judges to presume a 
fact, when another fact is proved, even if the latter is not the necessary consequence of the 
former. To pick an example that is valid for both English and Italian law, a child is 
presumed to be legitimate if it is proved that: i) the child was born to the wife; ii) it was 
born during lawful wedlock or within the normal period of gestation after wedlock has 
ended; iii) the husband was alive at the date of conception. In EU competition law, there are 
no statutory presumptions, but legal presumptions are, for instance, contained in soft law 
instruments,202 such as the Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which 
do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1), according to which an 
                                               
199 LAURA PARRET, ‘Sense and Nonsense of Rules on Proof in Cartel Cases’ (2008) DP 4/2008 Tilburg Law 
and Economics Center (TILEC) Research Paper Series 17. For a detailed analysis of how economic evidence 
and economic expertise play a crucial role in competition law proceedings, see IOANNIS LIANOS, 
‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ in IOANNIS 
LIANOS and IOANNIS KOKKORIS (eds), The Reform of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International 
(2010) 188 ff. 
200 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 21. 
201 The most systematic attempts to classify presumptions in EU competition law so far seem to have been 
made by DAVID BAILEY, ‘Presumptions in EU Competition Law’ (2010) 31 European Competition Law 
Review 362–369; GINEVRA BRUZZONE and MARCO BOCCACCIO, ‘Impact-Based Assessment and Use 
of Legal Presumptions in EC Competition Law: The Search for the Proper Mix’ (2009) 32 World Competition 
465–484; and ODUDU, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law - The Scope of Article 81 113–127. 
202 Two examples of legal presumptions are also provided by the Notice on the Effect on Trade between 
Member States, in the context of Commission’s proceedings. The Notice provides that, on the one hand, an 
agreement is presumed not to appreciably affect trade between Member states when the aggregate market 
share of the parties on any relevant market within the EU does not exceed 5 per cent and the aggregate annual 
European turnover in the products covered by the agreement does not exceed 40 million euros (negative 
presumption); on the other hand, an agreement, whose nature is capable of appreciably affect inter-state trade, 
is presumed to affect such trade if the market share of the parties exceeds 5 per cent or if the annual European 
turnover exceeds 40 million euros (positive presumption). See KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust 
Enforcement 65-66. 
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agreement is not likely to appreciably restrict competition if the aggregate market share for 
competitors is below 10%, and for non competitors is below 15%.203  
 Conversely, factual presumptions, or presumptions of fact, or inferences, often lack a 
formal legal status204 and are induction-based presumptions of common sense, which rely on 
factual elements, or indicia, of a certain subsumed state of affairs.205 The distinction appears 
to be very blurred, and it looks like it could be reduced to that presumptions of law are 
statutorily imposed, whereas presumptions of fact are left to the free evaluation of the judge. 
Presumptions addressed by this paragraph are judicial permissive presumptions which are 
aimed at establishing facts (often, the existence of an infringement), rather than the anti-
competitive effects of the infringement,206 and which, affecting the allocation of the 
evidential burden of proof, should be considered as inherently rebuttable.207 In EU 
competition law, these presumptions have not been incorporated by statutory law yet. 
Examples will be set out below.  
 The peculiarity of presumptions is that they are aimed at obviating the need of 
evidence to establish a proposition.208 They govern on whom the burden of proof must rest 
and usually operate to allow a decision to be taken notwithstanding the scarcity of evidence 
upon the facts. Since there is no hope to eliminate the total risk of judicial error, the choice 
of which kind of error is preferable is left to each legal system. The most blatant example is 
the presumption of innocence, which is ‘a corrective device […] regulating in advance the 
direction of errors, where errors are believed to be inevitable.’209 When the case is 
                                               
203 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition 
under Article 81(1) [2001] OJ 368/13. 
204 See JOHN DYSON HEYDON, Cross on Evidence (9th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2013) 299, who 
beautifully describes them as ‘frequently recurring examples of circumstantial evidence’. 
205 ANTONY DUFF, ‘Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence’ in ANDREW 
SIMESTER, Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford University Press 2005) 130. The Author explains how: ‘Legal 
presumptions (or ‘presumptions of law’) […] go beyond what is sanctioned by extra-legal common sense: they 
mandate courts to presume that q, given proof of p, even if without such a legal rule, proof of p might not give 
us good enough reason to take q as true.’ 
206 For a detailed analysis of this different type of presumptions in antitrust law, see GINEVRA BRUZZONE 
and MARCO BOCCACCIO, ‘Impact-Based Assessment and Use of Legal Presumptions in EC Competition 
Law: The Search for the Proper Mix’ (2009) 32 World Competition 465–484. 
207 The author of the present thesis completely agrees with PETER MURPHY and RICHARD GLOVER, 
Murphy on Evidence (12th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 686 that ‘[a]n irrebuttable presumption is a 
contradiction in terms’, because it is a rule of law improperly described as presumption. The fact that they are 
not always, in the practice, rebuttable is a partly different question, that will be examined when analysing the 
compliance of presumptions with the respect of fundamental rights. See, on this point, lett. G) of this 
paragraph. 
208 JACQUES-MICHEL GROSSEN, Les présomptions en droit international public, Delachaux & Niestlé 
(1954) 26: ‘[L]a présomption légale correspond à une dispense de preuve.’ 
209 EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, ‘On Presumption’ in WILLIAM TWINING and ALEX STEIN (eds), 
Evidence and Proof, Dartmouth (1992) 443. 
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particularly complex, the time and resources that judges, or the parties, expend on retrieving 
evidence produce very high costs. Therefore, the only efficient way to conduct fact-finding 
operations is by means of keeping the cost of procedures aimed at ensuring the accuracy of 
evidence and the cost of the harm that errors generate as low as possible.210 Factual 
presumptions in competition law are apt to this purpose. They allow the judge to take a 
decision in those situations where the evidence available to the claimant is insufficient to 
exclude doubt, but they are based on life experience, so that the risk of error is kept as low 
as possible.211 These ‘ready-made causal inferences’212 are often not backed up by a strong 
theoretical construction213 and there is uncertainty even as regards a definition: 
 
The reason resides without any doubt in that the presumption is a reasoning process, some 
sort of machinery of the thought, whose functioning we manage to comprehend after some 
practice, but whose nature is difficult to describe with few, striking, and exact words..214 
 
The main reasons why presumptions are created and adopted are: 
 the likelihood of a fact: in those cases where experience showed that there is a high 
probability that the fact occurred, reversing the burden of adducing evidence on the 
other party the law avoid wasting time and resources; 
 avoiding the risk of false positives:215 minimizing such risk is one of the paramount 
objectives of continental legal systems;216 
 avoiding the impasse of non liquet: ensuring that a decision can always be taken, 
also in those cases where the amount of evidence is too scarce or too evenly 
distributed; 
 levelling information asymmetry:217 equalizing the position of the parties in those 
cases where all factual evidence is in the hands of the defendant.218  
                                               
210 ALEX STEIN, Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford University Press (2005) 214. 
211 DOUGLAS WALTON, ‘Presumption, Burden of Proof and Lack of Evidence’ (2008) 16 L’analisi 
linguistica e letteraria 49–71, 60: ‘[A] presumption arises from a rule that is established for procedural and/or 
practical purposes in a type of rule-governed dialog (like a trial).’ 
212 IOANNIS LIANOS and CHRISTOS GENAKOS, ‘Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law: an 
Empirical and Theoretical Analysis’ [2012] CLES Working Paper Series 6/2012, 76. 
213 HEYDON, Cross on Evidence 298; EDMUND M. MORGAN, Presumptions, Washington Law Review, 
1937 255: ‘Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject has approached 
the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair.’ The author of 
the present dissertation makes no exception. 
214 GROSSEN, Les présomptions en droit international public 15. This translation is of the author. 
215 False positives, or type I errors, consist in prohibiting a pro-competitive conduct; whereas false negatives, 
or type II errors, consist in allowing an anti-competitive conduct. 
216 Compare KEVIN M. CLERMONT, ‘Standards of Proof Revisited’ (2009) 33 Vermont Law Review, 471, 
who highlights how civilians ‘are much more willing to accept a false negative than a false positive.’ 
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There are two main types of presumptions that are used in EU competition law as regards 
their effects: evidential presumptions and substantive presumptions.219 Evidential 
presumptions are those presumptions which operate on the evidential burden of proof; they 
are reversed when the party adduce sufficient evidence to put into question the fact asserted 
by the counterparty. Conversely, the function of substantive presumptions (also called 
persuasive presumptions) is to allocate the legal burden of proof from the beginning. They 
operate unless the party who is shouldered with the burden of proof successfully discharges 
it, which normally determines the outcome of the proceedings.220 Another major 
classification of presumptions is based on the possibility of the presumption of being 
successfully overturned by other evidence, and therefore one could distinguish between 
conclusive (or irrebuttable) presumptions and rebuttable presumptions. This distinction 
lacks consistency, in the author’s view, because an irrebuttable presumption is a rule of 
law.221 
 When proving an infringement, the Commission and, as it will be illustrated later, 
private parties can rely on a number of inferences and rebuttable presumptions of facts 
which help them reaching a full proof, in those cases where there is little evidence available 
to support their actions.222 
 
A) The Presumption of Cartel Participation 
  
One of the most commonly applied presumptions under Article 101 is the presumption 
according to which an undertaking is guilty of an infringement if it has participated in cartel 
                                                                                                                                                
217 CHRISTOPHER DECKER, Economics and the Enforcement of European Competition Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2009) 193–194, who, in regards to the use of rebuttable presumptions, argues that it might be 
helpful in addressing some of the ‘resource asymmetry issues’, even though he believes that, lacking other 
structural reforms, it will not improve decision-making alone. 
218 Some of these reasons echo the principles that should inform the application and use of presumptions 
according to BAILEY, ‘Presumptions in EU Competition Law’ 368–369. 
219 Compare BAILEY, ‘Presumptions in EU Competition Law’ 367, who also considers a different category, 
that of procedural presumptions. Those are presumptions which do not contain any substantive assessment, but 
are imposed by the law on grounds of convenience, speedy decision-making, and streamline procedure. An 
example would be that of Article 10(6) of the EU Merger Regulation. It provides that mergers with a 
Community dimension, in those cases where the Commission has not taken any decision within the time 
limits, are deemed compatible with the internal market. 
220 ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, Evidence (Oxford University Press 2009) 404. 
221 Compare fn. 207 above. 
222 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 21. 
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meetings,223 unless otherwise proven.224 This presumption is justified by the likelihood that 
it will use the information obtained from its competitors. On the assumption that the 
undertaking who has not publicly distanced itself from the agreement leads the co-
contractors to think that it will co-ordinate its market conduct,225 it is procedurally more 
convenient to reverse the burden of proving such severance on the undertaking, which is 
also better situated to yield such proof. The General Court clarified that such an 
apportionment of the burden of proof varies according to whether the evidence on which a 
party relies may be of such a kind as to require the other party to provide an explanation or 
justification, failing which it can be concluded that the burden of proof has been discharged. 
The General Court clarified that: 
 
That apportionment of the burden of proof is likely to vary […] inasmuch as the evidence 
on which a party relies may be of such a kind as to require the other party to provide an 
explanation or justification, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the burden of 
proof has been discharged […]. Where […] the Commission has adduced evidence of the 
existence of an agreement, it is for an undertaking which has taken part in that agreement 
to adduce evidence that it distanced itself from that agreement, evidence which must 
demonstrate a clear intention, brought to the notice of the other participating 
undertakings, to withdraw from that agreement […].226 
 
In this passage, the General Court does not expressly refer to the application of any 
presumption and the reversal of the burden of proof seems not to be justifiable by means of 
any other compelling reason than the need to lighten the burden of proof borne by the 
Commission. Pursuant to the general rule of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, one would 
expect that the causal link between the exchange of information and the collusion or, at 
                                               
223 Aalborg Portland and others v Commission, para. 81; case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, para 86; joined cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P Bundesverband der 
Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Commission v Bayer AG [2004] ECR I-23, para. 63. 
224 Acceptable counterevidence is that showing that the participation to the meetings was without anti-
competitive intent; or aimed at a different purpose which was clear to the other participants; or that exchanged 
information was not taken into account to determine the market conduct. See SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU 
Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices between Competitors 23. 
225 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van 
bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, para. 53: ‘[I]n examining whether there is a causal 
connection between the concerted practice and the market conduct of the undertakings participating in the 
practice – a connection which must exist if it is to be established that there is concerted practice within the 
meaning of Article 81(1) EC – the national court is required, subject to proof to the contrary, which it is for the 
undertakings concerned to adduce, to apply the presumption of a causal connection established in the Court’s 
case-law, according to which, where they remain active on that market, such undertakings are presumed to 
take account of the information exchanged with their competitors.’ 
226 Case T-110/07 Siemens AG v Commission [2011] ECR II-477, para. 55 (emphasis added).  
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least, the fact that the undertaking made use of information exchanged in the occasion of the 
meeting should be imposed on the applicant. Instead, the General Court considers sufficient 
the proof of the contacts between competitors in the specific sector. It is then for the 
undertaking operating in that market to provide evidence of its publication of non-
participation or non-compliance with the agreed collusive behaviour. It is also interesting to 
note the language adopted by the Court, according to which, the apportionment of the 
burden of proof may ‘vary’. Reference is evidently made here to the evidential burden of 
proof, and not to the legal one, which by definition cannot shift from a party to the other 
along the proceedings.  
 
B) The Presumption of Concurrence of Wills   
In opposition to previous decisions,227 the EU case law provides many examples where the 
Courts consider that from the existence of parallel conduct of enterprises in the same market 
can be inferred their collusion, when concertation is the most plausible explanation for the 
conduct.228 When direct evidence of the collusion exists, the EU Courts expect the 
undertaking to put forward evidence of its severance from the collusion or of the existence 
of alternative justifications. However, in the dearth of documentary evidence of the 
infringement, concerted practices can, in consideration of the specific circumstances, such 
as the nature of the products, the size and number of undertakings involved and the volume 
of the market,229 be proved by circumstantial evidence only.230 It is then for the Commission 
to show that no alternative plausible explanation exists for the conduct adopted, apart from 
                                               
227 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) v Commission, para. 8: ‘Although parallel behaviour may not by 
itself be identified with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it 
leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having 
regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the undertakings and the volume of the said 
market’ (emphasis added). The burden of proving abnormal conditions of the market rested on the 
Commission. 
228 Joined cases T-45/98 and T-47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless GmbH and Acciai speciali Terni SpA v 
Commission [2001] ECR II-3757, para. 180. It must be noted, however, that presumptions play a minor role in 
the case of vertical concerted practice, as opposed to horizontal concerted practice. Indeed, whilst Article 81(1) 
undoubtedly punish both forms of collusion, it must be noted that, on one hand, vertical relationships are 
usually pro-competitive and, on the other, that relationships between suppliers and distributors, differently 
from those between competitors necessarily requires recurrent contacts and co-ordination of commercial 
policy. Moreover, the EU Courts’ case law has established that for a finding of collusion to be adopted in 
vertical cases, the minimum requirement is evidence of at least implied participation or tacit acquiescence to 
the particular anti-competitive measure, rather than simple overall concurrence of wills. See, for further 
details, FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition 201–202 and 214–215. 
229 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) v Commission, para. 66. 
230 FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition 213. 
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concertation.231 In CISAC v Commission,232 a recent case regarding a concerted practice by 
copyright collecting societies, the General Court partially annulled the Commission’s 
decision on grounds that there was a lack of sufficient evidence to prove the concerted 
practice. The Commission had found that collecting societies had included territorial 
limitations in the reciprocal representation agreements for the conferral of copyright 
licences for the exploitation of musical works. CISAC argued that the Commission had 
failed to prove the concerted practice, because the relevant parallel conduct (namely, the 
inclusion in all reciprocal representation agreements of national territorial restrictions) could 
be explained by alternative factors. The General Court agreed that the Commission had 
failed to render implausible the applicant’s argument that parallelism was not due to 
collusive behaviour but resulted from the need to prevent the unauthorised use of musical 
works. The General Court, referring to its reasoning in PVC II,233 restated that if the 
Commission’s finding of an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU is based on the existence 
of documents, the applicants must challenge the facts established by the Commission by 
means of counterevidence. Conversely, if its decision is based on the mere finding of 
parallel behaviours (and thus, on circumstantial evidence) the Commission must also 
establish the absence of an alternative reason for the undertakings’ parallel conduct and the 
applicants may simply prove ‘circumstances which cast the facts established by the 
Commission in a different light and thus allow another explanation of the facts to be 
substituted for the one adopted by the Commission.’234 In that occasion, the Commission did 
not have direct evidence of the territorial restrictions, and thus the General Court examined 
whether alternative explanation offered by the applicant for the parallelism were 
implausible. The Court observed how the lack of documentary evidence relating to the 
national territorial limitations was striking in light of the fact that the Commission had 
admitted that two out of the twenty-four participating collecting societies wanted to abandon 
those limitations. Given the circumstances,  
                                               
231 Case T-213/00 CMA CGM and others v Commission [2003] ECR II-913, para. 124: ‘The applicants take 
the view that, in light of those factors, the minutes of the meeting of 9 June 1992 do not provide sufficient 
proof of the Commission’s allegation of the existence of an agreement contrary to Article 81(1) EC […]. 
Inasmuch as the minutes in issue lend themselves to several interpretations, and since the alternative 
interpretation of the FETTCSA parties is a plausible one, the Commission’s interpretation cannot be sustained 
in the absence of a firm, precise and consistent body of evidence […].’ Compare SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU 
Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices between Competitors 23. 
232 Case T-442/08 International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) v Commission, 
not yet reported. 
233 PVC II, paras. 725–728. 
234 International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) v Commission, para. 99. 
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[I]t would have been in the interest of those collecting societies to cooperate with the 
Commission, by providing it with documentary evidence of the existence of 
concertation.235 
  
The Court noted how, on grounds that the Commission, in its statement of objections, had 
demonstrated its intention to fine all the addressees of its decision, the collecting societies 
were all required to cooperate with it in their own interest, basically to avoid the risk of 
being fined, or, at least, to reduce the amount of the fine. The Court expected those 
collecting societies to submit evidence establishing that other collecting societies had put 
pressure on them in order to maintain the agreed national territorial limitations, and since 
they did not do so, the Court was entitled to infer their participation in the infringement. It is 
out of doubt that this case law of the CJEU, placing the burden of disproving any alternative 
justifications on the Commission, renders very hard to prove cartels by means of 
circumstantial evidence.236 It can, however, be observed how, in the absence of documents 
of the infringement, the Court considered appropriate to rely on inferences, according to the 
argument that direct evidence woul have been apt to be found in the applicants’ hands. This 
approach seems to derive from the application of the proof-proximity principle, which will 
be analysed in the next paragraph.237 
 
C) The Presumption of Continuous Infringement 
  
Another case in which the shift of the evidential burden of proof is found is where the 
burden of discharging the proof of a continuous infringement rests upon the undertaking, 
owing to the fact that evidence showing interruption238 (such as, for example, any 
information in writing of its intention to cease its participation in the agreement) is more 
easily accessible by the undertaking rather than by the Commission239 or the claimant. 
                                               
235 International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) v Commission, para. 104. 
236 For criticisms to this approach adopted also by the Italian Council of State, see MARIO LIBERTINI, 
‘Adeguata istruttoria e standard probatori nei procedimenti antitrust’ (2008) 10 Giornale di diritto 
amministrativo 1105–1109. 
237 See para. 6 of this Chapter. 
238 DAVID BAILEY, ‘Single, Overall Agreement in EU Competition Law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law 
Review 473, 506–507. 
239 Case C-441/11 P Verhuizingen Coppens NV v Commission, not yet reported, para. 70: ‘[I]n the light […] of 
the lack of evidence that, during that period, Coppens had publicly distanced itself from the content of that 
agreement […] the Commission was justified in taking the view that Coppens could be found liable for 
participating in the agreement on cover quotas continuously throughout the entire period.’ Compare also 
Chapter II 
The Evaluation of the Proof in EU Competition Litigation: A Comparison of Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 148 
However, one of the few cases where the defendant undertaking managed to prove to have 
publicly distanced itself from the agreement was the Italian Raw Tobacco cartel. In that 
matter, Romana Tabacchi had stopped attending meetings with the co-infringers for two or 
three years, which was acknowledged by the other participants. This was showed by means 
of an internal memorandum produced by the chairman of Romana Tabacchi, noting that the 
undertaking was being discredited by the other participants with the cigarette manufacturers 
and described as a maverick in the market.240 
 
D) The Presumption of Parental Liability 
  
A frequently applied evidential presumption is the one according to which parent companies 
are liable for infringements committed by their wholly owned subsidiaries. This is also 
known as ‘Stora presumption’, from the name of the case where the Court of Justice 
established it. In Stora, the Court of Justice held that the Court of First Instance had 
legitimately assumed, from the fact that the subsidiary was wholly owned, that ‘the parent 
company in fact exercised decisive influence over its subsidiary’s conduct’.241 The Court of 
Justice held that the presumption shifted the burden of adducing evidence upon the 
appellant, who was therefore weighed down with the burden of rebutting said presumption. 
Clearly, this latter is better placed to gather evidence apt to demonstrate that the subsidiary 
acted independently from the parent company’s instructions. The presumption replies, 
ultimately, to the need of increasing deterrence, because the eventual fine will be calculated 
on the turnover of the company group rather than on that of the subsidiary alone. This 
presumption is often criticised on the grounds that is it, in the practice, irrebuttable.242 In the 
                                                                                                                                                
BAILEY, ‘Single, Overall Agreement in EU Competition Law’ 478: ‘Instead of insisting on a detailed account 
of each party’s involvement in the cartel, the single, overall agreement enables the Commission to describe, in 
broad terms, how the cartel operated in circumstances when each party can be presumed to have taken part in 
the cartel.’ 
240 Compare Raw Tobacco Italy (Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2) Commission Decision 2006/901/EC [2006] OJ 
L353, para. 302, fn. 263: ‘[D]a quanto riferitoci da alcune importanti manifatture, noi veniamo segnalati a 
quest’ultimo, sempre dalle tre multinazionali, come elementi di disturbo e di conflitto’. See, also, case T-11/06 
Romana Tabacchi Srl v Commission [2011] ECR II-6681, para. 144. Compare BAILEY, ‘Single, Overall 
Agreement in EU Competition Law’ 507, who underscores how the Commission does not explicitly 
characterises Romana Tabacchi’s behaviour as ‘public distancing’. 
241 Case C-286/98 P Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v Commission [2000] ECR I-9925, para. 29.  
242 MANTAS STANEVIČIUS, ‘Portielje: Bar Remains High for Rebutting Parental Liability Presumption’ 
(2014) 5 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 24, 24. Since the parent company can be held liable 
irrespective of its instructions, direct participation, or even awareness of the subsidiary’s infringement, some 
have talked of an objective responsibility of the parent’s company. See ANTOINE WINCKLER, ‘Parent’s 
Liability: New Case Extending the Presumption of Liability of a Parent Company for the Conduct of its 
Wholly Owned Subsidiary’ (2011) 2 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 231, 233. Such opinion 
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recent Portielje case,243 this difficulty has been confirmed. In its decision, the Commission 
had found that Portielje and its subsidiary Gosselin Group NV participated in a cartel in the 
international removal services sector in Belgium. Portielje was a foundation that owned, 
directly and indirectly, 100% of the Gosseling shares. The General Court annulled the 
Commission’s decision which regard to the liability of Portielje. The Court of Justice 
overruled that judgement for two main reasons. On one hand, the legal form of the parent 
entity is irrelevant as long as they can be considered a single economic unity. On the other 
hand, in order for the undertaking to rebut the presumption, all relevant factors ‘relating to 
the economic, organisational and legal links which tie [the] author [of the infringement] to 
its holding entity and […] of economic reality’244 must be taken into account. Within these 
factors, also ‘personal links between the legal entities’ may be relevant in founding the 
informal basis of the economic unit.245 Moreover, the fact that it is difficult to adduce the 
necessary evidence to the contrary in order to rebut the presumption does not mean that that 
presumption is de facto irrebuttable, especially since, the entities against which it operates 
are those best placed to seek that evidence.246  
 It was in the recent case Elf Aquitaine that the Court of Justice referred more 
explicitly to this proof-proximity principle, and clarified that it is the undertaking’s 
responsibility to rebut the presumption of parental liability. Even if the Court of Justice’s 
arguments are more aimed at asserting the legitimacy of that presumption, repeatedly been 
impeached by defendants for being de facto irrebuttable and as such unlawful, the words 
used by the Court allow catching a glimpse of the principle lying behind: 
 
[I]t should be observed that the fact that it is difficult to adduce the evidence necessary to 
rebut a presumption does not in itself mean that that presumption is in fact irrebuttable, 
especially where the entities against which the presumption operates are those best 
placed to seek that evidence within their own sphere of activity. 247 
 
In a preceding passage, the Court stated: 
                                                                                                                                                
seems nevertheless ill-founded, given that the ‘existence of a significant interference’ on the part of the parent 
company in the subsidiary’s strategy and commercial policy needs to be proved, see case C-90/09 P General 
Química SA v Commission [2011] ECR I-1, para. 104. 
243 Case C-440/11 P Commission v Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje and Gosselin Group NV, not yet 
reported. 
244 Commission v Portielje, para. 66. 
245 STANEVIČIUS, ‘Portielje: Bar Remains High for Rebutting Parental Liability Presumption’ 68. 
246 Commission v Portielje, para. 71. 
247 Elf Aquitaine SA v Commission, para. 70 (emphasis added).  
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It should be borne in mind, moreover, that that presumption is based on the fact that, save 
in quite exceptional circumstances, a company holding all the capital of a subsidiary can, 
by dint of that shareholding alone, exercise decisive influence over that subsidiary’s 
conduct and, furthermore, that it is within the sphere of operations of those entities 
against whom the presumption operates that evidence of the lack of actual exercise of 
that power to influence is generally apt to be found.248 
 
In her Opinion in Akzo, Advocate-General Kokott observed, in the same vein, how the facts 
and information necessary for the rebuttal of the presumption of exertion of decisive 
influence over the subsidiary originate mostly in the domain of the parent and subsidiary 
company. On these premises, requiring the latter to discharge the burden of adducing 
evidence to disprove the facts subsumed by the presumption appears perfectly rational and 
consistent with due process requirements.249 
 
E) Other Presumptions under Article 102 TFEU 
 
Under Article 102 TFEU, a very commonly applied presumption is the one which connects 
a market share of 50 % with a finding of dominance.250 Since its establishment in Hoffman-
La Roche,251 the existence of high market shares has been considered as evidence of the 
existence of a dominant position, except for particular circumstances. Analogously, a 
market share of less than 40% has been considered as excluding such dominance. This 
presumption is now contained in the Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities 
in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings at paragraph 14.252 As specificied in the same Guidance, however, market 
                                               
248 Elf Aquitaine SA v Commission, para. 60 (emphasis added).  
249 Akzo Nobel NV v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 75. 
250 Case C-97/08 P Akzo Nobel NV v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237, para. 60. This presumption is recurring 
also in national competition law. For example, the newly adopted amendment to the Gesezt gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB, the German Antitrust Act) poses a rebuttable presumption of dominance 
for companies with a market share of 40%, whilst the presumption of dominance for oligopolies of two or 
three businesses with a combined market share of 50% already existed. The GWB amendment enter into force 
on 30 June 2013, bringing about important changes, in particular for merger control and antitrust fines, in 
order to align German merger control with EU law and to increase the efficiency of the German antitrust 
system. 
251 Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1978] ECR 461, para. 41. 
252 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings OJ C-45/7 [2009] para. 14: ‘The Commission considers that 
low market shares are generally a good proxy for the absence of substantial market power. The Commission’s 
experience suggests that dominance is not likely if the undertaking’s market share is below 40% in the relevant 
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shares provide a useful first indication for the Commission in relation to the market 
structure and the importance of the investigated undertaking, but they must be interpreted in 
the light of many other factors. In particular, the Commission must take into account the 
dynamics of the market; the extent to which products are differentiated and the trend or 
development of market shares over time.253 The flexibility of the approach is attested also 
by the fact that EU Courts have excluded the existence of a dominant position in presence of 
very high market share and found dominance in cases where the market share was below 
that threshold.254  
 Another widespread presumption under Article 102 TFEU is the one that considers 
asserted a prima facie abuse of dominant position when a dominant undertaking charges 
prices below average variable costs.255 It is always possible, for the undertaking, to claim 
that the predatory conduct created efficiencies or economies of scale with a view to 
expanding the market.256  
 
F) The Compatibility of Presumptions with the Effects-Based Approach 
   
When addressing presumptions in antitrust law it is necessary to tackle the issue of their 
compatibility with the now prevailing effects-based approach.257 On one hand, if their use is 
not compatible with the currently prevailing economic approach they may be bound to lose 
importance and be progressively discarded by the EU Courts; on the other, if there are 
compatible, their application find no other major obstacle but the presumption of innocence. 
To this latter issue is devoted the following paragraph. 
                                                                                                                                                
market. However, there may be specific cases below that threshold where competitors are not in a position to 
constrain effectively the conduct of a dominant undertaking, for example where they face serious capacity 
limitations. Such cases may also deserve attention on the part of the Commission.’ 
253 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings OJ C-45/7 [2009] para. 13. 
254 PHILIP MARSDEN and LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN, ‘Guidance on Abuse in Europe: the Continued 
Concern for Rivalry and a Competitive Structure’ (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 875, 889–890; BRUZZONE 
and BOCCACCIO, ‘Impact-Based Assessment and Use of Legal Presumptions in EC Competition Law: The 
Search for the Proper Mix’ 478. 
255 For its assertion in a national context, compare Napp 4, para. 110.  
256 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings OJ C-45/7 [2009] para. 74. 
257 In contrast with the formalistic approach, the effects-based approach was promoted by the Guidance on the 
Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45/7. The effects-based analysis requires a deep economic investigation 
for the evaluation of the effects produced by the infringement on the market. It focuses on the effect of the 
undertaking’s conduct, rather than on the factual elements of the infringement alone. For an overview of the 
Guidance, see GIORGIO MONTI, ‘Article 82 EC: What Future for the Effects-Based Approach?’ (2010) 1 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2–11. 
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 Reasons to consider the use of the presumptions here analysed compatible with the 
effect-based approach are numerous. Although they may be said to arise out of the need for 
certainty and of a structuralist approach, many presumptions are aimed at alleviating a 
burden of proof that is considered too severe. They operate as ‘evidential shortcuts’258 to 
reach the proof on certain aspects of the infringement but they never rule out the evaluation 
of its effects, nor they exclude the full appreciation of the economic consequences of the 
undertaking’s conduct. In addition, all the analysed presumptions are rebuttable. Such 
quality is crucial. Indeed, the undertaking is always allowed to rebut the facts subsumed by 
the presumption and to bring economic considerations into the legal discourse. As observed 
also in the Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, these latter 
considerations are given a preminent role in the evaluation of the facts and are always apt to 
prevail over the presumption, if well-founded. Presumptions, after all, frequently arise out 
of established economic theories and play a major role in ensuring effectiveness. They are 
aimed at preventing the risk of type II errors and of under-enforcement. In this vein, their 
widespread adoption by national courts appears particularly meaningful and not in contrast 
with the effect-based approach.  
 
G) The Compatibility of Presumptions with the Principle of Presumption of Innocence 
 
The principle of presumption of innocence is here touched upon because of its interplay 
with the evaluation of the evidence, and its strong connection with the allocation of the 
burden of proof and the procedural devices which alter it (such as the presumptions of 
fact).259 As illustrated beforehand, the general principle in dubio pro reo, resulting from 
Article 6(2) of the ECHR and Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, is 
safeguarded in the review control of Commission’s decisions, because any remaining 
reasonable doubt must favour the defendant. This principle does not conflict with the 
mechanism by means of which the allocation of the burden of proof shifts to the defendant 
under certain circumstances, due to the fact that such alterations of its allotment have to do 
                                               
258 The expression is used by LUIZ ORTIZ BLANCO, ‘Standards of Proof and Personal Conviction in EU 
Antitrust and Merger Control Procedures’ in European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of 
Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing 2011) 188. 
259 For presumptions, the protection of the presumption of innocence is, in the EU Courts’ mind, guaranteed by 
their irrebuttability. This assertion has been recently put into doubt particularly with regard to the parental 
liability presumption, and this debate is thoroughly addressed at lett. b) of this paragraph. 
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with the assessment of the probative value of the evidence, and therefore fall within the 
margin of free appreciation of the Commission. In the words of Advocate-General Kokott:   
 
 
[T]he presumption of innocence is not disregarded if in competition proceedings certain 
conclusions are drawn on the basis of common experience and the undertakings 
concerned are at liberty to refute those conclusions. After all, classic criminal 
proceedings allow for the use of circumstantial evidence and recourse to principles 
derived from experience.260 
 
A similar view is also taken by national jurisdictions. The CAT expressly acknowledged the 
compatibility of the principle, as embodied by the Human Rights Act 1998, with the 
application of evidential presumptions in Napp.261 The CAT restated the importance of the 
principle ‘he who asserts must prove’, according to which it was upon the OFT to discharge 
the burden of proof of the infringement262 and concluded that Article 6(2) was applicable 
due to the criminal nature of the proceedings under the meaning of that Article. The CAT 
expressed this choice in the following terms:  
 
The fact that these proceedings may be classified as ‘criminal’ for the purposes of the 
ECHR gives Napp the protection of Article 6, and in particular the right to ‘a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’ (Article 6(1)), to the presumption of innocence (Article 6(2)), and to 
the minimum rights envisaged by Article 6(3) including the right ‘to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain attendance and examination of witnesses 
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him’ (Article 6(3)(d)). 
 
Clearly, its intention was to broaden the interpretation of Article 6 ECHR as to encompass 
those proceedings, and to ensure full recognition to the appellant’s rights.   
 In the context of the analysis of the interplay between fundamental rights and EU 
antitrust law proceedings, the discourse will focus under Chapter III on the fundamental 
rights impinged upon by the gathering of evidence, which represents the most common 
situation and the one that seems to have drawn more attention in the literature. Nonetheless, 
                                               
260 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van 
bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 93. 
261 Recently upheld also by North Midland Construction PLC v Office of Fair Trading, paras. 14-15. 
262 Napp 4, para. 111. 
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more recently, the phase of the assessment of evidence - namely the application of 
presumptions - raised concerns on the part of the commentators as to their compliance with 
the rights of defence and the presumption of innocence. Since the present thesis has dealt 
thoroughly with the phenomenon of the extensive use of presumptions by the Commission 
and their endorsement by the EU Courts, including the national courts, it seems appropriate 
to include these arising complexities in the scope of the analysis.  
 As previously observed, the use of presumptions, tampering with the allocation of 
the evidential burden of proof, may potentially impact on the safeguard of fundamental 
rights of defence, as interpreted by the ECtHR. Some commentators have argued that these 
presumptions must be curtailed, in order to avoid tensions with the system of protection of 
human rights.263 Conversely, it is the opinion contended here that such administrative 
presumptions are too precious a tool for the enforcement of competition law to be ruled out. 
At the same time, developing awareness of the risks entailed by their automatic application 
is meaningful with a view to defining their boundaries and reducing any potential danger 
connected to their use. In particular, it seems that embedding presumptions in uniform 
substantive statutory or soft law would compel the EU institutions to take into account the 
respect of fundamental rights more seriously. At the same time it would establish clear 
conditions for their application and, with regard to their application in the private 
enforcement of competition law, would bypass the complexities arising from the conflicts of 
law rules. In this regard, acknowledging the proof-proximity principle would prove useful 
too.264 This should be done, in particular, by means of endowing the judge with the power to 
make use of presumptions on a case-by-case basis, in flexible terms and within the 
reasonable limits advocated by the ECtHR. 
 As said before, the wide application of induction-based inferences in this area of law 
is likely to clash with the presumption of innocence, if one considers that such procedural 
guarantee primarily exists because in many cases it is extremely difficult for defendants to 
prove themselves innocent, even when they are.265 Particularly so in the field of competition 
                                               
263 MARCO BRONCKERS and ANNE VALLERY, ‘No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of 
Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law’ (2011) 34 World Competition 535, 535. 
264 For the beneficial effects of this principle in easing the tension between presumptions and Article 6(2) 
ECHR, see text accompanying fn. 292 to 295. 
265 In R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, para. 57 and 59, the Canadian Supreme Court, dealing with the 
presumption of innocence, stated that: ‘In general one must […] conclude that a provision which requires an 
accused to disprove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a presumed fact, which is an important 
element of the offence in question, violates the presumption of innocence […]. A basic fact may rationally 
tend to prove a presumed fact, but not prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. An accused person could 
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law, for the many times illustrated difficulties of producing evidence - a distinctive feature 
in antitrust proceedings – of the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU or of defences under 
Article 102 TFEU. 
 In order to discuss the implications of the presumption of innocence, it is necessary 
to give reasons for application of Article 6 ECHR to EU antitrust proceedings. The remit of 
the present work does not allow to treat this topic extensively, but analysing it here provides 
justification for the references to this provision that have been and will be made throughout 
the text. Suffice it here to sum up the state of the debate, which has engaged the interest of 
many commentators.266 
    
a) The ‘Criminal’ Nature of Competition Law Proceedings under Article 6 ECHR 
 
As it will be more thoroughly illustrated in Chapter III, before the entering into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU Courts were only constrained to the respect of international law and 
human rights provisions as general principles of Community law, whose interpretation, 
remained a matter for the Court of Justice. After the Lisbon Treaty, pending the accession of 
the EU to the ECHR, all rights that are both granted by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and by the ECHR should progressively be interpreted as those laid down in the ECHR, and 
the case law of ECtHR should become the exclusive point of reference in determining their 
meaning and their scope.267 The change entailed by the Lisbon Treaty has been played down 
by some observers, on grounds that the ECHR principles had long been recognized; 
nonetheless, the case law of the ECtHR has undoubtedly grown more influential after 
December 2009.268 After Jussila, the ECtHR has characterised competition law proceedings 
as ‘non-hard core’ criminal law cases, underscoring how proceedings falling under Article 
6(1) ECHR can carry criminal charges of different weight and lead to different degrees of 
social stigma. Therefore, the guarantees provided for by Article 6 ECHR may apply with 
                                                                                                                                                
thereby be convicted despite the presence of a reasonable doubt. This would violate the presumption of 
innocence.’  
266 IAN FORRESTER, ‘Due Process in EC Competition Cases: a Distinguished Institution with Flawed 
Procedures’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 817, 823 ff.; MARCO BRONCKERS and ANNE VALLERY, 
‘Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for Authorities and Which Role for the Courts 
after Menarini?’ (2012) 8 European Competition Journal 283–299, 284; ALBERT SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, 
‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR and Due Process Rights in EU Competition Law Matters: Nothing New 
Under the Sun?’ in VASILIKI KOSTA, NIKOS SKOUTARIS and VASSILIS P. TZEVELEKOS (eds), The 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR (Hart Publishing 2014), forthcoming. 
267 For the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR, see Chapter III, fn. 69. 
268 BRONCKERS and VALLERY, ‘No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on 
Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law’ 536-537. 
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different stringency to ‘administrative penalties […], prison disciplinary proceedings […], 
customs law […], competition law […], and penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction 
in financial matters […]’.269 Even if this judgment has been read as patently excluding the 
criminal nature of competition law proceedings, it seems more sensible to take other factors 
into account, namely the fact that the ECtHR has repeatedly considered national competition 
law modelled on EU competition law as being covered by Article 6 ECHR,270 provided that 
one of these three alternative conditions is met: a) the competition law treats the charge or 
penalty inflicted as a criminal one; b) the nature of the offence punished is of general 
concern; c) the charge imposed operate as a punishment or deterrent, rather than as 
compensation for damages.271  
 Since the competition law infringements are undoubtedly against the public interest 
and the fines imposed are extremely severe, it seems reasonable to conclude that Article 6 
ECHR is applicable to EU competition law too,272 although it is still undertermined whether 
in full or in a less stringent way.273 Moreover, ever since Hüls, the Court of Justice has 
recognized the applicability of the presumption of innocence in EU competition law 
procedures ‘relating to infringements of the competition rules applicable to undertakings 
that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments’.274 Owing to the 
nature of the infringement and the severity of the consequences, such applicability is no 
more under discussion as part of the fundamental right to fair competition proceedings, 
                                               
269 Jussila v Finland, para. 43. 
270 See Fortum v Finland, 15 July 2003, Application no. 32559/1996, paras. 36 and 44-45; A. Menarini 
Diagnostics Srl v Italy, 27 September 2011, Application no. 43509/2008, para. 44. Contra (owing to the 
specific characteristics of the Russian competition law) Neste v Russia, 3 June 2004, Application no. 
69042/2001).  
271 These criteria are also called the Engel criteria, from the name of the case where the ECtHR first identified 
them. Compare Engel v The Netherlands, 8 June 1976, Application no. 5100/1971, 5101/1971, 5102/1971, 
5354/1972, 5370/1972 [1976] ECHR A2, para. 82: ‘[T]he Court must specify […] how it will determine 
whether a given “charge” vested by the State in question […] with a disciplinary character nonetheless counts 
as “criminal” within the meaning of Article 6 […] it is first necessary to know whether the provision(s) 
defining the offence charged belong, according to the legal system of the respondent State, to criminal law, 
disciplinary law or both concurrently. […] The very nature of the offence is a factor of greater import. […] the 
degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring. […]’. 
272 MARCO BRONCKERS and ANNE VALLERY, ‘No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of 
Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law’ (2011) 34 World Competition 535, 537–
541. 
273 Compare also the EFTA Court, case E-15/10 Posten Norge AS v ESA, 18 April 2012, para. 90: ‘Having 
regard to the nature and the severity of the charge at hand […], while the form of administrative review 
provided […] may influence, with regard to several aspects, the way in which the guarantees provided by the 
criminal head of Article 6 ECHR are applied, this cannot detract from the necessity to respect these guarantees 
in substance’.  
274 Case C-199/92 P Hüls AG v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287, para. 150. 
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regardless the criminal or non-criminal nature of the administrative procedure conducted by 
the Commission.275      
 
b) The ‘Reasonable Limits’ to the Application of Presumptions  
  
The question of the compatibility between the presumptions applied by the EU Courts and 
the presumption of innocence is ultimately a question of under which conditions the 
presumptions can be used without violating the principle enshrined by Article 6 ECHR. 
Indeed, any presumptions in any field of the law, for its nature and its functioning, is likely 
to impinge upon this procedural guarantee, due to the insurmountable observation that, put 
blunty, even if the defendant is telling the truth, it will not necessarily be easy for him or her 
to produce evidence sufficient to shed doubt on the facts subsumed by a presumption, let 
alone to adduce cogent counterevidence to rebut that presumption.276 
 With regard to the application of the Stora presumption, Advocate-General Kokott, 
basing her premises on the previously illustrated distinction between evidential and legal 
burden of proof,277 contended in Akzo Nobel that the presumption of innocence does not 
come into play, and the use of presumptions by no means interferes with the guarantee of 
the rights of defence.278 This is due to the fact that the shifting of the evidential burden of 
proof tampers with the standard of proof, rather than with the allocation of the legal burden 
of proof.279 According to some commentators, the distinction drawn by Advocate-General 
Kokott is ‘too subtle; […] when the standard of proof imposed on a competition law 
                                               
275 Joined cases C-209 to C-215 and C-218/78 Heintz van Landewyck Sarl v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, 
para. 8. See also joined cases C-201/09 P and C-216/09 P) Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg, not yet 
reported, Opinion of AG Bot, para. 44: ‘I consider it indisputable that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union contains […] the procedural guarantees in question [i.e. the guarantees recognised in 
Article 47 and 48 of the Charter and Article 6 ECHR] and that they are clearly binding on the Commission.’ 
276 For the need of ‘cogent evidence to the contrary’ in order to rebut the presumption see Akzo Nobel NV v 
Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 74: ‘Since the parent company’s 100% shareholding in its 
subsidiary supports prima facie the conclusion that decisive influence is actually being exercised, it is for the 
parent company to rebut precisely that conclusion, adducing cogent evidence to the contrary; failing this, that 
conclusion is adequate to discharge the burden of proof.’ 
277 Compare paragraph 4 of this Chapter.  
278 Akzo Nobel NV v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 74: ‘Recourse to a presumption rule […] does 
not lead to a reversal of the burden of proof that would be incompatible with the presumption of innocence. On 
the contrary, only the standard of proof which must be satisfied when attributing responsibility under antitrust 
law as between a parent company and its subsidiary is being laid down.’        
279 This distinction is described also by CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in 
Cartel Cases’ 518-519. 
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authority is relaxed, this will necessarily ease its burden of proving an infringement.’280 The 
opinion according to which the distinction between legal and evidential burden of proof is 
blurred cannot be shared, for all the reasons illustrated above. It has, however, to be 
acknowledged that there is a strong connection between presumptions, burden and standard 
of proof. Thus, the line of reasoning adopted here compels to take into account the profound 
implications of the use of presumptions on the rights of defence. The outcome of such 
analysis is not to prove the incompatibility of presumptions with those rights,281 but to 
underline the circumstances which would ensure their application in compliance with the 
rights of defence.  
 In the case of the presumption of parent’s company liability, commentators have 
noted how many national laws allow corporate veil to be pierced only when concurrent 
specific circumstances occur. Namely, besides the exercise of decisive influence on the 
conduct of the subsidiary, there are the bankruptcy of the subsidiary caused by the parent 
company, or the abuse or lack of good faith in the particular circumstances of the case. 
Nonetheless, it is hard to understand why EU competition law would not need to meet these 
other criteria,282 and would be entitled to pierce the corporate veil to such an extent as to 
presume parental liability in the presence of 100% of shareholding.283 Moreover, the 
argument according to which the rebuttability of the presumption would per se ensure its 
compliance with the presumption of innocence, recently upheld in Elf Aquitaine284 and 
Eni,285 is not conclusive, unless one makes sure that the relevant evidence is in the hands of 
                                               
280 BRONCKERS and VALLERY, ‘No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on 
Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law’ 549. 
281 This conclusion is reached by BRONCKERS and VALLERY, ‘No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact 
of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law’ 569–570, who contend that the use of 
these presumptions is de facto incompatible as it is with the procedural guarantee contained at Article 6 
ECHR.  
282 When such argument was first raised before the Court of Justice in Case T-299/08 Elf Aquitaine SA v 
Commission [2011] ECR II-2149, para. 72, the General Court rejected it on grounds that: ‘[A]s regards the 
arguments that the presumption of the exercise of decisive influence is contrary to the law applicable in some 
Member States of the European Union, […] the laws of those States do not constitute the relevant legal 
framework by reference to which the lawfulness of the contested decision falls to be assessed.’ 
283 BRONCKERS and VALLERY, ‘No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on 
Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law’ 551. 
284 Elf Aquitaine SA v European Commission, paras. 171–172: ‘[T]he fact that the applicant did not, in the 
present case, adduce evidence capable of rebutting the presumption of the exercise of decisive influence does 
not mean that that presumption cannot be rebutted in any circumstance […]. It follows that the Commission 
did not breach the presumption of innocence by presuming that the applicant exercised decisive influence over 
its subsidiary.’ 
285 Case C-508/11 P ENI SpA v Commission, not yet reported, para. 50: ‘As regards ENI’s argument that that 
presumption of the exercise of an actual decisive influence runs counter to the principles of lawfulness, that 
penalties should be applied only to the offender, of personal liability and of legal certainty, it is sufficient to 
recall that that presumption seeks precisely to find a balance between the importance, on the one hand, of the 
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the defendant. On this point, reference must be made to the concept of proof-proximity 
principle, described in detail in the next paragraph.  
 Recently, the question of whether the presumption of parental liability is applied 
within reasonable limits, as required by the ECtHR in Salabiaku, was addressed by 
Advocate-General Bot in ArcelorMittal. The Advocate-General pointed out that, for the 
presumption to operate in compliance with the procedural guarantees of Articles 47 and 48 
of the Charter and Article 6 ECHR, additional indicia were to be considered to exclude 
autonomy on the part of the subsidiary. The holding of the capital does not by itself express 
anything more than the existence of a group link.286 Given that the presumption of parent’s 
company liability is basically an exception to the principle of the presumption of innocence, 
it ‘unquestionably affects the rights of defence’ of the defendant.287 Therefore, besides the 
criterion of actual rebuttability in the case under examination, the principles laid down in the 
ECtHR case law come into play: namely, the presumption must comply with the 
Salabiaku288 and the Janosevic289 criteria, which compel the Court to, respectively, i) verify 
whether the presumptions of fact or of law that it applies are confined within ‘reasonable 
limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of 
the defence’;290 and ii) apply a test of proportionality, aimed at striking a balance between 
the strict liability and the objective of effectiveness of the enforcement system.291  
 It seems that, for the expression ‘reasonable limits’ to acquire meaning in practice, 
one ought to look at the particular circumstances of the case. To meet this latter condition, 
according to Advocate-General Bot in ArcelorMittal, objective elements corroborating the 
facts subsumed by the presumptions must exist.292 In the words of the Advocate-General: 
 
                                                                                                                                                
objective of penalising conduct contrary to the competition rules, in particular Article 101 TFEU, and to 
prevent its repetition and, on the other, the requirements of certain general principles of European Union law, 
such as, in particular, the principles of the presumption of innocence, that penalties should be applied only to 
the offender, legal certainty and the rights of the defence, including the principle of equality of arms. It is 
particularly for that reason that it is rebuttable.’ (emphasis added). 
286 Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg, Opinion of AG Bot, para. 204. 
287 Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg, Opinion of AG Bot, para. 206. 
288 Salabiaku v France [1988] ECHR Series A no. 141-A. 
289 Janosevic v Sweden ECHR 2002-VII. 
290 Salabiaku v France, para. 28: ‘Presumptions of fact or of law operate in every legal system. Clearly, the 
Convention does not prohibit such presumptions in principle. It does, however, require the Contracting States 
to remain within certain limits in this respect as regards criminal law. […] It requires States to confine them 
within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of 
the defence.’  
291 Janosevic v Sweden, para. 101: ‘[T]he means employed have to be reasonably proportionate to the 
legitimate aim sought to be achieved.’ 
292 Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg, Opinion of AG Bot, para. 212. 
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[T]he presumption in question must, in each case, be corroborated by other elements of 
fact proving that the parent company exercised decisive influence over its subsidiary. 
[…] That would encourage the investigating authorities to undertake, in each case, a 
nuanced assessment of the economic, legal and organisational links between the parent 
company and its subsidiary.293 
 
Arguably, however, the presumption is kept within ‘reasonable limits’ when its application 
when it is not applied mechanically and, more precisely, where it is de facto rebuttable. This 
latter condition is met when factual elements that would rebut the presumption, if they were 
to exist, would lie in the hands of the party against whom the presumption operates. Indeed, a 
‘nuanced assessment’ of the circumstances of each case seems to be material in rendering 
any of the presumptions applied by the European Commission more in line with the rights of 
defence. It would seem advisable to take into account whether economic and rational 
explanations of the conduct are actually available in the hand of the competition authority or 
of the plaintiff. In order to take this circumstance into consideration when allocating the 
evidential burden of proof, the proof-proximity principle will provide guidance.294 
 Very recently, the EU Courts have started adhering to this much more nuanced way 
of assessment and thus seem to be slowly converging towards the interpretation of the 
ECtHR, even if the process has just started and it may take some time to identify a proper 
pattern. For instance, in Air Liquide,295 Edison296 and Grolsch297 the General Court quashed 
the Commission’s decisions on grounds that the evidence presented by the defendants to 
support the argument for the autonomy of the parent company had not been analyzed 
thoroughly. The Commission had not given reasons for considering such evidence 
conclusive, thus depriving the applicant of the possibility to contest the validity of that 
imputation of responsibility on appeal. Examples of relevant evidence that the Commission 
neglected to consider and that therefore are deemed to possess particular probative value 
                                               
293 Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg, Opinion of AG Bot, para. 213. 
294 For the analysis of this emerging principle, refer to para. 6 of the present Chapter. 
295 Case T-185/06 L’Air liquide v Commission [2011] ECR II-2809, paras. 79–80. 
296 Case T-196/06 Edison SpA v Commission [2011] ECR II-3149, para. 88: ‘Inasmuch as the Commission 
contends, in the defence, that the contrary evidence relied on by the applicant was, in any event, inadequate to 
demonstrate Ausimont’s independence, no assessment by the Commission of the evidence at issue is apparent 
from the grounds of the contested decision. This impedes the review of the validity of the contested decision 
on this aspect.’ 
297 Case T-234/07 Koninklijke Grolsch NV v Commission [2011] ECR II-06169, paras. 86 and 88: ‘[T]he 
Commission fails to state the reasons why it imputes to the applicant the participation in the cartel by its 
subsidiary […] by virtue of the attendance of employees of the latter company at the contested meetings […]. 
The contested decision thus ignores the economic, organisational and legal links between the applicant and its 
subsidiary and its grounds make no mention of the name of the subsidiary.’ 
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are: letters stating changes in the delegation of the operational management; statements of 
the chairman of the undertaking giving evidence of the independence of this latter in matters 
of commercial policy; evidence of the fact that the subisidiary has its own departments 
(namely a commercial, a marketing, a human resources, an IT and an accounts department), 
which allows it to control its commercial conduct completely by itself; evidence of the 
avoidance of use of the parent’s company name on official commercial documents;298 or 
copies of the statute, in which the board of directors is vested, from a particular date 
onwards, with full powers for the ordinary and extraordinary management of the company – 
the full power being considered evidence of the complete decisional autonomy of the 
undertaking.299 It is important to underline, for the purposes of the present thesis, that the 
mentioned evidence is often, but not always, easily accessible by the parent company, 
against which the presumption operates. Evidence may be, on occasions, more likely found 
in the hands of the subsidiary or more easily gathered by the competition authority during its 
investigation. In Elf Aquitaine, the CJEU rejected the presumption applied by the 
Commission and endorsed the Salabiaku and Janosevic criteria:  
 
It follows from the case law […] that a presumption, even where it is difficult to rebut, 
remains within acceptable limits so long as it is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued, it is possible to adduce evidence to the contrary and the rights of the defence are 
safeguarded.300 
 
It is really too soon to tell whether this endorsement of the proportionality test for 
presumptions will be extended to all presumptions applied by the Commission, but it 
certainly could be read as an indication of the will of the CJEU to give up some of its 
‘steering space’ in regard to the interpretation and application of fundamental rights in EU 
competition law proceedings, rendering the application of presumptions compliant with the 
case law of the ECtHR. 
 
H) The Application of EU Competition Law Presumptions by National Courts 
 
                                               
298 L’Air liquide v Commission, para. 67. 
299 Edison SpA v Commission, para. 66. 
300 Elf Aquitaine SA v European Commission, para. 62. 
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In antitrust law, the shifting of the evidential burden of proof is triggered by the evidential 
presumptions that are judicially created, by means of crystallizing previously acquired 
knowledge. In public enforcement, such presumptions are applied by administrative 
regulatory bodies, the NCAs,301 and the respect of the rights of defence must be safeguarded 
by the administrative judge when reviewing their decisions.  
 In private enforcement, the national judges are entitled to apply those presumptions 
even if they are not provided by any national law, owing to the fact that they are directly 
empowered to apply EU competition law. In theory, the allocation of the evidential burden 
of proof could be considered a matter of competence of national procedural rules,302 because 
it has to do with the standard of proof, rather than with the strict application of Article 2 of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003. This safeguarded matter of exclusive national competence is, 
however, steadily eroded by means of the judicial assertion at the European level of 
objective justifications (as opposed to mere defences, which are by definition potentially 
unlimited) on one hand, and evidential presumptions on the other, which the national courts 
tend to follow. Moreover, there is growing consensus to consider the allocation of the 
burden of proof in general, and presumptions in particular, as substantive issues governed 
by the law of the cause of action (or the uniform substantive law), due to ‘their closeness to 
the substantive right at stake in the litigation and their plainly outcome determinative 
effect’.303 As already showed, this trend is confirmed also by Articles 18(1) and 22(1) of the 
Rome Regulations. The trend is confirmed also by the approach of the EU Courts, according 
to which presumptions become part of the substantive scope of the provisions of Articles 
                                               
301 The AGCM, Italian competition authority, has made use of presumptions extrapolated directly by EU case 
law in many recent cases: I723 Intesa nel mercato delle barriere stradali, decision no. 23931 of 28 September 
2012, para. 96; I722 Logistica internazionale, decision no. 22521 of 15 June 2011, paras. 246-249 (on 
partecipation to meetings); A423 ENEL-Dinamiche formazione prezzi mercato energia elettrica in Sicilia, 
decision no. 20705 of 27 January 2010, para. 24 (on parent company’s responsibility); I729 Gara d’appalto 
per la sanità per le apparecchiature per la risonanza magnetica, decision no. 22648 of 4 August 2011, para. 
172 (on parallel conducts).  
302 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm); [2011] 108(3) LSG 17, para. 94: 
‘[…] Generally, as a matter of English private international law, the burden of proof is probably a procedural 
matter determined by the lex fori […]’. Compare also Fuld (Deceased) (No.3), In the Estate of  [1968] P 675; 
[1966] 2 WLR 717, 696–697: ‘[…] I have come to the conclusion that the English Probate Court, if 
conducting its inquiry de novo and not merely giving effect to a probate, or its equivalent, already granted 
abroad, must in all matters of burden of proof follow scrupulously its own lex fori.’ See, for the opinion 
according to which presumptions applied in EU public enforcement should not be applied in national 
proceedings, BERNARDO CORTESE, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in EU Competition Law: the Parent 
Subsidiary Relationship and Antitrust Liability’ in BERNARDO CORTESE (ed), EU Competition Law 
(Wolters Kluwer 2014), International Competition Law Series 55, 93. This approach, however, does not seem 
to give due consideration to the case law of the EU Courts, which considered certain presumptions as forming 
‘integral part of applicable Community law’. See, for further details, fn. 305 below. 
303 GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 201. 
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101 and 102 TFEU.304 This has been made clear by the Court of Justice in T-Mobile. The 
Court of Justice restated that, when applying Article 101 TFEU, all the national courts of the 
Member States are compelled to apply the presumption of cartel participation. The Court 
examined that presumption (i.e. the presumption of causal connection), which the case law 
had long formulated within the scope of interpretation of the said Article. It confirmed that 
there is a rebuttable presumption according to which the undertakings participating in a 
concerted action and remaining active on the market afterwards will take account of the 
information exchanged with the other participants when determining their commercial and 
market policy. The responsibility for the rebuttal is borne by the undertaking against which 
the presumption operates. Moreover,  
 
[I]t must be held that the presumption of a causal connection stems from Article 81(1) 
EC, as interpreted by the Court, and it consequently forms an integral part of applicable 
Community law.305 
 
By making use of uniformed evidential presumptions, the EU case law306 models the 
apportionment of the evidential burden of proof in competition cases, thus judicially 
addressing problems of asymmetry of information, encountered especially in the private 
enforcement, and overcoming the principle of procedural autonomy. Indeed, once the 
presumptions has been established by the EU Courts, they can easily spread in all Member 
States through the general guidance that the EU case law offers to national judges 
empowered to apply EU competition law. In practice, this process appears very smooth and 
there is no apparent resistance of national courts against the embodiment of European 
evidential presumptions, due to three major factors:  
                                               
304 NAZZINI, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law 291. 
305 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van 
bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, para. 53.  
306 Presumptions in antitrust law are not exclusively judicially created: for instance, two examples of evidential 
presumptions are provided by the Notice on the Effect on Trade between Member States, in the context of 
Commission’s proceedings. The Notice provides that, on one hand, an agreement is presumed not to 
appreciably affect trade between Member states when the aggregate market share of the parties on any relevant 
market within the EU does not exceed 5 per cent and the aggregate annual European turnover in the products 
covered by the agreement does not exceed 40 million euros (negative presumption); on the other hand, an 
agreement, whose nature is capable of appreciably affect inter-state trade, is presumed to affect such trade if 
the market share of the parties exceeds 5 per cent or if the annual European turnover exceeds 40 million euros 
(positive presumption). See KOMNINOS, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement 65-66. 
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1) the profound reluctance showed by national judges to embark on very detailed analyses 
of technical and economic evidence, which nonetheless characterise competition law 
matters, cajole them into embracing with relish the use of those shortcuts; 
2) it is more convenient to resort to uniform substantive EU law to govern presumptions, 
rather than following a fragmented conflict of laws approach in multi-state lawsuit, which is 
likely to arise complexities;307 
3) the application of presumptions increases deterrence and is in line with the principle of 
effectiveness limiting the procedural autonomy of the Member States. 
 
a) Presumptions before the English Courts  
 
Evidence of the adoption of EU evidential presumptions by national Courts is provided by 
one of the landmark case of English public enforcement, the already mentioned Napp. The 
CAT made reference to different presumptions drawn on from the EU Courts’ case law, thus 
showing to deem them immediately applicable by the English judge even when applying 
national competition law provisions: 
 
That approach does not in our view preclude the Director, in discharging the burden of 
proof, from relying, in certain circumstances, from inferences or presumptions that 
would, in the absence of any countervailing indications, normally flow from a given set 
of facts, for example that dominance may be inferred from very high market shares (Case 
85/76 Hoffman-La Roche v Commission […]; that sales below average variable costs 
may, in the absence of rebuttal, be presumed to be predatory (see the opinion of 
Advocate General Fennelly in […] Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission […]; or 
that an undertaking’s presence at a meeting with a manifestly anti-competitive purpose 
implies, in the absence of explanation, participation in the cartel alleged: Montecatini v 
Commission […].308 
 
Directly quoting and referring to the EU case law, the UK Tribunal clearly treated it as its 
direct guidance.309 What is more, direct referral to the allocation of the evidential burden of 
proof of the EU Courts is made by the English judge also in the private enforcement, as 
                                               
307 These difficulties have been illustrated under Chapter I. 
308 Napp 4, para. 110. 
309 See, also, Claymore Dairies Ltd and Express Dairies Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2003] CAT 18, para. 10 
(Chapter I prohibition): ‘[T]he OFT may well be entitled to draw inferences or presumptions from a given set 
of circumstances, for example, that the undertakings were present at a meeting with a manifestly anti-
competitive purpose, as part of its decision-making process’.   
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happened in Chester City Council and Arriva.310 The case related to a Chapter II prohibition 
(i.e. a breach of Section 18 of Competition Act 1998, not of EU competition law), for an 
abuse of dominance in the bus market by predatory pricing. Both the presumption of 
dominance and that of predatory intent for pricing below average costs were referred to by 
the High Court, which mentioned the relevant case law of the EU Courts (Akzo and 
Hoffman-La Roche).311  
 
b) Presumptions before the Italian Review Courts 
 
As for the Italian judge, evidence of the application of identical presumptions is abundant. 
To mention a few examples, the Council of State specified, in a case of an Article 101 
infringement where indirect evidence of a cartel was found, that it was for the undertaking 
concerned to provide evidence of the fact that the cartel had ended according to its manifest 
and concurrent will.312 It is sufficient for the AGCM to produce evidence that the 
undertaking took part in meetings where an anticompetitive conduct was agreed upon, to 
prove that the undertaking participated to the agreement, unless it can provide evidence that 
it publicly distanced itself from the agreement,313 i.e. manifestly opposed it.314 Moreover, 
where it is established that an undertaking successfully concerted with another, and 
remained active on the market afterwards, it can be presumed that it took into account the 
information exchanged with the co-participants, unless the undertaking manages to rebut the 
presumption by means of showing that it did not make use of the relevant information,315 or 
the market policy was determined by alternative factors, or, naturally, that the market 
conduct was inconsistent with the concerted behaviour.316 With regard to the presumption of 
                                               
310 Chester City Council and Chester City Transport Limited v Arriva plc and Arriva Cymru Limited and 
Arriva North West Limited, High Court Chancery Division [2007] EWHC 1373 (Ch). 
311 Chester City Council v Arriva, paras. 115, 165 and 194. 
312 Council of State, 30 August 2002, decision no. 4362, para. 5.1.9 in fine. 
313 Council of State, Soc. C. v AGCM, 16 September 2011, decision no. 5171 (2011) Repertorio del foro 
italiano 715; Council of State, Anie v Soc. E., 20 May 2011, decision no. 3013 (2011) Foro amministrativo 
1637; Council of State, L.P.D. 1820 v AGCM, 13 May 2011, decision no. 2921 (2011) Foro amministrativo 
1620. 
314 MARIO SIRAGUSA, ‘Antitrust and Merger Cases in Italy: Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof and 
Evaluation of Evidence’ in European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its 
Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart 2011) 581–582. 
315 Council of State, Rifornimenti aeroportuali italiani Srl and Rifornimenti aeroportuali milanesi v AGCM, 20 
Febbraio 2008, decision no. 594, para. 4. 
316 Compare Council of State, 12 February 2001, decision no. 652, para. 15.2, specifically referring to the case 
law of the Court of Justice, Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I-04125, para. 121: 
‘[S]ubject to proof to the contrary, which it is for the economic operators concerned to adduce, there must be a 
presumption that the undertakings participating in concerting arrangements and remaining active on the market 
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parallel conducts, in presence of evidence of exogenous factors which might have provoked 
the alignment of the conducts in the market,317 the Council of State tends to place the 
evidential burden of proof on the undertaking, in accordance with the EU case law.318 This 
distinction between endogenous and exogenuous factors, entailing a different allocation of 
the evidential burden of proof, is adopted by the Italian civil judge too.319 Evidence of 
endogenous factors, connected to the inherently peculiar symmetrical behaviour of the 
undertakings or to the lack of alternative plausible explanations (i.e. evidence that, were the 
undertaking competing between each other, they would have plausibly adopted a different 
behaviour) must be borne by the competition authority.320 Should such alternative plausible 
justifications not be ruled out by the AGCM, the concerted practice cannot be considered 
proven.321 It is contended here, as it will be thoroughly illustrated in the following 
paragraph, that such conclusions derive from the implicit application of the proof-proximity 
principle, on the basis of the specific circumstances of the case, in which evidence of an 
alternative explanation where too difficult to be found by the defendants. Finally, the 
traditional presumptions of market share322 and prices below average variable costs help the 
Italian competition authority in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU.323 
 
                                                                                                                                                
take account of the information exchanged with their competitors when determining their conduct on that 
market, particularly when they concert together on a regular basis over a long period […], according to the 
findings of the Court of First Instance.’ Compare also Council of State, decision no. 5733 of 8 November 
2001, para. 3.3.2, quoting Anic again: ‘With renard to the burden of proof, in presence of reasonable 
circumstantial evidence of an anti-competitive practice, it is for the undertakings concerned to give evidence of 
the alternative plausible explanation for their conducts’. See, also, Council of State, decision no. 1397 of 16 
March 2006, para. 6.1 where the court goes so far as to say that established and consistent case law exists 
confirming that evidence of the occurrence of a concerted practice must be assessed freely, not according to a 
rigid canon which would result incompatible with the effet utile of EU antitrust provisions, but according to a 
loose evaluation, which may well factor in indicia, when they are reliable and consistent.    
317 Council of State, Rivoira SpA and others v AGCM, 7 March 2008, decision no. 1006 (Article 2 of Law 
287/1990); TAR Lazio, Soc. Bristol Myers Squibb v AGCM, 6 June 2008, decision no. 5578. 
318 Council of State, Soc. S. v AGCM, 23 May 2011, decision no. 2925 (2011) Repertorio del foro italiano 717. 
319 Court of Appeal of Naples, Vitiello c. Soc. Lloyd Adriatico, 17 January 2008 (2008) Foro italiano, I, 1303-
1307, 1307 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990), see fn. 338. 
320 Council of State, Soc. C. v AGCM, 16 September 2011, decision no. 5171, para. 17, quoting Council of 
State, Soc. H. Italia v AGCM, 17 January 2008, decision no. 102; Council of State, 13 May 2011, decision no. 
2925, para. 9.1. 
321 Council of State, Rivoira SpA and others v AGCM, 7 March 2008, decision no. 1006, para. 11.4.3 (Article 2 
of Law 287/1990); Council of State, Soc. H. Italia v AGCM, 17 January 2008, decision no. 102. 
322 See TAR Lazio, Telepiù v AGCM, 11 September 2001, decision no. 7433, para. 7d: ‘It is established that, 
among the indicators of an abuse of dominance, high market shares is one of the most telling ([…] Hoffman 
La Roche/Commission […] Akzo/Commission […]). The higher the market shares of the undertaking, as in 
the case under examination, the stronger is the presumption. 
323 SIRAGUSA, ‘Antitrust and Merger Cases in Italy: Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof and Evaluation of 
Evidence’ 589. 
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I) Presumptions in the Private Enforcement 
  
Clearly, due in particular to the prevalence of follow-on actions, the use of presumptions in 
the private enforcement is less widespread. Nonetheless, presumptions are still very useful 
for the facilitation of proof324 under two aspects: on the one hand, for the proof of the 
infringement, for which the claimant may rely on the binding effect of the previous decision 
of the Commission or the NCAs tout court, or on its particularly high probative strength; on 
the other, the proof of causation, which is especially hard to establish. Owing to such 
difficulty, the use of evidential presumption is pleaded by the Proposal for a Directive 
recently published by the Commission. As regards the issue of causation, in order to lighten 
the burden of proof resting upon the claimant, Article 16 of the Proposal for a Directive 
shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant, introducing a rebuttable presumption that 
anti-competitive infringements produce harm. Evidently, the Proposal is directed at 
facilitating the proof, and in order to do so, great recourse is made to the device of the 
shifting of the burden of proof. With regard to the pass-on defence, where the indirect 
purchaser has reached a prima facie case of the passing-on, proving that there has been an 
infringement upon the goods or services purchased which resulted in an overcharge for the 
direct purchaser of the defendant, the burden of proving that the overcharge did not pass-on 
to the indirect purchaser shifts to the defendant.325 The extensive use of presumptions in 
antitrust law both at the EU and national levels is at present undeniable.  
 
6) THE PROOF-PROXIMITY PRINCIPLE 
 
Presumptions arise from the necessity of protecting certain interests, which are considered 
to take precedence (at least momentarily, for a rebuttal is admitted) on the application on the 
usual adversarial fact-finding process.326 The main reasons for adopting evidential 
presumptions in antitrust law are two: 
                                               
324 To the same objective of facilitating the proof is aimed the cooperation between plaintiffs, which can bring 
to ceding and bundling of claims, in order to obtain data from other consumers. Compare DANOV, BECKER, 
and BEAUMONT, Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions 66–67.  
325 Proposal for a Directive, Article 13(2). 
326 GROSSEN, Les présomptions en droit international public 44–45. 
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1) the difficulty found in the retrieval of direct evidence of the infringement or of the 
relevant facts;327 
2) the need to protect one of the parties in the proceedings, for different reasons. 
 The first reason is linked to the nature of antitrust matters, as already explained;328 
the second has to do with the need to favour the plaintiff, intended to be the financially 
weaker party, or the one with lesser bargaining power and resources. Whilst this idea of 
protection of the weaker party is intuitive in the private enforcement, it is less obvious if 
applied in the public enforcement, where the prosecutor, the Commission or the national 
competition authority, does not seem to call for any special protection. It is exactly in this 
sense that the acknowledgement of the proof-proximity principle lying behind evidential 
presumptions gathers importance, as a limit, or a counterbalance to the pursuit of the 
practical purposes of presumptions.  
 This principle operates when available evidence is insufficient329 to form a full proof 
of the relevant facts. Since the collection of evidence is one of the most important phases of 
the proceedings, the interest of ensuring that decisions are taken after examining all 
available evidence makes it highly desirable to place the evidential burden of proof on the 
defendant, whenever he or she has an easier access to evidence. This holds valid for both the 
public and the private enforcement. On one hand, such allocation allows the Commission to 
deal better with its workload; on the other, it fosters private enforcement, where the 
difficulty of accessing evidence is considered to be one of the biggest hindrances to the 
development of a more effective compensation system. The mentioned principle has the 
function of compensating the imbalance existing between the parties’ powers, in a quest for 
fairness and justice. Such balance is attained, in those situations where relying heavily on 
circumstantial evidence is inevitable, by means of allocating the evidential burden of proof 
on the party to whom the required evidence is available or who is better situated in order to 
adduce the evidence easily and promptly, thus eliciting the production of as much evidence 
as possible. 
                                               
327 See, with regard to cartels, OECD, Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement [2006] 
DAF/COMP/GF(2006)7, 9. 
328 Refer to para. 3 of the Introduction. 
329 It is out of doubt that ‘insufficiency’ is a relative concept, which needs to be defined in conjunction with the 
establishment of a threshold for the required standard of proof. To the purpose of the present paragraph, 
nonetheless, insufficiency of evidence is intended as the situation where there is not enough evidence to meet 
the ‘requisite legal standard’ of proof usually applied by the EU Courts in antitrust cases. 
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 Given the significant information asymmetry that characterizes antitrust cases, the 
necessity was felt by the EU Courts to enshrine previously acquired knowledge into 
rebuttable ‘mini-rules of common sense’,330 to be deemed valid until rebutted. Such 
rebuttable mini-rules of common sense based on judicial experience or economic theories 
are the so-called evidential presumptions, which can be considered the most important 
device by means of which the proof-proximity principle is practically applied by the EU 
judicature.  
 Even the rationale of Article 101(3) (which is said to allocate the legal burden of 
proof) can be considered as an expression of such principle. In the words of commentators: 
 
[T]he information required to prove that the conditions of Article 81(3) are satisfied is 
generally in the hands of the undertaking that seeks to rely on the defence. For instance, 
the parties to the agreement control the cost data and other information required to 
substantiate claims that the agreement gives rise to objective economic benefits. They are 
also in a better position to explain why the agreement is indispensable for producing 
efficiencies and to demonstrate the benefits passed on to consumers. If the burden of 
proof under Article 81(3) were to be placed on the party seeking to establish an 
infringement the prohibition could be undermined, thereby affecting the very substance 
of Article 81.331 
 
The origins of the proof-proximity principle are undoubtedly national. According to the 
extensive interpretation of Article 340(2) TFEU, which makes reference to the ‘general 
principles common to the laws of the Member States’, principles considered valuable for the 
development and strengthening of the EU, even when not already applied in all 28 Member 
States, can be acknowledged as primary source of EU law and directly applicable across the 
EU. This Article might provide the legal basis for the application across the EU of the 
proof-proximity principle, which is now developed in some countries where disclosure is 
not widely admitted.332 The principle is envisaged as a corrective device for the fair 
apportionment of the burden of proof, for all cases where the mechanical application of the 
                                               
330 In competition law presumptions usually enshrine lessons learnt from juridical experience or crystallised 
mainstream economic principles. See DAVID BAILEY, ‘Presumptions in EU Competition Law’ (2010) 31 
European Competition Law Review 362, 367 and SIBONY, ‘Limits of Imports from Economics into 
Competition Law’ 51, who refers to ‘shortcuts […] based on economic consensus.’ 
331 JONATHAN FAULL and ALI NIKPAY (eds), The EC Law of Competition (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2007) 94–95. 
332 For the connection between a limited use of disclosure and the use of proof-proximity principle in another 
field of law, see STEFAN KROLL, ‘The Burden of Proof for the Non-Conformity of Goods under Article 35 
CISG’ (2011) 59 Belgrade Law Review 162–180, 169.  
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principle of ‘he who asserts must prove’ could entail undue results. In such cases, it is 
considered more just to impose on the party who allegedly committed the violation the 
burden of proving that it did not, or that the conduct was otherwise justified or alternatively 
explainable.333 The principle is particularly well-developed in the German tradition 
(Beweisnähe).334 For instance, in Austrian civil proceedings, the case law established a 
reversal of the burden of proof where a party has easier access to certain types of evidence. 
Such a reversal is justified where the party encounters disproportionate difficulties in 
producing evidence, which the other party has access to.335 A similar principle is applied 
also by Italian courts.336 In a private enforcement case, the Court of Appeal of Naples 
considered that a cartel had been proven, on grounds that the Italian regulatory body 
(Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM) had found clear, serious and 
coherent evidence of frequent contacts between the participants and of an unjustified 
increase in prices. Such evidence was deemed sufficient to prove the cartel, the harm 
                                               
333 UBALDO PERFETTI, ‘La responsabilità civile del medico’ in ORAZIO ABBAMONTE (ed), 
L’evoluzione giurisprudenziale nelle decisioni della Corte di Cassazione - Volume VII - Raccolta di studi in 
memoria di Antonio Brancaccio, Giuffrè Editore (2013) 128. Compare Nederlandse Federative Vereniging 
voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 74: ‘[T]he 
undertaking concerned cannot refute the Commission’s findings simply by unsubstantiatedly disputing them. 
Rather, it falls to them to show in detail why the information used by the Commission is inaccurate, why it has 
no probative value, if that is the case, or why the conclusions drawn by the Commission are unsound. This 
requirement does not represent the reversal of the burden of proof […] but the normal operation of the 
respective burdens of adducing evidence.’  
334 Compare German Federal Supreme Court, 30 June 2004, para. II 2) b), available in English at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040630g1.html.  
335 BLANKE and NAZZINI, International Competition Litigation - A Multijurisdictional Handbook 23. 
Compare OGH 10Ob21/08y of 12 May 2009; OGH 4Ob217/09d of 19 January 2010, para. 3; OGH 
10b190/06g of 17 October 2006, para. 2.4.2 available at <www.ris.bka.gv.at/Jus/g>. 
336 For the application of the proof-proximity principle with regard to Article 18 and 19 of Law 287/1990, see 
Council of State, Soc. P. v AGCM, 9 May 2011, decision no. 2742 (2011) Foro amministrativo 1598. For an 
application of the principle in non-antitrust matters, see Court of Cassation en banc, 30 October 2001, decision 
no. 13533; Court of Cassation en banc, 10 January 2006, decision no. 141; Court of Cassation en banc, 10 
January 2006, decision no. 141, para. 5: ‘[A]lso the way in which the trial develops, in the event that the 
success of the plaintiff’s initiative hinges upon the evidence presented, can affect the allocation of the burden 
of proof. Therefore, it happens sometimes that the appellant is required to show that his or her grounds of 
appeal are sound in order to have the court sustain them (23 December 2005 no. 28498). See, also, Court of 
Cassation en banc, 30 October 2001, decision no. 13533. In a labour law case, decision no. 20484 of 25 July 
2008, the Court of Cassation found that it is on the employer to give evidence that the conditions required for 
the assignment of a productivity award are not fulfilled rather than on the employee to demonstrate their 
fulfilment: ‘The burden of proof must be apportioned, other than according to the rules applicable to the 
substantial facts under examination, the description of the facts substantiating the right and those objecting or 
demurring it, also according to the proof-proximity principle [principio della riferibilità o vicinanza, o 
disponibilità del mezzo]; a principle which originates from Article 24 of Italian Constitution, which links the 
right of action to the prohibition of interpreting the law in such a way that renders impossible or too difficult 
its exercise […]. Evidently, it is the employer, and not the employee, who is in the knowledge of the 
competitiveness of the company and of the economic data attesting the productivity of the enterprise […], with 
the consequence that only the former must bear the onus probandi of the negative fact.’ All translations are of 
the author. 
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suffered by the plaintiff and the causal link required for an award of damages. The burden of 
proving that the increase in prices was due to alternative exogenous factors was placed on 
the defendant.337 The defendant insurance company contended that it was for the plaintiff to 
adduce evidence that no alternative justification for the increase in prices existed. The Court 
of Appeal rejected its argument, highlighting how the apportionment of the burden of proof 
proposed by the defendant was patently illogical and manifestly violated the principles of 
proof-proximity and of allocation of the (evidential) burden of proof.338  
 While not yet expressly formulated in EU jurisprudence, the proof-proximity 
principle seems to apply in numerous areas of EU law, which encourages thinking that it 
could be eventually recognized as a general principle of EU evidence law. Its use is 
abundant in those matters where the difficulty of retrieving the proof on the part of the 
claimant is particularly accentuated, such as in the field of discrimination, in the field of 
environmental liability or in the field of human rights.339 
 
A) The Proof-Proximity Principle in Other Areas of Law 
 
 In EU non-discrimination law, the use of the principle is based on considerations that are 
analogous to those held valid in competition law. Since discriminatory acts are not usually 
committed in the limelight, providing direct evidence of them can be an arduous task. In 
order to overcome such difficulty, EU non-discrimination law provides for a shared 
apportionment of the burden of proof, according to which the claimant needs to provide 
evidence sufficient to trigger a presumption that discrimination occurred, whereas the 
                                               
337 The reasoning of the Court of Appeal in this case is strikingly similar to that of the Court of Justice in a 102 
infringement case, C-395/87 Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier [1989] ECR 2521, para. 38: ‘When an 
undertaking holding a dominant position imposes scales of fees for its services which are appreciably higher 
than those charged in other Member States and where a comparison of the fee levels has been made on a 
consistent basis, that difference must be regarded as indicative of an abuse of a dominant position. In such a 
case it is for the undertaking in question to justify the difference by reference to objective dissimilarities 
between the situation in the Member State concerned and the situation prevailing in all the other Member 
States.’  
338 Court of Appeal of Naples, Vitiello c. Soc. Lloyd Adriatico, 17 January 2008 (2008) Foro italiano, I, 1303-
1307, 1307 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990): ‘Substantially, according to the defendant’s arguments (which are 
just analogous to the arguments of all insurance companies in similar cases) it is for the plaintiff to produce 
evidence that the increase in prices could not be the consequence of exogenous factors having nothing to do 
with the anti-competitive infringement and to produce a market study in order to demonstrate that those 
enterprises which did not take part to the cartel, did not raise their insurance premia (even more with regard to 
a mandatory form of insurance): and all that in clear contrast with both the proof-proximity principle and the 
allocation of the burden of proof, for all previously illustrated reasons’. The translation is of the author. 
339 Case C-303/06 S Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603, para. 54; Case C-390/07 
Commission v United Kingdom [2009] ECR I-214, paras. 44-45. 
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alleged infringer must prove otherwise,340 owing to the fact that he or she is usually in 
possession of the evidence or information necessary to prove the discrimination.341 The 
presumption is activated by the mere demonstration of the difference in treatment and of the 
substantial equality of the chosen comparable situation (for instance, the quality of the work 
performed).342 
 A similar reversal of the burden of proof is applied in the assessment of evidence of 
violations of human rights. The ECtHR considers that the apportionment of the burden of 
proof can depend on the circumstances of the case under examination. In D. H. and Others v 
the Czech Republic, it stated that prima facie evidence might be sufficient to shift the 
burden of proof onto the respondent State. The ECtHR, indeed, may rely on inferences 
drawn from the allegations of fact and submissions of the parties, and thus adopt 
conclusions according to its free evaluation of all evidence presented. It was confirmed that, 
pursuant to established case-law, proof may follow from the existence of ‘sufficiently 
strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact’. The 
ECtHR went on to say that:  
 
[T]he level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this 
connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the 
specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at 
stake.343 
 
In the same judgment, the Court also contended that the principle ‘he who asserts must 
prove’ must be flexibly interpreted, depending on where the relevant information is found. 
In particular, it has been recognised in the case law of the ECtHR that not all cases are apt to 
be decided according to a rigorous application of that principle and that, under specific 
conditions, namely when the facts in issue ‘lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive 
knowledge of the authorities’, a shift of the burden of proof is completely acceptable, 
                                               
340 The shift of the burden of proof is envisaged by the Article 10 of the Employment Equality Directive, 
Article 19 of the Gender Equality Directive, Article 8 of the Racial Equality Directive, Article 9 of the Gender 
Goods and Services Directive. 
341 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Non-
Discrimination Law, Luxembourg (2011) 124. 
342 Case C-381/99 Susanna Brunnhofer v. Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG [2001] ECR I-4961, 
para. 60: ‘If the plaintiff in the main proceedings adduced evidence to show that the criteria for establishing 
the existence of a difference in pay between a woman and a man and for identifying comparable work are 
satisfied in this case, a prima facie case of discrimination would exist and it would then be for the employer to 
prove that there was no breach of the principle of equal pay.’ 
343 D. H. and Others v the Czech Republic [2007] ECHR 922, para. 178. 
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compelling the national authorities to provide evidence of a plausible and satisfactory 
explanation for the events. The ECtHR made reference to Nachova and Others, noting how 
in that occasion it did not exclude the possibility of asking the respondent Government to 
disprove an allegation of discrimination, if the circumstances of the case required doing 
so.344     
 In the different context of inter-State litigation, it is interesting to note how the 
burden of proving an infringement has been associated with the control exercised over the 
territory in which the particular unlawful activity had been performed, even disregarding the 
general rule of allocation of the burden of proof upon the claimant. In the Corfu Channel 
case, the United Kingdom Government did not have any direct evidence of the fact that the 
minelaying had been done with the connivance of the Albanian Government (allegedly by 
the Yugoslav Government). Nonetheless, the International Court of Justice observed that the 
exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the 
means of proof available to establish the knowledge of that Such with regard to the facts. 
The International Court of Justice went on to say that: 
  
By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim of a breach of 
international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to 
responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of 
fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, 
and its use is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of special 
weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a 
single conclusion.345   
 
Particular consideration was given on that occasion to which of the two parties had the proof 
available in order to alleviate the burden of proof and admit the use of evidential 
presumptions, expressly endorsed as commonly accepted by all national legal systems. 
  
B) Beneficial Effects of the Application of the Proof-Proximity Principle 
 
                                               
344 D. H. and Others v the Czech Republic, para. 179. 
345 Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v Albania), judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports [1949] 18 
(emphasis added). In that case, the International Court of Justice was requested to decide on the liability of 
Albania under international law for explosions of automatic anchored mines occurred in the international 
highway of the North Corfu Channel (in Albanian territorial waters) in 1946 which caused damage to two 
British ships and resulted in the death and injuries of over 80 members of the naval personnel. 
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The European Court does not make a rigid application of the two principles of 
apportionment of the burden of proof (actori incumbit probatio and proof-proximity 
principle). Rather, they combine according to the case under examination. For example, 
pursuant to a straitjacketed interpretation of those rules, the Court should turn to consider 
the submission of evidence of alternative explanations of a parallel conduct, or of the lack of 
negative effects on consumers and competition, or of objective justifications for an abuse of 
dominance only after (not in chronological but in logical terms) those behaviours have been 
ascertained. Evidently, this approach is not strictly followed by the EU case law, where the 
consideration of those elements is, in the court’s reasoning, concurrent with the assessment 
of the evidence concerning the infringement.346  
 It is also necessary to specify that the application of evidential presumptions is 
channelled by the proof-proximity principle in the context of a flexible and contextual 
approach to evidence which is aimed primarily at reaching a decision upon the contended 
violation. Therefore, it is not to be interpreted as if the judge would not take into 
consideration any other probative element, unless the party has discharged its burden.347 On 
the contrary, in the judicial review operated by the EU Courts or by the national courts, but 
also in private antitrust actions, the judge usually evaluates all evidence presented at the 
same point in time, after submission of the totality of evidence.  
 Undoubtedly, the propensity of the EU Courts to elicit all available evidence is 
connected to the inquisitorial nature of competition law proceedings before the 
Commission. Nonetheless, owing to the fact that presumptions become part of the 
substantive law as set forth by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, or, anyway, that they are 
adopted by national judges in the exercise of their procedural autonomy in the pursuance of 
the effectiveness principle, such flexible interpretation of the apportionment of the burden of 
proof is followed by national judges when deciding civil adversarial proceedings.   
                                               
346 Case T-434/08 Tono v Commission, not yet reported, para. 158: ‘[I]t must be found that the Commission 
has not proved to a sufficient legal standard the existence of a concerted practice relating to the national 
territorial limitations, since it has neither demonstrated that the applicant and the other collecting societies 
acted in concert in that respect, not provided evidence rendering implausible one of the applicant’s 
explanations for the collecting societies’ parallel conduct [i.e. fight against unauthorised use of musical 
works]’. 
347 FERNANDO CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 517, 
quoting BARBIER DE LA SERRE and SIBONY, ‘Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit 
communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective’ 218: ‘[T]he evidential burden of proof 
does not change formally during the proceedings, the match is played as if both players were serving at the 
same time, and the judge would count the points at the end.’  
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 Upon such considerations, it seems reasonable to conclude that the widespread 
application at the EU and national level of evidential presumptions should be accompanied 
by the assertion of the proof-proximity principle. More specifically, the proof-proximity 
principle should act as a rule of interpretation for the application of a ‘dynamic’348 
evidential burden of proof in antitrust cases and as a limit to the use of evidential 
presumptions. Increasing awareness of this principle allows defining the boundaries of its 
practical application (in this case, the use of presumptions) and correcting the risk of errors 
entailed by its application. 
 If there is a genuine difficulty in gathering the proof, the fairness of the principle 
triggers the use of the presumption which shifts the evidential burden of proof. But in those 
cases where the judge considers that the proof is available in the sphere of the competition 
authority or the party in whose favour the presumption operates, he or she should perhaps 
not trigger the mechanism of the reversal of the burden of adducing evidence. In such a 
case, the judge should do without the presumption, and should not shoulder the counterparty 
with an unnecessary and unfair burden. By doing so, indeed, the judge would patently 
favour the competition authority or the party who should have engaged in a more serious 
attempt to retrieve evidence necessary to establish the infringement. Similarly where, 
notwithstanding the presentation of enough evidence to trigger the presumption, the 
counterparty presents evidence which puts in doubt the facts covered by the presumption, 
the judge should not endorse the shifting of the burden of proof, but should refer to the 
general rule ‘he who asserts must prove’ and embark on an overall assessment of the 
evidence presented. Not doing so heigthens the risk of incurring Russel’s teapot-like 
reasoning.349 Indeed, it is not coherent to draw the conclusion that the competition 
authority’s decision or the plaintiff’s claim is founded on the grounds that the undertaking 
could not prove it wrong, if the relevant evidence is not available in this latter’s hands. The 
central question becomes then whether, espousing the rational actor model and leaving out 
behavioural economics biases, one ought to consider that an undertaking operating in the 
                                               
348 For further details on the modern theory of the dynamic burden of proof, elaborated especially in Southern 
America (teoría de la carga dinámica de la prueba), see CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ GARZÓN, ‘Aspectos 
generales sobre la carga de la prueba en el derecho probatorio colombiano’ (2013) 1 Justicia y Derecho 46, 61 
ff.; GUSTAVO CARVALHO CHEHAB, ‘O princípio da não discriminaçao e o ônus da prova’ (2010) 76 
Revista do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho 52, 57 ff.; JULIANA PÉREZ RESTREPO, ‘La carga dinámica de la 
prueba en la responsabilidad administrativa por la actividad médica’ (2011) 68 Estudios de Derecho 203–225. 
349 BERTRAND RUSSELL, ‘Is There a God?’ [1952] commissioned but not published by Illustrated 
Magazine.    
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market is very likely to cheat to increase its profits, which, in turns, can ultimately be 
reduced to a question of policy of competition law enforcement.  
 Evidence of this kind of concerns can be found in the Seamless Steel Tubes case. In 
that case the Commission managed to prove the existence of a cartel, but also acknowledged 
the existence of certain international agreements which had prevented the cartel from having 
anti-competitive effects on trade in the Community. In that case, the burden of proving that 
those agreements were in force until at least the end of the infringement would have 
benefited the participant undertakings, but evidence was without doubt in the sphere of 
availability of the Commission, which had concluded those agreements with the Japanese 
Government, and should have retained the relevant documentation. Nonetheless, the 
Commission were unable to provide evidence of the date on which they had ended. The 
Court of Justice underscored that, in general, it is not possible for an applicant to make the 
burden of proof shift to the counterparty just by means of invoking circumstances of facts or 
a certain state of affairs that he or she is not in a position to establish; nonetheless, in that 
particular occasion it did not seem reasonable to make the Commission profit from the 
application of the burden of proof mechanisms with regard to the date of cessation of the 
international agreements that it had concluded. The fact that the Commission was 
incomprehensibly unable to produce evidence of such date of cessation, and thus of a fact 
that concerned it directly, prevented the Court of Justice from taking a decision with a full 
knowledge of the facts. The Court of Justice concluded that: 
It would be contrary to the principle of sound administration of justice to cause the 
consequences of that inability on the part of the Commission to be borne by the 
addressees of the contested decision which, in contrast to the defendant institution, were 
not in a position to produce the missing evidence. In those circumstances, it must be 
considered, by way of exception, that it was incumbent on the Commission to produce 
evidence of that cessation. […]350 
For the allocation of the risk of error in the proceedings to be fair, it needs not only to be 
impartial, but also ‘unbiased in some principled way, rather than adventitiously’.351 In order 
to satisfy this condition, the allocation of the risk of error needs to affect both parties equally 
and the system of justice must not ‘expose the claimant to a greater risk of error than the 
defendant, or vice versa.’ To reach such goal of primary equality in risk-allocation, the 
                                               
350 JFE Engineering v Commission, paras. 343–344. 
351 STEIN, Foundations of Evidence Law 216.  
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adjudicator should not admit unbalanced distribution of the risk of error, unless the marginal 
costs of a particular allocation offset the marginal costs of the harm produced by the 
error.352 The proof-proximity principle would then act as a corrective device for the 
inequality caused by the use of presumptions, because it requires the judge to make sure that 
the party bearing all the risk of error is also the one which is better situated to prevent him 
or her from committing errors in the adjudication. The reason is that evidence is available in 
that party’s sphere. While the application of presumptions is imposed by an evidentiary rule 
which aspires to efficiency, the proof-proximity principle aspires to fairness.353 Only if 
committed to the respect of both rules, the system can achieve desirable results.354 The 
rebuttable nature of evidential presumptions could per se suffice to ensure that each litigant 
is only exposed to the risk of error that inherently attaches to his or her own allegations. It 
would not be sufficient, however, in those cases where presumptions allocate the risk on the 
party who is not de facto in the availability of evidence, and where, thus, the proof-
proximity principle becomes necessary.355 The rules of tennis are aimed not to favour the 
luckier player, or the one who is better at playing the challenge system,356 but to allow the 
better player to win the match; by the same token, antitrust law proceedings should aim at 
assessing the facts and punishing the infringers, rather than favouring the party which more 
heavily and strategically relies on the existence of presumptions. 
 The assertion of the proof-proximity principle would act as a guarantee of the fair 
application of evidential presumptions. On the basis of the principle of free and unfettered 
evaluation of evidence, which is a general principle of EU evidence law, and on the basis of 
analogous national principles, the judge is free to evaluate the evidence presented and 
                                               
352 STEIN, Foundations of Evidence Law 215-217.  
353 The need for balance between efficiency and fairness and the role of presumptions in this regard is attested 
by the words of the Court of Justice in Elf Aquitaine SA v Commission, para. 59: ‘The purpose of the 
presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence is, in particular, to strike a balance between, on the one 
hand, the importance of the objective of combatting conduct contrary to the competition rules, in particular to 
Article 101 TFEU, and of preventing a repetition of such conduct, and, on the other hand, the importance of 
the requirements flowing from certain general principles of EU law such as the principle of the presumption of 
innocence, the principle that penalties should be applied solely to the offender, the principle of legal certainty 
and the principle of the rights of the defence, including the principle of equality of arms. It is for that reason, 
among others, that, […] the presumption is rebuttable.’ 
354 STEIN, Foundations of Evidence Law 218. Stein argues that the goal of equality in the risk-allocation 
might even clash with the accurate implementation of substantive law, see at 220.  
355 Such corrective principle could also be used by the judge to ‘punish’ defendants who engage in withholding 
and tampering of evidence, thus deserving to fully bear the risk of error. 
356 Analysis shows that an optimal use of the three challenges available can increase a tennis player’s chance 
of winning a set by 5% in an otherwise even contest. For more details see STEPHEN R. CLARKE and JOHN 
M. NORMAN, ‘Optimal Challenges in Tennis’ (2012) 63 Journal of the Operational Research Society 1765, 
1772. 
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decide whether it triggers or not the application of a presumption. Such evaluation would 
not be subject to challenge before the General Court, because the Commission or the 
national judges are the only arbiter of the assessment of the facts and evaluation of 
evidence.357 Nonetheless, if such evaluation were so unreasonable or unfair to be considered 
as a violation of the proof-proximity principle, and thus of the rules on the burden of proof, 
the defendant would be entitled to appeal the decision before the CJEU on the grounds of 
infringement of a rule of law according to Article 263(2) TFEU.358 The judicial formulation 
of such a principle would therefore inspire the application of evidential presumptions and 
avoid the risk of their misuse. 
 Finally, one might argue that stating that the evidential burden of proof should be 
placed on the party who is more likely to succeed in discharging it becomes an exercise in 
circular reasoning, since it is impossible to decide a priori where evidence is more easily 
found. It would kill legal certainty. In reply, it can be useful to mention that, in the lack of a 
rule of law, a flexible parameter empowering the judge to look at the circumstances of the 
case (equity) might be a polar star. In many cases, it is easy to foresee where evidence is apt 
to be found. Ultimately, a flexible application of the evidential burden of proof is guided by 
the need to reach the requisite standard of proof, which, as it will be showed below, is left to 
the evaluation of the judge on a case-by-case basis.    
 
7) THE STANDARD OF PROOF 
 
The burden of proof defines which side must prove the facts; the standard of proof identifies 
to what extent the facts must be proven, and it relates to the degree of persuasion necessary 
to reach judicial conviction.359 Whilst the notion of burden of proof is commonly used also 
                                               
357 Case C-182/99 P Salzgitter AG v Commission [2003] ECR I-10761, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para. 44: 
‘The situation, for the most part, is that a ground of appeal termed “failure to consider evidence” simply means 
that one party is complaining that the Court of First Instance misconstrued other evidence produced in the 
proceedings by, for example, considering its substance to be absolute proof of certain facts even though other 
conflicting (‘unconsidered’) evidence was tendered. However, such criticism of the appraisal of evidence by 
the Court of First Instance - subject to any allegation of distortion – renders a ground of appeal inadmissible’.  
358 Case C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P Siemens v Commission, not yet reported, paras. 129-130: 
‘[T]he appraisal by the General Court of the probative value of the documents submitted to it cannot, save 
where the rules on the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have not been observed or the evidence has 
been distorted, be challenged before the Court of Justice […]. By contrast, the question whether the General 
Court observed the rules relating to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence in its examination of the 
rules relied on by the Commission to support the existence of an infringement of the competition rules of the 
European Union constitutes a question of law which is amenable to judicial review on appeal.’ 
359 BARBIER DE LA SERRE and SIBONY, ‘Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit 
communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective’ 208. 
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in civil law countries, the one of standard of proof derived from the common law and is 
mainly taken into consideration by judicature and scholars of common law tradition.360 For 
example, the German Code of Civil Procedure only establishes that the court shall decide at 
its free conviction, by taking into account the proceedings and the outcome of any taking of 
evidence.361 The French Code of Civil Procedure does not contain any specific provision for 
the standard of proof, but the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the judge to decide 
according to his or her ‘intime conviction’.362 In Italy, the Code of Civil Procedure does not 
provide any indication, but the case law has identified in the preponderance of evidence the 
benchmark for the standard of proof in civil matters.363  
 In the common law, the standard of proof for the burden of persuasion has two main 
connotations: the first one, namely the preponderance or balance of probabilities, is softer, 
applied in general to civil matters, and it requires the party to show the court that the 
adduced fact is more likely than unlikely; the second one, usually applied to criminal 
matters, is defined as conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.364 Conversely, the standard of 
proof for the burden of production is remarkably lesser,365 and it has been depicted as a 
‘scintilla of evidence’.366 The notion of ‘preponderance’ is not to be interpreted statistically 
or mathematically (that is to say, as a probability of more than 50%),367 but rather as the 
                                               
360 BARBIER DE LA SERRE and SIBONY, ‘Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit 
communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective’ 208. 
361 German Code of Civil Procedure, Article 286(1). 
362 French Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 427. 
363 For an illustration of the ‘principio del più probabile che non’, see Court of Cassation en banc, 11 January 
2008, decision no. 581. Compare also LUIGI TRAMONTANO, STEFANO ROSSI, and RANIERO 
BORDON, La nuova responsabilità civile (Wolters Kluwer Italia 2010) 269; COMOGLIO, Le prove civili 
159–160. 
364 PER HELLSTRÖM, ‘A Uniform Standard of Proof in EU Competition Proceedings’ in European 
Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, 
2010, 148 and TONY REEVES and NINETTE DODOO, ‘Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial 
Review in European Commission Merger Law’ (2006) 29 Fordham International Law Journal 1034, 1038–
1039. 
365 HENRY PRAKKEN and GIOVANNI SARTOR, ‘A Logical Analysis of Burdens of Proof’ in HENDRIK 
KAPTEIN and others (eds), Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories, Logic (Ashgate Publishing 2009) 
224–225. 
366 The expression ‘scintilla of evidence’ has been used by the European Court of Justice for the first time in 
Milch-, Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission of the European Communities, para. 16.  
367 See, however, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A Treatise on Probability (MacMillan and Co. Ltd. 1921) 
84–85: ‘It is difficult to see […] to what point the strengthening of an argument’s weight by increasing the 
evidence ought to be pushed. We may argue that, when our knowledge is slight but capable of increase, the 
course of action, which will, relative to such knowledge, probably produce the greatest amount of good, will 
often consist in the acquisition of more knowledge. But there clearly comes a point when it is no longer worth 
while to spend trouble, before acting, in the acquisition of further information, and there is no evident principle 
by which to determine how far we ought to carry our maxim of strengthening the weight of our argument. A 
little reﬂection will probably convince the reader that this is a very confusing problem.’ The statistical 
interpretation of probability is mainly advocated by Northern American scholars. On the risks entailed by such 
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conviction of the judge deriving from the belief in the existence of a fact. Although it should 
not be a mere subjective intuition, a rational and strongly justified personal belief is 
required.368    
 Within these benchmarks, the standard of proof applied in specific cases may vary, 
depending on a number of factors.369 The setting of such standards aims at keeping false 
negative and false positive as low as possible, so that the risk of errors is minimized.  
 In civil law the standard of proof is reflected by the judge’s intime conviction. Such 
intime conviction is identified with the judge’s profound conviction,370 whose definition 
inevitably results in a tautology. It takes as much evidence as necessary to make a judge 
form his or her personal persuasion, according to the standard he or she freely considers 
appropriate in the specific case. Commentators have defined it as ‘inner and deep-seated 
conviction of [the] truth’.371 The final goal of such standard is to prevent the risk of false 
positives.372 
 The common law system embraces a more neutral standard of proof, relying on the 
concept of probability; whereas the civil law system embraces a much more un-objective 
and personal standard of proof.373 Such different approachs are in line with the tradition of 
the two legal systems, given that historically common law always relied more on the judge 
(and on jury trials) than on the sheer law, whereas civil legal systems rely highly upon 
                                                                                                                                                
interpretation compare MICHELE TARUFFO, ‘Rethinking the Standards of Proof’ (2003) 51 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 659, 669–670. 
368 MORITZ BRINKMANN, ‘The Synthesis of Common and Civil Law Standard of Proof Formulae in the 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure’ (2004) 9 Uniform Law Review 875, 878 and 
881. 
369 Compare Lord Denning J. in Bater v Bater, Court of Appeal [1951] P 35, 36-37 who highlights how the 
difference between the criminal and civil standards of proof may be blurred, according to the circumstances of 
the case under examination: ‘It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than 
in civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal 
cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof within that 
standard. Many great judges have said that, in proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be 
clear. So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be 
degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil court, when 
considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a higher degree of probability than that which it would 
require if considering whether negligence were established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal 
court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature, but still it does require a degree of probability 
which is commensurate with the occasion.’ (emphasis added). 
370 The same notion, with regard to the assessment of evidence, can be found in most European legal systems: 
for instance, in Italy ‘libero convincimento’, in France ‘intime conviction’, in Germany ‘freie Überzeugung’, 
in Spain ‘apreciación según conciencia’. 
371 CLERMONT, ‘Standards of Proof Revisited’ 471. 
372 CLERMONT, ‘Standards of Proof Revisited’ 471. 
373 LIANOS and GENAKOS, ‘Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law: an Empirical and Theoretical 
Analysis’ 67–68. 
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written laws. This has been said to be connected with the quest for certainty that is typical of 
the civil law tradition, in which the legitimacy of the judicature is a pillar of the system.374 
 Nonetheless, the two systems ultimately tend to converge given that, besides the 
wording and the motivations, both systems of law stress the importance of dealing with the 
proof with accuracy and diligence in every single case.375 The two approaches can be 
synthesized as does Article 21(2) of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure: ‘[f]acts are considered proven when the court is reasonably convinced of their 
truth’.376 As for the notion of ‘reasonably convinced’, the comment clarifies that it is the 
standard applied in most legal systems, and it substantially coincides with the notion of 
‘preponderance of evidence’. Moreover, even in those civil law systems which do not 
expressly provide for a different standard of proof in civil and criminal matters, the intime 
conviction of the judge is guided by the circumstances of the case and is higher in very 
serious matters. As a result, the standard is analogous to the one applied in the common law 
tradition.377 Besides, as already explained, the allocation of the evidential burden of proof 
and the existence of presumptions play a major part in the definition of the standard of 
proof, thus influencing its application and the outcome of the proceedings.378 
 With regard to EU competition law, in contrast with the rules laid down to determine 
the apportionment of the legal burden of proof, there is, in principle, no provision setting a 
fixed standard of proof at the European level. Whilst Regulation (EC) 1/2003 regulates the 
allocation of the burden of proof, it does not expressly set any standard of proof. Recital (5) 
provides that the 
  
[…] Regulation affects neither national rules on the standard of proof nor obligations of 
competition authorities and courts of the Member States to ascertain the relevant facts of 
a case, provided that such rules and obligations are compatible with general principles of 
Community law.  
 
                                               
374 CLERMONT, ‘Standards of Proof Revisited’ 472. 
375 BRINKMANN, ‘The Synthesis of Common and Civil Law Standard of Proof Formulae in the 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure’ 891. 
376 The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure are available on the UNDROIT website 
at <www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/main.htm>.  
377 See, for instance, Italy, where the case law established a difference in the standard of evaluation of 
causation, according to the matter under examination. Whilst for civil matters the standard is that of the 
preponderance of evidence, for criminal matters it is the one of beyond reasonable doubts. See COMOGLIO, 
Le prove civili 157–160. 
378 LIANOS and GENAKOS, ‘Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law: an Empirical and Theoretical 
Analysis’ 68. 
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The debate upon the existence of a standard of proof in EU competition law dates back a 
long time. At the outset, it is worth re-stating that that of standard of proof is mostly a 
common law concept and, consequently, it seems to be more a concern of jurists of common 
law traditions that of trying to detect which standard of proof is applied by the EU Courts.379 
The quest for a pre-defined threshold arise out of the ambiguous meaning of the expression 
‘sufficiently proved’,380 which is recurrent in the case law and lend itself to be interpreted as 
if it implied the existence of some prefixed standard to be met. Indeed, different expressions 
have been used by the EU Courts to describe the degree of persuasion that the evidence 
presented by the Commission is supposed to reach, but none of those expressions precisely 
identifies a unique standard.381 The CJEU used the expression ‘standard of proof’ a few 
times for practical reasons, but the notion does not seem to have been adopted by the 
European judicature. As an example, the first judgement where the expression has been used 
was Sumitomo,382 but the notion was mentioned only in that part of the judgement 
summarizing the requests of the parties and it is only reproductive of the wording of the 
party’s plea. This happened in more recent cases as well.383 Conversely, the CJEU has in 
numerous occasions, both in Article 101 and 102 infringements, used expressions relating to 
a standard of proof such as, ‘specific and credible evidence indicating with reasonable 
probability’ the infringement;384 ‘sufficiently precise and consistent evidence’;385 
‘convergent and convincing evidence’.386 
 It is a common belief that there is no fixed standard of proof for antitrust 
infringements at the European level, and that the EU Courts deliberately avoid to precisely 
                                               
379 ERIC GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ in European 
Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, 
2011 297. 
380 Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v Commission, paras. 135–136. 
381 LIANOS and GENAKOS, ‘Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law: an Empirical and Theoretical 
Analysis’ 72. 
382 Joined cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd and Nippon Steel Corp. v 
Commission [2007] I-729, paras. 26–28. 
383 See, for instance, Case C-89/11 P E.ON Energie AG v Commission, not yet reported, para. 70: ‘According 
to the Commission, E.ON Energie is seeking, by producing an argument relating to the standard of proof, to 
take the attention of the Court of Justice away from the fact that E.ON Energie has never succeeded in 
seriously calling in question the performance of the seal at issue […]’. Compare, also, Joined cases C-628/10 P 
and C-14/11 P Alliance One International Inc. and Standard Commercial Tobacco Co. Inc. v Commission and 
Commission v Alliance One International Inc. and others, not yet reported. 
384 KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v Commission, para. 86. 
385 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 57. 
386 Case T-314/01 Coöperatieve Verkoop-en Productievereniging van Aardappelmeel en Derivaten Avebe BA 
v Commission [2006] ECR II-3085, para. 97. For further expressions see GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive 
Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 301. 
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define what the ‘requisite legal standard’387 exactly means, in order not to take a stand 
which might contrast with the legal tradition of one or another Member State.388 The Court 
of Justice clarified its ‘non-position’ in a famous merger case, Tetra Laval, in which it 
specified that, even if the Court of First Instance had found that, in order to establish the 
anti-competitive conglomerate effects of a merger it is necessary to examine thoroughly the 
circumstances of the case and the produced evidence must be convincing, this is not 
tantamount to affirm the existence of a new condition to be met. The Court of First Instance 
only aimed at drawing attention to the pivotal role played by the evidence, which need to 
‘establish convincingly the merits of an argument’ for the decision to be taken.389 When the 
evidence adduced qualifies as precise and consistent, it can be said that ‘sufficient’ evidence 
has been presented to back up the decision.390 Naturally, the sufficiency of evidence to meet 
the requisite legal standard of proof391 must be evaluated according to, on one hand, the 
probative value to be attributed to it, and, on the other hand, the contextual assessment of all 
other evidence presented by both sides.392 Such considerations are true to the point that the 
General Court, followed on this point by national appellate/review courts, holds that a single 
item of evidence alone is sufficient to conclude that an infringement has occurred, owing to 
the unquestionability of its probative strength.393 
 Even though the lack of a predetermined standard may appear too uncertain to jurists 
of common law tradition, the judge’s intime conviction, however undefined, is by no means 
                                               
387 Case T-53/03 BPB plc v Commission [2008] ECR II-1333, para. 61: ‘According to case-law, where there is 
a dispute as to the existence of an infringement of the competition rules, it is incumbent on the Commission to 
prove the infringements which it has found and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite 
legal standard the existence of circumstances constituting an infringement’. 
388 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 24. 
389 Commission v Tetra Laval BV, para. 41. The same absence of a predefined standard of proof can be 
observed for other fields of EU law. 
390 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 649. 
391 Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission, para. 58: ‘[I]t must be pointed out that, where there is a dispute as to 
the existence of an infringement of the competition rules, it is incumbent on the Commission to prove the 
infringements found by it and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the 
existence of the circumstances constituting an infringement.’ 
392 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 219: ‘[A]ccording to the case-law of the Court of First Instance, an 
admission by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested by 
several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate proof of an 
infringement committed by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence.’ 
393 Cimenteries CBR and others v Commission, para. 1838: ‘It should however be pointed out that there is no 
principle of Community law which precludes the Commission from relying on a single piece of evidence in 
order to conclude that Article 85(1) of the Treaty has been infringed, provided that its evidential value is 
undoubted and that the evidence itself definitely attests to the existence of the infringement in question.’ 
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a lesser or an arbitrary standard. In Dunlop Slazenger, the Court of First Instance (now, 
General Court), stressed the importance of the requirement of legal certainty, stating that it  
 
entails that when there is a dispute concerning the existence of an infringement of 
competition law the Commission, which bears the burden of proving infringements 
which it finds, must adduce evidence which will sufficiently establish the existence of the 
facts constituting the infringement.394 
 
Recently the EU Courts have made reference to some sort of standard of probability,395 the 
normal civil standard of proof in common law, and the amount of evidence required is 
always affected by a number of factors, which renders the standard of proof applied, if any, 
even more flexible. The fact that all these factors, that are connected with the specific 
characteristics of the single case under consideration, affects the degree of persuasion to be 
reached by the applicant, corroborates the theory that there is no standard of proof ex ante 
predefined to which the EU Courts adhere, but rather it is only possible to infer ex post the 
reasons driving the reasoning of the judge in each particular case.396 
 
A) Factors Determining the Standard of Proof  
 
Besides what already said about the evaluation of the probative value assigned to specific 
items of evidence, which, of course, concurs to the definition of the standard to be applied, 
and acknowledging the fact that both the allocation of the evidential burden of proof and the 
existence of presumptions strongly affect the definition of a standard of proof, a number of 
factors may be identified.397 Although the flexibility conveyed by referring to a ‘requisite 
legal standard’ should suffice, it is convenient to briefly give account of the factors that are 
generally considered to determine the level of proof that the European judicature applies to 
competition cases.  
 The first factor is allegedly represented by time: it is affirmed that it is generally 
harder to prove future facts that past facts398 and, consequently, whilst the standard of proof 
                                               
394 Case T-43/92 Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd v Commission [1994] ECR II-441, para. 79.  
395 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 24–25. 
396 GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 297. 
397 GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 303. 
398 Contra MARIATERESA MAGGIOLINO, ‘Standard probatori: alcuni spunti di riflessione per e da il diritto 
della concorrenza’ (2013) 40 Giurisprudenza commerciale 51, 98 ff. 
Chapter II 
The Evaluation of the Proof in EU Competition Litigation: A Comparison of Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 185 
of past facts requires a reasonably high standard, the one of future facts should be less 
severe. This would also allow drawing a distinction between the standard applicable in 
antitrust cases and that applicable in merger cases.399 The party cannot be required to give 
precise and consistent proof of what could (but might not) happen and, therefore, it seems 
reasonable to affirm that a lower effort can be required in order to prove the anticompetitive 
effects of the conduct of an enterprise.400 Such considerations seem to be supported by the 
EU case law.401 It is also worth noting that, this less high level of proof as regards the 
effects of a conduct can be observed also when the effects constitute one of those elements 
whose existence is required to ascertain an infringement. This is made clear by the case law 
on the effects on trade between Member States, required by the provision of Article 101 
TFUE. As specified by the EU Courts402 and by the Guidelines on the Effect on Trade 
                                               
399 REEVES and DODOO, ‘Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in European Commission 
Merger Law’ 1047–1048. 
400 ANNE-LISE SIBONY, Le juge et le raisonnement économique en droit de la concurrence (L.G.D.J. 2008) 
749. Compare also GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 304 ff, 
who holds that the distinction is not between past facts and future effects, but rather between personal acts and 
their consequences, or unwanted external circumstances, whose standard of proof is significantly less stringent 
of that of the conduct of the enterprise. 
401 BPB plc v Commission, paras. 300–301: ‘[C]onsideration of the impact of a cartel on the market necessarily 
involves recourse to assumptions. In this respect, the Commission must in particular consider what the price of 
the relevant product would have been in the absence of a cartel. […] the assessment of the influence of factors 
other than that voluntary decision of the undertakings concerned in the cartel not to compete with one another 
is necessarily based on reasonable probability, which is not precisely quantifiable. Therefore, […] the 
Commission cannot be criticised for referring to the actual impact on the market of a cartel having an 
anti-competitive object even though it does not quantify that impact or provide any assessment in figures in 
this respect. Consequently, the actual impact of a cartel on the market must be regarded as having been 
sufficiently demonstrated if the Commission is able to provide specific and credible evidence indicating with 
reasonable probability that the cartel had an impact on the market’ (emphasis added). Compare para. 311, 
where the Court of First Instance concluded: ‘The Court therefore considers that the Commission has 
demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the cartel had an actual impact on the marked concerned as 
regards prices.’ See also case T-69/04 Schunk GmbH, Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik GmbH v Commission 
[2008] ECR II-2567, para. 168: ‘In order to assess the gravity of the infringement, the decisive point is 
whether the cartel members did all they could to give concrete effect to their intentions. What then happened at 
the level of the market prices actually obtained was liable to be influenced by other factors outside the control 
of the members of the cartel.’ 
402 Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar plc v Commission [1999] ECR II-2969, para. 170: ‘[…] It should also be 
remembered that, to be capable of affecting trade between Member States, it is not necessary to demonstrate 
that the conduct complained of actually affected trade between Member States in a discernible way; it is 
sufficient to establish that the conduct is capable of having that effect”. See also case C-19/77 Miller 
International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission [1978] ECR 131, para. 15: ‘In prohibiting agreements which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the restriction of competition 
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty does not require proof that such agreements have in fact appreciably affected such 
trade, which would moreover be difficult in the majority of cases to establish for legal purposes, but merely 
requires that it be established that such agreements are capable of having that effect. The Commission, basing 
its assessment on Miller’s position on the market, its scale of production, ascertainable exports and price 
policy, has provided appropriate proof that in fact there was a danger that trade between Member States would 
be appreciably affected.’ 
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Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty403 the requirement of the effects on 
trade between Member States is to be interpreted loosely, since the proof that the agreement 
or practice is capable of having an effect on trade between Member States is sufficient.  
 The second notion that has been indicated as a softening factor of the level of the 
proof is that of economic normality, and more precisely, the judge’s opinion of economic 
normality.404 The judge’s consideration is very likely to affect the threshold to be reached by 
the party before a fact or conduct can be maintained as fully proven. As an example, the 
judge is far more inclined to apply a severe standard of proof to evidence of a conglomerate 
merger than to an abuse of dominant position and that has mainly to do with the general 
attitude of the judge, who is (inevitably) affected by personal views, experiences and 
knowledge. In the general perception, the conduct of an enterprise, which takes advantage 
of a situation where it has few or no competitors, is far more reproachable than one where it 
decides to merge with another firm involved in a totally unrelated field of business.405 
 The foregoing observations are strongly connected with the third factor which has 
been identified as affecting the standard of proof required by EU competition law decisions: 
the impact of the decision and the risk of error. The judge is clearly influenced by the 
interests lying behind the parties and the possible consequences of the decision on the 
market or on the sector affected. Therefore, he or she will potentially raise or lower the 
threshold also in consideration of the impact of the decision that he or she foresees to take, 
especially when dealing with a particularly difficult case.   
 Besides these three major factors, there are other criteria that have been identified, 
according to the case law of the EU Courts, as possibly determining a change in the standard 
of proof adopted. Between the factors that undoubtedly affect the approach of the EU 
Courts, there is the type of remedy sought after by the applicant. For hard-core 
infringements like cartels, the evidentiary threshold to be met can be higher, also because 
the judgement may lead to hefty penalties. The type of remedy sought after by the plaintiff 
or envisaged by the Court may play a role. The more the remedy is invasive or structural, 
the more evidence is needed to obtain it.406 In this regard, the Court, however, specified that 
                                               
403 Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 
101/81, para. 26. 
404 The list of factors under examination was originally proposed by SIBONY, Le juge et le raisonnement 
économique en droit de la concurrence 749–751; and then elaborated by GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive 
Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 309 ff.  
405 GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 309. 
406 LOWE, ‘Taking Sound Decisions on the Basis of Available Evidence’ 166. 
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no different threshold should be applied according to the nature of the infringement, but of 
course the general context of the case cannot be disregarded.407 Taking into account the 
quasi-criminal nature of some competition cases, the EU Courts have thus highlighted the 
importance of respecting the principle of the presumption of innocence.408 While taking into 
due consideration circumstantial evidence, the EU Courts strongly leaned towards the 
respect of the principle in dubio pro reo, so that any existing doubt should act as a deterrent 
and should prevent the taking of an adverse decision.409 As already hinted at, civil law 
tradition is wary of false positives, which are to be avoided also by means of heightening the 
degree of persuasion to be reached in those cases where only circumstantial evidence is 
available. The principle of presumption of innocence comes into play, when applying 
Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU, because their enforcement might bring to the imposition 
of fines. Nonetheless, the standard of proof to be met is not the full criminal one, both 
because the nature of the Commission’s procedure is ‘non-hard core’ criminal410 and 
because the EU Courts have effective powers of review.411 
 Fifhtly, timing may be relevant. A decision taken at a very early stage of the 
proceedings might well be subject to a lower standard of proof, in consideration of the fact 
that sometimes urgency is required, or that the decision to be taken is not final. This 
                                               
407 Case C-260/09 P Activision Blizzard Germany GmbH v Commission [2011] ECR I-419, paras. 71-72: ‘It 
should be pointed out at the outset that […] it is not true that, as a matter of principle, the standard of proof 
required for the purposes of establishing the existence of an anti-competitive agreement in the framework of a 
vertical relationship is higher than that which is required in the framework of a horizontal relationship. It is 
indeed true that factors which, in the context of a horizontal relationship, can sometimes suggest the existence 
of an anti-competitive agreement between competitors may prove inadequate for the purposes of establishing 
the existence of such an agreement in the framework of a vertical relationship between a manufacturer and a 
distributor, given that, in such a relationship, a certain measure of contact is lawful. However, the fact 
nonetheless remains that, for the purposes of assessing whether there is an illegal agreement, regard must be 
had to all the relevant factors, as well as to the economic and legal context specific to each case. The question 
whether it can be inferred from certain evidence that an agreement contrary to Article 81(1) EC has been 
concluded cannot therefore be addressed in abstract terms, according to whether the relationship involved is 
vertical or horizontal, with that evidence being considered separately from the context and the other factors 
characterising the case.’ 
408 Compare Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission, Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, at II-954: ‘There must be a 
sufficient basis for the decision and any reasonable doubt must be for the benefit of the applicants according to 
the principle in dubio pro reo’ and at II-991: ‘[C]onsiderable importance must be attached to the fact that 
competition cases of this kind are in reality of a penal nature, which naturally suggests that a high standard of 
proof is required.’ 
409 LIANOS and GENAKOS, ‘Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law: an Empirical and Theoretical 
Analysis’ 72. 
410 Compare SIRAGUSA, ‘Antitrust and Merger Cases in Italy: Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof and 
Evaluation of Evidence’ 582, who casts doubt on the view according to which, since personal freedom is not 
entangled by antitrust sanctions, the criminal standard of proof is not appropriate. Conversely, the Author 
maintains that the application of a higher standard of proof might be more adequate in consideration of the 
increasing level of the fines inflicted at the European level. 
411 LOWE, ‘Taking Sound Decisions on the Basis of Available Evidence’ 166.  
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happens frequently when the authority has to grant interim measures, which can undergo a 
less severe standard of proof.  
 Some authors have observed that the theory of harm embraced by the judge also 
affects the standard of proof applied,412 in the sense that the less approximation it requires, 
the less evidence is needed to reach the proof and vice versa.413 In its case law, the CJEU, 
however, specified that the complexity of the theory of competitive harm accepted by the 
Commission must not have repercussions on the standard of proof applied to the case.414 
 As seen before, a part is also played by the objective difficulty of retrieving evidence 
in the specific case. In the attempt of levelling the information asymmetry that is 
characteristic of some competition matters, the EU Courts established a number of 
presumptions which allow the judge to lower the standard of proof.  
 The absence of a fixed standard of proof in EU competition law matters is consistent 
with the civil law tradition of most of the Member States. The variety of factors described 
above, affecting the amount of evidence required by the EU Courts to discharge the legal 
burden of proof, encourages believing that the appreciation of the EU judges is free and that 
the standard is customized for each specific cases under examination.415 It stands to reason 
that, in the end, this lack of any standard determined ex ante is perfectly logical and inherent 
to the EU system, characterized by the principle of free evaluation of evidence. If any 
standard can be extrapolated from the European case law, it is the one of the judge’s intime 
conviction, which varies for each case in issue, along with the factual elements of the case. 
Therefore, as for the EU Courts, the judges need to be persuaded of the truth of the facts 
                                               
412 REEVES and DODOO, ‘Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in European Commission 
Merger Law’ 1065. 
413 LOWE, ‘Taking Sound Decisions on the Basis of Available Evidence’ 166. 
414 Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers and 
Labels Association (Impala) [2008] ECR I-4951, para. 51: ‘[I]t cannot be deduced […] that the Commission 
must, particularly where it pursues a theory of collective dominance, comply with a higher standard of proof in 
relation to decisions prohibiting concentrations than in relation to decisions approving them. That case-law 
merely reflects the essential function of evidence, which is to establish convincingly the merits of an argument 
or, as in the case of the control of concentrations, to support the conclusions underpinning the Commission’s 
decisions […]. Furthermore, the fact that an issue of collective dominance does, or does not, arise, cannot of 
itself have an impact on the standard of proof which applies. In that regard, the inherent complexity of a theory 
of competitive harm put forward in relation to a notified concentration is a factor which must be taken into 
account when assessing the plausibility of the various consequences such a concentration may have, in order to 
identify those which are most likely to arise, but such complexity does not, of itself, have an impact on the 
standard of proof which is required.’ 
415 In the words of GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 302: 
‘[T]he level of proof required is quite simply the one that is convincing to the Court, and it is not amenable to 
prior formalistic standardization. The qualitative and quantitative level of the required evidence does not fit 
into pre-established models because it varies from case to case and from issue to issue.’ 
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asserted and that happens when they attain their personal conviction of the facts under 
examination.416 
 
B) The Standard of Proof before the CAT 
 
In the judicial control of OFT decisions, the general assumption of the Tribunal is that the 
correct standard of proof to be applied is the usual civil standard of the balance of 
probabilities. The possibility of applying the higher criminal standard is excluded due the 
nature of the factual issues that are presented before the court in competition cases. Usually, 
these factual issues might relate, for instance, under Article 102 TFEU, to the determination 
of the relevant market, the assessment of the existence of dominance and the evaluation of 
the material conduct connoted as abusive in order to verify whether it was economically 
justified. These kind of issues normally involve a complex assessment of economic data and 
expert evidence. Therefore, in the words of the CAT: 
 
It seems to us more likely that Parliament would have intended us to apply the civil 
standard of proof to issues of this kind, rather than the time-honoured criminal standard 
of ‘proof beyond the reasonable doubt’.417 
  
To such pragmatic observations connected with the nature of the particular competition law 
matter, the Tribunal adds the more general argument that nothing allows concluding that the 
proceedings should be governed by criminal procedure rules, neither in the law (ECHR or 
Human Rights Act 1998),418 nor in the case law419 (in particular, Han).420 In the Tribunal’s 
view, the correct standard to be applied should therefore be determined according to the 
‘normal rules of the United Kingdom domestic legal systems’.421 The Tribunal further 
specifies that it is well possible to adjust the ‘intensity’ of the civil standard to match the 
                                               
416 GIPPINI-FOURNIER, ‘The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases’ 298. 
417 Napp 4, para. 106. 
418 Napp 4, para. 103. 
419 Napp 4, para. 101. 
420 Han (t/a Murdishaw Supper Bar) v Customs and Excise Commissioners, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1048, para. 88: ‘The classification of a case as criminal for the purposes of Article 6(3) of 
the Convention on Human Rights, using the tests established by the Strasbourg jurisprudence, is a 
classification for the purposes of the Convention only. It entitles the defendant to the safeguards provided 
expressly or by implication by that article. It does not make the case criminal for all domestic purposes […].’ 
421 Napp 4, para. 104. 
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gravity of the allegation,422 in such a way that it takes strong and convincing evidence to 
prove Chapter I and II infringements. In this basis, the UK Tribunal also notes that the 
practical results will not be sensibly different, and the said distinction is more academic than 
juridical.423 
 After Napp, the use of the balance of probabilities standard was subsequently 
confirmed (and partly corrected) in JJB Sports plc. v OFT. The Tribunal upheld the argument 
of the OFT that the civil standard of proof is flexible, and needs to be adapted to the 
circumstances of the case. In that specific matter, the UK Tribunal was required to take into 
account that cartels, by their very nature, are secret or concealed to the public, and that 
therefore most evidence is indirect or circumstantial or entirely springing from a sole source 
(usually an informant). Chances to retrieve documentary evidence are extremely low.424 The 
CAT made reference to its observations in Claymore Dairies v OFT, where it stated that 
there is no rule of law compelling the OFT to rely only on written or documentary evidence 
in order to establish an infringement under Chapter I. The most important factor is, indeed, 
the credibility of evidence. As a consequence, oral evidence of a credible witness, if 
believed, may in itself be sufficient to prove an infringement, if the circumstances of the case 
allow concluding so. In such a case, if the OFT has no choice but to rely exclusively, or 
primarily, on a witness rather than on documentary evidence, it is advisable that it also 
collect for corroborating evidence in the surrounding circumstances. In the same vein, there 
is no rule of law prescribing that evidence must emanate from a participant in the cartel:  
 
Although evidence at one remove […] may be less compelling than direct evidence of 
what was said or done by a person present at a particular meeting, indirect evidence and 
circumstantial evidence generally, may well have a powerful role to play in the factual 
matrix of a case.425   
 
The CAT recalled the words of Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ, who, in B v Chief Constable 
of Avon and Somerset, held that it should be acknowledged how the civil standard of proof 
                                               
422 Compare Napp 4, para. 107, citing In Re H. and Others (Minors) (A. P.), House of Lords [1996] AC 563, 
586 which on its turn cites Re Dellow’s Will Trust, also known as: Lloyds Bank v Institute of Cancer Research, 
Chancery Division [1964] 1 WLR 451, 455: ‘The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence 
required to overcome the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it’. For a less recent case see 
Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd, Court of Appeal [1957] 1 QB 247, para. 264: ‘Just as in civil cases the 
balance of probability may be more readily tilted in one case than in another, so in criminal cases proof beyond 
reasonable doubt may more readily be attained in some cases than in others.’ 
423 Napp 4, paras. 108 and 113. 
424 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading, para. 167. 
425 Claymore Dairies Ltd and Express Dairies Plc v Office of Fair Trading, paras. 8–9 (Chapter I prohibition). 
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does not always correspond to a ‘bare balance of probability’, but it might well be a flexible 
standard applicable with greater or lesser strictness according to the seriousness of the case 
of the consequences stemming from the eventual decision.426 In that occasion, performing 
an overview of the more recent case law at the time, the CAT also referred to the argument 
that claiming unlikely events requires stronger evidence, as vividly depicted by the example 
of Lord Hoffmann in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman: 
  
I think that a “high civil balance of probabilities” is an unfortunate mixed metaphor. The 
civil standard of proof always means more likely than not. The only higher degree of 
probability required by the law is the criminal standard. But […] some things are 
inherently more likely than others. It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that 
the creature seen walking in Regent’s Park was more likely than not to have been a 
lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that it was an Alsatian. In 
this basis, cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person 
has been fraudulent or behaved in some other reprehensible manner. But the question is 
always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not.427 
   
Expressed in this way, there seems to be a very little, if any, divide between the balance of 
probabilities and the intime conviction standard. Upon such premises, the CAT therefore 
concluded that the amount and quality of evidence must satisfy the court to the extent of 
convincing it that the facts are more likely than not. The Tribunal also upheld that the 
flexibility of the civil standard allowed adapting to the circumstances of case under 
examination,428 in particular as regards the seriousness of the allegations.429 Such view is 
also taken on the basis that many issues in competition law matters involve appreciation of 
economic concepts, to which the criminal standard would not be applicable.430  
                                               
426 B v Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset Constabulary, Queen’s Bench Division [2000] EWHC 559 (QB), 
para. 30. 
427 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, House of Lords [2001] UKHL 47, para. 55 
(emphasis added). 
428 Compare, for a family law case, Bater v Bater 36–37.  
429 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading, para. 188. In the CAT’s mind, the cogency of the 
evidence must be directly proportional to the seriousness of the allegations, and to their consequences. This is 
relevant, for instance, for cases from which can derive the disqualification of directors. See para. 201. 
430 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading, para. 193. The CAT mentions economic assessment 
of ‘whether an agreement “distorts” competition, the extent of the relevant market, whether dominance is 
established, whether certain conduct is “objectively justified”, whether an agreement satisfies Article 81(3) 
and […] “economic progress”, “allowing consumers fair share of the economic benefits” and whether 
restrictions are “not indispensable” […].’ Compare Aberdeen Journals Limited v OFT, para. 125: ‘We bear in 
mind […] that an issue such as the relevant product market may require a more or less complex assessment of 
numerous interlocking factors, including economic evidence. Such an exercise intrinsically involves an 
element of appreciation and the exercise of judgment. On such issues it seems to us that the question whether 
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 In JJB Sports plc v OFT, the Tribunal drawn a distinction between the balance of 
probabilities test and the nature of the evidence required to satisfy it. The cogency of the 
evidence that is required to satisfy the applied standard is left to the consideration of the 
judge and it is the linchpin of the flexibility of the standard. In other words, the Tribunal 
championed a protean civil standard commensurate to the cogency, quality and weight of 
the evidence presented, for example taking into consideration that fraud is less likely to 
occur than negligence;431 or that, in general, reproachable behaviours are less likely than 
honest behaviours (being the defendant entitled to benefit from the presumption of 
innocence).432 Clearly, such presumption operates in favour of the alleged infringer, so that: 
 
If in a borderline case the decision is finely balanced and the Tribunal finds itself to-ing 
and fro-ing, the correct analysis is that the evidence is not sufficiently strong to satisfy 
the Tribunal on the balance of probabilities that the infringement occurred.433 
 
On the subject of the cogency of evidence, the Tribunal also observed that in certain cases, 
such as that of price fixing, a finding of infringement may be based on a single item of 
evidence or on circumstantial evidence only, which would be sufficient to meet the required 
standard. To corroborate such observations, the CAT made reference to the case law of the 
EU Courts, and in particular Aalborg Portland v Commission: 
  
In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred 
from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of 
another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition 
rules.434 
 
In the CAT’s mind, especially due to the decentralisation operated by Regulation (EC) 
1/2003 and the new role attributed to national competition authorities and courts in the 
application of the EU competition law, the standard of proof to be applicable by English 
                                                                                                                                                
the Director has “proved” his case involves asking ourselves: Is the Tribunal satisfied that the Director’s 
analysis of the relevant product market is robust and soundly based?’ 
431 In Re H. and Others (Minors) (A. P.), para. 73. 
432 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading, para. 199. 
433 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading, para. 200. 
434 Aalborg Portland and others v Commission, para. 57. 
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judges should ‘not be out of line’ with that applied by the CJEU when deciding on appeals 
against Commission’s decisions.435  
 
C) The Standard of Proof before the Italian Review Judge  
 
Even if a notion of standard of proof is not identifiable as such in the Italian case law of the 
appellate courts, it can be observed that the criminal standard is not required, i.e. proof 
beyond any reasonable doubt. The TAR Lazio and the Council of State tend to require the 
AGCM to adopt a civil standard of proof, expressed as a ‘reasonable certainty’ of the 
infringement, to rely on clear, precise and consistent circumstantial evidence of the facts.436 
Given the importance attributed to the conviction of the judge upon the facts, it can be 
concluded that the standard adopted is the same as the European (and English) one. In a 
recent case, the benchmark of the intime convinction has been implicitly endorsed by the 
Council of State, which has underlined the importance of the contextual evaluation of 
evidence. The lodestar for the Italian administrative judge is the coherence of the version 
presented (the so-called ‘congruenza narrativa’): the standard of proof is satisfied when the 
‘story’ proposed by the AGCM is the only convincing one, capable of giving sense to all 
gathered factual elements of the case.437 The ‘story’ is subject to a reality check which 
requires i) corroboration by other evidence; and ii) the application of a cumulative 
redundancy test which rules out all alternative hypothesis.438   
  
D) The Standard of Proof in the Private Enforcement 
 
Finally, turning to private enforcement, setting a standard of proof is theoretically a matter 
of national jurisdictions that is left to the procedural autonomy of each Member State. When 
national judges are required to apply EU competition law provisions they are bound to 
                                               
435 JJB Sports Plc and Allsports v Office of Fair Trading, para. 207. In this regard the Tribunal also refers to 
Napp 4, para. 112 in fine: ‘We have no reason to suppose that the standard of proof we propose to follow is 
any different from that followed in practice by the courts in Luxembourg.’ 
436 Council of State, 13 May 2011, decision no. 2925, para. 9.1: ‘The Court, well aware of the rarity of direct 
evidence (the so-called smoking gun or bleeding hand) considers valid proof of collusion, other than 
documental evidence, also circumstantial evidence that proves to be serious, precise and consistent’; Council 
of State, 8 November 2001, decision no. 5733, para. 3.3.3. 
437 Council of State, AGCM v Acea SpA, Suez Environnement SA, Federutility-Federazione Imprese 
Energetiche ed Idriche, 24 September 2013, decision no. 5067, para. 5.1; TAR Lazio, 18 June 2012, decision 
no. 5559, para. 10; Council of State, Soc. Ataf v AGCM, 25 March 2009, decision no. 1794, para. 10.5. 
438 Council of State, Soc. Trambus v AGCM, 9 April 2009, decision no. 2201 (2009) Repertorio del foro 
italiano, 838 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990). 
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decide according to the degree of persuasion required by their own legal system. Therefore, 
this is one of those topics where discrepancies between the Member States are likely to 
occur, especially between the two blocks of countries of common law and civil law 
tradition.439 Both the allocation of the burden of proof and the setting of the standard of 
proof are nonetheless subject to the principle of the effet utile of private enforcement rights 
and must respect the equivalence and effectiveness principles. Moreover, the standard of 
proof tends to converge towards a European standard of proof, due to the fact that many 
connected issues of evidence (such as the evidential burden of proof, the assessment of the 
probative value of evidence, admissibility) are substracted from the scope of national 
procedural law and fall within the scope of substantive EU competition law, as established 
by the case law of the EU Courts and identified in the preceding paragraphs.  
 In follow-on actions, the burden and standard of proof applicable by national judges 
are rather easily identifiable. Actions following a Commission’s decision will often match 
the burden and standard applied by the European regulatory body with regard to the finding 
of infringement, given that national decisions cannot contradict the Commission’s 
decision.440 The same happens in those Member States where domestic rules provide for the 
judge to be bound by the national competition authority’s decisions, such as the UK and 
Germany. In those cases, it will suffice for the plaintiff to illustrate how the case decided by 
the Commission presents all elements required for an action for civil liability under the 
national rules. Usually it is necessary to add evidence to prove an element of the 
infringement required under domestic rules, such as, for instance, fault or the foreseeability 
of the damages in damages actions. Conversely, the most effective line of defence for the 
defendant is to argue that one of those ‘national elements’ is missing. 441 
 In stand-alone actions, the obstacle of information asymmetry is particularly 
cumbersome. To safeguard the principle of the effet utile, the national court should 
undertake to use its powers in such a way to guarantee to the maximum extent that all 
existing evidence is made available to the plaintiff. In those countries where the disclosure 
                                               
439 Compare, in an international perspective, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, (Ser. C) no. 4, IACrtHR, 29 
July 1988, paras. 127-128, where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, after having pointed out that 
‘international jurisprudence has recognized the power of the courts to weigh the evidence freely, although it 
has always avoided a rigid rule regarding the amount of proof necessary to support the judgment’, goes on by 
stating that ‘[t]he standards of proof are less formal in an international legal proceeding that in a domestic one. 
The latter recognize different burdens of proof, depending upon the nature, character and seriousness of the 
case.’ 
440 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 16. 
441 VAN DER VIJVER, ‘Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective Justifications in the 
Case of prima facie Dominance Abuse?’ 131. 
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of evidence is not allowed, some help could be provided by a sensible use of presumptions 
and proof-proximity principle by the judge.442 A problem which might arise in this kind of 
actions is that it might be difficult in practice for a national court, which is normally 
required to decide on the claim filed by the applicant, to undertake a thorough examination 
of the possible defences presented by the counterparty in order to rebut a prima facie 
infringement. Moreover, it will be very difficult to prove such defences to the required 
standard. Therefore, even when the undertaking’s conduct might have had positive effects 
or beneficial social impact, the national court is normally not very well situated to assess 
them443 and the defendant is usually not well placed to prove them.  
 Overall, it can be observed that the standard of proof adopted by English and Italian 
courts in private enforcement match the one adopted by the EU Courts. In Arkin,444 the High 
Court confirmed the ‘buttressed/reinforced’ civil standard for anti-competitive violations, 
quoting the words of Lord Bridge in Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, and underlining how the gravity of the charge and the legal consequences of 
the decision must affect the standard of proof. When the former are serious, the court should 
seek to apply ‘probability of a high degree’.445 Such adaptive standard of proof has been 
confirmed by the High Court in Attheraces Limited v The British Horseracing Board 
Limited where the court held that, without prejudice to the applicability of the ordinary civil 
standard of the balance of probabilities, the specific circumstances of the case, namely the 
severity of the allegations, might require that ‘the proof or evidence […] be commensurately 
cogent and convincing’.446 
 Such quest for a European ‘standardized standard’ was enounced also in a non-
competition case, Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v Watson Co. Ltd., where the High Court 
established the principle that the standard of proof applicable in national proceedings should 
be a standard of proof known to the English courts and consistent with the test established 
                                               
442 The interplay between presumptions and proof-proximity principle, and how they could be used in order to 
overcome the difficulties due to the strong information asymmetry which characterizes private antitrust 
actions, has been analysed in paras. 5 and 6 above. 
443 VAN DER VIJVER, ‘Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective Justifications in the 
Case of prima facie Dominance Abuse?’ 132. 
444 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd. & others [2003] EWHC 687 (Comm), para. 392. 
445 Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department, House of Lords [1983] UKHL 8, para. 111. 
446 Attheraces Limited v The British Horseracing Board Limited, English High Court (Chancery Division) 
[2005] EWHC 3015 (Ch), para. 126. 
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by the EU Courts case law,447 in particular those of the sufficiently precise and coherent 
proof448 and that of the certain and unassailable foundation.449  
 This ‘European’ standard of proof was confirmed also in a very recent case of 
private enforcement, 2 Travel Group Plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services 
Limited, where the CAT made reference to the standard set in JJB Sports plc v OFT.450 Not 
only the CAT refers to its own public enforcement case law when deciding private antitrust 
matters, but also the English courts refer to the case law of the CAT in private enforcement 
cases.451  
 In Italian private antitrust cases, no defined standard of proof is expressly embraced. 
Nonetheless, indications with regard to the criteria applicable by the national judge to 
decide the matter at hand are provided in the case law, and they substantially coincide with 
those applied by the EU Courts. In the application of presumptions, the judge is constrained 
to take into account only those factual elements which are ‘serious, precise and consistent’, 
according to the wording of Article 2729 of the Civil Code. These three characters have 
been explained by the case law as referring to the use on the part of the judge of 
probabilistic reasoning, which should make him or her reach conviction upon unknown 
facts.452 The national judge often recurred to such ‘probabilistic reasoning’ – i.e. a way of 
reasoning which reach a conclusion based on what usually occurs in analogous 
circumstances, the so-called id quod plerumque accidit – in antitrust cases. Direct reference 
to it is made in Bluvacanze, where the Court of Appeal of Milan concluded that some tour 
operators had colluded in order to prevent Bluvacanze from continuing its policy of granting 
                                               
447 Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd. and others, English High Court, Queen’s 
Bench Division (Commercial Court) [1989] 3 CMLR 429, para. 283. 
448 Joined cases C-29/83 and C-30/83 Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines SA and Rheinzink GmbH v 
Commission [1984] ECR 1679, para. 20. 
449 Case C-6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission [1973] ECR 
215, Opinion of AG Roemer, at 262. 
450 2 Travel Group Plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2012] CAT 19 (Chapter II 
prohibition), para. 62: ‘[W]here (as here) an allegation of conscious wrongdoing is made, we consider that JJB 
Sports provides a helpful guide to the evaluation of the evidence.’ 
451 Chester City Council and Chester City Transport Limited v Arriva plc, Arriva Cymru Limited and Arriva 
North West Limited [2007] EWHC 1373 (Ch) (Chapter II prohibition), para. 10: ‘In applying that standard 
[balance of probabilities] it is […] settled that it is necessary to factor into the assessment the seriousness of 
the particular allegation being considered, the short point being that the more serious the allegation, the less 
probable it is that it is well founded and therefore the stronger must be the evidence to make it good. […] This 
is in line with the approach adopted by Blackburne J in Ineos Vinyls Limited and others v Huntsman 
Petrochemicals (UK) Limited [2006] EWHC 1241, paras. 210 and 211, applying the principle explained by the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal in Napp […] para. 109.’  
452 Court of Appeal of Naples, Vitiello c. Soc. Lloyd Adriatico, 17 January 2008 (2008) Foro italiano, I, 1303-
1307, 1307 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990). 
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flat discounts to its customers for the sale of ‘travel packages’. The Court of Appeal 
sentenced that:  
 
[…] in order to prove a restrictive practice it is sufficient to give evidence of a number of 
coherent and conclusive elements [indicia] which pleads, even by means of 
presumptions, for the existence of a practice/agreement aimed at excluding a competitor 
from the market or barring it from entering the market, and even if, as in the instant case, 
it is located at a different level of the product distribution chain. […] The free evaluation 
of evidence, according to which the judge infers from a known fact an unknown fact, has 
to be based on the id quod plerumque accidit […].453   
 
A similar test has been frequently applied also to infer causation, an element which is very 
hard to demonstrate, but necessary for the award of compensation. In several occasions, the 
judge restated its entitlement to infer the causal link between the infringement and the 
suffered damage by means of applying highly probabilistic reasoning or presumptions and 
making sure not to neglect evaluating any elements or information offered by the alleged 
infringer which are aimed at disproving presumptions or proving the intervention of 
alternative causative factors, capable alone of inflicting the damage or to concur to its 
causation.454  
 Even if no reference is made to a fixed standard of proof, by way of recalling such 
criteria Italian judges reach similar results to those attained by the EU and English Courts: 
eliminating inconsistent evidence, they only rely on convincing evidence, until the point 
where they are intimately convinced that the matter has been ‘sufficiently proved’. It seems 
plausible to conclude that a noticeable convergence also under this aspect has been attained 
in the EU competition law enforcement.  
 
8) ECONOMIC EVIDENCE  
  
Economic expertise enters proceedings in two different ways: as a source of law, or as 
evidence.455 In the first way, economic analysis affects the result of proceedings by means 
                                               
453 Court of Appeal of Milan, Soc. Bluvacanze v Soc. I viaggi del Ventaglio, Soc. Turisanda, Soc. Hotelplan 
Italia, 11 July 2003 (2004) Foro italiano, I, 597-615, 601-602.  
454 Court of Appeal of Naples, Vitiello c. Soc. Lloyd Adriatico, 17 January 2008 (2008) Foro italiano, I, 1303-
1307 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990). 
455 LIANOS, ‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ 
187. 
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of hard law (an example is provided by block exemption regulations, which embody 
economic analysis into the law and therefore bypass the use of economic evidence) or of 
soft law instruments at the European level. These latter are mostly non-binding guidelines 
(the so-called Notices), aimed at clarifying economic notions. In the second way, economic 
analysis enters competition law proceedings directly via the formation of evidence,456 in the 
guise of expert evidence.457 In its turn, such economic evidence can take the form of:  
- testimony, in order to prove certain facts that are peculiarly marked by technical 
details and that only an expert can bring out;  
- technical consultancy or advice, in order to provide the adjudicator with a technical 
point of view on the facts, in the sense that the advisor fills those gaps in the 
adjudicator’s knowledge that could not be otherwise overcome.458 In this latter 
function, experts acquire their fundamental importance, translating into simple terms 
those technical concepts that the adjudicator cannot or has no time to study and 
comprehend alone.459   
One of the factors contributing to the rise in importance of economic expertise in European 
competition law was the decentralization process accomplished by Regulation (EC) 1/2003, 
given that interpreting Articles 101 and 102 TFEU necessarily implies mastering economic 
concepts. The national judges are responsible for the enforcement of European competition 
                                               
456 Economic data can be presented to the judge under different degree of certainty: judges might have to 
attribute a certain probative value to the expert opinion, in those cases where economic notions are not 
expressly mentioned in the law but may be relevant according to the community of experts and the legal 
literature (economic authority); or judges might have to endorse the opinion of the expert since it is so well 
established that it reflects the general view on the issue (economic fact); or judges might have to obey the law 
that has already incorporated the economic notion in itself (economic law) or, finally, the judge might have to 
take into account those economic concepts that are referred to by the law but that are not crystallized yet, as 
they are defined only as theories by the scientific community (economic transplants). As for the economic 
authority, examples are the notions of abuse of dominant position or restrictions of competition, because they 
are not self-contained but need to be defined through other public policy concepts that give them content. 
Economic facts are that category of concepts which are applied daily by professionals, and are mainly 
descriptive, such as variable or fixed costs. Economic laws are to be given for granted and not questionable, 
and they constitute firm points of reference for judges and economists, like the law of supply and demand. 
Finally, economic transplants are those notions that are indirectly incorporated by sources of law, in the sense 
that they operate as guiding principles but are not established yet; these are, for example, market power, 
consumer welfare and so forth. It is immediately noticeable that the judge will be more likely not to conform 
to economic transplant than to economic facts or laws, given their considerably lower degree of certainty. This 
analysis is performed by LIANOS, ‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law 
Litigation: A European View’ 237 ff. 
457 The other main function of the expert in the process, that of ascertaining directly and ex ante a fact by way 
of experiment, survey or research does not apply to the role of economists in competition law proceedings and 
therefore is excluded by the present analysis.  
458 COMOGLIO, Le prove civili 849–850. 
459 LIANOS, ‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ 
192. 
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law directly and, in order to do that accurately, they may need to be flanked by economic 
experts.460 A ‘more economic approach’, based on the effects of the infringements on the 
market, is fostered by the EU Courts.461 Such a change of perspective, at the beginning, 
arose out of the criticisms levelled at an excessively rigid ordoliberalist462 approach taken by 
the European Commission. The attitude of the Commission was disapproved of in that it 
would consider any restriction of economic freedom as a restriction of competition. On the 
contrary, in order to prevent a too broad and formalistic application of competition law, only 
unreasonable and unlawful restraint of trade must fall within the scope of the prohibition.463  
 Many problems are connected to this strong economic trend emerging in EU 
competition law. They relate to, on one hand, the information asymmetry between the 
parties and the asymmetry of knowledge of the judge and the expert;464 on the other hand, to 
the more general lack of uniform procedural rules governing economic evidence in 
competition litigation.465 As opposed to direct evidence of the infringement (mainly 
documental), economic evidence is considered to be a form of circumstantial evidence.466 
The Commission has expressly inserted economic evidence among the category of indirect 
evidence:  
 
The notion of indirect or circumstantial evidence […] comprises of evidence which is 
appropriate to corroborate the proof of the existence of a cartel by way of deduction, 
                                               
460 LIANOS, ‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ 
234. 
461 NICHOLAS FORWOOD, ‘The Commission’s “More Economic Approach” - Implications for the Role of 
the EU Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review’ in by by CLAUS-
DIETER EHLERMANN and MEL MARQUIS, European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of 
Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing 2011) 255–256. 
462 Very briefly, ordoliberalism is the German school, born in Freiburg in pre-World War II, which sought to 
promote moralistic and humane values by combining economic and legal understanding into a comprehensive 
account of a just and liberal social order. As for competition law, it fostered individual economic freedom, 
which was considered a core obligation of the state. DANIEL A. CRANE and HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
(eds), The Making of Competition Policy - Legal and Economic Sources (Oxford University Press 2013) 252–
254. 
463 JONES and SUFIN, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 192. 
464 LIANOS, ‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ 
189. 
465 ANDREW I. GAVIL, ‘The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European 
Competition Policy System: Lessons from the American Experience’ (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 177, 177. 
466 Examples of indirect evidence are, for instance, for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU travel orders, 
travel expenses or diary entries in relation to the attendance at a meeting, e-mail exchanges and telephone 
records (when they are only illustrative of the fact of contacts and do not constitute direct proof of the 
violation), meeting invitations, constitution of trade associations, all economic evidence. 
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common sense, economic analysis or logical inference from other facts which are 
demonstrated.467  
 
Even if no pre-established hierarchy exists among different types of evidence,468 direct 
evidence is undoubtedly preferred by the EU Courts.469 The highest probative value has to 
be attributed to documental evidence (such as contemporary documents, gentlemen’s 
agreements, minutes or notes of meetings, budget notes and the like); high evidential 
strength is attributed to corporate statements gathered in the context of leniency applications 
followed by, at a distance, other oral evidence. Therefore, economic analysis cannot in 
general override the probative strength of documentary evidence.470 Preference for a certain 
type of evidence over another is mainly accorded with respect to the object of the proof and 
the circumstances of the case. This lack of a predefined pecking order among evidence in 
the EU competition law system is confirmed by the Commission, with regard to the process 
of defining the relevant market in the Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market, as 
follows: 
 
There is a range of evidence permitting an assessment of the extent to which substitution 
would take place. In individual cases, certain types of evidence will be determinant, 
depending very much on the characteristics and specificity of the industry and products 
or services that are being examined. The same type of evidence may be of no importance 
in other cases. In most cases, a decision will have to be based on the consideration of a 
number of criteria and different items of evidence. The Commission follows an open 
approach to empirical evidence, aimed at making an effective use of all available 
                                               
467 European Commission, Roundtable on Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement - Global 
Forum on Competition - Session II, 8 February 2006, para. 26. 
468 The absence of hierarchy between different types of evidence is confirmed also by the CAT, in the English 
system: Aberdeen Journals Limited v OFT, para. 127. 
469 See Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission, Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, at 957: ‘Economic analysis often make 
up an important part of the evidence in competition cases and can be of great value to the Court in 
understanding the relevant economic context. It is thus important to obtain information about how an 
oligopolistic market might react in different circumstances. But - and this is the important point - the findings 
of economic experts cannot take the place of legal assessment and adjudication. […] It is for the Court to 
consider what is prohibited under Article 85(1) and the evidence for the commitment of prohibited acts, and 
not for economic theorists. […] It is the content of the documentary evidence which must show whether the 
persons attending the meetings had the intention of influencing prices or whether they simply wished to tell 
each other what they thought were reasonable prices on the basis of market evaluation and it is the Court 
which must determine were necessary whether it is unlawful for parties to inform one another over a very long 
period of time about what they think the market can bear’ (emphasis added). 
470 JFE Engineering v Commission, para. 89. 
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information which may be relevant in individual cases. The Commission does not follow 
a rigid hierarchy of different sources of information or types of evidence.471 
 
But since direct evidence is rarely available, economic evidence is gathering greater 
importance in demonstrating infringements, both in the public and the private enforcement. 
The phenomenon is made more visible by the extensive use made by the European 
Commission and the national competition authorities of economists and economic 
experts.472  
 In the public enforcement, the most frequent use of economic evidence is the 
production by the investigated undertaking of economic reports either to defend itself, as a 
form of counterevidence when evidence adduced by the Commission is weak, or to claim 
that the infringement had no adverse effects on the market,473 thus deserving a reduction of 
the fine, providing alternative explanation for parallel conducts or satisfying the conditions 
to benefit from a justification. 
 A certain caution in considering the deployment of economic analysis can be 
generally observed in the EU case law, accompanied by the recurring remark than an overall 
view of evidence presented is always necessary. For instance, in Bolloré, the General Court 
endorsed the attitude of the Commission, which did not respond ‘point by point’ to the 
arguments presented by the defendant undertaking. The Court considered, in particular, that 
the Commission was ‘not obliged to refute the analysis [stating that the agreements did not 
have any effect on the increase in prices] in the first Nera report submitted by AWA’.474 In 
several occasions the EU Courts rebutted the probative strength of the economic evidence 
presented.475 Sometimes the Court seems to even consider inadequate to the circumstances 
of the case the use of complex economic assessment: 
                                               
471 Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law 
OJ [1997] C 372/5, para. 25. 
472 LIANOS, ‘“Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ 
186. 
473 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 557. 
474 Bolloré SA and others v Commission, para. 451. AWA had submitted two reports by Nera (National 
Economic Research Associates). The first one was submitted during the administrative procedure, whilst the 
second one was commissioned for the purposes of the judicial proceedings. They both aimed at demonstrating 
that the prices resulting from the offending agreements could not have exceeded those which would have been 
observed under normal conditions of competition and thus denied any actual impact of the infringement on the 
market.  
475 Joined cases T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG and others v 
Commission [2006] ECR II-5169, paras. 303-305. Compare para. 303: ‘The expert thus limited the subject-
matter of his study to an examination of certain specific questions, and his analysis did not concern all the 
potential effects of the agreements on the market. The report cannot therefore demonstrate the absence of any 
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[I]t would be disproportionate to require such proof, which would absorb considerable 
resources, given that it would necessitate making hypothetical calculations based on 
economic models whose accuracy it would be difficult for the Court to verify and whose 
infallibility is in no way proved.476  
 
A) The Standard of Judicial Review for Economic Evidence 
 
The intensity of the EU Courts’ review is limited with regard to complex economic 
assessments for two main reasons: economic evidence in competition law matters often 
involves value judgements, so that there is no way to verify it objectively; and the 
jurisdictional and procedural rules allowing the CJEU to test the credibility of oral evidence 
of complex facts is very restrained.477 In the judicial review of the EU Courts, this type of 
evidence plays a unique role, for it is often subject to an intense review by the CJEU. Under 
the four grounds provided for by Article 263(2) TFEU, the review applied by the General 
Court, and in second instance, by the Court of Justice, assume two forms. It is 
comprehensive when the CJEU is empowered to control the legality of an administrative 
decision. The CJEU has full control over the correctness of the facts and the correct 
application of the law. It is marginal, when the CJEU is bound to verify ‘whether the 
relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the reasons for 
the decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has 
                                                                                                                                                
actual impact of the cartel on the market.’ See also case T-241/01 Scandinavian Airlines System v Commission 
[2005] ECR II-2917, paras. 126-128: ‘In order to demonstrate that the overall market-sharing agreement had 
no effect on the market, the applicant relies, finally, on a study carried out by the Lexecon company, which is 
alleged to show that the actual impact of the agreement on the fares of routes from Denmark was minimal. 
Apart from the fact that that study, commissioned by the applicant, was supplied only at the reply stage 
without the applicant explaining why that evidence was submitted late […] it is sufficient to note that the 
infringement which was found consists in the sharing of markets, and thus does not directly concern the fares 
charged by parties to the agreement, and that the parties adopted a line of conduct in accordance with that 
market-sharing. Moreover, the study deals only with the impact of the agreement on the prices charged by 
SAS, whereas the non-competition clause was reciprocal and it had also been agreed that SAS would not fly 
on routes operated by Maersk Air to and from Billund. Clearly, in the absence of an agreement, SAS would 
have been able to exercise a significant competitive constraint on Maersk Air. Neither the study nor the 
applicant have put forward anything to demonstrate that the agreement had no impact in that regard. Even if 
the study does tend to show that SAS fares on routes from Denmark, affected by the overall market-sharing 
agreement, remained stable in relation to those charged by SAS on routes from Sweden and Norway, which 
were not covered by that agreement, it compares only the prices charged on 20 chosen routes among the 105 
destinations served by SAS and does not establish that competitive conditions on the affected market and the 
unaffected market were comparable. […]’ 
476 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG and others v Commission, para. 286. 
477 BAILEY, ‘Scope of Judicial Review under Article 81 EC’ 1336. 
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been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of power’.478 In EU competition law, the 
CJEU has long established to apply a full review to non-complex economic assessments and 
a marginal review to ‘complex economic assessments’.479 In other words, the CJEU does 
not interfere with the exercise of the Commission’s margin of appreciation of economic 
(and now also technical) matters and, in both antitrust law and merger control, this latter 
enjoys wide discretionary power.480 The case law shows that the CJEU is reluctant to 
interfere with the discretionary power of the Commission, owing to the complex economic 
nature of the matter examined, by confining the judicial review ‘to an examination of the 
relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the Commission deduces 
therefrom’.481 So restricted by the leeway of appreciation exercised by the Commission, the 
broadness of the General Court’s review seems to be limited, in complex economic matters, 
to the correction of manifest errors of appraisal. Nonetheless, since the case law is 
inconsistent on this point, it has been observed that the intensity of the review may vary 
according to the provision enforced.482 
 The complexity of the assessment does not coincide with its degree of difficulty. The 
CJEU does not restrain itself from a detailed review of evidence. It examines the facts in 
considerable detail even if it requires engaging its own experts, or reviewing a great deal of 
evidence produced by different sources.483 To clarify,  
 
‘complexity’ refers more to the nature of assessment that needs to be made, rather than 
its technical or evidential difficulty. Article 81(3) assessments, to the extent that they 
involved making value judgments, such as to whether a ‘fair’ share of benefits of a 
restrictive agreement are likely to be passed to consumers, or other judgments of a 
similar apples and orange nature, exemplified this sort of assessment. By contrast, 
whether an agreement was or was not restrictive of competition within Article 81(1), or 
                                               
478 Case C-42/84 Remia BV and others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para. 34. See, also, C-194/99 P 
Thyssen Stahl v Commission [2003] ECR I-10821, para. 78; Joined cases C-142 and C-156/84 British-
American Tobacco Company Ltd and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v Commission [1987] ECR 4487, para. 62. 
479 The first case where the Court of Justice clarified the boundaries of the Commission’s discretion was case 
C-56/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 347. 
480 JAMES VENIT, ‘Human All Too Human: the Gathering and Assessment of Evidence and the Appropriate 
Standard of Proof and Judicial Review in Commission Enforcement Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82’ 
in by by CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN and MEL MARQUIS, European Competition Law Annual 2009: 
The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing 2011) 243. 
481 Case C-56/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission 347. The Court of Justice referred in that case to the 
Commission’s power to grant exemptions under art. 81(3). 
482 JONES and SUFIN, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 1140–1141. 
483 FORWOOD, ‘The Commission’s “More Economic Approach” - Implications for the Role of the EU 
Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review’ 264–268. 
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whether a company was dominant or its conduct abusive, would not require the Court to 
depart from its default approach of a ‘comprehensive review’.484 
 
This approach of the EU Courts as to the extent of their jurisdiction may result to be very 
‘conservative’.485 A turning point could be seen in the Court of First Instance’s reasoning in 
Microsoft, where, after having extended the Commission’s margin of appreciation to 
complex technical appraisals, for which the CJEU has no power to substitute its assessment 
to that of the Commission,486 went on to say that that does not mean that the CJEU must 
decline to review the Commission’s interpretation of economic or technical data. 
Conversely, the CJEU should evaluate the evidence thouroughly and establish both whether 
it is ‘factually accurate, reliable and consistent’ but also whether ‘the evidence contains all 
the relevant data that must be taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’.487   
 Broadly speaking, English488 and Italian judicial review follows this blueprint. The 
Competition Act 1998 empowers the CAT to fully review an OFT decision on the merits, 
which implies by it can remit a decision to the OFT, but also substitute its assessment to the 
impugned decision. In practice, nonetheless, the CAT considers the merits of the case 
building upon the OFT decision, to which some deference is clearly owed.489 With regard to 
the role played by economic evidence, it has been observed that sometimes specialised 
tribunals, like the CAT, critically evaluate the expert evidence presented and, when they do 
not consider it convincing, they apply their own economic assessment of that evidence. 
Non-specialised tribunals, contrariwise, normally highly rely upon the expert’s opinion.490 
Such off-track assessment of economic methods operated by specialised tribunals is 
perceived as a undue diversion from the judge’s institutional role, which might entrain the 
                                               
484 FORWOOD, ‘The Commission’s “More Economic Approach” - Implications for the Role of the EU 
Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review’ 267–268. 
485 The wording belongs to D. SLATER, S. THOMAS, D. WAELBROECK, Competition Law Proceedings 
Before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need For Reform?, in European 
Competition Journal, 2009, 5, 43. 
486 Microsoft Corp v Commission, para. 88. 
487 Microsoft Corp v Commission, para. 89. 
488 Aberdeen Journals Limited v OFT, para. 125. 
489 KELYN BACON, ‘Standard of Proof, Standards of Review and Evaluation of Evidence in UK Antitrust 
and Merger Cases’ in European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial 
Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing 2011) 673: ‘[I]n a case where the regulator has reached a 
robustly reasoned decision on what may be a complex factual or economic issue, the CAT is entitled and 
indeed bound to place weight on that in reaching its decision.’ 
490 IOANNIS LIANOS, ‘Observations of Ioannis Lianos’ (presented at the Workshop on the Quantification of 
Antitrust Harm in Actions for Damages European Commission Directorate-General for Competition January 
26, 2010) 24. 
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risk of preventing the acceptance and diffusion of new theories, or of transposing legal 
values and policy goals into scientific economic methodology.491 One example of this 
propensity is offered by Albion Water. The CAT refused to apply the “Efficient Component-
Pricing Rule” to the purpose of computing profit margins in a margin squeeze case. In short, 
Albion Water Limited appealed to the Tribunal against the decision of the water services 
regulatory authority that the first access price offered by Dŵr Cymru to Albion Water 
Limited for the carriage of non-potable water did not constitute abuse of a dominant 
position under English competition law. To take its decision the water regulatory authority 
had applied the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (“ECPR”), which is a way of calculating 
optimal costs for access to monopoly (also called bottleneck) facilities. The rule basically 
states that the appropriate access charge is calculated by means of adding to the direct costs 
of providing access to the service the monopolist’s opportunity costs of providing access to 
the competitor providers, including forgone revenues from the concomitant reduction in the 
monopolist’s sales of the complementary component. The ‘seductive logic’ of ECPR lies in 
that it ensures that only at least as efficient competitors as the monopolist will be allowed to 
provide the service.492 The CAT refused to apply the ECPR approach to access pricing, on 
grounds that the ECPR methodology was a controversial one, which had been criticised in 
other cases for having adverse effects on competition,493 and that it was not a ‘safe 
methodology to use’ in the specific case.494 This seems nonetheless to be an isolated episode 
and the general rule is that the CAT pay respect to the economic assessment performed by 
the OFT. Moreover, it is natural that the court, when appreciating the probative value of 
evidence presented, especially if endowed with the power to review the merits, take a stand 
                                               
491 Compare LIANOS, ‘Observations of Ioannis Lianos’ 25: ‘Even an “expert” judge needs […] to respect the 
institutional constraints of her role, in particular if the “expert” authority maintains a discretionary power to 
make policy choices. […] [T]he objectives and values of legal decision-making are different from those of 
scientific research and […] this approach may affect the admissibility of relatively new, non-tested, theories, 
even if they are generally accepted by the specific scientific community.’ 
492 NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES and LAWRENCE J. WHITE, ‘Access and Interconnection Pricing: How 
Efficient is the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule”?’ (1995) 40 The Antitrust Bulletin 557, 559. 
493 Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority (formerly Director General of Water Services 
[2006] CAT 23 (Chapter II prohibition), para. 31. 
494 Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority (formerly Director General of Water Services, 
para. 44: ‘The Tribunal’s conclusion on ECPR is that the ECPR approach in the Decision was not a safe 
methodology to use in this case for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the First Access Price 
because: (i) the ‘retail’ price used in the calculation is not shown to be cost-related as regards the distribution 
element; (ii) the evidence strongly suggests that that price is itself excessive; (iii) the particular method of 
ECPR used in the Decision would eliminate the existing competition and in effect preclude virtually any 
competitive entry, because the resultant margins are insufficient; and (iv) the approach of the Authority to 
avoidable costs in its evidence and submissions was not the same as that in the Decision. None of the 
justifications advanced by the Authority for an ECPR approach persuaded the Tribunal that it could safely rely 
on the ECPR approach set out in the Decision in the circumstances of the present case.’ 
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upon which economic theory it considers to be more convincing, because the assessment of 
evidence is reserved to it. 
 In Italy, the judicial review is exercised by the administrative judge in the same 
terms of the EU Courts. According to the case law, when the AGCM interprets complex 
economic concepts which are not precisely defined (such as that of relevant market) it is 
endowed with a great margin of appreciation, due to the fact that most economic theories 
are a matter of opinion.495 Over technical economic matters, the intensity of the judicial 
review is lesser and the substitution of the assessment of evidence of the court to that of the 
NCA is prohibited. It is, however, admitted a control over the consistency of the statement 
of reasons, for the correction of manifest errors of appraisal.496 Such control must be 
thorough and encompass the adequacy of the statement of the reasons, the accuracy of the 
statement of facts, the existence of manifest error of appraisal or of misuse of power.497 
With regard to the revision of fines, the scope of the review extends to the merits and the 
assessment of the judge can substitute that of the AGCM.498 
 It is interesting to note that, due to the deferential attitude toward a certain margin of 
regulatory autonomy showed by the review courts,499 on the one hand, and the binding 
effect or high probative value of the decisions of competition authorities in follow-on 
actions before national courts, on the other, the assessment of complex economic matters 
performed by competition authorities is less likely to be put into question. The system, as it 
is, tends to crystallize such assessment and the almost exclusive adjudicator of certain 
complex assessments of the fact will consistently be the competition authority (European or 
national) both for the public and the private enforcement, with the only exception of the rare 
(for the time being) stand-alone actions. 
 
B) Economic Evidence in the Private Enforcement 
 
                                               
495 TAR Lazio, 14 July 2010, decision no. 25434, para. 3.1. 
496 Court of Cassation Soc. ind. Farmaceutiche Menarini v Reg. Toscana, 17 March 2008, decision no. 7063 
(2008) Giurisprudenza italiana, 2052 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990).  
497 TAR Lazio, 2 December 2009, decision no. 12319, para. 3.1; TAR Lazio, 22 September 2009, decision no. 
9171, para. III.2.1. 
498 TAR Lazio, 22 September 2009, decision no. 9171, para. IX.2. 
499 CAROL HARLOW and RICHARD RAWLINGS, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2009) 311. The Authors, nonetheless, also observe that the CAT is an example of a new regulatory 
model in which, being it a specialist regulatory court, the CAT’s ‘hard look’ creates ‘tension’ rather than 
‘deference’. Due to its specialism and its full review of the merits, it secures effective legal accountability and 
avoid risks of non-compliance with Article 6 ECHR (which would arise from the limitations of judicial 
review). See at 321-322. 
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In the private enforcement, national courts usually do not perform any economic analysis 
from scratch and bank on the decisions of the Commission or the national authority. Of 
course, civil judges are not required to be economic experts themselves. Their education is 
based on the law and, even though these two social sciences are intertwined and basic 
notions of economics appropriately constitute sound background for jurists, judges 
throughout European Union rarely possess the necessary instruments to understand and 
apply autonomously economic theories in competition litigation. Such observation does not 
diminish the importance of economic evidence, but it implies that economic evidence must 
be handled with care.500 Economic evidence is vividly capable of explaining and 
interpreting the facts under examination, and is highly valuable in strengthening the judge’s 
conviction upon the facts. It is, however, not necessarily conclusive and notoriously 
uncertain.501 The judge, when deciding stand-alone actions, is entirely free to evaluate 
economic evidence and is under no obligation to align with the opinion of the expert, which 
is to be weighed up altogether with all other evidence.  
 The role of expert evidence and the way the problem of epistemic asymmetry is dealt 
with are different in the civil502 and in the common legal systems, and therefore differences 
are likely to be appreciable in the jurisdictions of the Member States. This issue is 
particularly important in private enforcement of EU competition law because, absent any 
harmonized regulation of the use of expert evidence in national proceedings, the risk of 
discrepancies among Member State as to the admissibility and assessment of this type of 
evidence is especially high. Concomitantly, greater use of economic expertise in national 
proceedings may also indirectly contribute to harmonising courts’ decisions across the EU, 
improving the predictability of their outcome.503 In common law systems expert witnesses 
                                               
500 The argument according to which economic evidence is better understood by judges who deal repeatedly 
with antitrust cases is advocated for those who are in favour of the adoption of specialised courts. With regard 
to the judicial review, see DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG and JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, ‘Antitrust Courts: 
Specialists versus Generalists’ (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 788–811. 
501 FORWOOD, ‘The Commission’s “More Economic Approach” - Implications for the Role of the EU 
Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review’ 257: ‘[E]conomic analysis is a 
notoriously uncertain science – some would even say “art” - and few economists would deny that economic 
assessments are never matters on which there is room for reasonable differences of view.’ 
502 The French, Italian, German and Spanish civil law traditions define very thoroughly the assessment of the 
expert evidence (technicien, consulente tecnico, Beweis durch Sachverständige, perito) in their codes of civil 
procedure. See, for extensive comparative analysis, COMOGLIO, Le prove civili 852, fn. 54. 
503 DENIS WAELBROECK, DONALD SLATER, and GIL EVEN-SHOSHAN, ‘Study on the Conditions of 
Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules - Comparative Report’ (Ashurst 
August 31, 2004) 10: ‘Greater recourse to greater expertise could improve predictability in the application of 
the law. Such expertise could come from a variety of quarters, such as the creation of courts specialised in 
competition matters and/or the training of judges […].’ 
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play an ‘adversarial’ role, offering a one-sided opinion on the facts and supporting the 
party’s argument. In civil traditions, the role of the expert is more neutral and is played 
mostly in the form of court-appointed experts which should provide the judge with impartial 
and neutral insights on the facts.504 It is convenient now to briefly analyse the two most 
wide-spread models of integration of economic evidence in competition law litigation. 
 
a) Expert witness 
 
Expert witnesses are characteristic of common law legal systems and sometimes they are 
used in civil law countries in the form of shadow experts, i.e. a party-appointed expert 
adviser which acts to balance the opinion of a court-appointed expert. The main issues 
arising out in conjunction with the use of this type of expert are the costs connected to it, 
which may hinder the protection of the rights of defence of the party which has fewer 
means; the increased length of litigation which would result from the appointment of experts 
by the parties; and the biased evidence that would be allowed to enter proceedings. It has 
been observed how the first two set of issues are not specific of expert-witnesses and would 
be encountered also if neutral expert were used. Impartiality, on the other hand, is inherent 
to this kind of economic expertise.505 
 The risk of allowing biased opinions enter the proceedings is tangible because the 
knowledge possessed by the expert allows him or her selecting the favourable data and way 
of analysis among the available ones and presenting to the judge a picture which has been 
already manipulated in order to convey consensus upon the party’s arguments. In a way that 
it is no different from the way lawyers choose to present the most convenient evidence to 
support their allegations, the appointed economist receives remuneration for helping the 
claimant or the defence to support their argumentations.  
 In the attempt of rendering the expert witness as impartial as possible, the ‘hot tub’ 
procedure is particularly effective. It consists of a pre-trial confrontation of experts in order 
to allow a maieutical search for the scientific ‘truth’. In the ‘hot tub’ procedure economists 
are invited, once they have received written evidence available, to submit their written 
observations before the oral hearing. At the end of the oral proceedings, and before the 
counsel’s submissions, they may be asked to participate in a short seminar or debate before 
                                               
504 LIANOS, ‘Observations of Ioannis Lianos’ 2. 
505 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 558. 
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the court. The experts are not cross-examined by the lawyers, but are interrogated directly 
by the judge, who can, this way, form its opinion. In the following part of the proceedings, 
the expert witnesses go back to their partial role and are cross-examined as usual. Among 
the advantages of such procedure there is the limitation of partisanship, the narrowing of the 
debate to real issues, and the stimulus of scientific debate among experts. 
 
b) Court-appointed expert 
 
An independent expert appointed by the court avoids all risk of a biased outcome. Usually, 
national civil procedural rules empower the parties to ask questions and submit observations 
to the neutral court-appointed expert. The downside of the use of court-appointed forensic 
economists consists mainly in the elevated risk of error, especially in cases where the 
appointed expert is not competent or not genuinely neutral, but also because the expert, even 
when acting in good faith, will most likely tend to endorse a particular theory or to follow 
his or her ‘school’ ideas.506 An expensive solution to this problem would be the appointment 
of a panel of experts, instead of an individual, as already happens in the context of the WTO 
dispute resolution. 
 
c) Economic Evidence in England 
 
Expert evidence is governed by Part 35 of CPR or, before the CAT, by paragraphs 12.8 to 
12.11 of the CAT Guide to Proceedings 2005. Experts (in competition law, they are most 
likely economists or forensic accountants) can be used in the proceedings with the 
permission of the court. They have a duty to help the court with the matter of expertise and 
such duty prevails upon any obligation towards the party by which the expert has been 
appointed. In competition matters, both before the High Court and the CAT, expert evidence 
is usually given in the form of a written report. After the exchange of the written reports, the 
expert can be addressed questions by the counterparty in written form. Only when 
necessary, experts can also be cross-examined and re-examined at trial. Even if the 
complexity of the case in competition matters normally suggest not doing so, the court can 
also employ a single expert appointed jointly.507 In England, appointed experts have a 
                                               
506 LIANOS, ‘Observations of Ioannis Lianos’ 10. 
507 On the Court’s power to direct that evidence is given by a single joint expert, see Rule 35.7 of CPR. 
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general obligation, or rather a duty, to assist the court along the proceedings, which 
overrides any other obligations they may have to fulfil towards the person who appointed 
them or by whom they are paid.508 Parties cannot appoint or make use of an expert in the 
proceedings, unless so authorised by the court.509 Expert reports for which the parties have 
not received directions from the court must be excluded as inadmissible evidence. Expert 
evidence must be restricted to what is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings.510 
Such principles are applied also by the CAT.511 Informal statements by experts are also 
permitted.512 According to the case law, two main principles guide the judge in dealing with 
expert evidence: the expert must be needed to help the court in the decision-making;513 and 
the issue must concern an area where there is a body of recognised expertise.514 
                                               
508 Rule 35.3 of CPR. 
509 Rule 35.4 of CPR. 
510 Rule 35.1 of CPR. See, before the CAT, how it may be considered appropriate to organise a structured 
discussion to focus on the main points of dispute: Genzyme Ltd v OFT [2005] CAT 32, paras. 149–154. 
511 Compare paras 12.8 and 12.9 of the CAT’s Guide to Proceedings: ‘As regards expert evidence, the Tribunal 
will take into account the principles and procedures envisaged by Part 35 of the CPR, notably that expert 
evidence should be restricted to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings. It may be 
appropriate to organise, prior to, or at some stage during the hearing, a structured discussion, in the presence of 
the Tribunal, between the parties and their experts, in an endeavour to focus on the main points of dispute […] 
Informal statements by experts may be permitted […] Other procedures, including putting written questions to 
the experts, discussions between experts, the appointment of a single joint expert, or of the Tribunal’s own 
expert, can equally be envisaged. The Tribunal considers that, as under Part 35 of the CPR, it is the duty of the 
expert to help the Tribunal on matters within his expertise: that duty overrides any obligation to the person 
from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid. Expert evidence presented to the Tribunal 
should be, and should be seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced by the pressures of the 
proceedings. An expert witness should never assume the role of an advocate and should not omit to consider 
material facts which could detract from the expert’s concluded opinion. Where necessary, the expert must 
make it clear if a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.’ 
512 Claymore Dairies Limited and Arla Foods UK plc v OFT [2005] CAT 30. 
513 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd and another v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp, Chancery Division [1979] Ch. 384, 402: 
‘As to this, I have heard the evidence of a number of practising solicitors. Mr. Harman modestly contented 
himself with calling one; but Mr. Gatehouse - mindful, no doubt, of what is said to be the divine preference for 
big battalions - called no less than three. I must say that I doubt the value, or even the admissibility, of this sort 
of evidence, which seems to be becoming customary in cases of this type. […] Clearly, if there is some 
practice in a particular profession, some accepted standard of conduct which is laid down by a professional 
institute or sanctioned by common usage, evidence of that can and ought to be received. But evidence which 
really amounts to no more than an expression of opinion by a particular practitioner of what he thinks that he 
would have done had he been placed, hypothetically and without the benefit of hindsight, in the position of the 
defendants, is of little assistance to the court […]’ 
514 Barings Plc (in liquidation) and another v Cooper & Lybrand & others, High Court Chancery Division 
[2001] Lloyd’s Rep PN 379, paras. 44–45: ‘[T]he test whether expert evidence in any particular case is to be 
received is a two stage test, the first stage being whether the evidence is admissible as “expert evidence” […], 
and the second stage whether the Court should admit it as being relevant to any decision which the Court had 
to arrive at, that is, helpful to the Court for that purpose. […] [E]xpert evidence is admissible under section 3 
of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 in any case where the Court accepts that there exists a recognised expertise 
governed by recognised standards and rules of conduct capable of influencing the Court's decision on any of 
the issues which it has to decide and the witness to be called satisfies the Court that he has a sufficient 
familiarity with and knowledge of the expertise in question to render his opinion potentially of value in 
resolving any of those issues. Evidence meeting this test can still be excluded by the Court if the Court takes 
the view that calling it will not be helpful to the Court in resolving any issue in the case justly. Such evidence 
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 The problem of partisanship of expert evidence is strongly felt in England, which has 
recently engaged in a civil procedure reform with regard to this aspect. As early as 1980, 
Lord Wilberforce expressed his concerns and the need for neutral expertise in a civil 
litigation case: 
 
While some degree of consultation between experts and legal advisers is entirely proper, 
it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen 
to be, the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the 
exigencies of litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only 
incorrect but self-defeating.515 
 
To overcome such problems, a reform of the UK Civil Procedure Rules has instituted the 
‘single joint expert’, whose function is exactly the same as that of the expert witness, with 
the difference that the joint expert is chosen in agreement by the parties, usually under 
direction of the court, which also decides the manner in which the expert should be selected 
or selects him or her directly from the list proposed by the parties in the event that these 
latter cannot agree on whom to choose.516 In practice, the appointment of single joint expert 
tends to be extremely rare. Notwithstanding such trend of legislative reform, to date the full-
scale adversarial nature of the proceedings stays untouched and the role of the expert in 
English civil litigation is still ‘one of the principal weapons used by litigators’.517 
 One of the tools offered by the UK Civil Procedure Rules to ease the process of 
narrowing the issues and improving the use of expert evidence is the power of the court, at 
any stage along the proceedings, to direct a discussion between the experts in order to 
identify and have them discuss the relevant issues in the specific matter and to explore the 
possibility of reaching an agreed opinion on those issues, whenever feasible.518 Nonetheless, 
the parties need to give their consent to refer to the content of the discussion during the trial 
                                                                                                                                                
will not be helpful where the issue to be decided is one of law or is otherwise one on which the Court is able to 
come to a fully informed decision without hearing such evidence.’ 
515 Whitehouse v Jordan and another, House of Lords [1981] 1 WLR 246, 256–257. 
516 Compare Rule 35.7 of CPR. 
517 HARRY WOOLF, ‘Access to Justice’, July 2006, Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice 
System in England and Wales, Ch. 13, para 7. At the same paragraph Lord Woolf warns against the risk of a 
‘universal application of the full, “red-blooded” adversarial approach’: ‘The purpose of the adversarial system 
is to achieve just results. All too often it is used by one party or the other to achieve something which is 
inconsistent with justice by taking advantage of the other side’s lack of resources or ignorance of relevant facts 
or opinions. […] The present system allows […] to withhold from their opponents material which may be 
damaging to their own case or advantageous to their opponents. This practice of non-disclosure cannot be 
justified, because it inevitably leads to unnecessary cost and delay, and in some cases to an unfair result.’  
518 Rule 35.12 of CPR. 
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and to be bound by the opinion of the agreed experts; otherwise, the contentions of the 
experts cannot be used against them. Two main criticisms are levelled to this procedural 
device. The first one is that meetings can ultimately result useless if the experts are 
instructed by the parties or their counsels not to agree anything. The second one is 
represented by the high costs entrained by such meetings, especially if attendance is 
required for the parties and the lawyers, instead of the experts alone. The proposed solution 
to the first problem is to consider unprofessional conduct for the experts to accept 
instructions for the meetings. The proposed solution to the second one is to cut costs of 
travelling expenses, by way of allowing the meetings to be held via conference calls or 
telephone and compelling attendance of the experts alone.519 
  Another tool offered by the UK Civil Procedure Rules is the appointment of 
assessors, aimed at assisting the court in the decision-making process. The CPR provide that 
the court is empowered to appoint an assessor, to the purpose of dealing with a matter in 
which the assessor has skill or experience by means of preparing a report for the court’s use 
or attending the trial or a part of it to advise the court on the matter.520 The assessor’s main 
function is therefore that of ‘educating’ the judge in a technical subject matter,521 without 
being subject to cross-examination or any other adversarial device.  
 The above stated about the methods for integrating economic evidence in civil 
proceedings, let’s consider now the issues of the admissibility and the assessment of 
economic expertise in English private antitrust cases. In the course of the case 2 Travel 
Group plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited, the defendant applied 
to exclude certain evidence that 2 Travel Group plc wanted to adduce before the CAT. Mr. 
Harrison was, as well as an accountant, also a member or the Tribunal’s ordinary panel. In 
support of its claim, 2 Travel Group plc relied upon Mr. Harrison’s written witness 
statement, which substantially referred the circumstances under which reports on the 
defendant’s business had come to be written by Pricewaterhouse Coopers. In refusing to 
exclude Mr. Harrison’s written statement, the CAT had the occasion to restate the 
distinction between expert witnesses and witnesses of fact. The defendant objected to the 
adducing of Mr. Harrison’s statement on grounds that he was an expert witness and not a 
witness of fact, and that his dual status was likely to give rise to biased conclusions. The 
Tribunal drawn the distinction between expert evidence given by a witness of fact, and 
                                               
519 WOOLF, ‘Access to Justice’ 13 paras. 43-50. 
520 Rule 35.15 of CPR. 
521 LIANOS, ‘Observations of Ioannis Lianos’ 14. 
Chapter II 
The Evaluation of the Proof in EU Competition Litigation: A Comparison of Public and Private Enforcement 
 
 213 
genuine expert evidence, which is also recognised by the Civil Evidence Act 1972 at 
Section 3(1). English law considers opinions based on experience or previously acquired 
knowledge of the witness, whenever they are drawn from facts perceived through senses, as 
facts.522 On this premise, the Tribunal concluded that the evidence brought by the chartered 
accountant, which Cardiff City Transport Services Limited aimed at excluding, was factual 
and as such admissible. With regard to the bias objection, the Tribunal observed that all 
steps were taken to ensure Mr. Harrison’s dual status would not arise difficulties (for 
instance, the three members of the Tribunal had never met Mr. Harrison). Since there was 
no real danger of bias on the part of the constituted Tribunal,523 the CAT concluded for the 
rejection of the application, in line with the general favor probationis that is recurrent in 
competition matters. 
 
d) Economic Evidence in Italy 
 
In Italy, the use of economic evidence by private parties is at a very early stage of its 
development (as is, overall, private enforcement itself). Given that the majority of actions 
have been to date follow-on actions, the use of this type of evidence would have proved 
particularly relevant in the quantification phase for damages actions, but Italian judges have 
often recurred to equity to avoid embarking on complex quantification calculations. Among 
the reasons for the reluctance on the part of the Italian civil judge to use econometric models 
are often mentioned the epistemic asymmetry between the economists and judges; the 
inaccuracy of the econometric models; the fact that they can introduce biased assertions in 
the decision-making process; the lack of independent econometric experts.524 None of these 
reasons, however, is conclusive and they can be easily overcome in the furtherance of a 
more economic approach to competition law enforcement. Occasionally, such as in 
                                               
522 2 Travel Group plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2011] CAT 44 (Chapter II 
violation), para. 6: ‘Take the example of a brain surgeon accused of negligence, giving evidence in his 
defence. Such evidence, justifying sophisticated conduct alleged to have been negligent, will in content often 
be indistinguishable from “expert” evidence. But it will not be expert evidence, because the witness will be 
explaining, as a matter of fact, precisely what he did during the course of a particular operation, drawing on his 
expertise to give that factual explanation. This distinction between “expert” evidence given by a witness of 
fact, and genuine expert evidence, is one which is regularly drawn by the Tribunal […] and is one which is 
expressly recognised in section 3(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 , which provides: “Subject to any rules of 
court made in pursuance of this Act, where a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings, his opinion 
on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence shall be admissible in evidence.”’ 
523 2 Travel Group plc (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited, para. 13. 
524 PAOLO BUCCIROSSI, ‘Chi ha paura dell’econometria?’ in I rimedi civilistici agli illeciti 
anticoncorrenziali. Private Enforcement of Competition Law - Atti del III Convegno di Studio presso la 
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Trento 15-16 aprile 2011 (Cedam 2012) 204–208. 
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Telsystem v SIP,525 the Italian court appointed experts to assist it in the quantification of 
damages. In that case, in the above mentioned Bluvacanze, and in Albacom,526 the Italian 
courts of appeal applied the ‘but for’527 economic model for the quantification, mitigated by 
a cautious assessment. The ‘but for’ test is the basic test for causation. The test is performed 
in two steps: first of all, it is necessary to eliminate all irrelevant causes; secondly, it must be 
verified whether the identified cause is the effective one, because but for it, the damage 
would not have occurred. The way in which the ‘but for’ test operates in practice in 
competition law cases is by means of mentally eliminating the alleged violation, and trying 
to verify whether, absent the infringement, the suffered losses would disappear as well. The 
reasoning is very similar to that used to build the counterfactual. The judge ought to 
conjecture what would have happened in the ‘but for’ world. In Bluvacanze, the Court of 
Milan made use of ‘before and after’ test for the evaluation of lost profits, explaining its 
choice as follows: 
 
The quantification of lost profits can also be made on the basis of presumptive criteria of 
the lost profit as derived by the unlawful conduct of the defendant, by means of 
forecasting the amount of money that could have been earned absent the unlawful 
conduct and by using projections of recorded past data which could have likely be 
referable to subsequent periods.528 
 
In doing so, clearly the court refused to go into complex economic analysis, adopting a very 
simple method that it could verify without the assistance of any expert. This case law and 
that of the English courts can be read in line with the tendency of the EU Courts (and other 
                                               
525 Court of Appeal of Milan, Telsystem v SIP SpA and Telecom Italia SpA, 18 July 1995 (1996) Danno e 
responsabilità, I, 105-110. 
526 Court of Appeal of Rome, Soc. Albacom v Soc. Telecom Italia, 20 January 2003 (2003) Foro italiano, I, 
2474 ff. (Article 3 of Law 287/1990).  
527 Compare Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd. & others, para. 536 and Galoo Ltd (in liquidation) and others v 
Bright Grahame, Court of Appeal [1994] 1 WLR 1360, 1372 where the Court of Appeal makes reference to a 
very similar Australian case decided by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, Alexander v Cambridge 
Credit Corporation Ltd [1987] 9 NS WLR 310, and quotes the words of Judge Mahoney J.A. At para. 333, the 
judge beautifully describes the issue of causation as follows: ‘If a defendant promises to direct me where I 
should go and, at a cross-roads, directs me to the left road rather than the right road, what happens to me on the 
left road is, in a sense, the result of what the defendant has done. If […] because I am there, a car driving down 
that road and not down the right road strikes me, my loss is, in a sense, the result of the fact that I have been 
directed to the left road and not the right road. But […] in relation to losses of that kind, the fact that the 
breach has initiated one train of events rather than another is not, or at least may not, be sufficient in itself. It is 
necessary, to determine whether there is a causal relationship, to look more closely at the breach and what (to 
use a neutral term) flowed from it.’ 
528 Court of Appeal of Milan, Soc. Bluvacanze v Soc. I viaggi del Ventaglio, Soc. Turisanda, Soc. Hotelplan 
Italia, 11 July 2003 (2004) Foro italiano, I, 597-615, 612. 
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national courts) to ‘keep it simple’: adopting their decision based on other evidence 
available and resorting to economic evidence only if no alternative is left or only for those 
issues, like quantification, where it is necessary to do so. As a result, the economic 
assessment of evidence is an almost exclusive prerogative of the competition authorities. 
Moreover, according to the signposting of the Court of Justice, a strong propensity for the 
contextual evaluation of evidence can be observed,529 which can be seen in the light of a 
general alignment on the part of national courts to the case law of the EU Courts with regard 
to the assessment of evidence. Indeed, given the role played by economic evidence in 
competition law proceedings, it is not an issue that can be easily severed from those of the 
probative value of evidence and ultimately of the standard of proof. Indeed, economic 
evidence is always considered as circumstantial evidence corroborating other evidence.  
 
9) THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR EVIDENCE 
 
In the same way in which the notion of standard of proof is not familiar to jurists of civil 
law tradition, also the notion of standard of review is mainly entrenched in common law 
jurisdictions. The standard of review is defined as ‘the intensity of the scrutiny exercised by 
courts of law over the legality of the act subject to review’.530 Naturally, the fact that 
Commission’s decisions are scrutinised by the General Court and, in second instance only 
with regard to issues of law, by the Court of Justice, affects the decision-making itself of 
that institution, whose legitimacy is strictly influenced and calibrated by the review. The 
two standards of proof and of review are clearly differentiated in their functions. 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that they can be seen as two sides of the same coin, because 
what it takes for the competition authority to convince the judge (standard of proof) reflects 
on what it takes for it to win a challenge in the review phase (standard of review).531  
 The standard of review applied by the General Court focuses primarily on questions 
of facts and law concerning the general consistency of the Commission’s reasoning and on 
manifest errors of assessment, directed to the control of the credibility of the body of 
evidence which make the Commission’s case.532 Together with the review of legality, 
                                               
529 Court of Cassation, Pesce v Axa Assicurazioni, 18 December 2009, decision no. 26748 (2010) Danno e 
responsabilità, 815. 
530 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 644. 
531 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases’ 561. 
532 See Introduction, para. 3 C). 
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according to Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the EU Courts 
are endowed with unlimited jurisdiction over Commission’s competition decisions imposing 
a fine. The EU Courts may review, cancel, reduce or even increase the amount of the fine. 
In practice, the control in antitrust law has taken four main forms: i) interpretation of 
substantive law; ii) test of due process; iii) review of the amount of imposed fines; iv) test of 
evidence.533 Whilst the respect of the defendant’s fundamental rights is dealt with in the 
following Chapter, the test of evidence is considered below, as part of the currently 
discussed topic. 
 The review of evidence is aimed at verifying the accuracy, reliability and sufficiency 
of the body of evidence presented by the Commission in its role as public prosecutor. Since 
the Commission, when acting as an adjudicator, enjoys a certain margin of discretion with 
regard to technical or economic complex assessments, how thorough the review control is in 
antitrust cases also depends on the relevant competition provision enforced: hard-core 
violations do not require a complex economical assessment of their effects, because they are 
considered prohibited ‘by object’ according to Article 101(1) TFEU; whereas other 
infringements, such as the abuse of dominance, may require more detailed economic 
analysis. As a consequence, the standard of review applied to evidentiary issues is very 
close to that of a strict scrutiny in cartel cases,534 whereas in other cases it might be variably 
less stringent. 
 Detecting the appropriate standard of review to be applied, however, is not so easy in 
the practice: the distinction of what must be considered fact, law and complex economic 
assessment is not always straightforward.535 With regard to the standard of judicial review 
for factual evidence, it has been established that a full review is performed both for the 
review of the legality under the four grounds of Article 263(2) TFEU and under the 
unlimited jurisdiction under Article 31 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 in relation to fines. The 
evidence test carried out by the General Court is aimed at checking ‘meticulously the nature 
and import of the evidence taken into consideration by the Commission in the decision’.536 
As emphasised by Advocate-General Tizzano in a merger case,  
                                               
533 For further details, refer to the Introduction, text accompanying fn. 126 to 138. 
534 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 645. Note also that, for this reason, the analysis of the case law stemming from cartel 
cases is particularly relevant when analysing issues of evidence, and therefore it is significantly predominant in 
the current discourse.  
535 SCORDAMAGLIA-TOUSIS, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling Effective Public Enforcement with 
Fundamental Rights 112. 
536 Società Italiana Vetro v Commission, para. 95. 
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with regard to the finding of facts, the review is clearly more intense, in that the issue is 
to verify objectively and materially the accuracy of certain facts and the correctness of 
the conclusions drawn in order to establish whether certain known facts make it possible 
to prove the existence of other facts to be ascertained. By contrast, with regard to the 
complex economic assessments made by the Commission, review by the Community 
judicature is necessarily more limited, since the latter has to respect the broad discretion 
inherent in that kind of assessment and may not substitute its own point of view for that 
of the body which is institutionally responsible for making those assessments.537  
 
The standard of review applied to evidence tackles different aspects which may be generally 
traced back to four main rules of evidence: a) the principle of free evaluation of evidence; b) 
the sufficiency of evidence to meet the required standard of proof; c) the principle of 
presumption of innocence; d) the principle of contextual evaluation of evidence.538 All of 
these issues have been tackled above, also in the national context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
537 C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, Opinion of AG Tizzano, para. 86. 
538 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 645–652. 
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Chapter III – The Gathering of Evidence in EU Antitrust Litigation: 
Mechanisms for Cooperation and the Respect of Fundamental Rights  
 
Whilst a high degree of convergence has been attained with regard to the rules on evaluation 
of evidence by means of the signposting of the EU case law, the rules on the gathering of 
evidence spread from the European to the national level by influence of other factors. In 
other words, the procedural autonomy of the Member States in relation to the evaluation of 
evidence is limited by the principle of effectiveness, which, as set out above, erodes the 
leeway of autonomy of the States under different aspects (for instance, the use of 
presumptions, the probative value of evidence, the admissibility of evidence and so on). The 
procedural autonomy in relation to the gathering of evidence, while still aimed at preserving 
the effet utile, is more clearly limited by two other factors. The factors fostering 
convergence in the gathering of evidence for EU antitrust cases are: the mechanisms of 
cooperation for the taking and handling of evidence available within the EU, on the one 
hand; and the respect of those fundamental rights on which the gathering of evidence might 
have an impact, on the other. It will be shown how differences in procedural enforcement 
rules are found mainly in administrative procedures, whereas, as far as judicial proceedings 
are concerned, they tend to be overcome by the judicial review of the EU Courts and 
national courts (in the public enforcement) or by the statutory instruments available (in the 
private enforcement). In particular with regard to evidence, progressive convergence in the 
EU Member States is attained either by means of the recognition of fundamental rights of 
the investigated undertakings, which is compelled by the envisaged accession of the EU to 
the ECHR, or by the recognition of a full right to compensation promoted by the CJEU (for 
instance, ensuring the right to access antitrust files). On the front of cooperation, 
convergence is all the more important for the ‘free circulation of evidence’ envisaged by 
Article 12 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. In this regard, statutory instruments play a major role. 
The cooperation regime within the ECN will be analysed, along with the existing tools for 
cooperation with regard to evidence in the private enforcement, namely the EU Evidence 
Regulation.  
 
1) FREE MOVEMENT OF EVIDENCE IN EU ANTITRUST LAW: CROSS-BORDER 
INVESTIGATIONS AND COORDINATION BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS 
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In the modernised and decentralised system created by of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, 
cooperation is provided for between the European Commission and national competition 
authorities or national judges on one hand (vertical cooperation), and, on the other, between 
NCAs of different Member States (horizontal cooperation). The functions of the European 
Competition Network have already been briefly illustrated in Chapter I,1 but it is necessary 
here to specify how the cooperation is developed with specific regard to evidence. This 
paragraph is devoted to the illustration of the vertical and horizontal cooperation between 
competition authorities within the public enforcement.    
 Given the existing multi-level and national/supra-national framework of the 
competition law enforcement in Europe, substantial differences can be observed in the way 
each Member States implement EU rules, particularly with regard to the procedure, either in 
the investigation phase, i.e. the exercise of inspection powers and the gathering of evidence, 
or in the evaluation of evidence. The point where discrepancies are minimized is reached 
only when due process rights and other fundamental rights come into play, because, as it 
will be explained in the next paragraphs, all Member States are required to adhere to a 
common standard of fundamental rights, according to the interpretation provided by the 
ECtHR. In the phase of the assessment of evidence, however, the case law of the EU Courts 
is playing a major role in reaching harmonised solutions that pierce the shield of the 
procedural autonomy granted to each Member State, in the name of the principle of 
effectiveness. Conversely, the phase of the gathering of evidence and the cooperation 
between authorities with regard to evidence is still marked by strong diversity between the 
different systems, which need to be managed in order to strike the right balance between 
effectiveness and legitimacy.2 More importantly, the full recognition of some fundamental 
rights may conflict with the principle of effectiveness and, therefore, in this phase, the polar 
star of effet utile falls foul of the process of convergence, instead of fostering it. For 
instance, the recognition of a right of access to the file may diminish the effectiveness of 
leniency programs; the recognition of a full right to non-self incrimination may hinder 
investigations; and so does the recognition of the professional legal privilege. The balance 
between convergence and procedural autonomy is therefore very delicate. 
                                               
1 See Chapter I, para. 2 A) b).  
2 DAMIEN MB GERARD, ‘Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective Enforcement and Due 
Process in Cross-border Antitrust Investigations’ in International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and 
Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012) 368. 
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 Since, to some extent, procedural differences between systems cannot be ruled out, 
cooperation between authorities at the European and national level raises complexities 
connected to the circulation of evidence gathered according to the rules of one system. More 
specifically, difficulties arise out with regard to the possibility for a NCA to make use of 
evidence collected abroad, which it would not have been possible to collect according to its 
procedural rules. To address such issues it is necessary to take into consideration the 
existing rules on cooperation between competition authorities, and to understand whether 
the objectives of almost unconditioned circulation of evidence set forth in Recital (16) of 
Regulation (EC) 1/20033 correspond to a real (and legitimate) state of affairs. 
 
A) The Binding Effect of Final Decisions of Competition Authorities within the 
European Competition Network 
 
With regard to the intersection between public and private enforcement and the cooperation 
between administrative and judicial authorities, it must be analysed, at the outset, the effect 
of final decisions of competition authorities in private antitrust actions. Such effect does not 
only have conseguences on the interaction between NCAs (or the Commission) and national 
judges; but also on the interaction between national judges of different Member States and 
between different NCAs, or between national judges and NCAs. Naturally, that the burden 
of proof weighing upon private claimants will be considerably reduced, if they can rely on 
an administrative decision, which not only contains a declaratory judgment upon the 
infringement but also the probative results of the NCA’s investigation.4 
 
a) The Binding Effect of Commission’s Decisions 
 
Article 16 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 addresses the control over a uniform application of 
EU competition law. Its first paragraph provides that national courts cannot take decisions 
running counter decisions already adopted by the Commission on identical subject-matters. 
Such obligation of conformity extends also to decisions which potentially fall foul of a 
                                               
3 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Recital (16): ‘Notwithstanding any national provision to the contrary, the exchange 
of information and the use of such information in evidence should be allowed between the members of the 
network even where the information is confidential. This information may be used for the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty as well as for the parallel application of national competition law, provided 
that the latter application relates to the same case and does not lead to a different outcome. […]’. 
4 ALBERTO PERA and GIULIA CODACCI PISANELLI, ‘Decisioni con impegni e private enforcement nel 
diritto antitrust’ (2012) 1 Mercato concorrenza regole 69, 79. 
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decision contemplated by the Commission and may oblige the relevant national court to stay 
its proceedings. The second paragraph, which is devoted to the conformity of decisions 
between Commission and competition authorities, provides that they cannot decide 
contrariwise what already decided by the Commission on the same matter. The extent to 
which such bindingness operates has been limited by the restrictive interpretation given by 
the English House of Lords in Inntrepreneur Pub Company v. Crehan, according to which 
conflicting decisions are only those relating to exactly the same infringement by the same 
parties and not to similar ones, or to other violations in the same market.5 Nevertheless, in 
that occasion the House of Lords also specified that the Commission’s decision constitutes, 
before national judges, admissible evidence ‘which, given the expertise of the Commission, 
may well be regarded by that court as highly persuasive.’ Absent any rule of law imposing 
an estoppel on the English judge, he or she can well depart from the Commission’s finding.6  
 Article 16 is thus aimed at avoiding conflicts between decisions of the Commission 
and of the judges of the 28 Member States in the parallel or subsequent application of EU 
antitrust law to the same case.7 Commission’s decisions have binding effect, and can be 
considered as a binding proof, by NCAs and judges deciding a follow-on action for 
damages. Such binding effect of Commission’s decisions had already been recognised by 
the CJEU in Masterfoods,8 and that principle has been applied on a voluntary basis by some 
Member States with regard to NCAs’ decisions. 
 
b) The Binding Effect of NCAs’ Decisions 
 
In its White Paper, the Commission’s proposal was to take into consideration the possibility 
of endowing all NCAs’ decisions with binding effect over national jurisdictions. According 
to the Commission, it was advisable that NCAs’ decisions had a binding effect before every 
judge of the European Union: namely, to consider it as a proof of the alleged infringement.9 
The beneficial effects of bestowing probative value to NCAs’ decisions in all Member 
States are multiple: not only to ensure legal certainty, but also to enhance the 
                                               
5 Inntrepreneur Pub Company and others v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38, para. 64. 
6 Inntrepreneur Pub Company and others v Crehan, para. 69. 
7 ALDO FRIGNANI and STEFANIA BARIATTI (eds), Disciplina della concorrenza nella UE (Cedam 2012) 
700. 
8 See Chapter I, fn. 31. 
9 White Paper on  Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final, 6 and 
Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules SEC (2008) 404, para. 144 ff. 
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implementation of a right to damages, by means of ensuring the circulation and recognition 
of decisions taken by national competition authorities. Such circulation of the final decisions 
has also the power of lightening considerably the burden of proof resting upon the private 
claimant in  follow-on damages action. The more recent Proposal for a Directive, at Article 
9, suggests that, in private antitrust actions under Article 101 and 102 TFEU or under 
national competition law, national courts should not take decisions running counter final 
infringement decisions taken by NCAs or review courts of a Member State. It must be noted 
that the Proposal does not solve the problem of the legal effect to be attributed to the NCA’s 
decision. Namely, in a system which recognises the principle of free and unfettered 
evaluation of evidence, it is hard to imagine that the administrative decision may be 
considered as an irrebuttable proof, legally binding for the civil judge. Such an 
interpretation would entail two serious risks: on the one hand, the risk of producing 
mechanically binding evidence which would hinder the search for the truth in follow-on 
proceedings; on the other, the risk of transforming the NCA in a producer of ready-made 
evidence for use in private antitrust actions. To avoid such adverse pitfalls, Article 9 of the 
Proposal for a Directive should be read as providing for a binding effect over the facts 
assessed by the NCA and not on their juridical characterisation, thus leaving a margin of 
appreciation to the national civil judge to re-qualify the elements of fact (not anymore 
questionable) according to his or her own discretion. The other issue that the Proposal for a 
Directive does not address (nor it could have, given that it deals with damages actions 
exclusively) is that of the status to be attributed for recognition of a decision of a NCA by 
the NCA of a different Member State. As a consequence, such a decision might be taken 
into consideration as providing evidence of the facts, but the administrative decision of the 
NCA does not produce any binding legal effect for other NCAs, pursuant to a strictly 
territorial effect of administrative decisions. A practice of de facto recognition of decisions 
issued by other NCAs is, however, considered to exist.10 A ‘Masterfoods effect’, according 
to which nationals courts are bound by decisions taken by a foreign NCA, is recognised, for 
the time being, only in Germany11 and Sweden.12   
                                               
10 JÜRGEN BASEDOW, ‘Recognition of Foreign Decisions within the European Competition Network’ in 
International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 2011) 395–396. 
11 In Germany, decisions of the Bundeskartellamt, and of all other NCAs, are statutorily binding in damages 
cases, according to Section 33(4) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition: ‘Where damages are 
claimed for an infringement of a provision of this Act, or of Article 81 or 81 of the EC Treaty, the court shall 
be bound by a finding that an infringement has occurred, to the extent that such a finding was made in a final 
decision by the cartel authority, the Commission of the European Community, or the competition authority – 
or a court acting as such – in another Member State of the European Community.’ 
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 In England, according to Section 58A of the Competition Act 1998, as amended by 
Section 20 of the Enterprise Act 2002, findings of infringements of UK or EU competition 
law by the OFT and the CAT on appeal are binding for English judges, when deciding upon 
damages actions, once the time of any appeal has expired or any appeal has been 
unsuccessful. With respect to the CAT, Section 18 of the Enterprise Act 2002 introduced a 
new Section 47A into the Competition Act 1998, which provides that the CAT is bound by 
any EU competition law infringement decisions taken by the OFT or the European 
Commission, once the time for appealing has expired or if any appeal made has been 
unsuccessful.13 As regards OFT’s decisions, both the High Court and the CAT must uphold 
the OFT’s finding of facts, unless they direct otherwise (in the sense that they make use of 
their margin of appreciation in order to expressly depart from the decision taken by the 
regulator),14 and the findings of infringement, unless they have been appealed. For a 
definition of what constitutes a finding of fact, reference must be made to Enron Coal 
Services v English Welsh and Scottish Railway, where Lord Justice Lloyd clarified that the 
party seeking to rely on a finding of fact must demonstrate that the regulator has made a 
clearly identifiable finding of fact to a given effect. It is not sufficient, for that party, to 
point to passages in the decision from which a finding of fact might arguably be inferred.15 
 In Italy, as seen beforehand when talking about the probative value of evidence, 
there is no express statutory provision which attributes binding effect to administrative 
decisions of the AGCM or other NCA. Nonetheless, administrative decisions are considered 
as ‘prova privilegiata’ by the Italian judges, although subject to the unfettered discretion of 
the civil judge, and seems to operate as a rebuttable presumption in favour of the claimant.16 
According to the correct interpretation, however, the civil judge should be allowed to depart 
from the qualification of the facts proposed by the competition authority, especially since no 
probative value is statutorily assigned to that evidence. A ‘prova privilegiata’ is not different 
from any other evidence, which, as such, should be subject to the free and unfettered 
evaluation of the judge.  
                                                                                                                                                
12 DANOV, BECKER, and BEAUMONT, Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions 4. 
13 GEORGE CUMMING and MIRJAM FREUDENTHAL, Civil Procedure in EU Competition Cases before 
the English and Dutch Courts, vol. 42 (Klumer Law International 2010), International Competition Law Series 
219. 
14 Competition Act 1998, Section 58(1). 
15 Enron Coal Services Ltd (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd, para. 56. 
16 Court of Cassation Tommasselli v Soc. Axa Assicurazioni, 4 March 2013, decision no. 5327 (2013) Il Foro 
Italiano, I, 1520 (Article 2 of Law 287/1990); Court of Cassation, Soc. Allianz v Palladino, 20 June 2011, 
decision no. 13486 (2011) Il Foro Italiano I 2674 ff. (Article 2 of Law 287/1990). 
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 With regard to the provision contained in the Proposal for a Directive in this respect, 
concerns have been raised also with regard to the level of protection of procedural 
safeguard, which might be played down by the recognition process. In particular, it has been 
noted how inconsistent it appears to require, for the recognition of a judgment, under Article 
34(2) of Brussels I Regulation that the defendants are served with the document which 
instituted the proceedings in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable them to arrange 
for their defence, and not to require a similar condition for the recognition of an 
administrative decision, which is all the more likely to tamper with the rights of defence of 
the individual.17  
 
c) Circulation of Decisions from the Public to the Private Enforcement 
  
Due to the cooperation within the ECN, decisions can circulate quite efficiently and swiftly 
from the public enforcement to the private enforcement in most Member States. As 
mentioned before, this mechanism, however useful, is bound to raise tensions in relation to 
the nature of the proceedings, and, in particular, the adequacy of the safeguards offered by 
the administrative procedure for the formation of proof which will be evaluated in civil 
adversarial proceedings. The transposition of the already evaluated evidence from the 
administrative procedure to the civil proceedings and the prevailing effect of the 
administrative decision undoubtedly poses serious concerns about the neutrality of the 
administrative authority and the protection of the rights of defence.18 Particular attention, in 
this context, must be devoted to ensuring the highest level of protection of the rights of the 
investigated undertaking in the administrative procedure, also with a view to the possibility 
that from that procedure will stem civil proceedings, where the claimant will enjoy a 
considerably more favourable position. As Otis seems to suggest,19 contrary to the Proposal 
for a Directive, the defendant should be always be allowed to prove that no direct causal 
link exists between the competition law infringement and the loss suffered by the claimant. 
                                               
17 BASEDOW, ‘Recognition of Foreign Decisions within the European Competition Network’ 397. 
18 MUNARI, ‘Antitrust Enforcement after the Entry into Force of Regulation (EC) 1/2003: the Interplay 
between the Commission and the NCAs and the Need for an Enhanced Role of National Courts’ 122. 
19 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and others, not yet reported, para. 65. 
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B) Cooperation between European Commission, National Competition Authorities and 
National Courts as regards Evidence 
 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides for a number of ways for the exchange of evidence and 
information between authorities. Its Chapter IV, which is devoted to Cooperation, starts 
with Article 11 which regulates the transmission of documents from the Commission to the 
national competition authorities and from the latter to the Commission. With regard to the 
horizontal cooperation, Article 22(1) regulates cooperation between NCAs in the gathering 
of evidence, whereas Article 12 regulates cooperation between NCAs after evidence has 
already been collected, either before the case was reallocated to a different competition 
authority or while helping a different competition authority in its investigations.20 These two 
are the most important management rules with regard to cooperation, and by themselves 
constitutes the cooperation mechanisms for cross-border antitrust investigations. As already 
mentioned, the EU public enforcement of competition law inlays the ECN which, in the 
scheme of a decentralised application of competition law, gathers all national competition 
authorities and manages their exchange of information for use in evidence in national 
proceedings. A few more provisions in this regard have been produced by the ECN and are 
contained in the Network Notice.21  
 Article 22 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides that national competition authorities 
may be asked to carry out inspections or other investigations under their national law ‘on 
behalf and for the account of the competition authority of another Member State’. In the 
same horizontal dimension, Article 12 provides that: 
 
1. For the purpose of applying Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty the Commission and the 
competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power to provide one another 
with and use in evidence any matter of fact or of law, including confidential information. 
2. Information exchanged shall only be used in evidence for the purpose of applying 
Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty and in respect of the subject-matter for which it was 
collected by the transmitting authority. However, where national competition law is 
applied in the same case and in parallel to Community competition law and does not lead 
to a different outcome, information exchanged under this Article may also be used for the 
application of national competition law. 
                                               
20 CHALMERS, HADJIEMMANUIL, MONTI, and TOMKINS, European Union law 965. 
21 See Network Notice, mentioned at fn. 33. 
Chapter III 
The Gathering of Evidence in EU Antitrust Litigation: Mechanisms for Cooperation and Fundamental Rights 
 
 227 
 
Paragraph 3 of the same Article regulates such exchange of information, according to the 
use for which the shared evidence will be transmitted. If the use of evidence is purported to 
the imposition of sanctions on natural persons, precautionary measures are taken to avoid a 
too broad exchange of information, whereas evidence for the imposition of sanctions on 
legal persons is more liberally administered. To the end of imposing sanctions on physical 
persons, evidence can be exchanged only if: 
 
[…] — the law of the transmitting authority foresees sanctions of a similar kind in 
relation to an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty or, in the absence 
thereof, 
— the information has been collected in a way which respects the same level of 
protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the national 
rules of the receiving authority. However, in this case, the information exchanged cannot 
be used by the receiving authority to impose custodial sanctions. 
 
The reason why these safeguards are adopted can be found in that some Member States (for 
instance, the United Kingdom) impose criminal sanctions for national competition law 
infringements.22 The same wariness is not applied when evidence is used by the receiving 
authority to impose sanctions on legal persons, for whose application it is sufficient that the 
exchanged evidence is collected in compliance with the national law of the transmitting 
authority, provided that evidence is used for the purpose for which it has been collected. As 
obvious, but restated by the Network Notice, Article 12 takes precedence over any contrary 
national laws of the Member States.23 To determine whether evidence was gathered 
lawfully, the transmitting authority must have acted in compliance with its national law.24 
When it transmits evidence whose gathering was contested or may still be, the transmitting 
authority must advice the receiving authority about that.25 Where NCAs act on behalf of 
another NCA, they act pursuant to their own rules of procedure and can only display their 
                                               
22 CHALMERS, HADJIEMMANUIL, MONTI, and TOMKINS, European Union law 965. See, for further 
details, Introduction, para. 5. 
23 Network Notice, para. 27. Compare Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Recital (16): ‘[…] When the information 
exchanged is used by the receiving authority to impose sanctions on undertakings, there should be no limit to 
the use of the information than the obligation to use it for the purpose for which it was collected given the fact 
that the sanctions imposed on undertakings are of the same type in all systems. The rights of defence enjoyed 
by undertakings in the various systems can be considered as sufficiently equivalent.’ 
24 Network Notice, para. 27. 
25 Network Notice, para. 27. 
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own powers of investigation.26 This is confirmed by the provisions contained in the 
Network Notice, namely by paragraphs 27 to 29. The only other relevant provision included 
in the Network Notice appears to be the one of paragraph 4, which provides that NCA 
remains fully responsible for ensuring due process in the cases it deals with.27 Evidence 
exchanged through the Network can however be always used as intelligence, when it cannot 
be used in evidence by the receiving authority.28 
 In the context of vertical cooperation for the private enforcement, Article 15 of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides that national judges may ask the Commission to transmit 
to them information in its possession or its opinion on questions concerning the application 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Coordination is ensured also by means of the transmission 
of copy of judgments adopted by national courts to the Commission and of observations by 
national competition authorities or the Commission to national courts. Article 22(2) obliges 
NCAs to undertake inspections at the request of the Commission, acting in compliance with 
their national laws.  
 Such pyramidal system ensures the rapid circulation of information and evidence, to 
enable a more effective enforcement of the EU competition law at every level (European 
and national). The exchange of information is based on the reciprocal trust that each 
Member States have in the fairness and procedural guarantees offered by the others’ legal 
system. Nonetheless, from the point of view of the protection of fundamental rights, the 
circulation of evidence, gathered by a different authority outside the context of the 
proceedings in which it will be used, may create issues about the compatibility with the rule 
of law and fundamental rights protection.29 One major source of concerns is represented by 
the fact that the circulating evidence may not only be evidence in its rough, unevaluated 
state, but also the assessment of that evidence.30 If so interpreted, the Regulation would 
open the doors to a flow of proof (in the sense of evaluated evidence) across the Member 
States. This phenomenon, however compatible with a speedy and efficient enforcement of 
competition at the EU level, would need to be subject to particular guarantees in order to 
                                               
26 Network Notice, para. 29. 
27 Network Notice, para. 4. 
28 WOUTER P.J. WILS, ‘EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: the 
Interplay between EU Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 34 World Competition 189–213, 210. 
29 MUNARI, ‘Antitrust Enforcement after the Entry into Force of Regulation (EC) 1/2003: the Interplay 
between the Commission and the NCAs and the Need for an Enhanced Role of National Courts’ 117. 
30 ROBERTO BONATTI, ‘La libera circolazione della prova nel nuovo regolamento europeo sulla 
concorrenza’ [2006] Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 193–214, 203. 
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bring it into line with the European standard of protection of fundamental rights on one 
hand, and, on the other, with the respect of the procedural autonomy principle which 
preserves the authority of Member States in that field. According to some commentators, the 
wording of Article 12, which allows exchanging ‘any matter of fact or of law, including 
confidential information’31 refers not only to evidence in its rough state, but also to its 
evaluation pursuant to the law.32 Although detaching the two elements is in certain 
occasions extremely difficult, this opinion cannot be shared. First of all, it is based 
exclusively on the wording of Article 12, which is not alone decisive, especially in the 
English version, in order to allow such broad interpretation. The second argument is that the 
exclusive circulation of matters of national law, not accompanied by factual elements, for 
the purpose of applying Article 101 and 102 TFEU, would be irrevelant, given the direct 
applicability of EU competition law by national authorities and its consequent harmonized 
interpretation.33 This interpretation is not convincing. The expression ‘matter of law’ may 
refer to information regarding the national procedural laws under which the specific 
evidence was collected, which may of help in providing the context to evaluate it. In 
addition, for instance, pursuant to Article 12(3), the receiving authority may need to verify 
the sanctions and guarantees provided for by the national law of the transmitting authority. 
The approach according to which the expression ‘matter of fact or of law’ must be 
interpreted more as a hendiadys than as a dyad seems not correct. This, however, does not 
mean that risks connected to the existence of a freedom of movement of proof are 
completely averted. Analogous to the circulation of the assessment of evidence, for 
example, is the binding effect of the administrative assessment in the national civil 
proceedings, or the high probative value attributed to that assessment. The result is that the 
evaluation of factual elements circulates across Europe, guiding the assessment of evidence 
in an indirect manner, from the public to the private enforcement. Such an approach, 
according to which not only the rough factual elements but also the appreciation and 
evaluation attached to it can circulate, leads to conclude that the appreciation and evaluation 
of the receiving adjudicator should not run counter that of the transmitting competition 
                                               
31 The French version adopts the expression ‘tout élément de fait ou de droit’; the Italian version ‘qualsiasi 
elemento di fatto o di diritto’; the German version ‘einander tatsächliche oder rechtliche Umstände’.   
32 BONATTI, ‘La libera circolazione della prova nel nuovo regolamento europeo sulla concorrenza’ 204. 
33 BONATTI, ‘La libera circolazione della prova nel nuovo regolamento europeo sulla concorrenza’ 204, fn. 
25. 
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authority. It would, thus, completely elide confrontation and the adversarial nature of the 
proceedings.34  
 Against this backdrop, the legislative limits provided for by Article 12 of the 
Regulation do not appear to be adequate. On the one hand, the limit ratione materiae 
according to which exchanged information can be used in evidence only for the subject-
matter for which it was collected, i.e. the purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
does not ensure that the information transmitted is reliable or the assessment accurately 
performed. On the other hand, the subjective limit, which provides that for the imposition of 
sanctions on individuals the legal system of the receiving authority must make provision for 
similar sanctions for individuals constitutes a very formal limit, which does not really 
ensure a substantial equal level of protection. Such an analysis is nonetheless performed at a 
later stage, if the two systems do not foresee similar sanctions.35 The risk of abuse is real, if 
due consideration to fundamental rights is not ensured.36 
 
C) The EU Evidence Regulation 
 
In the private enforcement, cooperation with regard to evidence is mainly attained by means 
of Regulation (EC) 1206/2001 on Cooperation between the Courts of the Member States in 
the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters. The EU Evidence Regulation 
entered into force on 1 July 2001 and is applicable to EU antitrust cases. The primary 
objective of this instrument is to simplify and accelerate the taking of evidence in the 
internal market.37 In order to facilitate the taking of evidence in a different Member State, 
the Regulation allows the court of a Member State38 to take evidence directly in another 
Member State or to request transmission and execution of requests to the competent court of 
another Member State.39 Requests must be made to obtain evidence intended for use in 
judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated.40  
                                               
34 PAOLO BIAVATI, ‘Il diritto processuale e la tutela dei diritti in materia di concorrenza’ [2007] Rivista 
trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 97, 108. 
35 BONATTI, ‘La libera circolazione della prova nel nuovo regolamento europeo sulla concorrenza’ 204-207. 
36 See BIAVATI, ‘Il diritto processuale e la tutela dei diritti in materia di concorrenza’ 114–117, who 
advocates for the allocation of antitrust cases before Italian civil, rather administrative, judges.  
37 Regulation (EC) 1206/2001, Recital (2). 
38 The EU Evidence Regulation is not applicable to Denmark, compare Regulation (EC) 1206/2001, Article 
1(3). 
39 Regulation (EC) 1206/2001, Article 1(1). 
40 Regulation (EC) 1206/2001, Article 1(3). 
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 With regard to the applicability of the EU Evidence Regulation, some authors41 have 
argued that its use might be extended to procedure involving regulatory authorities, i.e. to 
the public enforcement. In particular, it has been suggested that the Regulation could apply 
to procedures conducted by NCAs, when the competition authority exercises a first instance 
competence against which an appeal can be lodged before a judicial court. Given that the 
cooperation with regard to evidence in the public enforcement falls under the scope of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, applicability of the EU Evidence Regulation to those matters 
results in a useless duplication. The wording of the EU Evidence Regulation (‘judicial 
proceedings’, ‘court’) supports the idea that its scope is limited to disputes opposing private 
parties before judicial courts42 and, in competition matters, to private enforcement.43 
 From the formulation of Article 4, the EU Evidence Regulation focuses on two main 
types of evidence: testimony and the inspection of documents or objects. The Practice Guide 
for the EU Evidence Regulation drawn up by the Commission Services in consultation with 
the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters specified that, in the lack 
of a definition of the term ‘evidence’, it includes ‘hearings of witnesses of fact, of the 
parties, of experts, the production of documents, verifications, establishment of facts, 
expertise on family or child welfare’.44 Requests for the production of documents falls 
within the scope of the EU Evidence Regulation.45 The Council of the European Union, 
however, in its Declaration accompanying the Regulation, has specified that pre-trial 
disclosure is expressly excluded from the scope of the Regulation.46 This exclusion, in line 
with the objective of avoiding the risk of ‘fishing expeditions’, has led some commentators 
                                               
41 THOMAS HABU GROUD, ‘Coopération entre les juridictions des Etats membres dans le domaine de 
l’obtention des preuves en matière civile ou commerciale’, Jurisclasseur Droit International 22.  
It has been also submitted that requests to foreign NCAs for taking evidence in support of private proceedings 
could be made under the EU Evidence Regulation, see DANOV, BECKER, and BEAUMONT, Cross-Border 
EU Competition Law Actions 139. 
42 ARNAUD NUYTS and JOE SEPULCHRE, ‘Taking of Evidence in the European Union under EC 
Regulation 1206/2001’ (2004) 5 Business Law International 305, 310–311. 
43 FRANCO DE STEFANO, Gli strumenti di prova e la nuova testimonianza scritta (Giuffrè 2009) 191. See, 
also, IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 265: ‘If the action is brought, not 
before a competition authority but before an ordinary court, with the end purpose of examining the validity of 
a legal document or compensation for harm caused, the answer [to the question of whether Regulation (EC) 
1206/2001 may cover actions based on the infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU] is assuredly 
affirmative.’ 
44 Practice Guide for the Application of the Regulation on the Taking of Evidence, para 8. 
45 NUYTS and SEPULCHRE, ‘Taking of Evidence in the European Union under EC Regulation 1206/2001’ 
312. 
46 Council of the European Union, ‘Declaration to be included in the minutes of the Council that will adopt this 
Regulation - Annex III - Note of the Presidency to the Coreper’, May 17, 2001. 
Chapter III 
The Gathering of Evidence in EU Antitrust Litigation: Mechanisms for Cooperation and Fundamental Rights 
 
 232 
to conclude that all other forms of disclosure are also ruled out.47 It has also been noted that 
it would be difficult in the practice to use the Regulation in order to obtain the production of 
a document, in absence of suitable standard forms and guidance. Whilst this latter 
observation is not conclusive, the express exclusion of pre-trial disclosure could be read in 
the light of a general propensity of EU instruments for civil law procedural devices and in 
continuity with the reservation provided for under Article 23 of the Hague Convention of 18 
March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.  
 To shed some light on the applicability of the EU Evidence Regulation, the Opinion 
of Advocate-General Kokott in Alessandro Tedesco v Tomasoni Fittings Srl and RWO 
Marine Equipment Ltd48 is useful. In that case, a reference for preliminary ruling was 
addressed to the CJEU as to whether a request from an Italian court to the English High 
Court fell within the scope of the EU Evidence Regulation. Mr. Tedesco claimed that RWO 
Marine Equipment Ltd, a UK company, had infringed his patent, protecting a harness 
system he had invented. Mr. Tedesco obtained by the Italian court an order requesting the 
English court to perform a description of RWO’s product at its premises, specifying that the 
description was to encompass also ‘other evidence of the contested conduct, such as by way 
of example, however, not exhaustively: invoices, delivery notes, payment orders, 
commercial offer letters, advertising material, computer archive data and customs 
documents’.49 The question for the CJEU was whether such search and seizure order was a 
‘taking of evidence’ for the purposes of the EU Evidence Regulation. According to the 
Advocate-General, the order for the description of goods issued by the Italian judge 
constituted a measure for the taking of evidence under the EU Evidence Regulation that the 
English court must execute, unless grounds for refusal exist. Objections to the application of 
the Regulation stemmed from the fact that, according to the United Kingdom Government, 
the taking of evidence must be distinguished from investigatory measures prior to the actual 
act of obtaining evidence. In this regard, the Advocate-General specified that the 
Declaration contained in the Council minutes may be taken into account in the interpretation 
                                               
47 PAOLO BIAVATI, ‘Civil law e common law sullo sfondo del diritto dell’Unione Europea: un incontro alla 
pari?’ (2009) in ‘Due iceberg a confronto: le derive di common law e civil law’ Rivista trimestrale di diritto e 
procedura civile 135, 137-138. 
48 Case C-175/06 Alessandro Tedesco v Tomasoni Fittings Srl and RWO Marine Equipment Ltd [2007] ECR I-
07929. 
49 Case C-175/06 Alessandro Tedesco v Tomasoni Fittings Srl and RWO Marine Equipment Ltd [2007] ECR I-
07929, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 16. The CJEU did not pronounce itself on the subject-matter of the 
dispute, because the referring Italian court terminated the case and, as a result of that, the questions referred 
became devoid of purpose. 
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of a legal act inasmuch as its content is referred to also in the wording of the act and if it 
clarifies a general concept. In the case of the EU Evidence Regulation, the statement 
indicated that evidence must be described with a sufficient degree of precision that the link 
to the proceedings commenced or contemplated is evident and that the judicial cooperation 
may relate only to the items themselves which are capable of constituting proof and not to 
circumstances which are linked only indirectly to the judicial proceedings.50 Thus, in order 
to prevent excessive requests for disclosure (the so-called ‘fishing expeditions’), a 
distinction must be drawn between disclosure of documents leading to the identification of 
items which are potentially capable of serving as evidence, but not in themselves serving an 
evidential function in the proceedings and disclosure aimed at the production of documents, 
described with precision and directly linked to the subject-matter of the dispute. Whilst the 
first type of disclosure, the so-called ‘train of enquiry’, is inadmissible; the second type of 
disclosure is perfectly admissible under the EU Evidence Regulation.51    
 Recently, the English Court of Appeal was required to decide upon three appeals in 
two separate follow-on actions in Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories 
Limited and National Grid Electricity Transmission plc v ABB Limited.52 In the Servier 
case, the French company was accused of engaging in anti-competitive agreements with 
generic drug manufacturers in order to delay their entry into the market of Perindopril, a 
drug used mainly in the treatment of hypertension and heart failure. In the ABB Limited 
case, the French defendant was guilty of participating to a cartel in the gas insulated 
switchgear market. The French appellants in the two appeals sought to discharge the orders 
for disclosure and inspection of documents on grounds that compliance with those 
interlocutory orders would have put them in breach of the French ‘blocking’ stature. Under 
French Law 68-678 it is prohibited to natural and legal persons to disclose documents or 
information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical nature, with a 
view to establishing evidence in foreign judicial or administrative proceedings.53 Criminal 
sanctions are imposed for any breach. The appellants argued that the English Court should 
                                               
50 Alessandro Tedesco v Tomasoni Fittings Srl and RWO Marine Equipment Ltd, Opinion of AG Kokott, 
paras. 69–70. 
51 Alessandro Tedesco v Tomasoni Fittings Srl and RWO Marine Equipment Ltd, Opinion of AG Kokott, 
paras. 72–73. 
52 Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd and National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v 
ABB Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1234.  
53 Loi no. 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 relative à la communication de documents et renseignements d’ordre 
économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique à des personnes physiques ou morales étrangères, 
Article 1bis.  
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have resorted to the EU Evidence Regulation for the taking of that evidence, because the 
orders for disclosure involved a violation of French law, and therefore affected ‘the powers 
of the Member State’, according to the interpretation of the CJEU in ProRail BV v Xpedys 
NV.54 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, helding that matters such as disclosure are 
governed by the lex fori, i.e. English law, to which the French defendants had submitted, 
and that the risk of prosecution under French law had been thoroughly taken into account by 
the High Court. Due to the procedural nature of the orders, regardless of whether 
compliance with those orders is illegal under French law, the English court has jurisdiction 
to make them, in its discretion, without resorting to the EU Evidence Regulation.55 
Although, according to the Court of Appeal, the case did not entail any application of the 
EU Evidence Regulation, to the purposes of the present discourse one of the arguments 
arisen is particularly interesting. With regard to the applicability of the EU Evidence 
Regulation, Lord Justice Rimer stated that: 
 
[N]othing in the regulation was intended to limit, or reduce, the options already available 
to Member States in the way of obtaining evidence or disclosure from the parties to the 
litigation before it. If, therefore, before the introduction of the regulation, it was lawful 
for a Member State, applying the lex fori, to make orders [for disclosure], it was not the 
purpose of the regulation to deprive Member States of such judicial power.56  
 
According to the Court of Appeal, and pursuant to the interpretation of the EU Courts in 
Lippens v Kortekas AAS,57 the EU Evidence Regulation is not the exclusive means by which 
a court in one Member State should seek to obtain information and evidence located in 
another Member State. A national court is entitled to use its national procedural law, for 
instance, to summon as a witness a party residing in another State.58 An order for ordinary 
disclosure does not fall within the EU Evidence Regulation and it is a matter for the lex fori. 
The case, however, is useful to show how increasing multi-jurisdictional actions may arise 
complexities, which the EU instruments cannot solve unless in coordination with the 
                                               
54 Case C-332/11 ProRail BV v Xpedys NV and Others, not yet reported, paras. 47–48. 
55 Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd and National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v 
ABB Ltd, paras. 99 and 117. 
56 Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd and National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v 
ABB Ltd, para. 101. 
57 C-170/11 Maurice Robert Josse Marie Ghislain Lippens and others v Hendrikus Cornelis Kortekaas and 
Others, not yet reported, para. 39. See also ProRail BV v Xpedys NV and others, para. 54. 
58 Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd and National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v 
ABB Ltd, para. 113. 
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national systems. This point does not seem to have been satisfactorily addressed by the 
Proposal for a Directive.59  
 It appears that the EU Evidence Regulation guarantees a sufficient degree of 
protection of fundamental rights. Article 10(2) provides that the requested court shall 
execute the request in accordance with the law of its Member State. The requesting court 
may call for the request to be executed in accordance with a special procedure provided for 
by the law of its Member State, but the requested court shall not comply with such a 
requirement if that procedure is incompatible with its national law or if major practical 
difficulties exist.60 In addition, evidence can be taken directly only if the requested measure 
does not violate fundamental principles of law in the requested Member State.61 
Interferences of a more serious nature, like the use of coercive measures affecting the rights 
of the person concerned, are determined exclusively in accordance with the lex fori of the 
requested court, under Article 13.  
 It seems that the use of the EU Evidence Regulation in the private enforcement of 
competition law fosters convergence with the mechanisms of cooperation provided for the 
public enforcement. In particular, some symmetry with the provisions contained in 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 for the cooperation between NCAs, namely with Articles 12 and 
22, can be detected. On one hand, Article 22, read in conjunction with the Network 
Notice,62 provides that NCAs must conduct inspections and fact-finding according to their 
own rules of procedure, and under their own powers of investigation. On the other hand, the 
Network Notice establishes that it is for the NCA handling the case, and deciding on its 
merits, to ensure due process, according to the standards provided by its own national law.63 
This ‘cumulative approach’, according to which the law of the requesting Member State 
must govern the compliance with due process rights, and that of the requested Member State 
must govern the actual taking of evidence, is the most suitable to manage diversity whilst 
ensuring consistency. 
 
                                               
59 LAURA C. ATLEE, ‘The English Unblocking of the French “Blocking Statute”: Companies are Ordered to 
Disclose Information that Claimants Requested in Follow-On Civil Cases’ (Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 8 
November 2013) <http://www.steptoe.com/publications-9151.html> accessed 6 December 2013. 
60 Regulation (EC) 1206/2001, Article 10(3). 
61 See, for the direct taking of evidence, Regulation (EC) 1206/2001, Article 17(5)(c). 
62 Network Notice, para. 29. 
63 Network Notice, para. 4. 
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2) CONVERGENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS STANDARDS IN THE GATHERING OF 
EVIDENCE 
 
As noted above, when illustrating the allocation of the burden of proof and the recent wide 
application of factual evidential presumptions at the EU level, the best evidence is often 
found in the sphere of activity of the alleged infringer. In order to investigate anti-
competitive infringements and to gather evidence of the infringement, the European 
Commission and the NCAs usually conduct inquiry through three fashions: directly, by 
means of inspections, dawn raids and the use of physical force; or indirectly, either by 
means of the deterring effect of sanctions for the refusal to cooperate, or by means of the 
persuading effect of leniency programmes. It is a widespread opinion that an efficient 
enforcement of antitrust law should deploy all these methods.64  
 Whilst defining the investigatory powers of NCAs is a matter for national law, the 
twin principles of equivalence and effectiveness must be respected at all times. As a result, 
Member States must ensure that the enforcement of EU competition law by their NCAs and 
courts is conducted in an analogous and as effective way as that of the national competition 
law. When the Commission and the NCAs make use of investigatory powers in order to 
gather evidence to make a case before issuing their administrative decisions, they 
necessarily impinge on a number of fundamental rights usually protected both at the 
European and the national level. For stand-alone actions in the private enforcement, the 
compliance with fundamental rights is less strongly felt, due to, of course, the less invasive 
powers of the private individual in the gathering of evidence. Whilst the risk of violating a 
number of fundamental rights arise out of the gathering of evidence in the public 
enforcement; for the private enforcement the main risks may arise out of the denial of access 
to the competition authority’s file and out of inter partes disclosure mechanisms, which will 
be examined. 
 With particular regard to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, it is crucial to recall 
that, after Lisbon, Article 6(2) TEU provides for the accession of the European Union to the 
ECHR, whilst Article 6(3) TEU provides that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
ECtHR, and therefore as interpreted by the case law produced by this latter, and as they 
result from the constitutional traditions common to the EU Member States, qualify as 
                                               
64  WOUTER P.J. WILS, ‘Powers of Investigation and Procedural Rights and Guarantees in EU Antitrust 
Enforcement: the Interplay between European and National Legislation and Case-law’ (2006) 29 World 
Competition 3, 4. 
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‘general principles of the Union’s law’. Pending the accession, the relationship between 
fundamental rights protection afforded by the EU and the ECtHR will be governed by the 
case law.65 Although the principle of equivalent protection66 had been established since M. 
& Co. v Federal Republic of Germany 67and Bosphorus v Ireland,68 it a matter of debate 
whether the Commission is bound, strictly speaking, in the exercise of its power of 
investigations, by the respect of the fundamental rights of the ECHR as interpreted by the 
ECtHR or as interpreted by the Court of Justice.69 This debate is fuelled by the approach 
adopted by the ECtHR, which seems to have passed  
 
from an overall attitude of trust towards the degree of protection provided at Community 
level to an increasing willingness to hold the Contracting States to account for allegations 
that Convention rights were not effectively protected in the EC context.70 
 
This divergence has no significant impact on the national enforcement of EU competition 
law, because, on one hand, decisions of NCAs may be challenged under the ECHR, and, on 
the other, national judges in private antitrust cases are bound to apply ECHR provisions as 
per the interpretation given by the ECtHR, given that all Member States are signatories of 
the Convention.71 Moreover, national judges can go beyond the interpretation provided by 
                                               
65 PAUL CRAIG, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Competence, Procedure and Substance’ (2013) 36 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1114, 1135. 
66 For an exhaustive examination of this principle, see PAUL DE HERT and FISNIK KORENICA, ‘The 
Doctrine of Equivalent Protection: Its Life and Legitimacy before and after the European Union’s Accession to 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 13 German Law Journal 874–895. 
67 M. & Co. v Federal Republic of Germany, European Commission of Human Rights, Decision on 
admissibility no. 13258/87, 9 February 1990. 
68 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, 45036/98 [2006] 42 EHRR 1. 
69 On the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR, see SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, ‘A Tale of 
Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 629, 665, who argues: ‘The current European human right acquis leaves room for 
possibilities behind the binary poles of certainty and chaos […] not the constricting “Either/Or” of a formal 
mechanistic jurisprudence, but the “Both/And” of a less clockwork-like world.’ Compare also the more recent 
CRAIG, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Competence, Procedure and Substance’, 1141-1142. The Author 
highlights how ‘[t]he ECJ has always regarded the ECHR as an important source of inspiration for its 
decisions on fundamental rights […]’. Note, however, that in the recent preliminary ruling C-617/10 
Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, not yet reported, para. 44, where the Court has restated that the ECHR 
‘does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been 
formally incorporated into European Union law.’ 
70 ANDREANGELI, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights 10. 
71 It must be noted that Protocol no. 16 to the ECHR, opened for signature in October 2013 and requiring ten 
signatures for its entry into force, provides that highest courts and tribunals of the Contracting Parties shall be 
empowered to request the Court to give (non-binding) advisory opinions on questions of principle relating to 
the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR and the Protocols. 
Chapter III 
The Gathering of Evidence in EU Antitrust Litigation: Mechanisms for Cooperation and Fundamental Rights 
 
 238 
the Strasbourg Court, extending the reading of the relevant Article to different situations.72 
It is evident, however, that Member States comply with common fundamental right 
standards in their own ways,73 and that therefore remnants of inconsistency may be found in 
the due process guarantees for each individual case, because each State designs its law 
enforcement system autonomously in compliance with the common standard.74 The above 
stated, the analysis will focus on the standard of due process set by the EU Courts for 
proceedings before the European Commission, because in such context a tension between 
the case law of the ECHR and the CJEU can be more easily appreciated. In antitrust matters, 
as it will be showed below, the Luxembourg courts have frequently been unwilling to apply 
Strasbourg case law and the case law of the former was actually at odds with the ECtHR 
interpretation.75 Only the accession of the EU to the ECHR envisaged by Article 6 TEU will 
make all cases fall under the direct jurisdiction of the ECtHR, with the consequence that this 
latter Court will get the last word on matters involving EU law and ECHR rights.76 Even for 
actions taken on grounds of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the polar star will be the 
case law of the ECtHR, due to the acknowledgment of primacy contained in Article 52(3) of 
the Charter, and only wider interpretations will be acceptable.77  
 With regard to the rules of evidence, a conflict with fundamental rights may have 
two outcomes: i) ex ante, existing evidence cannot be collected by the Commission or by 
                                               
72 WILS, ‘EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: the Interplay between EU 
Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ , 208, fn. 88. 
73 For the divergence between the procedure before the Commission and before the Polish competition 
authority with regard to the guarantees of the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the legal professional privilege, and the proportionality of inspections, see MACIEJ BERNATT, 
‘Convergence of Procedural Standards in the European Competition Proceedings’ (2012) 8 Competition Law 
Review 255, 264-265. 
74 See, now, Protocol no. 15 amending the ECHR and introducing an express reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. The Protocol states that the Contracting Parties 
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention and that they, in 
doing so, enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the ECtHR. See, also, 
GERARD, ‘Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective Enforcement and Due Process in Cross-
border Antitrust Investigations’ 375. For the margin of appreciation of the Member States in general, see 
HOWARD C. YOUROW, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996). 
75 DOUGLAS-SCOTT, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human 
Rights Acquis’ 643–644. 
76 CRAIG, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Competence, Procedure and Substance’ 1146–1147. 
77 The requirement to implement the ECHR in the Member States is reinforced by the provision contained by 
Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which is granted the same legal value as the 
Treaties: ‘In so far as this Charter contains right which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down in the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection.’  
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the NCAs, because its gathering would result in an infringement of a fundamental right; ii) 
ex post, collected evidence is considered inadmissible at the proceedings, because its 
gathering violated a fundamental right.78 Such limits significantly constrain the exercise of 
the power of investigation of the competition authorities, taking the form of rules of 
exclusion of evidence which ultimately guide the fact-finding process. By means of the 
process of review, the EU Courts have ‘generated a body of evidential rules’ with regard to 
the right to withhold information or to have information excluded from the proceedings.79 In 
Roquette Frères, the Court of Justice clarified that unlawfully gathered evidence is 
sanctioned with exclusion from the proceedings. The Court of Justice has stated that an 
undertaking against which the Commission has ordered an investigation is entitled to bring 
an action against the Commission’s decision before the EU Courts according to Article 
230(4) TFEU. If the decision of the Commission is quashed by the General Court, the 
Commission is 
 
prevented from using, for the purposes of proceeding in respect of an infringement of the 
Community competition rules, any documents or evidence which it might have obtained 
in the course of that investigation, as otherwise the decision on the infringement might, in 
so far as it was based on such evidence, be annulled by the Community judicature […].80 
 
The protection of conflicting fundamental rights therefore circumscribes the enforcement 
powers of the competent competition authority. Procedural requirements are imposed by 
different sources of law to Commission’s investigations: the general principles of EU law; 
the ECHR; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; and some provisions contained in 
EU regulations, like Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and Regulation (EC) 773/2004.81 The same 
holds true for all Member States,82 where these instruments are directly applicable to 
                                               
78 For the inadmissibility of evidence, refer to Chapter II, para. 2. 
79 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 205-206. 
80 Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des 
fraudes and Commission, para. 49. 
81 This latter Regulation contains, especially, many rules protecting the rights of the defence during an 
investigation, see ANGUS MACCULLOCH, BARRY RODGER, KIRSTY MIDDLETON, and JONATHAN 
GALLOWAY, Cases & Materials on UK & EC Competition Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
46; WILS, ‘EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: the Interplay between 
EU Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ 212. 
82 With regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Poland and the United Kingdom secured a 
protocol on the application of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights in their countries. Protocol no. 30 
provides that Polish, British courts and EU Courts cannot declare any laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom inconsistent with the fundamental rights 
recognized by the Charter and that Title IV of the Charter, which addresses economic and social rights, does 
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investigations conducted by national competition authorities. It is always possible that 
national laws envisage a broader protection of fundamental rights, provided that the general 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected.83  
 Recital 37 of the Preamble of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 is devoted to the respect of 
fundamental rights: 
 
This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in 
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Accordingly, 
this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and 
principles.  
 
Such multi-level system of protection of human rights, however, has created non negligible 
difficulties in the definition of the respective jurisdiction of the CJEU and the ECtHR on 
one hand, and in reconciling the positions adopted by the two judicatures in their case law 
upon fundamental rights in this field,84 on the other. As observed by one commentator: 
 
Both EU Courts have emphasized that the legal protection provided as a matter of 
Community law, although autonomous and ultimately governed by Community 
objectives, should nonetheless as far as possible comply with a ‘European standard’, and 
so draw upon analogies from the Convention system and from Member State public 
law.85  
 
The fundamental rights which run the risk of being violated at the administrative stage of 
the EU competition procedures are presented here below, along with the more recent case 
law of the EU Courts and the state of the debate. At the end of this section, the legitimacy of 
the most effective means of gathering evidence available to claimants will be set out.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
not create justiciable rights. The Protocol, which is considered to be interpretative, and not instantiating a full 
opt-out, should not lead to a different application of the Charter in those two Member States when compared 
with the others. 
83 WILS, ‘EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: the Interplay between EU 
Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ 209. 
84 DOUGLAS-SCOTT, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human 
Rights Acquis’ 650: ‘The ECJ has been unwilling […] to transpose certain ECHR rights, such as the right 
against self-incrimination, to an EC corporate, competition law context. So transplants may not always be an 
exact fit […] in the EU human rights context, such as the mino quakes and quivers produced by Hoechst and 
Orkem.’ 
85 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 206-207. 
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A) Right to Private and Family Life  
 
The Commission is empowered to carry out inspections in business and non-business 
premises (like private homes of directors, managers, and other members of staff of the 
undertaking). Similarly, all NCAs are vested with the power to carry out their inspections in 
business premises, while most of them are vested with the power to carry out their 
inspections also in private premises. This is not the case of Bulgaria, Denmark, and Italy.86 
 Article 8 ECHR protects the right to private and family life. Its second paragraph 
provides that interferences with the right to privacy by a public authority are lawful only 
when justified by a legitimate aim and necessary to a democratic society in the interests of, 
as far as competition law enforcement is concerned, the economic well-being of a country or 
the prevention of crime.87 In contrast with the case law of the ECtHR, the CJEU has 
traditionally held that a right to the inviolability of the home only applied to searches of 
private homes and not to business premises. The potential clash with the ECHR provision is 
relevant only for Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) 1/2004 decisions, because, under Article 
20(3) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the undertaking is allowed to refuse the inspection without 
incurring in any financial sanction.88 According to the interpretation of the CJEU, Article 
8(1) ECHR concerns the development of individuals’ personal freedom and may not be 
referred to business premises. Such discrimination is due to the considerable divergences 
existing between the nature and degree of protection of private homes and business premises 
in the legal systems of the different Member States. The ‘protection against arbitrary and 
disproportionate intervention by public authorities’, however, is recognized as a general 
principle of EU law, thus extending to all persons, including legal ones: 
 
[I]n all the legal systems of the Member States, any intervention by the public authorities 
in the sphere of private activities of any person, whether natural or legal, must have a 
legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by law, and, consequently, those 
systems provide, albeit in different forms, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate 
                                               
86 ECN Working Group Cooperation Issues and Due Process, ‘Investigative Powers Report’ 31 October 2012, 
22. 
87 Other justifications considered are national security, public safety, the protection of health or morals, or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
88 Under Article 20(3) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 the Commission can carry out the inspection at the premises 
simply on production of a written authorization, either giving advance notice or without warning. The 
undertaking is under no legal obligation to submit to the inspection. Under Article 20(4), conversely, 
undertakings must actively cooperate in pursuance of the Commission’s decision. 
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intervention. The need for such protection must be recognized as a general principle of 
Community law.89 
  
The ECtHR, however, subsequently affirmed the inviolability of business premises from 
arbitrary interferences of public authorities under Article 8 ECHR in Niemietz v Germany;90 
and the necessity of prior judicial authorization for inspections in competition law cases in 
Société Colas Est and others v France.91 In Roquette Frères, a preliminary ruling filed by 
the French Court of Cassation to clarify the point, the CJEU extended the applicability of 
Article 8 ECHR to legal persons, and therefore to inspections conducted on business 
premises.92  
 If business premises are encompassed by Article 8 ECHR, inspections conducted by 
NCAs must satisfy the conditions of Article 8(2) ECHR. They must be conducted in 
accordance with the law, they must have a legitimate purpose and they must be necessary to 
a democratic society, i.e. the interference by the public authority must be counterbalanced 
by the protection of relevant interests. Whilst the first two conditions are, by implication, 
satisfied by EU competition law matters, for the investigations are based on accessible legal 
rules and they are aimed at detecting anti-competitive violations, the satisfaction of the third 
requirement is a matter of debate.93 It is often objected that the Commission’s powers may 
not be compliant with this third ‘proportionality’ requirement.94 The position taken by the 
EU Courts has contributed to fuel the debate according to which judicial review would not 
be sufficient to satisfy the conditions required by the ECtHR. Namely, the CJEU does not 
require prior judicial authorization, unless so provided by the national law of the country 
where the investigation was conducted, on the (controversial) grounds that ex post review is 
always allowed and sufficient alone to ensure adequate protection against abuses. In his 
                                               
89 Hoechst AG v Commission, paras. 17-19.  
90 Niemietz v Germany, decision no. 13710/88 [1992] ECHR 80; 16 EHRR 97, para. 31: ‘More generally, to 
interpret the words “private life” and “home” as including certain professional or business activities or 
premises would be consonant with the essential object and purpose of Article 8, namely to protect the 
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities […]’. 
91 Société Colas Est and others v France, decision no. 37971/97 [2002] ECHR 421; [2004] 39 EHRR 17, para. 
46 : ‘[...] The inspectors entered the premises of the applicant companies’ head or branch offices, without 
judicial authorisation, in order to obtain and seize numerous documents containing evidence of unlawful 
agreements. It therefore appears to the Court that the operations in issue, on account of the manner in which 
they were carried out, constituted intrusions into the applicant companies’ “homes” […]. The Court considers 
that […] “the interference complained of is incompatible with Article 8 […]”’. 
92 Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des 
fraudes and Commission, para. 29. 
93 CHALMERS, HADJIEMMANUIL, MONTI, and TOMKINS, European Union law 945. 
94 SCORDAMAGLIA-TOUSIS, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling Effective Public Enforcement with 
Fundamental Rights 189. 
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Opinion in Roquette Frères, Advocate-General Mischo specifically addressed this concern, 
clarifying that the fact that the proportionality of the inspection is reviewed only ex post 
does not reduce the degree of protection of fundamental rights, since ‘the ECtHR expressly 
acknowledges that results obtained on the basis of a warrant or decision which is 
subsequently declared unlawful cannot be used’.95 
 For the conduction of inspections in business premises, in the EU and in all Member 
States, either a decision of the competition authority or a court warrant96 is required. In 
particular since prior judicial authorization is not expressly required by Regulation (EC) 
1/2003 for inspections of business premises but only for non-business premises,97 it is a 
matter of debate whether, in those Member States where no prior judicial authorization is 
required for dawn raids, those inspections are conducted in violation of Article 8 ECHR, for 
the potential lack of observance of one of the safeguards required by the ECtHR case law. 
Consequently, it would be debatable that evidence obtained through those dawn raids is 
transmissible through the cooperation network or admissible in evidence before the EU 
Courts.98 It seems that, however, sufficient guarantees are offered to the investigated 
undertaking. Not only the undertaking can oppose an inspection, which compels the 
authority to request for a court order; but when such order is issued (ascertaining the non-
arbitrariness of the inspection) the undertaking can still seek annulment of the final decision 
before the EU Courts on grounds of an infringement of Article 8 ECHR.99   
 Article 21 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 specifically provides that for the inspection of 
private premises, judicial authorization is required, on grounds that inspections conducted in 
                                               
95 Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des 
fraudes and Commission, Opinion of AG Mischo, para. 47. 
96 A court warrant is required in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Lituania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Sweden. Dawn raids do not require prior judicial authorization and an 
inspection decision issued by the competition authority is sufficient in, among the others, Italy, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Finland and the United Kingdom (but in some of these jurisdictions a court 
warrant might be needed in case opposition is encountered on the part of the undertaking, or the use of 
coercive measures is required). In Slovenia, where for the inspection of private premises a court order is 
required, whilst for business premise an order of the competition agency suffice, the Constitutional Court has 
recently declared the national competition authority’s regime of inspections not in line with the Slovenian 
Constitution, setting a one year deadline to the Parliament to change the dawn raids regulation, which currently 
clashes with the protection of the inviolability of dwelling of legal persons. See EVA ŠKUFCA, 
‘Constitutional Court Ruling on Lawfulness of Antitrust Inspections’ (Legal Insights - Schonherr) 
<www.schoenherr.eu/news-publications/legal-insights/slovenia-constitutional-court-ruling-on-lawfulness-of-
anti-trust-inspections> accessed on 15 January 2014. Compare also ECN Working Group Cooperation Issues 
and Due Process, ‘Investigative Powers Report’ 8 ff. 
97 Article 21(3) of Regulation. 
98 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 182.  
99 SCORDAMAGLIA-TOUSIS, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling Effective Public Enforcement with 
Fundamental Rights 190. 
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such dwellings are more likely to interfere with the right to privacy and the inviolability of 
home. The inspection must be authorized by a court order, and it has to be needed due to the 
suspect of a serious anti-competition infringement. The officials performing it cannot seal 
premises, book or records, nor they can ask for information or on the spot explanations.100  
 Finally, it is important to underline that the divergences existing between national 
rules on the conduct of investigations might be exploited by undertakings in order to hinder 
or bar the effectiveness of dawn raids. In particular in the case of multi-State cartels, 
jurisdictions offering higher procedural guarantees might be strategically chosen as the 
‘epicenter’ of the cartel, so that relevant evidence is located where it is harder to access.101 
In this context, the importance of procedural convergence is all the more evident.    
 
B) Privilege against Self-Incrimination 
 
In competition law cases, with regard to the types of evidence which can be gathered and 
used in the proceedings, the EU general principle of protection against arbitrary and 
disproportionate intervention of public authority established in Hoechst may take two other 
forms: the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confidentiality,102 this latter 
with regard to professional secrecy and business secrets respectively. The reason why these 
rights are relevant to the present discourse is that, under certain circumstances, their 
protection is strongly conflicting with the enforcement of competition law in general, and 
the collection of evidence in particular, allowing the investigated undertaking ‘to withhold 
crucial evidence and thus significantly impede the construction of a prosecution case’.103 
The exercise of the power to take statements and to ask questions on the spot by the 
competition authorities may conflict with the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
professional legal privilege. Other limitations to these powers are, in less common 
circumstances, found in data protection and banking secrecy.104  
 The landmark cases for the recognition of a right to silence in the competition law 
field are Orkem and Solvay. In those occasions, the CJEU denied the existence of a general 
                                               
100 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 182–183. 
101 SCORDAMAGLIA-TOUSIS, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling Effective Public Enforcement with 
Fundamental Rights 196. 
102 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 208. 
103 HARDING and JOSHUA, Regulating Cartels in Europe 209.  
104 ECN Working Group Cooperation Issues and Due Process, ‘Investigative Powers Report’ 31. 
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principle, common to the traditions of the Member States, granting a right to non-self 
incrimination to legal persons in relation to competition law infringements, or more 
generally, to infringements in the economic sphere. The Court of Justice considered that ‘the 
laws of the Member States grant the right not to give evidence against oneself only to a 
natural person charged with an offence in criminal proceedings’.105 Yet, the Court of Justice 
drew a very subtle distinction. On the one hand, it confirmed the power of the Commission 
to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning the facts as they 
are known to it and to disclose, if necessary, documents in its possession, even if those 
documents may be used to establish, against it or another undertaking, an infringement. On 
the other, it stated that:  
 
[…] the Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which 
might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is 
incumbent upon the Commission to prove.106 
 
Given the vagueness of the principle enunciated, the case law of the EU Courts provided 
some indications with regard to the ‘blacklisted’ information that the Commission is not 
entitled to request to undertakings. A distinction must be made according to the nature of 
the Commission’s request, and, in particular, according to how aware the Commission is to 
be close to the truth: exploratory questions, which seek for factual information (such as 
which undertakings and which persons participated in a meeting, the dates of the meetings 
or the subject-matter discussed) are admitted; whereas leading questions,107 which seek to 
detect the purpose of the undertaking’s behaviour or details of conducts already assessed to 
be illegal (such as details of any system or method for sales targets or quotas),108 do not 
have to be answered on grounds that they violate the undertaking’s right to non-self 
incrimination.109 Basically, questions of factual nature can be asked, even if the information 
may be used to establish liability, whereas requests for information seeking admission of 
guilt should not be asked.110 
                                               
105 Orkem v Commission, para. 29. 
106 Orkem v Commission, paras. 34-35. 
107 Leading questions are questions concerning the objective and purpose of the behaviour adopted by the 
investigated undertaking. Compare ANDREANGELI, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights 132. 
108 Orkem v Commission, para. 39. 
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 Since determining whether a particular question infringes the right as interpreted by 
the Court of Justice is sometimes hard, reference is made to ‘whether an answer from the 
undertaking to which the question is addressed is in fact equivalent to the admission of an 
infringement, such as to undermine the rights of the defence’,111 having regard exclusively 
to the nature of the question.112 In particular, no questions regarding the target and object of 
an undertaking’s conduct should be addressed, if they may cause the undertaking to admit 
responsibility for an anti-competitive infringement; as well as general ‘fishing’ questions, 
aimed at determining whether the infringement has been committed or not, instead of at 
gathering evidence of an already suspected infringement.113 This distinction according to the 
nature of the evidence is purpoted now by Recital 23 of the Preamble of Regulation (EC) 
1/2003, according to which undertakings, when are required to comply with a decision of 
the Commission, during the investigation process, cannot be forced to admit commission of 
an infringement. Nonetheless, they are obliged to respond to factual questions and to 
produce the required documents, regardless of whether the information yielded may be 
relevant in order to found or corroborate a finding of infringement on their part or on the 
part of another undertaking. The right to remain silent is recognized in such terms from the 
very beginning of proceedings, i.e. during the preliminary investigation of the Commission 
before a statement of objections is issued.114  
 This approach of the EU Courts may conflict with the interpretation of Article 6 
ECHR established by the ECtHR,115 although steps are taken in the direction of a position 
which is more convergent with the approach of the ECtHR. In Funke v France116 and 
Saunders v United Kingdom,117 the Strasbourg Court recognized a full right not to 
incriminate oneself, deriving from Article 6(1) ECHR. This right, in the interpretation of the 
ECtHR, does not cover the use in criminal proceedings of evidence which has ‘an existence 
independent of the will of the suspect, such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a 
warrant’.118 But it may cover, in the broader interpretation of the Strasbourg Court, not only 
                                               
111 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM), DSM NV and DSM Kunststoffen BV, Montedison SpA, Elf 
Atochem SA, Degussa AG, Enichem SpA, Wacker-Chemie GmbH and Hoechst AG and Imperial Chemical 
Industries plc (ICI) v Commission, para. 273. 
112 FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition 866. 
113 SIRAGUSA and RIZZA, EU Competition Law - Cartel Law - Restrictive Agreements and Practices 
between Competitors 136. 
114 Orkem v Commission, para. 28.  
115 JONES and SUFIN, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 1060. 
116 Funke v France [1993] A256-A, 16 EHHR 297. 
117 Saunders v United Kingdom ECHR 1996-VI; [1997] 23 EHRR 313. 
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directly incriminating information, but all types of factual information. The rationale of this 
right lies precisely in the objective of protecting the accused against improper compulsion 
by the authorities which may contribute to miscarriages of justice, in violation of the aims of 
Article 6 ECHR.119 The right is applicable as a general requirement of due process,120 and 
thus to administrative procedures falling within the autonomous concept of ‘criminal 
charge’ contained at Article 6 ECHR.121 Even if the CJEU, after Funke and Saunders, was 
forced to modify its position on the right to silence, for example in Roquette Frères, it still 
applied ECHR to EU law only ‘by analogy’, thus showing not to formally bound by the 
Convention.122 In particular, Commission proceedings address only legal persons, and not 
private individuals, which allegedly justifies restrictions of their right against self-
incrimination.123 
 From the viewpoint of an efficient process of fact-finding, some criticism has been 
levelled to the developing recognition of a full right to silence. The already scarce 
availability of documents and other evidence, for some infringements, would be exacerbated 
by an excessive use of this procedural guarantee, which should not be exercised in contrast 
with the protection of consumers’ welfare and general economic interests. These arguments 
might be well-founded to a certain extent, but practical difficulties in the retrieval of 
evidence are not sufficient to justify averting procedural guarantees that are integral part of 
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States. Competition law proceedings 
may not qualify as ‘hard-core’ criminal proceedings, but serious reasons to consider them 
‘at the periphery of criminal law’124 in a ‘Jussila sense’, undoubtedly exist and call for full 
compliance with the procedural safeguards. Since evidence withheld by means of invoking 
the right of non-self incrimination is always found in the sphere of activity of the accused 
undertaking, the recognition of the principle is also strongly intertwined with the proof-
proximity principle illustrated above.125 Any hindrance posed to the investigation process 
might bring adjudicators to overcome them by deploying alternative strategies (such as the 
use of presumptions, adverse inferences, or other procedural devices) which may bypass the 
                                               
119 Saunders v United Kingdom, para. 68. 
120 Commission’s Green Paper on the Presumption of Innocence COM (2006) 174 final, para. 2.4. 
121 SCORDAMAGLIA-TOUSIS, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling Effective Public Enforcement with 
Fundamental Rights 166. 
122 SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 629, 649. 
123 FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition 864. 
124 BRONCKERS and VALLERY, ‘No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on 
Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law’ 540. 
125 See Chapter II, para. 6. 
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obstacle for the furtherance of an effective search for the truth. This renders the role of 
judicial review even more crucial and suggests setting the boundaries of recognition of this 
right within reasonable limits, with a view to searching for a proper balance.   
 After Funke and Saunders, the CJEU acknowledged the developments of the ECtHR 
case law, but at the same time, distanced itself from it, reiterating the lack of jurisdiction 
ratione personae for the application of the ECHR126 and choosing to build an autonomous 
notion of the privilege against self-incrimination. First of all, under EU law, the privilege is 
not violated by the Commission’s requests for information, which, unlike Commission’s 
decisions, do not compel the investigated undertaking to provide a reply and thus does not 
instantiate coercion, on the part of the authority, to obtain information from a suspect.127 
Secondly, the recipient of a Commission’s request for information  
 
is entitled to confine himself to answering questions of a purely factual nature and to 
producing only the pre-existing documents and materials sought and, moreover, is so 
entitled as from the very first stage of an investigation initiated by the Commission.128  
 
The importance of preserving effectiveness has been more recently confirmed by the Court 
of Justice;129 after restating that the undertaking is granted no right to evade the 
investigation, the Court has stressed the importance of the duty to actively cooperate which 
rests upon the investigated undertaking during the fact-finding process.130 Such duty implies 
that the undertaking must provide the Commission with all information which is relevant to 
the subject-matter of the investigation.131  
 Generally, the Court of Justice is trying to make the safeguard against self-
incrimination converge to a large extent with the one shaped by the ECtHR and is 
                                               
126 T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] ECR II-729, para. 59. See ANDREANGELI, 
EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights 132.      
127 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM), DSM NV and DSM Kunststoffen BV, Montedison SpA, Elf 
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Industries plc (ICI) v Commission, para. 455. 
128 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, para. 77. 
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1255; Case C-407/04 P Dalmine v Commission [2007] ECR I-829. 
130 The privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in two occasions along the investigations 
conducted by the Commission: on one hand, when the Commission requires information by means of binding 
decisions pursuant to Article 18(3) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003; on the other, when the Commission requests 
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FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition 865. 
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compatible with it.132 It is nonetheless undeniable that the circumstances under which 
evidence is covered by the privilege in EU law are limited if compared to those protected by 
the Convention.133 The distance between the privilege as guaranteed in the EU public 
enforcement, and, on the other side, in the national public enforcement and in the private 
enforcement, resides specifically in that, in the context of Commission’s investigation, pre-
existing incriminating documents can be gathered, as well as information of factual nature 
requested during on-the-spot inspections of the business premises to the undertakings’ 
representatives.134    
 In Otto v Postbank,135 a reference for a preliminary ruling required the Court of 
Justice to clarify whether the Orkem criteria were directly applicable by national judges 
when enforcing EU competition law. The Court of Justice restated the procedural autonomy 
of the Member States in applying the right to remain silent in their national civil procedings. 
It also specified that such national rules might differ in national administrative and civil 
proceedings, and that, EU law does not require to grant a party the privilege against self-
incrimination in competition litigation. The Orkem criteria are, according to the Court of 
Justice, not transposable directly into national civil proceedings.136 It seems that the same 
approach137 is nonetheless taken by the Court of Justice for national administrative 
proceedings. For instance, in Hoechst, the Court of Justice affirmed that it is for each 
Member State to determine the conditions under which the national authorities will afford 
assistance to the Commission’s officials,138 i.e. in national administrative proceedings. A 
common procedural convergence, however, should be attained in pursuance of the 
effectiveness, given the profound implications that the recognition of the privilege has on 
this latter principle. Commentators have noted how its recognition directly impacts on the 
NCAs’ and claimant’s capacity to obtain the enforcement of EU competition law.139 
 In England, whilst not directly in a competition law case, the question of the 
compatibility of this right with the principle of effectiveness was raised before the House of 
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Lords. This could give an idea of how an English court might approach the issue, if 
prompted in a private enforcement case. In Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric 
Corp, this latter was considered liable for a breach of contract in the US, according to which 
it had the obligation to build power stations and supply them with uranium. Its main defence 
was that a supervening circumstance, the steep increase in price of uranium, had rendered 
impossible to comply with the terms of the contract. Such increase in price was allegedly 
due to the existence of a cartel, which kept the price of uranium artificially high. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp wanted to adduce evidence of the cartel before the English 
court, therefore a US court issued letters rogatory to the High Court seeking orders requiring 
legal representative of an English company, Rio Tinto Zinc Corp to attend for oral 
examination in London and to produce the required document for use at the trial before the 
US court. Rio Tinto Corp invoked privilege against such orders, because the requested 
evidence might have exposed it to sanctions for infringements of EU competition law. The 
claim for privilege was upheld by the House of Lords, which specified that under section 
14(1)(a) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968140 the interpretation of ‘penalty’ extends to ‘fines 
imposable by an administrative body’141 and that the privilege covered both directly and 
indirectly incriminating evidence. This interpretation offered by English courts is much 
broader than the one established by the CJEU in Orkem, and a clash with the EU principle 
of effectiveness could arise.142 
   
C) The Protection of the Legal Professional Privilege  
 
Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, whilst addressing the obligation of confidentiality 
lato sensu imposed upon Commission and NCAs’ staff, makes reference to the necessity of 
respecting information covered by ‘professional secrecy’. The notion is nonetheless 
undefined, and there has initially been some uncertainty with regard to whether information 
exchanged between undertakings and their lawyers were to be classified as protected 
                                               
140 Civil Evidence Act 1968, Section 14(1)(a): ‘[T]he right of a person in any legal proceedings other than 
criminal proceedings to refuse to answer any question or produce any document or thing if to do so would tend 
to expose that person to proceedings for an offence or for the recovery of a penalty – (a) shall apply only as 
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law.’ 
141 Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation House of Lords [1978] AC 547; [1978] 2 
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142 GEORGE CUMMING and BRAD SPITZ (eds), Civil Procedure Used for Enforcement of EC Competition 
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evidence or not. The argument for convergence upon this privilege was raised during the 
process of formation of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, but the amendment, which did not win the 
favour of the Commission, was rejected by the Parliament and did not see the light of 
day.143 In AM & S Europe,144 the Court of Justice held that exchange of written information 
between undertakings and counsels were to be safeguarded and legitimately withheld from 
competition authorities, in observance of a right to protection of confidentiality which is 
common to all legal traditions of the Member States and, as such, protected as a general 
principle of EU law.145 In particular, information exchanged between the two is covered by 
the legal professional privilege,146 when directly referring to the subject-matter of the 
investigation – i.e. evidence usually drafted ex post to inform the counsel of the facts and to 
allow him or her preparing the defence;147 and when the lawyer is acting independently – 
i.e. is not employed by the undertaking requiring assistance.148  More specifically, the 
categories of evidence covered by the privilege according to EU law are those ‘prepared for 
the purposes and in the interests of the client’s right of defence and in the framework of 
obtaining legal advice in relation to the subject-matter of the procedure’.149 These categories 
encompass: written communications with independent lawyers after initiation of the 
investigation; preceding communications with independent lawyers which are directly 
connected with the subject-matter of the investigation; internal documents reporting the 
content of legal advice provided by independent lawyers and preparatory documents drawn 
up for the purpose of requesting legal advice from independent lawyers in the exercise of 
                                               
143 WILS, ‘Powers of Investigation and Procedural Rights and Guarantees in EU Antitrust Enforcement: the 
Interplay between European and National Legislation and Case-law’ 20. Compare Amendment No. 10 
contained in the Report on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and Amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, 
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Affairs, Jonathan Evans, PE 296.005, A5-0229/2001, 21 June 2001. The Amendment was accompanied by the 
following justification: ‘Legal privilege for in-house counsel exists already before the national competition 
authorities in several Member States. This creates inequality in the Union, which will become even more 
problematic in the light of the exchange of confidential information that is expected according to the new 
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144 Case C-155/79 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission [1982] ECR 1575.  
145 FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition 868. 
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from disclosure. Compare JONES and SUFIN, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 1064 and the 
statutory formulation by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 10(1).  
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the right of defence.150 The recognition of the right derives from the principle that ‘any 
person must be able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the 
giving of independent legal advice’151 and it is limited to ‘lawyers who are not bound to the 
client by a relationship of employment’.152 The rationale for such limited protection resides 
in the existence of professional codes of discipline regulating the legal profession, which 
must be exercised independently and confidentially.153 For the same reason the recognition 
of the privilege does not extend to in-house lawyers who, in most Member States, are not 
subject to deontology provisions and, even when admitted to the bar, in their quality of 
salaried employees do not act in a sufficiently independent fashion.154 This limitation has 
been criticized by commentators on grounds that the exclusion of in-house lawyers from the 
privilege is unjustified, and the EU Courts seem to lean towards its reconsideration, 
following to the developments in the regulation of the legal profession throughout 
Europe.155 
 When an undertaking claims legal privilege with regard to a specific item of 
evidence, it is entitled not to show it to the Commission, but it has to yield relevant 
documentation supporting such claim, for instance showing the sender or the addressee of 
the communication, the subject and the lack of attachments consisting in pre-existing 
documents. When the Commission is in doubt as to whether the document classifies as 
privileged, the ‘envelope procedure’ may be followed, in order to allow the undertaking the 
                                               
150 JON TWEEDALE and KATE MENIN, ‘Legal Professional Privilege: EU Rules OK Says European Court 
of Justice’ (Resolve - Litigation Newsletter Early Autumn 2010) 
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his client.’ In that case, the Commission’s right to seize e-mails exchanged between the general manager of 
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discrimination between lawyers and in-house counsels was identified in the relationship of employment 
bounding these latter, thus preventing them from ignoring the commercial strategy of the employer-
undertaking.  
155 Joined cases T-125/03 R and T-253/03 R Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v 
Commission [2003] ECR II-4771, Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, para. 125: ‘[T]he role 
assigned to independent lawyers of collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts, which proved 
decisive for the recognition of the protection of written communications to which they are parties […] is now 
capable of being shared, to a certain degree, by certain categories of lawyers employed within undertakings on 
a permanent basis where they are subject to strict rules of professional conduct.’  
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time to adequately support its claim, and consenting the Commission to take the decision of 
returning the document or opening the envelope at a later set time.156 
 With specific regard to the (denied) legal privilege of in-house counsels, a conflict 
may arise between the position adopted by the CJEU and the laws of some Member States 
which extend the privilege to such non-independent lawyers.157 Among these, there is the 
national law of the United Kingdom, which provides that in-house lawyers enjoy the same 
protection as lawyers in private practice when they are acting in their capacity as legal 
adviser and not as executive administrators for the company. The scope of the legal 
professional privilege was analyzed in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England, 
where the House of Lord held that legal privilege must extend to all legal advice provided 
by solicitors in their quality as counsels,158 even if not directly related to the subject-matter 
of the case – i.e. also for advice given in the preparation and presentation of evidence before 
a Government inquiry.159 Since the discoverable or confidential status of information 
exchanged is determined by the instrument immediately authorizing the investigation, either 
at the national or at the European level, knowing which rules apply to the specific 
investigation is relevant to identify whether the specific item of evidence can be considered 
admissible or not. As shown when illustrating the cooperation tools within the European 
Competition Network (ECN), information collected by a NCA can be exchanged via the 
ECN and used by a different NCA either as intelligence or as evidence. The receiving NCA 
is entitled to use information collected by a transmitting authority in evidence to impose 
sanctions on legal persons if the item of evidence has been collected in compliance with the 
                                               
156 FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition 871–872. The procedure of putting the documents in a 
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legal advice. Those purposes have to be construed broadly. Privilege obviously attaches to a document 
conveying legal advice from solicitor to client and to a specific request from the client for such advice. But it 
does not follow that all other communications between them lack privilege. In most solicitor and client 
relationships […] there will usually be […] an overall expectation that the solicitor will at each stage, whether 
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the law; it must include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context.’ 
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law of the transmitting authority, even if such gathering violates the law of the receiving 
authority. As a consequence, the OFT is empowered to lawfully use in evidence 
correspondence exchanged between an undertaking and its in-house counsel, even if the 
national law prohibits its collection, provided that it receives it from a transmitting NCA, 
whose law does not recognize the legal professional privilege to in-house counsels.160 
Commentators are divided on this issue: some consider such exchange of evidence as a 
potentially harmful circumvention of the recognition of fundamental rights; others 
underscore how the area where the risk is run is very limited, i.e. restricted only to the in-
house counsels’ legal privilege, and even in that regard, it does not appear to lead to 
irreparable consequences. On the one hand, only rights of legal persons are jeopardized and 
the human rights guarantees applicable in the EU Member States (arising from the general 
principles of EU law, from the ECHR or from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) 
are more than sufficient to provide a reasonably high level of protection of fundamental 
rights. On the other, the practical consideration that undertakings employing in-house 
lawyers are surely capable of affording independent lawyers considerably reduce the fears 
connected to the adumbrated erosion of fundamental rights.161 Notwithstanding such 
pragmatic considerations, however, it is undeniable that a uniform definition of the scope of 
fundamental rights safeguards would be desirable across the multi-level system of 
protection of such rights in the EU, and that the argument regarding legal persons is weak, if 
one considers the high level of pecuniary sanctions imposed. In addition, in the perspective 
of the accession of the EU to the ECHR, the problems entailed by such discrepancies are 
more serious and call for a harmonized solution. 
 
D) Disclosure and Conflicting Rights 
 
With regard to the interaction between rules on the gathering of evidence and human rights, 
it is time to take into consideration the instruments available in the private enforcement. The 
most relevant tools offered to the claimants for the gathering of evidence are essentially 
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EU Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, paras. 211-212. 
Chapter III 
The Gathering of Evidence in EU Antitrust Litigation: Mechanisms for Cooperation and Fundamental Rights 
 
 255 
two: disclosure and the right to access the file of the competition authority. These two 
instruments will be analysed below.  
 There is no specific rule governing the disclosure of evidence in the hands of the 
defendant, at the European level. Apart from the harmonisation envisaged by the Proposal 
for a Directive, which encourages the Member States to implement disclosure between the 
parties, whether or not parties are allowed to ask counterparty to produce evidence is a 
procedural question which must be solved according to each relevant national law. The only 
proviso to be respected is the principle of equivalence and effectiveness.162 Naturally, the 
differences existing between national civil procedures and the procedural devices they offer 
to claimants in order to retrieve, or elicit the retrieval, of evidence strongly affects their 
preference for a forum against another, a phenomenon that is commonly referred to as 
‘forum shopping’. Since disclosure of evidence in the hands of the counterparty falls under 
the lex fori, those systems, such as that of England, where ‘disclosure’ is more effective are 
preferred by claimants. That is not to say that measures for the disclosure of documents do 
not exist in continental legal systems, but they usually require the involvement of the judge 
and are far more limited. 
 
a) Disclosure in England 
  
To describe how disclosure operates, it is convenient to take into consideration its 
application in the private enforcement in the United Kingdom. As anticipated, although 
many other legal systems of the Member States feature court-ordered production of 
documents, one of the characteristic of the English (and Wales) system of law, which makes 
its particularly plaintiff-friendly,163 is the possibility of making use of broad disclosure 
obligations towards the counterparty. In the common law tradition, disclosure can be 
conducted by the parties with minimal supervision by the judge. This tool reduces 
information asymmetry inherent to competition matters.  
 Disclosure is the process by means of which a party (or a potential party) to a claim 
is under an obligation to inform the other party of the existence of all documents in his or 
her control which might be relevant to the proceedings, pursuant to the other party’s request. 
The party requiring disclosure is then entitled to access the disclosed documentation and 
                                               
162 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 263. 
163 DANOV, BECKER, and BEAUMONT, Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions 37. 
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take copies of it, except for those documents which are covered by privilege rights. Before 
the High Court, the applicable rules are contained at Part 31 of CPR. Parties may benefit 
from three different categories of disclosure: pre-action disclosure, standard disclosure, and 
specific disclosure. 
 
I) Pre-Trial Disclosure  
 
Besides the possibility of asking for disclosure in the course of proceedings, claimants can 
ask for disclosure before initiating litigation, provided that the request is made before the 
final hearing on the merits. This device is aimed at clarifying what the claim is about, 
allowing both sides to evaluate the merits of the case and, thus, promoting settlements. Rule 
31.16 of CPR provides that, before proceedings start, the claimant may apply for disclosure, 
supporting his or her application with evidence. The court can, at its discretion, uphold the 
application only if both the applicant and the respondent are likely to be a party to 
subsequent proceedings and the pre-action disclosure seems desirable164 (and this is a 
cumulative requirement, not an alternative one) in order to dispose fairly of the anticipated 
proceedings, or assist the dispute to be resolved without proceedings, or save costs. The 
court’s order granting pre-action disclosure must specify the documents or the classes of 
documents to be disclosed and the time and place for inspection and disclosure. In the words 
of the Court of Appeal in Black v Sumitomo: 
 
Clearly, the narrower the disclosure requested and the more determinative it may be of 
the dispute in issue between the parties to the application, the easier it is for the court to 
find the request well founded, and vice versa.165 
 
If the documents are no longer in the hands of the respondent or if they are covered by a 
right or duty to prevent disclosure, the respondent must let the court know. For the 
collection of evidence through pre-trial disclosure, all costs (including the costs of the 
respondent) are usually covered by the claimant. The court, when evaluating a pre-action 
disclosure application should not embark on a thorough analysis of all potential issues that 
                                               
164 As to the meaning of ‘desirable’ in this context see Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited, Orange 
Personal Communications Services Limited, T-Mobile (UK) Limited, Vodafone Limited High Court of Justice 
Queen’s Bench Division Commercial Court [2008] EWHC 55 (Comm), para. 53: ‘By “desirable” […] is 
meant “to be wished for as reasonably necessary or at least useful”.’ 
165 Black and others v Sumitomo Corporation and others, Court of Appeal [2001] EWCA Civ 1819, para. 72. 
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could arise in the subsequent proceedings, but it should rather perform an overall 
assessment of the application, appreciating the nature of the matter, the arguments of the 
parties and the appropriateness of disclosure at an early stage rather than in the usual course 
of proceedings, when the case has been pleaded out.166 It is particularly important that the 
plaintiff does not ask for ‘fishing’ pre-action disclosure, because the court requires the 
claimant to have a clear idea of which documents he or she is seeking for. In Hutchinson 3G 
UK Limited v Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile, the claimant’s application was denied 
on grounds that the request for pre-action disclosure was overly broad. Hutchinson pleaded 
that the UK system of mobile telephone number portability constituted a significant barrier 
to entry of new operators in the UK mobile phone market. It therefore sought an order for 
pre-action disclosure against its four principal competitors, which allegedly had prevented 
the development of an efficient alternative mobile number portability system, thus 
restricting and distorting competition. Hutchinson asked for the disclosure of all documents 
illustrating the history of each respondent’s attitude to the development of the portability 
system between 1999 and 2006. In that case, the court agreed with the respondents that, 
even though the disclosure of classes of documents is permitted, it is not possible to call for 
classes of documents in which only some documents would then be discoverable, or to 
require respondents to identify which documents are within the scope of such disclosure.167 
In pre-trial disclosure, all documents and classes of documents must potentially fall within 
the scope of standard disclosure.168 The application must be detailed and specific; it cannot 
encompass categories of documents which might prove irrelevant afterwards, or relevant 
only to the purpose of a subsequent train of inquiry.169 In that occasion, the request lacked in 
                                               
166 Total E&P Soudan SA v Edmonds, Court of Appeal [2007] EWCA Civ 50, para. 29: ‘Generally when 
considering an application under CPR Rule 31.16 […] application are in the nature of case management 
decisions requiring the judge to take a “big picture” view of the application in question. This obviously 
involves the judge taking a broad view of the merits of the potential claim, but should not necessitate an 
investigation of legally complex and debateable potential defences or grounds for stay.’ 
167 Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited, Orange Personal Communications Services Limited, T-
Mobile (UK) Limited, Vodafone Limited, para. 38. 
168 Rule 31.16 (c) of CPR provides that if proceedings had started, the respondent’s duty by way of standard 
disclosure would extend to the documents or classes of documents of which the applicant seeks pre-action 
disclosure. Therefore it is a requirement for the exercise of discretion that the documents (or classes of 
documents) of which the applicant seeks disclosure would be encompassed in due course within the standard 
disclosure if proceedings were started. The documents have to comply with Rule 31.6 of CPR. Compare 
Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited, Orange Personal Communications Services Limited, T-Mobile 
(UK) Limited, Vodafone Limited, para. 44: ‘In my view the test is indeed more stringent. The applicants have 
to show that it is more probable than not that the documents are within the scope of standard disclosure in 
regard to the issues that are likely to arise.’ 
169 Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited, Orange Personal Communications Services Limited, T-
Mobile (UK) Limited, Vodafone Limited, para. 40. 
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specificity and was not focused,170 on grounds of which the court concluded that pre-action 
disclosure was not desirable, also upon consideration of the fact that the cost-benefit 
analysis favoured the respondents and there was no serious probability of settlement 
originating from the disclosure.171  
 
II) Standard Disclosure 
 
According to Rule 31.6 of CPR, standard disclosure requires the parties to disclose, without 
any specific order to do so, the documents on which the party relies; the documents which 
the party is required to disclose by a relevant practice direction; and the documents which 
adversely affect his or her own case, or adversely affect another party’s case, or support 
another party’s case.172 Standard disclosure consists of the exchange of schedules or list of 
identified documents by the parties, usually after the allocation of the proceedings to the 
appropriate case management track (which takes place after pleadings have closed, i.e. after 
the service of claim, defence and any replies). Disclosure, under Rule 31.17 of CPR, may be 
sought also from third parties (i.e. a person who is not a party to the proceedings) when 
documents or classes of documents are likely to support the case of the applicant or 
adversely affect the case of one of the parties to the proceedings and disclosure is necessary 
in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs. Privileged documents cannot be 
disclosed, but they are nonetheless listed in the disclosure statement. These privileged 
documents are those protected by legal professional privilege, privilege against self-
incrimination, documents protected on grounds of public policy and without prejudice 
communications (such as, for instance, pre-negotiations offers). The solicitor has a proper 
duty to ensure that the client discloses all documents requested, preserving all originals for 
future use. When the documents are not privileged but still contain commercially sensitive 
information, they are disclosed only to a certain ‘confidentiality ring’, whereby only 
                                               
170 Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited, Orange Personal Communications Services Limited, T-
Mobile (UK) Limited, Vodafone Limited, para. 35: ‘[T]he schedule of documents sought in the present 
application […] runs to eight pages for each of the Respondents with very few specific documents identified: 
the vast bulk are groups or classes of documents.’ and para. 47: ‘The request is so lacking in specificity, that it 
is not possible to accept that the entirety of the classes of documents are “likely” or “may well” fall within 
standard disclosure. As already noted, the request runs to 8 pages covering an overall period of 7 years. It 
contains numerous categories within which something like 80 classes of documents are identified without any 
limitation whatsoever on the documents, correspondence, reports, notes or communications referred to and 
without any regard to the potential limitations in the search as provided in CPR 31.7.’ 
171 Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited, Orange Personal Communications Services Limited, T-
Mobile (UK) Limited, Vodafone Limited, paras. 58 and 61–62. 
172 BLANKE and NAZZINI, International Competition Litigation - A Multijurisdictional Handbook 157. 
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professionals or other specified persons (legal advisers, lawyers, and external experts) are 
allowed to see the document. The applicant’s access to such confidential documents, on the 
other hand, is precluded.  
 
III) Specific Disclosure 
 
Specific disclosure is a form of disclosure which is addressed to those documents that have 
not been disclosed as part of standard disclosure. It is provided for by Rule 31.12 of CPR, 
which states that with an order for specific disclosure the party must disclose the documents 
or the class of documents specified, or disclose any documents located as a result of a search 
granted by the order itself. 
 
IV) Disclosure before the CAT 
 
For the sake of completeness, since the CAT can hear private damages actions, it is useful to 
clarify that the rules for disclosure before the CAT and, more generally, for the gathering of 
evidence, are analogous to those contained in the CPR, but sometimes more relaxed than 
before the High Court. The main difference is that, whilst the disclosure requirements 
contained in the CPR are automatic, disclosure before the CAT must be ordered.173 The 
CAT may give directions for the disclosure, exercising full discretion with regard to which 
documents must be disclosed and on the time of the disclosure. Even if the procedure is not 
constrained by as rigid rules as those contained in the CPR, the CAT in practice tends to 
conform to some general principles, normally ordering disclosure after close of the 
pleadings, according to its own discretion.174 Another significant difference is that, under 
English procedural law, ordinary English courts do not have any express power to prevent 
documents from disclosure on grounds of their confidentiality. Nonetheless, as seen above, 
if a party claims secrecy the court may order a restricted form of disclosure, by letting only 
the lawyers examine the documents. In a public enforcement case, Aquavitae (UK) Limited 
v the Director General of the Office of Water Services, the Tribunal observed:  
 
[I]t is a general principle of proceedings before the Tribunal, as indeed before any Court 
in this country, that a party to the case should not withhold documents that might 
                                               
173 BLANKE and NAZZINI, International Competition Litigation - A Multijurisdictional Handbook 157. 
174 Aquavitae (UK) Limited v The Director General of the Office of Water Services [2003] CAT 4 (Chapter II 
prohibition) 2: ‘[D]isclosure is not […] automatic and should, in the view of the Tribunal, be done only if it is 
necessary for a fair and just disposal of the case before it.’ 
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adversely affect his case or might support the case of his opponent. That is essentially the 
underlying principle of disclosure of documents as now set out in Part 31 of the CPR.175  
 
Both standard and specific disclosure can be sought for before the CAT, which can give 
directions according to CAT Rule 19(2)(k). Follow-on actions before the CAT must be 
complete of the claim form, a copy of the decision on the basis of which the claim for 
damages is brought and, as long as practicable, a copy of all essential documents on which 
the claimant relies.176  
 In line with the High Court’s reasoning in Total E&P Soudan SA v Edmonds, the 
CAT commits to take a big picture view of the disclosure application, which has to be 
rejected any time that the specified documents do not meet the requirements of relevance 
and necessity for the management of the case. The principles governing disclosure before 
the CAT are, in the end, very close to those applied by the High Court. In another public 
enforcement case, Albion Water, the CAT expressly stated that obtaining production of 
specified documents, under Rule 19(2)(k), must be the only object of a disclosure 
application. The application for disclosure must be specific and relevant, and application of 
fishing and speculative nature must be avoided. The Tribunal specified that, whilst the 
criteria of relevance and necessity are individually considered, the matter is considered as a 
whole for the decision-making.177  
 
b) Disclosure in Italy 
 
Powers of disclosure of Italian judges are considerably less pervasive. Italian law does not 
provide for a formal right to disclosure.178 Nevertheless, under specific conditions and upon 
application of the party, the court may order the counterparty, or third parties (including the 
competition authority), to disclose specific documents in their possession.179 Such order of 
disclosure is contained in Article 210 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, which also 
provides that regard must be had to conflicting rights. In particular, the disclosure should 
not be ordered where it could cause serious damage to the counterparty/third party, or where 
                                               
175 Aquavitae (UK) Limited v The Director General of the Office of Water Services 3. 
176 CAT Rule 32 (4) (b). 
177 Albion Water Limited, Albion Water Group Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority [2008] CAT 3, 
paras. 41–43. 
178 VALERINI, ‘Il giudizio di merito nell’azione antitrust’ 240. 
179 Article 210 of Italian Code of Civil Procedure. 
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it could entail the violation of Articles 200 and 202 of the Italian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which protect professional and State secrets.180 Such orders may entail disclosure 
of legal advice given by in-house lawyers but not by external legal advisers. Disclosure is 
granted on condition that the documents requested are described in detail; and that the 
documents requested are not in possession or otherwise accessible to the party requesting it, 
subject to a proportionality test. If the counterparty refuse to cooperate without any 
reasonable grounds, adverse inferences may be drawn from such behaviour.181 If it is the 
requested third party who refuse to cooperate, a small fine may be imposed.182 
 
c) Disclosure in the Proposal for a Directive 
 
The recent Proposal for a Directive provides that national courts can order to any party or to 
third parties to produce any type of evidence admissible183 before the relevant national 
court, provided that it is plausible that an infringement has occurred and that the plaintiff 
has suffered harm from it.184 According to the Proposal for a Directive, the national judge 
should play a major role in the fact-finding and in ensuring the effectiveness of the private 
enforcement. Chapter II of the Proposal for a Directive concerns the disclosure of evidence. 
The rules contained in the proposals are to be applied without prejudice to Regulation (EC) 
1206/2001 on Cooperation between the Courts of the Member States in the Taking of 
Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters.185 Article 5 prescribes that Member States should 
implement rules allowing national judges, where the claimant has presented reasonably 
available facts and evidence showing plausible grounds for suspecting that he or she 
suffered harm as a result of a competition law infringement, ordering disclosure to the 
defendant or third parties. The order should be issued regardless of whether the evidence is 
                                               
180 Article 118 of Italian Code of Civil Procedure, referred to by Article 210. 
181 Article 118(2) of Italian Code of Civil Procedure. 
182 Article 118(3) of Italian Code of Civil Procedure. 
183 Arguably, given the extensive provision of the Proposal, an order for disclosure could theoretically enclose 
the identity of witness for certain facts, other types of non-documental evidence, or information that is part of 
the file of the NCA, excluded leniency and settlement submissions. FREDERIC LOUIS, STEFAN 
OHLHOFF, and ERIC MAHR, ‘EU Commission Presents Package to Facilitate Private Actions for Antitrust 
Damages’, (Wilmer Hale - Publication & News, 14 June 2013) 
<www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=10737421594> accessed on 18 
January 2014.  
184 Article 5(1) of Proposal for a Directive. 
185 Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on Cooperation between the Courts of the Member 
States in the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L174/1.  
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also included in the file of a NCA, subject to the two conditions that evidence for which 
disclosure is requested is: 
- relevant for substantiating the claim; and  
- identified as precisely and narrowly as possible.186  
National courts shall limit disclosure of evidence to that which is proportionate. The criteria 
taken into consideration to determine whether disclosure is proportionate are: (i) the 
likelihood of the infringement; (ii) the scope and costs of disclosure; (iii) confidentiality of 
information to be disclosed; (iv) the specificity of the request with regard to the nature, 
object and content of the documents in cases where the infringement is being or has been 
investigated by a competition authority.187 The Member States should ensure that legal 
privilege and other rights are respected. Among evidence which are contained in the file of a 
NCA, leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions cannot be disclosed.188 
Information prepared by a party for the purpose of administrative proceedings and 
information gathered by a NCA in the course of its proceedings are not blacklisted, and can 
be disclosed after the NCA has closed its proceedings or taken a final decision.189 All other 
types of evidence are in the white list, and can be disclosed at any time.190 Disclosure can be 
sought also by the defendant.191  
 Article 7 requires inter alia the Member States to consider inadmissible leniency 
corporate statements and settlement submissions obtained solely through access to the file 
of a NCA, while Article 8 prescribes that the national courts impose sanctions on parties, 
third parties and lawyers when they fail to comply with a disclosure order, or when they fail 
to protect confidential information. If the party is responsible for obstruction of justice, 
Member States shall ensure that the judge may draw adverse inferences from such 
behaviour, with consequences on the allocation of the burden of proof. Namely, the judge 
may presume that sufficient proof had been adduced in order to dismiss the claims and 
defences. 
 If the Directive will be enacted, which is the traditional means by which the EU 
legislator seeks for the rapprochement of laws across the EU, a certain degree of 
convergence will be reached in the gathering of evidence in the private enforcement. A 
                                               
186 Proposal for a Directive, Article 5(2). 
187 Proposal for a Directive, Article 5(3). 
188 Proposal for a Directive, Article 6(1). 
189 Proposal for a Directive, Article 6(2). 
190 Proposal for a Directive, Article 6(3). 
191 Proposal for a Directive, Article 5(1). 
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minimum level of disclosure will be ensured, uniform solutions to the interaction between 
access to the file, set out below, and leniency programmes will be provided. Nevertheless, 
on the one hand, forum shopping issues are by no means averted, because national laws may 
provide for broader means of access to evidence (and the UK disclosure may remain 
particularly attractive);192 on the other hand, the Proposal does not solve problems arising 
out of the multi-jurisdictional nature that private damages actions may often have. Conflicts 
between the taking of evidence abroad and the protection of fundamental rights, as recently 
shown by Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Limited and National Grid 
Electricity Transmission plc v ABB Limited,193 can still arise and are not tackled by the 
Proposal for a Directive.      
  
d) Disclosure Abroad 
  
Different problems arise when the evidence sought for is physically located in the territory 
of another Member State, other than the one where the case is brought. In such cases, 
reference must be made to existing instruments applicable to competition law matters 
providing solutions to overcome the principle of territoriality: in particular, Regulation (EC) 
44/2001 and the EU Evidence Regulation.194 Article 31 of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 could 
prove useful in those cases where the disclosure of specific item of evidence could be traced 
back to the category of ‘provisional or protective measures’.195 In the Saint Paul Dairy 
case,196 where a Belgian claimant addressed directly a Dutch court in order to obtain the 
hearing of a witness residing in the Netherlands pursuant to the Dutch Civil Procedure 
Code, the Court of Justice excluded that the request for the hearing of a witness fitted that 
category (provisional or protective measures). It is contended, however, that Article 31 of 
Regulation (EC) 44/2001 could be used for the gathering of evidence in a different Member 
State and that the measure was denied in Saint Paul Dairy, due the particular circumstances 
of the case. In that case, the claimant lodged a request for a ‘measure in futurum’, which, as 
                                               
192 Compare Proposal for a Directive, Article 5(8): ‘[…] this Article shall not prevent the Member States from 
maintaining or introducing rules which would lead to wider disclosure of evidence.’ 
193 Secretary of State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd and National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v 
ABB Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1234. 
194 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 264–265. 
195 Regulation (EC) 44/2001, Article 31: ‘Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such 
provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this 
Regulation, the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter’. 
196 C-104/03 St. Paul Dairy Industries NV v Unibel Exser BVBA [2005] ECR I-03481. 
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such, has to be rejected, given the existence of a specific instrument covering those 
measures: the EU Evidence Regulation.197 
 The EU Evidence Regulation covers both the taking of evidence in civil and 
commercial matters following a request by a requesting court and the direct taking of 
evidence by this latter. The first method is modelled on the model of the letters rogatory, 
based on the cooperation between two courts of different Member States, by means of 
which the requested authorities will comply with the request applying its own law.198 
According to the second method the requesting authority is empowered to obtain evidence 
abroad directly. The terms in which the EU Evidence Regulation applies in EU competition 
matters and the question of whether it covers disclosure have been discussed above.199  
 
E) The Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities by Third Parties 
within the EU 
 
Evidence may be in the hands of the defendant undertaking or third parties (in which case 
the appropriate device is an application for disclosure, as shown above); or in the hands of 
the investigating regulatory body. The importance of access to evidence in private actions is 
self-evident: the extensive powers of investigation of the competition authorities guarantee 
that their files are much richer in evidence, data and information than those which a private 
claimant may manage to collect on his or her own. For this reason, private parties often 
consider more convenient denouncing anti-competitive behaviour to public authorities, 
rather than bringing a stand-alone actions.200  
 In the lack of any statutory provision governing the access to file at the EU level, the 
question as to the existence of a right to access antitrust files and its limits has been left to 
date to the discretion of the domestic rules of the each Member States.201 Nonetheless, a 
certain degree of convergence has been attained by means of the case law of the EU Courts, 
as it will be set out below. It is appropriate here to analyse the right of access to the file of 
the competition authority and its interplay with conflicting rights, in particular with a view 
to preserving the effectiveness of leniency programmes. Reference is not made, conversely, 
                                               
197 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 265–266. 
198 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 266. 
199 See para. 1 C) of this Chapter. 
200 ULF BÖGE, ‘Leniency Programmes and the Private Enforcement of European Competition Law’ in 
JÜRGEN BASEDOW (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, vol. 25 (Klumer Law International 
2007), International Competition Law Series 222. 
201 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 260. 
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to the right of access to file by the party to the proceedings as an expression of the principle 
of equality of arms.202 This right is not strictly connected to the rules of management of 
evidence and, as a result, falls out of the scope of the present discourse on evidence.203 
Conversely, the third party’s right to access to the file of the competition authority will be 
analysed. Access to file concerns the disclosure of documents and the interaction between 
public and private enforcement in the gathering of evidence, or, more precisely, in preparing 
damages actions.   
 With the Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in 
Cartel Cases,204 leniency programmes were introduced, in order to foster the disclosure of 
information by whistleblowers in exchange for immunity (full or partial) from fines. The 
existence of a right to access the antitrust file poses many problems with regard to the 
effectiveness of leniency programmes, which are one of the pillars of EU antitrust 
enforcement.205 Leniency programmes proved to be highly beneficial in increasing the 
deterrence of antitrust infringements. Yet, their use may conflict with self-incrimination 
privilege and confidentiality rights, on the one hand; and with the right of access to file 
(with regard to cartel cases), on the other. Evidence collected through leniency applications 
might be relied on by private individuals seeking for compensation, easing the difficult 
burden of proving the infringement that is normally placed on them. Allowing the plaintiffs 
to use such shortcut (i.e. founding its case upon the evidence collected by the competition 
authority) evidently undermines the attractiveness of leniency programmes. In other words, 
immunity will look far less alluring if leniency applications may pave the way to an almost 
surely successful private damages action. If corporate statements are circulated and rendered 
accessible to claimants or national courts, applications for leniency will be strongly 
penalised. To balance these conflicting interests, the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive 
recommends ensuring protection to leniency applicants in private enforcement actions, by 
means of preventing corporate statements from disclosure. As mentioned above, Article 6 of 
                                               
202 On this topic, compare the Commission Notice on the Rule for Access to the Commission’s File [2005] OJ 
C325/7. For a detailed analysis of the right of access to file of the undertaking involved, see 
GIANNAKOPOULOS, Safeguarding Companies’ Rights in Competition and Anti-dumping/Anti-subsidies 
Proceedings 174 ff. 
203 To be more precise, in the context of the public enforcement the issue of access to evidence is relevant from 
the point of view of the exchange of information among competition authorities, as addressed by Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003 and in the bosom of the European Competition Network at the European level; and of bilateral 
cooperation agreements and other soft law instruments at the international level. All these topics have been 
analysed in the present Chapter under the respective paragraphs. 
204 Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases OJ C 298/17.  
205 BÖGE, ‘Leniency Programmes and the Private Enforcement of European Competition Law’ 218. 
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the Proposal for a Directive requires Member States to ensure that, for the purpose of 
actions for damages, national courts cannot at any time order a party or a third party to 
disclose leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions. After a competition 
authority has closed its proceedings or taken a final decision, two categories of evidence 
may be disclosed: i) information prepared by a natural or legal person specifically for the 
proceedings of a competition authority; ii) information drawn up by a competition authority 
in the course of its proceedings. In its attempt to foster deterrence and bring up well-
concealed cartels, the Commission’s White Paper went further than ensuring such 
‘documental immunity’, suggesting the possibility of limiting civil liability for those 
leniency applicants whose request was accepted. Practically, the Commission suggested 
they should face fixed or anyway predictable compensation for damages, so that they would 
be in the position to calculate upfront the consequences of filing for leniency.206 The more 
recent Proposal of a Directive does not include any limit to civil liability, but it proposes a 
blanket rejection of any disclosure of leniency statements, in line with the preceding White 
Paper. This categorical elimination of any possibility for the party to get hold of leniency 
documents contained in the authority’s file is somehow counterbalanced by the provision of 
a proper system of court-ordered disclosure.207 Article 7 of the Proposal for a Directive 
deals with the limits on the use of evidence obtained solely through access to the antitrust 
file. Corporate statements and settlement applications are in the ‘black list’ and should not 
be admissible in actions for damages. Information prepared by a natural or legal person 
specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority or information drawn up by a 
competition authority in the course of its proceedings are in the ‘grey list’ and may be 
admissible only after the competition authority has closed its proceedings or taken a 
decision. All other evidence, obtained solely through access to the file of a competition 
authority, can be used in actions for damages brought by the person who successfully 
obtained the access.  
                                               
206 White Paper on  Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM(2008) 165 final 10. Compare 
the opinion submitted by JOSEF DREXL, BEATRIZ CONDE GALLEGO, STEFAN ENCHELMAIER, 
MARK-OLIVER MACKENRODT, and RUPPRECHT PODSZUN, ‘Comments by the Max Planck Institute 
for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on European Commission’s White Paper’ (2008) 39 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 799, 811 in which the Authors endorse the 
limitation of disclosure and, in contrast, consider too generous the reduction of the civil liability of immunity 
recipients, on grounds that the purpose of deterrence served by leniency programmes must be kept separated 
from the objective of compensation served by damages actions. 
207 FREDERIC LOUIS, STEFAN OHLHOFF, and ERIC MAHR, ‘EU Commission Presents Package to 
Facilitate Private Actions for Antitrust Damages’, (Wilmer Hale - Publication & News, 14 June 2013) 
<www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=10737421594> accessed on 18 
January 2014. 
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 Pending the adoption of the Directive, two distinct problems may arise with regard 
to access to the competition authority’s file: a) whether the party can use evidence in its 
possession which is also contained in a competition authority’s file; b) whether a right of 
access to the competition authority’s file exists.  
 
a) The Right to Use Evidence Contained in the Competition Authority’s File  
 
With regard to the first issue, the leading case is Postbank v Commission. In that case, the 
Commission transmitted the statement of objections and the minutes of the hearing 
containing business secrets to third parties, who aimed at producing those documents in 
national legal proceedings. The addressees of the statement of objections brought an action 
for annulment before the General Court against the Commission’s letter granting permission 
to make use of the evidence. The Commission argued that the business secrets contained in 
the statement of objections had become public when transmitted to third parties.208 The 
General Court ruled that the Commission should have, before transmitting the evidence, 
given the parties an opportunity to submit their views concerning the presence of business 
secrets in the file and should have obviated any risk of disclosure of business secrets.209 If 
the matter is investigated by a NCA, national rules apply.  
 
b) The Right of Access to the Competition Authority’s File 
  
With regard to the more important question of the existence and limits of a right of access to 
file, as an expression of the right to an effective remedy, tensions arise due to the 
fragmented application of procedural enforcement rules across the EU Member States. As 
noted above, there is no provision ensuring such right in competition law. Although Article 
15 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 provides for requests for opinion or for information, these are 
available to national courts, and not to the parties directly. They were conceived to 
coordinate autonomous or parallel proceedings, rather than consecutive proceedings.210 On 
grounds of such lack of specific provisions, parties wishing to access the Commission’s file 
have sometimes referred to the general provisions on public access to EU documents, laid 
                                               
208 Case T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921, para. 82. 
209 Postbank v Commission, paras. 94–95. 
210 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 271. 
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down by Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.211 In this regard, the General Court pointed out that 
applicants in an action for damages can found their claims on this Regulation.212 
Nonetheless, the use of this instrument to cover the granting of a right for which it was not 
designed arises considerable complexities,213 and the Commission has called for its 
exclusion as a basis for a right of access to evidence.214 
 Recently, in the Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG case,215 the Court 
of Justice of the European Union has been asked by the Austrian Higher Regional Court 
(Oberlandesgericht), sitting as Cartel Court, to clarify whether a national law prohibiting 
third party access to documents submitted before a national competition court, without the 
explicit consent of the parties to the proceedings, is compatible with EU law. The Austrian 
Cartel Court had previously sanctioned a number of undertakings in the printing chemicals 
sector which had applied for leniency for having taken part to a cartel; its decision was then 
confirmed by the Austrian Supreme Court. Verband Druck & Medientechnik, an association 
representing the interests of undertakings in that market, submitted a request for access to 
the cartel documents with the purpose of bringing damage actions against the cartel 
participants. The Austrian Federal Law on Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition of 
2005 prohibits third parties’ access to files of competition authorities without the consent of 
all the parties to the proceedings;216 and, thus, Verband Druck & Medientechnik was not 
granted access to the relevant documents on account of the predictable refusal of the 
participants. The Austrian Cartel Court questioned the compatibility of the national law with 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and in particular of the provision which 
made the file disclosure strictly conditional on consent of all the parties to the proceedings. 
In its preliminary ruling, building on the landmark case Pfleiderer,217 the Court of Justice 
concluded that such a national law violates the principle of effectiveness. The Austrian law 
made the right to compensation of those who suffered harm from the cartel excessively 
difficult to be exercised, because the access to competition authority’s file would be the only 
                                               
211 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents [2003] OJ L145. 
212 Case T-2/03 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Commission [2005] ECR II-1121. 
213 IDOT, ‘Access to Evidence and Files of Competition Authorities’ 271–272. 
214 Explanatory Memorandum on the pre-draft Directive on damages actions, para. 104. 
215 Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others, not yet reported. 
216 Compare paragraph 39(2) of the 2005 Austrian Law on Cartels (Kartellgesetz). 
217 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161. 
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way to obtain evidence necessary to back up their claim.218 Moreover, national courts must 
be empowered to weigh up conflicting interests – for disclosure of information and for its 
protection under leniency programmes – on a case-by-case basis. This way, the courts can 
successfully manage to reconcile the protection of the right to compensation of third parties 
and the effectiveness of leniency programmes, which could otherwise be jeopardised. In 
particular, potential leniency applicants may be prevented from resorting to the programmes 
owing to the fact that  
 
they will find themselves in a less favourable position in actions for civil damages, due to 
the self-incriminating statements and evidence which they are required to present to the 
authority, than the other cartel members which do not apply for leniency.219  
 
The rationale for the consideration of each request on a case-by-case basis is to allow the 
judge to balance the necessity for the requesting party to get hold of certain documents for 
the purpose of initiating action with the public interest to effective enforcement of 
competition law and with the eventual harmful consequences which may arise from granting 
the access. The Court underscored that the risks entailed by the interaction between granting 
access to file and the recourse to leniency programmes could not justify tout court the 
systematic refusal to grant access to evidence.220 Only if there is a risk that a given 
document may actually undermine the public interest, non-disclosure may be justified.221 
 The friction generated by the interaction between leniency programmes and private 
enforcement was clearly highlighted by the Pfleiderer preliminary ruling, where the 
plaintiff, a purchaser of décor paper, asked for full access to the documents retained by the 
                                               
218 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others, para. 32: ‘On the one hand, it is clear that a 
rule under which access to any document forming part of competition proceedings must be refused is liable to 
make it impossible or, at the very least, excessively difficult to protect the right to compensation conferred on 
parties adversely affected by an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. This is the case inter alia when only 
access to the documents relating to the proceedings before the competent national competition authorities 
enables those parties to obtain the evidence needed to establish their claim for damages. Where those parties 
have no other way of obtaining that evidence, a refusal to grant them access to the file renders nugatory the 
right to compensation which they derive directly from European Union law.’ 
219 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, Opinion of AG Mazàk, para. 38. 
220 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others, para. 46: ‘[A]s regards the public interest of 
having effective leniency programmes referred to by the Austrian Government in the present case, it should be 
observed that, given the importance of actions for damages brought before national courts in ensuring the 
maintenance of effective competition in the European Union […], the argument that there is a risk that access 
to evidence contained in a file in competition proceedings which is necessary as a basis for those actions may 
undermine the effectiveness of a leniency programme in which those documents were disclosed to the 
competent competition authority cannot justify a refusal to grant access to that evidence.’ 
221 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others, para. 48. 
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Bundeskartellamt. In contrast with the decision of this latter, the local tribunal of second 
instance, Amtsgericht Bonn, delivered a decision by which it ordered to grant access to the 
file, through Pfleiderer’s lawyer, on grounds that the aggrieved party has a legitimate 
interest in obtaining access to the documents and compensation.222 Only access to 
confidential business information and internal documents (like correspondence exchanged 
under the aegis of the ECN) was restricted.223 Anticipating what then became the ‘Pfleiderer 
formula’224 set by the Court of Justice, the Amtsgericht Bonn contended that various 
interests needed to be balanced in defining the extent of the right of access, namely, ‘the 
respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information and in favour of the protection 
of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant for leniency’.225  
 It is interesting to note how, in its Opinion on the case, Advocate-General Mazàk 
repeatedly invoked the fundamental right to an effective remedy recognized by Article 47, 
in conjunction with Article 51(1), of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, as well as the right to a fair trial of Article 6(1) ECHR,226 to found the claimant’s 
absolute right to access pre-existing documents. Contrary to what one would expect, no 
reference to such principles was nonetheless reported by the Court of Justice in its statement 
of reasoning, which mentioned equivalence and effectiveness exclusively.227 By way of 
deciding to refer to the equivalence and effectiveness principles rather than to a right of 
access to file stemming from Articles 47 and 51 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights and 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the Court of Justice reiterates its reluctance to explicitly (or 
exclusively) base its decision on the recognition of fundamental rights. Holding a position 
that is very similar to the one adopted in Hoechst and Orkem, the Court of Justice refused to 
explicitly compel the Member States to follow its guidance in the interpretation of EU 
fundamental rights when they might clash with national procedural rules. Whilst confirming 
the procedural autonomy of the Member States, the Court of Justice restrained itself to 
restating the equivalence and effectiveness principles. 
 Founded on equivalence and effectiveness, however, the argument of the Court of 
Justice loses considerable momentum. On the one hand, even if access to documents is 
                                               
222 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, para. 14.  
223 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, para. 15. 
224 ANTONELLO SCHETTINO, ‘Il difficile rapporto tra public e private enforcement: il caso dell’accesso 
agli atti nei programmi di clemenza’ (2013) VIII Studi sull’integrazione europea 153, 157. 
225 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, para. 30. 
226 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, Opinion of AG Mazàk, para. 3. 
227 VÖLCKER, ‘“Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 14 June 2011”’ 706. 
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surely valuable for claimants, it is less easy to image cases where, without that access, 
obtaining compensation will prove to be ‘practically impossible’. On the other hand, it is 
valid only for NCAs and courts, but not for the European Commission, which is not, this 
way, bound to recognize a fundamental right to access. Namely, Article 51 of the Charter 
ensures that institutions and bodies of the European Union are constrained to follow its 
provisions and in this case, Article 47. Article 6(1) ECHR, as already illustrated, does not 
bind the European Commission yet, but the accession of the EU to the ECHR championed 
by Article 6 TEU will give rise to an obligation for the EU institutions to converge with the 
dicta of the ECtHR. The argument of the Court of Justice reposed entirely on the twin 
Courage/Manfredi proviso, thus also avoiding the conundrum of identifying which of the 
rights or freedoms identified by the Charter would need to be violated to trigger the 
safeguard of an effective remedy pursuant to Article 47(1).228 No reference was made to the 
proposal formulated by the Advocate-General of distinguishing between voluntarily 
submitted pre-existing documents (drafted before the submission of application for 
leniency), always discoverable,229 and voluntary self-incriminating declarations drafted for 
the purposes of the leniency application (i.e. corporate statements), which should never be 
disclosed.230 Whilst this distinction has been criticised as artificial and ill-founded, if aimed 
at avoiding the risks entailed by US-style indiscriminate disclosure,231 it nonetheless appears 
interestingly modelled on the CJEU’s interpretation of the protection of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. In other words, it is analogous to the distinction among evidence of 
different nature established as a safeguard of that privilege.  
 In Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie, a solution based on Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(1) TEU was advocated by Advocate-
                                               
228 VÖLCKER, ‘“Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 14 June 2011”’ 706–708. The Author underlines how some commentators have suggested that 
reference could theoretically be made to the right to property, but that that idea is not entirely convincing. In 
particular, the argument clashes with the fact that even if the overcharge paid by private parties as a 
consequence of an anti-competitive violation causes harm to their assets, they have engaged in the commercial 
transaction from which the harm derived on a voluntary basis. Another option would be to base the right to 
compensation on the provision of Article 101 TFEU directly, but in that case the right would be guaranteed 
exclusively from national rules that make its exercise impossible or excessively difficult, according to the 
Courage/Manfredi decisions. Upon such considerations, it seems not to have been established as a full right.    
229 The discoverability of such documents could be limited, according to the Advocate-General, in those 
jurisdictions where final decisions of the NCA have binding nature, therefore allowing the plaintiffs to rely on 
them as proof of the anti-competitive violation. In those jurisdictions, indeed, the right to an effective remedy 
is not jeopardised by the existence of leniency programmes. Compare Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, para. 
47 fn. 75. 
230 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, Opinion of AG Mazàk, para. 47. 
231 VÖLCKER, ‘“Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 14 June 2011”’ 709–710. 
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General Jääskinen, according to whom it is not sufficient to ensure that claims are not 
practically impossible or excessively difficult, but they have to be made in an ‘accessible, 
prompt and reasonably cost effective’ way.232 The CJEU limited itself to restating the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the need for a case-by-case evaluation of the 
single document to be disclosed. This case-by-case evaluation falls foul of the Proposal for a 
Directive, which prohibits any access to corporate statements. The Proposal for a Directive 
ensures legal certainty, by ruling out the possibility of a case-by-case evaluation. Which of 
the two solutions is preferable is hard to tell, but it appears that the solution adopted by the 
Proposal for a Directive risks to hamper the private enforcement. As noted above, however, 
the elimination of any possibility for the party to access leniency applicants’ self-
incriminating statements could be counterbalanced by the provision in the Proposal for a 
Directive of other measures facilitating the retrieval of evidence.233 According to the CJEU, 
although very unlikely, the possibility that a claim can be based exclusively on evidence 
from the case file exists.234 
 
c) Access to the File in England 
 
From the viewpoint of national jurisdictions, in one of the first cases brought before the 
English judicature after Pfleiderer, National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd,235 
the High Court chose to protect against disclosure corporate statements and other documents 
drafted for the purposes of the leniency application. In the aftermath of Pfleiderer, National 
Grid amended its application, requesting disclosure of the confidential version of the 
Commission’s decision and of the pre-existing (the so-called ‘contemporaneous’) 
documents submitted to it directly to the defendants, rather than to the Commission in 
application of Article 15 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. After having heard the Commission as 
amicus curiae, the English judge concluded that the ‘Pfleider formula’ was applicable in the 
case at hand, even if the documents disclosed where in the availability of the European 
Commission and not of a national authority;236 and that the disclosure of leniency material is 
                                               
232 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and Others, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 47. 
233 See fn. 207 above and NICHOLAS HIRST, ‘Donau Chemie: National Rules Impeding Access to Antitrust 
Files Liable to Breach EU Law’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 484, 486. 
234 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others, para. 39. 
235 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and others [2011] EWHC 1717 (Ch). 
236 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and others, para. 36. 
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in such cases a matter of national jurisdiction.237 In evaluating the trade-off between 
disclosure and public interest the English judge took into account the gravity and duration of 
the infringement, as well as the amount of the fine imposed, thus adhering, in the exercise of 
its procedural autonomy, to the guidelines provided by the EU Courts.   
  
d) Access to the File in Italy 
 
Third parties do not have any explicit right of access to the file of the AGCM. In particular, 
according to Statetement no. 21092 of 6 May 2010 of the AGCM, access to file concerning 
both infringement of Article 2 of Law 287/1990 and Article 101 TFEU is expressly 
precluded to third parties. Third parties cannot obtain disclosure of self-incriminating 
statements, nor of other evidence.238 Such access is precluded also as a consequence of the 
provisions of Article 24(7) of Law 241/1990 and Article 13 of D.P.R. 217/1998. The former 
ensures the access to documents of public administrative bodies in order to preserve the 
right to an effective remedy; whereas the latter protects the confidentiality of commercial, 
industrial and financial information. As TAR Lazio clarified, this latter provision always 
prevails, unless disclosure is essential to guarantee the rights of defence.239 Third parties, 
however, can always rely on other instruments provided for by the national procedural rules 
in order to obtain access to evidence, such as those mentioned above when talking about 
disclosure in Italy.240 These instruments always require the involvement of the judge. Italian 
courts, upon application of the party, may order disclosure to the AGCM under Articles 210 
of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (which allows parties to request such order of 
disclosure against the counterparty or third parties).241 Alternatively, Article 213 of the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure allows the judges, also of its own initiative, to request the 
AGCM to provide information relating to documents and evidence in its possession that are 
relevant and necessary to bring a claim. The court cannot adopt such orders where the 
disclosure of information and evidence would cause the party serious adverse consequences 
                                               
237 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and others, para. 26. 
238 AGCM, ‘Modifica alla comunicazione sulla non imposizione e sulla riduzione delle sanzioni ai sensi 
dell’art. 15 della legge 10 ottobre 1990, no. 287 (Programma di clemenza nazionale)’, Provvedimento no. 
21092 of 6 May 2010, Article 10bis. Such Declaration constitutes an amendment to a previous Declaration 
(Provvedimento no. 16472 of 15 February 2007) for the enactment of Article 15(2bis) of Law 287/1990.  
239 TAR Lazio, 10 February 2012, decision no. 1344, para. 7. 
240 See para. 2 D) d) of this Chapter. 
241 TAR Lazio, 2 November 2009, decision no. 10615, para. 3 (Article 3 of Law 287/1990).  
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or when they entail breach of professional or State secrets.242 This state of affairs was 
recently confirmed, albeit only for the party to the proceedings, in Alitalia v AGCM. TAR 
Lazio explicitly admitted that, in those cases where access granted by the authority does not 
allow the party to make good of its right in civil proceedings, the party can make use of 
those tools provided for by the Italian system which allow disclosure, namely Article 210 
and 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure.243 When the AGCM does not follow suit a request 
under this latter provision, without any compelling reason, a violation of the right of access 
of the party occurs. It must be noted, however, that the provision is often considered 
deprived of practical significance due to the mild consequences connected to its violation.244 
Indeed, the AGCM seems to exercise a considerable margin of appreciation in executing 
such orders, especially when public interests come into play.245 The Italian judge has 
ordered disclosure to the AGCM in a few cases.246 It seems that, to date, greater importance 
has been attributed by Italian courts to the rights of defence and to the access to the file 
requested by the party to the proceedings,247 rather than to the right to an effective remedy 
and to the access to the file requested by the private claimant. Against this backdrop, a 
voluntary convergence of the Italian court towards to the approach of the EU Courts, in 
order to strike the appropriate balance between confidentiality rights and right to an 
effective remedy, would be beneficial, in the lack of a EU uniform legislative solution.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
242 For this exclusion, reference must be made to Article 118(1) of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. 
243 TAR Lazio, 10 February 2012, decision no. 1344, para. 11.  
244 ALBERTO PERA and GIULIA CODACCI PISANELLI, ‘Decisioni con impegni e private enforcement nel 
diritto antitrust’ (2012) 1 Mercato concorrenza regole 69, 93. 
245 Compare Court of Milan, 20 May 2011, decision no. 52997, where the court had to appoint an expert to 
verify which documents were relevant to a follow-on action arising out of an investigation of the AGCM. The 
investigation concerned Vodafone’s abuse of dominance in the telecommunication sector. See ALBERTO 
PERA, ‘Le decisioni con impegni e il rilievo per l’antitrust private enforcement’ in LORENZO FEDERICO 
PACE (ed), Dizionario sistematico del diritto della concorrenza (Jovene 2013) 385–386.  
246 See, for an application of Article 210 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, Court of Palermo, 15 July 
2011, quoted by PERA, ‘Le decisioni con impegni e il rilievo per l’antitrust private enforcement’ 385 fn. 20. 
For Article 213 of the same Code, Court of Appeal of Rome, 8 May 2011 (I124 Raffineria di Roma/Fina 
Italiana/ERG Petroli/Monteshell). Compare PERA and CODACCI PISANELLI, ‘Decisioni con impegni e 
private enforcement nel diritto antitrust’ 93 ff., who also underlines the more favourable approach of French 
and Dutch courts and national competition authorities towards requests for disclosure. 
247 Council of State, Soc. Colabeton v AGCM, 29 September 2010, decision no. 5864; Council of State, 6 
September 2010, decision no. 6481 (2010) Giornale di diritto amministrativo 1207; TAR Lazio, Soc. Reckitt 
Benckiser Holdings v AGCM, 22 April 2010, decision no. 8015.  
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Conclusions 
 
Following the decentralisation of the EU system of enforcement of competition law and the 
direct involvement of NCAs and national judges in the application of both Article 101 and 
102 TFEU, there has been no statutory harmonisation of the national procedural rules. In 
EU antitrust law enforcement, the task of ensuring the effective implementation of the 
substantive provisions of EU law is delegated to the institutional and procedural frameworks 
of the Member States, which pursue the same objectives with very diverse approaches. 
Whilst some differences must be cherished by the principle of procedural autonomy, the 
diversity inherent to each national system, in particular with regard to the gathering and 
evaluation of evidence, may hinder the procedural convergence that is called forth by 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Both the Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and the case law of the EU 
Courts proclaim the protection of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided 
that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected. Such state of affairs, 
however, seems to be changing and, under the aegis of the ECN, efforts to promote a 
voluntary convergence have been made for different aspects of antitrust enforcement.1 
 In this multifarious system, evidence-related issues struggle to find their position. 
The traditional substance-procedure dichotomy is not sufficient to characterise evidence, 
which straddles the two realms of procedural and substantive law. On the one hand, only 
one evidential issue, the allocation of the burden of proof, is dealt with by Regulation (EC) 
1/2003, which can be characterised as a procedural regulation, given that most of its content 
prompts procedural convergence for the implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. On 
the other hand, the case law of the EU and national courts seems to be advocating for 
harmonised solutions to procedural and substantive evidential issues such as the 
admissibility of evidence; the assessment of the probative value of evidence; the application 
of presumptions, and the standard of proof.  
 The traditional dichotomy between procedural and substantive evidential issues is 
indeed blurred, if at all existing. There is no distinction between the two body of rules: some 
evidential issues are patently considered to appertain to the sphere of substantive law, or are 
directly regulated by EU law (for instance, under Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003), or 
are classified as substantive law by EU instruments (namely, by Articles 18 and 22 of the 
                                               
1 To name a couple, see the ECN Model Leniency Programme - Report on Assessment of the State of 
Convergence As Revised in November 2012 for the harmonisation of leniency programmes and the Proposal 
for a Directive in relation to damages actions.  
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Rome Regulations). The legal burden of proof (clearly a matter of uniform EU substantive 
law) is, however, closely linked to the definition of the standard of proof, a procedural issue, 
and the two aspects must be considered together. Presumptions affect the allocation of 
evidential burden of proof and are, ultimately, a matter of standard of proof. Yet, the 
evaluation of the probative value of evidence and the hierarchy between different means of 
proof should be considered a matter for national procedural law, but the EU case law seems 
to be followed by some (i.e. those examined in the present analysis) national review courts, 
and by the civil judges in private antitrust cases.  
 This purpose of uniformity and consistency is rather natural insofar as it is limited to 
providing interpretation to the legal notions or economic concepts implied by the EU law. 
As appears from the preceding analysis, however, procedural convergence is also attained 
by Regulation (EC) 1/2003, and is advocated for the furtherance of an effective enforcement 
system. In this line, a strong propensity for a ‘healthy imitation process’2 is noticeable from 
the analysed systems of law (England and Italy), with regard to evidence. On numerous 
evidential issues of EU competition law, the case law of the Luxembourg courts influence 
the evaluation of evidence of the two jurisdictions analysed. It is submitted that the 
peculiarities of the enforcement of EU competition law and the crucial role played by 
evidence in this field are the major reasons promoting such imitation process well beyond 
the effet utile standard. Even more interestingly, convergence guides a judicial operation, the 
evaluation of evidence, which is traditionally reserved to the national judge. The national 
case law of the chosen countries often adopt solutions which are analogous to those adopted 
by the EU Courts. This phenomenon, which is evident from the analysis of the evaluation of 
evidence in England and Italy, has the potential to pave the way for future statutory 
harmonisation and to avoid the numerous complexities arising out of the divergences 
between different legal systems in relation to evidence. It has also the advantage of 
completing a process of procedural harmonisation with regard to EU antitrust law which has 
already concerned the powers of investigation of the NCAs, commitment decisions and 
leniency programmes.3 With regard to the rules on proof, convergence models the phase of 
                                               
2 This wording is employed by KRIS DEKEYSER and MARIA JASPERS, ‘A New Era of ECN Cooperation - 
Achievements and Challenges with Special Focus on Work in the Leniency Field’ (2007) 30 World 
Competition 3, 12. 
3 For the substantial procedural convergence on aspects different from evidence, see DEKEYSER and 
JASPERS, ‘A New Era of ECN Cooperation - Achievements and Challenges with Special Focus on Work in 
the Leniency Field’ 12; HANS VEDDER, ‘Spontaneous Harmonisation of National Competition Laws in the 
Wake of the Modernisation of EC Competition Law’ (2004) 1 Competition Law Review 5, 7–10.  
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the assessment of the evidence, which is usually a matter for the competetent judge. 
National judges are therefore provided with a EU blueprint to follow not only with regard to 
‘what law to apply’ (and how it must be interpreted), but also to ‘how to apply it’ (i.e. how 
evidence should be assessed, which probative value must be attached to it, what needs to be 
proven and by who, against what standard and to what extent). Many aspects of the 
evaluation of evidence, even if not strictly classifiable as substantive law and often 
characterised as procedural by conflict of law rules, are being attracted by the gravitational 
pull of a European substantive convergence, which, by means of the case law of the EU 
Courts and helped sometimes by soft law tools such Commission Notices, is in the process 
of modelling a ‘EU law of evidence of antitrust law’. This uniform law of evidence, to 
which no resistance seems to be offered by national procedural frameworks, appears to be 
developing because of the specificities of this field of law and in the name of the principle 
of effet utile. As a result, legal and evidential burden of proof are allocated in analogous 
ways by the EU Courts, by NCAs and by national judges; a similar standard of proof will be 
applied, as a result of the use of the same presumptions; the rules of admissibility will be the 
same, as well as the criteria for the evaluation of the probative value of evidence, for the 
assessment of economic evidence and so on.  
 Following the approach of the EU Courts in the evaluation of evidence in EU 
antitrust law, and uniformly solving procedural issues connected to them, national courts 
contribute to giving origin to a quite unique phenomenon: EU case law provides guidance 
for the national judges on how to evaluate evidence when enforcing EU competition law. In 
a way that finds little correspondence in other fields of EU law (apart from the statutory 
reversal of the legal burden of proof, in EU non-discrimination law), the Luxembourg 
Courts are laying down, by means of their case law, a code of evidence law to which any 
authority in charge of enforcing EU competition law can resort to. Not even in EU criminal 
matters, where great harmonization of the law of evidence is occurring, the process has gone 
so far, sticking to the more strictly procedural aspects of cross-border gathering and 
handling of evidence, but certainly not of its assessment.  
 Beside those embodied by statutory provisions such as Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 
1/2003 (‘he who asserts must prove’), it appears there is a number of rules of EU law of 
evidence in antitrust matters. These are: 
 the favor probationis: the only relevant criterion for admitting and evaluating 
evidence is its reliability; 
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 the evaluation of evidence by the judge is free and unfettered; 
 the evaluation of evidence must be performed taking into account the general 
context (contextual evaluation); 
 only evidence on which the parties have had the opportunity to express their views 
can be considered; 
 facilitating the evidential burden of proof is an admissible judicial operation, if it is 
aimed at eliciting more information and factual elements of the case and if it is 
mitigated by the proof-proximity principle; 
 presumptions should be subject to the proportionality test and should always be 
rebuttable; 
 great probative value is assigned to documents drawn up in close connection with 
the events, or by direct witnesses, or which run counter to the interest of the 
declaring party; 
 the evaluation of evidence performed by competition authorities (Commission or 
NCAs) is authoritative and must be taken into account. 
One might object that all such rules and principles do not derive from the case law of the 
EU Courts and are applied by national judges by virtue of their existence in their respective 
domestic legal systems and of the procedural autonomy principle. This argument is, 
however, contradicted by the above analysis. First, in most cases, the national judges cite 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU in order to support their views, rather than their domestic 
case law. The CJEU case law is followed, sometimes, also in contrast with national 
procedural rules.4 Secondly, the principles of evidence law drawn from the CJEU are 
autonomous and do not belong to neither the common law nor the civil law tradition, but 
appear to be a syncretistic elaboration of the two. In particular, they all seem to derive by 
the balance striken between the two models (Romano-Germanic and Anglo-Saxon 
respectively) of legal certainty/predictability and equity.5 For instance, with regard to the 
favor probationis, the probative value of evidence, the admissibility of evidence, the 
availability of discovery6 and the use of presumptions, it is clear how the adversarial 
                                               
4 An example is provided by the consideration given by the Italian judge to the ‘argomento di prova’ in 
antitrust matters, see Chapter II, text accompanying fn. 113 to 118. Another example is the presumption of 
fault which the Italian judge draws directly from the EU case law, see Chapter II, para. 1 C) a). 
5 For an analysis of these two models in the different context of the European private international law, see 
FRANCESCO SALERNO, ‘La cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile’ in Diritto dell’Unione Europea - 
Parte speciale (3rd edn, Giappichelli 2010) 482.  
6 In relation to the availability of discovery, see RILEY, ‘Beyond Leniency: Enhancing Enforcement in EC 
Antitrust Law’ 384, who asserts: ‘In states of the Civilian tradition, civil litigation is a truly private matter, in 
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approach is mitigated by the goal of promoting justice. The need for legal certainty is 
extenuated by having regard to the particular circumstances of the case. This reconciliation 
is, in the field of competition law, favoured by the circumstance that Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU must be directly applied by administrative authorities and civil judges. As a result, 
some features of administrative procedures are transposed in civil proceedings: these latter 
loose their marked adversarial nature to gain a more fact-oriented, streamlined and 
purposive approach, typical of the common law tradition. Thirdly, the argument for the 
convergence towards the EU case law, rather than for an application of domestic principles, 
is corroborated by the fact that procedural harmonisation in the furtherance of effectiveness 
is needed in the EU competition law enforcement framework. The judicial harmonisation 
could be read as a response to such need and to avert the complexities raised by the 
substantive and procedural nature of evidence.  
 All in all, progressive convergence of the rules on proof in EU antitrust law is 
created, both on an horizontal and vertical dimension. This spontaneous convergence 
between the EU and the national systems, however, follows different dynamics. Whilst in 
the evaluation of evidence, a quite consistent imitation process is triggered in the name of 
the respect of the principle of effectiveness, in the process of gathering of evidence, 
convergence is inspired by other factors. In that phase, convergence of rules on proof is 
called for by, on one hand, the mechanisms of cooperation provided by Regulation (EC) 
1/2003 (i.e. in particular, the binding effect of Commission decisions and the circulation of 
evidence) and, on the other, the adoption of common standards for fundamental rights. In 
particular with regard to this latter aspect, the principle of effet utile can be considered as an 
obstacle, rather than as a catalyst. As a consequence, it is crucial to be mindful of such 
different drives within the system. For the time being, national (administrative and civil) 
judges are best placed to strike the right balance, adopting a case-by-case approach, either in 
their review function, or directly. They are entitled to make use of the margin of discretion 
left by the procedural autonomy principle to adhere as much as possible to the signposting 
provided by the EU Courts, while preserving the rights of defence. This judicial activism 
towards convergence, however commendable and positive, will have to be exercised in the 
full awareness of the risks enrooted in the system. National courts, as the guardians of the 
correct formation of the proof and of the respect of all due rights of defence, will have to 
                                                                                                                                                
which the procedural rules should leave the parties to argue their case before the courts. By contrast, the 
Anglo-Saxon view is that the promotion of justice is a value the procedural rules should support with rules as 
discovery.’ 
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pay special attention when transposing certain rules on proof from the public to the private 
enforcement. Due to the significant differences in structure of administrative procedures and 
civil proceedings, a great degree of caution in waiving the national procedural autonomy 
must be applied.   
 As shown when analysing the cooperation mechanisms and the process of gathering 
of evidence, the importance of the recognition of fundamental rights is all the more vital in 
this respect if one considers the risks entailed by the enhanced transmission of the evidence, 
and by the recognition of foreign decisions. In particular, if the phase of the assessment of 
evidence is harmonised at the supranational and national level, the circulation of evidence-
related concepts (such as standard of proof, burden of proof, contextual approach to 
evidence) encapsulating values that are designed at the EU level will transpose such values 
directly into national systems of law. As a result, and the risk is particularly accentuated in 
the private enforcement of EU antitrust law, due to its direct impact on the rights of physical 
persons, the national judges are compelled to apply principles which were modelled by EU 
institutions. These latter, and the Commision in particular, are much more involved in the 
furtherance of general policy goals than it would be appropriate to accept in national 
adversarial proceedings. To give just one example of this risk, it will suffice to think about 
the significant role played by the European Commission in the creation of presumptions of 
facts of ‘plainly outcome determinative effect’.7 Such presumptions are crafted by an 
institution acting as a prosecutor, in pursuance of administrative goals which have little to 
do with the needs for protection of the procedural guarantees of the defendant, required in 
national adversarial proceedings. Even if undoubtedly useful to the purpose of enhancing 
deterrence, one might wonder whether directly importing them into national review systems 
or applying them in private antitrust proceedings is appropriate. Another example is the 
binding effect attributed, in follow-on actions, by national judges to administrative 
decisions. Hence, it is crucial that the dimension of the protection of rights of defence and of 
all other fundamental rights is fully recognised, in order to prevent major miscarriages of 
justice and the violation of fundamental principles. In other words, it should be ensured that 
the horizontal and vertical convergence with regard to evidence in EU antitrust law, both in 
the public and the private enforcement, and the uniform development of the rules of 
management of evidence is in keeping with fundamental rights as enshrined in EU law. 
Filling in the gaps of the case law (which, for instance, applies presumptions but does not 
                                               
7 For this expression, see GARNETT, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law 201. 
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expressly address their legitimacy yet), the protection of procedural guarantees and 
fundamental rights will allow building a harmonised law of evidence in this field, making it 
more coherent and vesting it with legal certainty.     
 In conclusion, the case law of the EU Courts is softly shaping evidentiary rules for 
any decisional body vested with the power to decide competition law matters according to 
EU rules, filling the gaps left behind by EU Regulations and Notices. This process can be 
welcomed and must be developed paying a great deal of attention to its impact on 
fundamental rights. Spontaneous harmonisation improves the effectiveness of the 
management of evidence and, ultimately, the effectiveness of the public enforcement. It 
rectifies discrepancies created by the application of conflicts of law rules in the private 
enforcement. Given the paramount importance of procedural advantages for a claimant to 
conduct a trial in one Member States rather than another, the adoption of a uniform body of 
EU rules of evidence in this area would prevent dangerous ‘litigation tourism’8 pitfalls.9 In 
addition, harmonisation may enhance compliance with fundamental rights.  
 Having been already tested via their application at the European and national level, 
the uniform rules are likely to be easily accepted by the Member States. A code of EU rules 
on proof in competition law would provide a testing ground for the adoption of standard 
rules of evidence also in other areas of EU law, having regard to any relevant differences. 
Harmonisation of national procedural rules in relation to evidence is currently occurring in 
EU competition law. Although differences in civil procedure reflect the diversity of the 
Member States’ legal traditions and should not be completely eliminated, since they are the 
result of a valuable process of norms production10 and of important policy considerations,11 
convergence on a number of paramount principles and rules of evidence is desirable, 
provided that due consideration is given to the interests at stake. 
 
 
 
                                               
8 PATRICK L. KRAUSKOPF and ANDREA TKACIKOVA, ‘Competition Law Violations and Private 
Enforcement: Forum Shopping Strategies’ (2011) 4 Global Competition Litigation Review 26, 30. 
9 DANOV, BECKER, and BEAUMONT, Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions 43: ‘[K]ey procedural 
questions such as standard of proof and the availability of disclosure […] vary depending on the Member State 
in which the claim is litigated. This may encourage strategic use of particular jurisdictions where rules are the 
most favourable to claimants, or even pre-emptive applications to jurisdictions where procedure most favours 
defendants.’ 
10 FRANCISCO MARCOS and ALBERT SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, ‘Towards a European Tort Law? Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Harmonizing Tort Law through the Back Door?’ (2008) 16 
European Review of Private Law 469, 481. 
11 LASOK, ‘Some Procedural Aspects and How They Could/Should be Reformed’ 207. 
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